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INTRODUCTION   
 
 
The aerial view of Catalonia on September 11, 2013 must have been spectacular. More than 1.5 
million independence supporters formed a 400-kilometer human chain spanning the entire region. 
The chain was called the Via Catalana (“Catalan Way”), because it followed the stretch of the 
ancient Via Augusta from the French border to the Valencian Community. The Via Catalana was 
planned and prepared by the Assemblea Nacional Catalana (ANC), a social movement 
organization fighting for Catalan independence.  
Tens of thousands of t-shirts were printed with the logo “My place in history. Catalan Via 
towards Independence.” The participants registered online to take a specific slot in their 
locality. The event was hugely successful, and it demonstrated the immense organisational 
capacity of the pro independence Catalan movement. (Della Porta et al. 2017, 90) 
The Via Catalana was only one protest in a series of  mass mobilizations that took place in the 
streets of Barcelona and other towns of the region between 2010 and 2017 (Agustín and 
Raftopoulos 2021; Della Porta, O’Connor, and Portos 2019).  Protests in this period were 
meticulously organized by the ANC and Òmnium Cultural, another large professionalized social 
movement organization (Crameri 2015b; Della Porta et al. 2017). The Catalan independence 
movement came to be known for preparing protests through “an impressively thorough 
organisation” (Crameri 2015b, 52).  
Four years after the Via Catalana, the Catalan struggle for independence intensified 
dramatically. In early June 2017, Carles Puigdemont, the president of the Catalan Generalitat (the 
autonomous institutions), stepped in front of the media to make a public declaration. He 
announced his intention to hold a referendum on Catalonia’s independence on October 1 of the 
same year. Puigdemont’s push for a binding referendum on independence was met with severe 
opposition by the Spanish state. When it became unclear whether the referendum could go ahead, 
pro-independence activists and voters and occupied voting stations to ensure that the vote could 




police intervention deployed by the Spanish state to close voting stations and confiscate ballot 
boxes.  
Protests such as the Via Catalana were organized in long and detailed preparatory processes by 
large and professionalized social movement organizations. However, these organizing processes 
took place in periods of  relative tranquility when protests were met with little opposition from the 
Spanish state. When Puigdemont announced the referendum, the conflict between secessionists 
and the Spanish host state became much more contentious. This dissertation asks how the 1-O 
referendum changed the ways in which the Catalan independence movement organized protests. 
Whereas previous research has mainly studied social movement organizations as entities, this 
dissertation focuses on the process of  protest organizing: I am interested in how activists plan and 
prepare contentious action and how these processes change over time.  
This introductory chapter provides an overview of  the dissertation. The next section elaborates 
more in detail on the research questions. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature as well as the 
contributions of  this dissertation. Section 3 outlines the main argument of  the dissertation. The 
final section presents the structure of  the dissertation. 
1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Demands for independence had been a marginal political issue in Catalonia for a long time. Only 
after 2009, support for secession from Spain has risen sharply. Pro-independence activists have 
repeatedly voiced their claims in the streets and through a series of  unofficial referendums. Spanish 
state actors responded with judicial and soft repression, but did not actively interfere in the region’s 
politics. While these interactions became contentious on occasions, they did not put into jeopardy 
the integrity of  the Spanish state. The balance of  power between secessionist challengers and the 
host state remained relatively stable until 2017.  
The 1-O referendum broke with the routine interactions between the independence movement 
and the Spanish state. The efforts to hold a binding referendum provoked an escalation of  conflict 
that manifested itself  in a dense sequence of  secessionist contention and counter-secessionist 
repression. The rapid expansion of  contention confronted organizers in the independence 
movement with challenges that differed very much from the normal interactions in previous times. 
In addition, the contentious character and contested outcome of  the referendum itself  
dramatically altered the opportunity structure for the independence movement. In short, the 





In a recent article, Donatella della Porta (2018, 3) has called to differentiate between “normal times 
and intense times.” Following this idea, the secessionist cycle of  contention can be divided in the 
normal times before Puigdemont’s referendum announcement and the intense 1-O episode of  
contention that followed. At the outset of  this introduction, I have stressed the role of  the 
movement’s organizational capacity in its push towards independence before 2017. But it is unclear 
how the organizational dimension of  the independence movement has evolved over time. This 
presents the main research question of  this dissertation: how did the intense 1-O episode of  
contention shape the ways in which the secessionist movement organized protest? I break this 
question down into two parts.  
First, I focus on the protest organizing during the 1-O episode of  contention. The 1-O episode of  
contention is the term I use for the series of  contentious interactions from the vote on the Law on 
Self-Determination in the Catalan parliament on September 6 and 7 until the application of  article 
155 of  the Spanish constitution and the ineffective declaration of  independence by the Catalan 
parliament on October 27. A the time of  writing this dissertation, this period of  roughly seven 
weeks represents the peak of  the larger secessionist cycle of  contention, which has been under 
way at least since 2009 and whose end remains unclear. How were protests organized during this 
episode of  intense contention? To answer this question, I look at organizational practices and 
processes in this time in comparison to the previous mode of  normal organizing. 
Second, I turn to protest organizing in the time after the 1-O episode of  contention. The 
referendum triggered a series of  strategic and repressive mechanisms that initiated the contraction 
of  the cycle of  contention, in particular after October 27. The Catalan parliament’s declaration of  
independence was ineffective, while the application of  article 155 by the Spanish senate involved 
the suspension of  Catalan autonomy and put the region under the control of  the Spanish 
government. Article 155 also removed Puigdemont and his government from office, dissolved the 
Catalan parliament, and called a snap election in the region. While these events brought the focus 
of  the secessionist conflict back to the institutional sphere, there were still a number of  protests 
in this period. How did protest organizing change after the 1-O episode? Did organizational 
practices and processes return to previous modes of  organizing? Or did the 1-O referendum have 
a lasting transformative impact? This is the second set of  questions this dissertation seeks to 
answer. 
The challenge in addressing these questions is that concepts like “normal times,” “intense 
times,” and “transformative events” do not represent objective temporal units. Previous research 
has pointed out that the meaning of  temporal categories is created by social and political actors in 




Sewell 1996a; Wagner-Pacifici 2010, 2017). Instead of  taking events, normal times, and intense 
times as given, this dissertation takes an interpretive approach, which focuses on participants’ 
understandings of  these categories. The goal is to explore to how activists made sense of  the 
referendum and other occurrences and how they linked their organizational processes and 
practices to these understandings. In other words, I approach these questions through the 
retrospective view of  activists using a series of  qualitative methods. 
Answering these questions is crucial for understanding one the most salient cases of  
secessionist conflict around the world. The organizational capacity of  Catalan secessionists has 
been a cornerstone of  their successful mobilizations. Studying the organizational dimension of  
the independence movement over time may tell us more about how it managed to challenge the 
integrity of  the Spanish state. The 1-O referendum was arguably one of  the most important events 
in recent Catalan history.  
However, the conflict in Catalonia is not only relevant for Spanish politics. As much as Catalan 
secessionists voice their solidarity with other independence movements in Scotland, Kurdistan, 
Corsica, or Flanders, these movements look with great interest at what is happening in Catalonia. 
For many of  them, the organizational capacity of  the Catalan independence movement has been 
exemplary. Arguably, no other independence movement is based on such a dense network of  civil 
society organizations and has repeatedly managed to turn out millions of  protesters. Catalonia can 
hence be considered an ideal case of  an organized secessionist movement.  
Studying this organizational factor may help scholars understand secessionism as a highly 
relevant political phenomenon at the intersection of  domestic and international politics. The 
dynamics of  secession and counter-secession directly touch upon the sovereignty of  states over 
territory and population, which can be considered the foundational element of  modern politics. 
Perhaps because the state itself  is at stake in secessionist conflicts, many of  them have turned 
violent. Roughly half  of  the 150 self-determination campaigns recorded since 1960 have become 
violent conflicts (K. G. Cunningham 2014, 14; see also Fearon and Laitin 2003; Griffiths 2016; 
Sorens 2012). Barbara Walter (2009, 3) even holds that secessionism is the primary source of  
political violence around the world. Studying how secessionist movements organize protest helps 
understanding an important facet of  secessionism as salient political issue. Secessionist 
movements’ organizational capacity is key for their success or failure to mobilize their supporters 
and to achieve their goals (K. G. Cunningham 2014, 17–18). 
Whether in secessionist movements or other social movements, protest organizing is an 
important topic in itself. How activists prepare and plan collective action is a central factor for 




capacity of  movements to bring about social change depends to a large extent on whether they are 
capable of  organizing impactful protests. But protest organizing matters beyond its instrumental 
value. Many social movements do not orient their organizational practices and processes towards 
immediate strategic gains and reject supposedly effective bureaucracy in favor of  horizontal, 
deliberative, and inclusive organizing. In this perspective, protest organizing represents an 
important democratic practice in civil societies.  
2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE 
Ernest Renan (1882) has famously been quoted that a nation is “a daily plebiscite.” But, in fact, 
referendums on independence are extremely rare in established democracies (Dion 1996; Lecours 
2018; López and Sanjaume-Calvet 2020). The 1-O was particularly unusual for two reasons. First, 
while other secessionists (e.g. Scotland and Québec) sought the agreement of the central state 
government, the 1-O represented an attempt at unilateral secession (Holesch and Jordana 2021; 
Muro, Vidal, and Vlaskamp 2019). Second, when there is no agreement about a referendum, central 
states usually ignore the vote and treat it as non-binding. In contrast, the Spanish state sent police 
forces to Catalonia trying to prevent the referendum (Letamendia 2018; López and Sanjaume-
Calvet 2020). Most importantly, the referendum was accompanied by an unprecedented wave of 
protest.  
Despite the importance of  the 1-O referendum for the Catalan conflict in particular, and 
Spanish politics more broadly, there is still very little research on its impact. Existing studies have 
focused primarily on the behaviors of  the regional and central governments (Ferreira 2021; López 
and Sanjaume-Calvet 2020) and the consequences of  state repression (Balcells, Dorsey, and Tellez 
2020; Barceló 2018; Della Porta, Gunzelmann, and Portos 2021; Della Porta, O’Connor, and 
Portos 2019). However, the role of  the 1-O for other dimensions of  the secessionist conflict 
remains understudied. 
More in general, the question of  how protest organizing in secessionist movements changes 
over time has not been addressed so far. One reason may be that research on secessionism has 
engaged only very little with social movement studies and organization theory. On the other hand, 
social movement scholars have lost interest in organization studies (Soule 2013) and turned a blind 
eye on secessionist movements and on ethnic and nationalist movements more broadly (Muro 
2015). This dissertation brings together organizational theory, social movement studies, and 
research on secessionist movements and makes contributions to each of  these fields. 
The literature on secessionism has developed an extensive body of  knowledge on independence 




tactics of  secessionist and self-determination movements more broadly (Chenoweth and Stephan 
2011; K. G. Cunningham 2013; Griffiths and Muro 2020b; Griffiths and Wasser 2019; Sorens 
2012). In contrast, how secessionist movements organize these strategies and tactics has not been 
investigated in a systematic way yet. The contribution of  this dissertation to this literature is to 
explore the organizational dimension of  secessionist movements and how it changes over time. 
Previous research in social movement studies has highlighted the role of  organization for 
protest (for overviews, see e.g. Clemens and Minkoff  2004; Davis et al. 2005; den Hond, de Bakker, 
and Smith 2015; McCarthy and Zald 2001; Minkoff  and McCarthy 2005; Piven 2013). Contention 
would often not be possible without preparation and planning, which has sometimes been called 
the backstage of  protest (Haug 2013; Rucht 2017). The classic literature focused primarily on the 
organizational infrastructure of  social movements, and the study of  social movement 
organizations (SMOs) in particular, because they often provide the human and material resources 
that are required for contentious action (Clemens 1997; Curtis and Zurcher 1974; Kriesi 1996; 
McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Minkoff  1995; Zald and Ash 1966). More recently, however, Sarah 
Soule (2013) has lamented that social movement scholars have lost interest in organization. And 
indeed, it appears that researchers have dispensed of  the notion of  organization and stressed the 
role of  other concepts such as networks (Anduiza, Cristancho, and Sabucedo 2014; Baldassarri 
and Diani 2007; Castells 2012; Diani 2015; Mische 2008). Den Hond, de Bakker, and Smith (2015) 
have suggested that this has been due to the narrow focus on SMOs as formal organizations and 
propose to expand the concept to partial forms of  organization.1 While I agree with their 
assessment of  the field, I suggest another way forward. 
This dissertation tackles a different meaning of  organization: as the process of  organizing 
protest. Activists spend a great amount of  time planning, preparing, and coordinating before the 
event itself  (Della Porta and Rucht 2015; Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Haug 2010, 2013; Polletta 
2002; Rucht 2017), although spontaneous dynamics can unfold during protests (Cheng and Chan 
2017; Killian 1984; Snow and Moss 2014). In the present study, I am primarily interested in these 
organizing processes in the independence movement and how they were shaped by the contentious 
interactions with its opponents over time. I build on organization theory to distinguish between 
organizations as entities, organizing as a process, and organizationality as a property (Schoeneborn, 
Kuhn, and Kärreman 2019). This distinction allows for a more comprehensive approach to the 
organizational dimension of  social movements.  
                                                 
1 The concept of partial organization was developed by Ahrne and Brunsson (2011) and denotes modes of 




Most studies of  secessionism have ignored the temporal development of  movements. Strategies, 
for example are studied as static objects (K. G. Cunningham 2013; Griffiths 2016; Griffiths and 
Muro 2020b; Griffiths and Wasser 2019). However, Mark Beissinger (1996, 2002) emphasized that 
secessionist protest unfolds in waves. This dissertation builds on Beissinger’s work and examines 
secessionist protest organizing over time. Other scholars found that social movements often 
undergo organizational changes. New groups emerge; old groups shift their goals and strategies; 
others disappear. Social movements may follow paths of  oligarchization (Michels 1911; Piven and 
Cloward 1979; Zald and Ash 1966), institutionalization (Staggenborg 2013; Tarrow 2011), 
professionalization (McCarthy and Zald 1973; Staggenborg 1988), commercialization and 
involution (Kriesi 1996), and radicalization (Kriesi 1996; Tarrow 2011). One problem with these 
studies was that they focused exclusively on how organizations change. This dissertation advances 
this literature by approaching the organizational dimension more comprehensively, as mentioned 
above.  
Finally, Beissinger (1996, 2002) in his work on the Soviet Union also highlighted the role of  
events as endogenous factors in the development of  secessionist contention. He showed how one 
secessionist protest led to another one and spread across the Soviet Union, eventually resulting in 
its disintegration. Karlo Basta (2018) emphasized the symbolic power of  transformative events, 
demonstrating how Catalan secessionists anticipated the 2010 ruling of  the Spanish Constitutional 
Court on the Statute of  Autonomy and attempted to frame it in their favor. Social movement 
scholars have been more attuned to eventful approaches. A series of  contributions examined the 
role of  transformative events and critical junctures (Della Porta 2008, 2018; Della Porta, 
Gunzelmann, and Portos 2021; McAdam and Sewell 2001; Sewell 1996a; Wood et al. 2017). This 
dissertation expands this literature by focusing on the consequences of  the 1-O referendum as a 
transformative event on the organizational dimension of  social movements. 
3 THE 1-O REFERENDUM AS A TRANSFORMATIVE EVENT 
Drawing on rich qualitative evidence, my argument essentially is the following: Although the 1-O 
referendum did not lead to Catalan independence, it did have important consequences for the 
independence movement itself. The referendum fundamentally changed the ways in which activists 
organized protest both during and after the 1-O episode of  contention.  
This research idea builds on a previous contribution by Donatella della Porta, Martín Portos, 
and myself  (2021). We found that the 1-O referendum altered the movement’s action repertoire, 
frames, and organizational dimension. This is why we argued that the 1-O referendum can be 




for the independence movement. Transformative events have been defined as “very brief, spatially 
concentrated, and relatively chaotic sequences of  action [that] can have durable, spatially extended, 
and profoundly structural effects” (McAdam and Sewell 2001, 102).  
Sewell, McAdam, and others have used the concept of  transformative events referring to large-
scale overhauls of  political structures, such as revolutions and regime changes, but also other 
occurrences triggering important political change, such as 9/11 or the Montgomery bus boycott. 
In contrast, our research confirmed that contentious events can also “have cognitive, affective and 
relational impacts on the very movements that carry them out” (Della Porta 2008, 30). However, 
our research only scratched the surface of  the problem. Leaving aside action repertoires and 
frames, this dissertation explores the transformative impact of  the 1-O on organizing in the 
movement much more in depth. I argue that the 1-O referendum was eventful for how the 
movement organizes protest in two ways.  
First, the concentration of  contentious interactions between the Spanish state and the Catalan 
secessionist challengers had an impact on how the independence movement organized protests 
during the 1-O episode of  contention. Time pressure, enhanced contingency, and opponent action 
made previous routines of  long, detailed, and deliberative planning impossible to maintain. 
Instead, protests were organized in short, directed processes between or outside organizations. At 
the heart of  this episode is the so-called defense of  the voting stations. In the days before the 
referendum, activists from different backgrounds came together in open assemblies at the local 
level to form Committees for the Defense of  the Referendum (Comitès de la Defensa del Referèndum, 
abbreviated CDRs) to occupy the voting stations and obstruct the Spanish police intervention. 
The referendum as a shared goal allowed activists to organize the defense of  the voting stations 
without the support of  the pre-existing SMOs.  
Second, the referendum had consequences for protest organizing even after the end of  the 1-
O episode. Some of  the changes that happened during the 1-O episode were there to stay and 
sedimented into permanent properties of  processes and practices. The CDRs changed their name 
to Committees for the Defense of  the Republic and became an important third civil society actor. 
But the referendum also triggered four mechanisms that transformed protest organizing beyond 
the 1-O episode. Exhaustion, facilitation, repression, and strategizing made internal 
communication and interorganizational collaboration became more difficult. Organizational 
leaderships were weakened and could rely less on directing. Not everything was changed though. 
Protests after the 1-O episodes resembled protests before in that there was less spontaneity and 
organizational processes were longer and more meticulous. Organizational structures and practices 




4 PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION 
The 1-O referendum fundamentally altered the ways in which the Catalan independence 
movement organized protest. I develop this argument in four parts. The first part elaborates the 
conceptual framework of  the dissertation and presents the research design. Chapter 2 turns to the 
main object of  inquiry: protest organizing. It uses lesser-known organization theories as analytical 
resources to develop a holistic framework of  the organizational dimension in social movements, 
which focuses on four concepts: organizations as structures, protest organizing as a process, 
organized protest as organizationality, and organizational practices. It then addresses how these 
components change over time. Chapter 2 also proposes an eventful approach to organizational 
change in social movements. It develops the core theoretical argument of  the dissertation: 
Contentious episodes can be eventful and transform protest organizing in social movements 
through a series of  mechanisms. Chapter 3 builds on the conceptual chapter and outlines the 
research design for the dissertation. 
The second part of  the dissertation describes the strategies, protest actions, and organizing of  
the independence movement during the normal times of  the secessionist conflict between 2009 
and 2017. Chapter 4 builds on the relevant literature on secessionism and social movements to 
define the scope and context of  the research question. It clarifies what secessionist movements 
are and what they do and traces the secessionist cycle of  contention in Catalonia from its origins 
in 2009 to the 1-O episode of  contention. In this time, demands for independence became more 
prominent and were accompanied by the emergence of  a pro-independence civil society. Chapter 
5 describes how these civil society actors organized protest in the normal phase until the 
announcement of  the referendum. It introduces a generalized account of  organizational practices 
and how they functioned in normal times of  conflict. 
The third part of  the dissertation focuses on the intense 1-O episode of  contention. Chapter 
6 discusses the unique character of  the 1-O as a contentious referendum in comparative perspective. 
It explains how the idea of  a binding and unilateral referendum emerged and how the push for 
the referendum resulted in the 1-O episode of  contention. Chapters 7 and 8 focus on protest 
organizing during the 1-O episode. Chapter 7 compares the five protest cases in this period of  
time. Chapter 8 analyzes in detail the most curious of  these cases: the defense of  the voting stations 
on the day of  the referendum.  
The fourth part addresses the changes of  protest organizing after the end of  the 1-O episode. 
Chapter 9 compares four protest cases that took place after the cycle of  protest started to contract 




of  time: re-equilibration, sedimentation, and transformation. Transformation was driven by four 
mechanisms: repression, facilitation, strategizing, and exhaustion. Chapter 10 focuses in detail on 
the mechanism of  strategizing by outlining how strategy debates after the 1-O referendum 
impacted protest organizing. Chapter 11 describes how organizers adapted to repressive action by 
the Spanish state and what they perceived as an increased level of  surveillance. Chapter 12 


























Research on secessionist conflicts has produced some important theoretical developments over 
the last thirty years. Most of  these writings are theories of  secession. They theorize when substate 
actors pursue independence, how host states respond, and under what conditions secession 
eventually occurs (Griffiths 2016; Sorens 2012). Questions about the organizational and temporal 
dimension of  secessionist conflict have only been of  secondary importance, both theoretically and 
empirically. These questions are, however, the central concern of  this dissertation. 
This chapter presents the conceptual framework of  the dissertation. The chapter is divided in 
two parts. The first part concerns the organizational dimension of  the research question. Building 
on a number of  writings in organization theory, it discusses three meanings of  organization: 
organization as an entity, as a process, and as a property. I develop the central concept of  protest 
organizing, which is the primary object of  inquiry of  the dissertation. The second part tackles the 
temporal dimension of  the research question. It uses cyclical approaches to contentious politics as 
a starting point to theorize the temporal development of  social movements over time, 
distinguishing between “normal” and “intense” times of  conflict. Building on the work of  William 
H. Sewell (1996a) and others, I develop the argument that intense episodes of  contention can be 
eventful and have transformative consequences for protest organizing. The result is an eventful 
approach to organizational change in social movement. 
However, the framework is not constructed as a theory of  organizational change. Instead of  
formulating theoretical expectations about the conditions under which protest organizing changes, 
the framework is composed of  sensitizing concepts that guide and structure the empirical analysis. 
Moreover, the framework does not advocate a single approach to the study of  organization and 
social movements, but draws inspiration from a series of  theoretical resources in an eclectic 
fashion. Nevertheless, most of  these inspirations share an ontological attention to processes, 
events, agency, and practices. Social structures are relegated to the background of  the analysis. In 
other words, I am concerned with how collective action in social movement evolves over time and 




1 ORGANIZATIONS, ORGANIZING, AND ORGANIZATIONALITY IN SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS 
It is virtually impossible to read a text in social movement studies without coming across the phrase 
“to organize a protest”. Take Charles Tilly’s classic The Contentious French as an example: 
By Bastille Day 1921 the themes of peace and internationalism had regained prominence 
after dissolving in World War I. On the morning of that holiday Dijon’s “communist 
socialists” organized a march to the city’s cemetery. One hundred fifty to two hundred 
people (including some twenty women) gathered at the Place du President Wilson. (Tilly 
1986, 37, emphasis added) 
Throughout the book, Tilly used the expression 29 times to describe how collective actors engaged 
in demonstrations, strikes, campaigns, and resistances. Despite its abundance and centrality in the 
text, Tilly did not elaborate on what he exactly meant when writing that activists “organized a 
march” and one might be inclined to ask: why should he? After all, the expression is familiar from 
everyday language and media reports on social movements. However, delving into what it means 
to organize protest is more than a linguistic exercise. I suggest that the novel concept of  protest 
organizing, which represents the main object of  inquiry of  this dissertation, holds the potential to 
clarify the relationship between structure and action in research on protest and social movements.  
Since its emergence as a subfield of  the social sciences, there has been a lot of  debate on 
organization in social movement studies, which is documented in text books and edited volumes 
(Davis et al. 2005; Della Porta and Diani 2006, 2015; Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2004b; Tilly and 
Tarrow 2015). Nevertheless, there is still a lot of  conceptual confusion, as I see it. This is why it is 
best to begin with a basic distinction.  
What is organization? In his seminal Power in Movement (2011), Sidney Tarrow distinguished 
three meanings of  organization: first, organization may refer to “the connective structures or 
interpersonal networks” (124). To avoid confusion, I would like to relegate this meaning 
immediately to the realm of  network analysis.2 Second, the more common usage of  organization 
is as “the advocacy organization - or formal associations of  persons” (123), which has been made 
prominent by the concept of  the social movement organization (SMO). The third meaning of  the 
term refers to “the organization of  collective action at the point of  contact with opponents” (123). 
                                                 
2 This is for two reasons. On the one hand, network and organization represent two fundamentally different types 
of social order (Ahrne and Brunsson 2011). On the other hand, social network analysis possesses far better concepts 
to describe the structures of networks than the term “organization” (Diani 2015; Diani and McAdam 2003). Thus, 




This is what I would like to call protest organizing: the planning and preparation of  contentious 
action. Tarrow’s two latter meanings reflect the common distinction in organization studies of  
“organizations, as things or nouns, from organizing, as a verb or process” (Van de Ven and Poole 
2005, 1379). I suggest that there is a third meaning of  organization in social movements: 
organization as a property of  collective action. Protest can be more or less organized. Drawing on 
Schoeneborn, Kuhn, and Kärreman‘s (2019) terminology, I call this the organizationality of  protest.  
This leaves us with three dimensions of  organization: organizations as entities, organizing as 
the process of  preparing protest, and organizationality as a property of  protest. It must be stressed 
that these are different phenomena and it is important not to confuse them. Following again 
Schoeneborn, Kuhn, and Kärreman‘s (2019) and other organizational theorists, I use the noun 
when referring to an organization as a specific entity, the verb or gerund form when speaking about 
the process of  organizing, and the adjective organized when describing a quality of  collective action. 
Table 1 summarizes this terminology. 
 
Table 1: Organization, organizing, organizationality (based on Schoeneborn, Kuhn, and Kärreman 
2019). 
Concept Definition Grammar 
Organization Entity within a social movement Noun 
Organizing 
Process of  preparing contentious 
action 
Verb, Gerund 
Organizationality Property of  contentious action Adjective 
 
This conceptual distinction avoids conflating three phenomena that are often described with the 
same term. Using three different terms is more than just a grammatical difference or a play on 
words but helps keeping ontologically different objects analytically separate.  
The field of  social movement studies has produced an impressive literature about organizations 
as entities. Organizationality has not been treated as a term itself, but there has been considerable 
debate on the closely related topic of  spontaneity. In contrast, Dieter Rucht (2017) has recently 
pointed out that there is no systematic account of  the preparatory activities of  protest, which are 
usually treated as one among many elements in case studies on social movements. Thus, despite a 
large body of  literature on organizations and social movements, we know very little about how 




In my view, the reason for this shortcoming is that most social movement scholars only read and 
use entity-based organization theory if  any. Organization studies is a more diverse than that, 
however. Process and practice approaches have been around for some time (Corradi, Gherardi, 
and Verzelloni 2010; Feldman and Orlikowski 2011; Langley and Tsoukas 2010, 2016; Tsoukas and 
Chia 2002). More recently, theories prioritizing communication (Cooren et al. 2011; Putnam, 
Nicotera, and McPhee 2009; Schoeneborn, Kuhn, and Kärreman 2019) and decision (Ahrne and 
Brunsson 2011, 2019b; Ahrne, Brunsson, and Seidl 2016) have proliferated. I do not argue that 
any of  these approaches is theoretically superior to an entity-based approach. Neither do I want 
to redefine the meaning of  organization in social movement studies. If  anything, the introductory 
distinction has shown that there is a plurality of  meanings of  organization, which refer to very 
different research objects. 
The goal of  this first part of  the chapter is to use less-known organization theories as analytical 
resources to develop the central concepts of  this dissertation. This allows shedding light on a 
largely neglected phenomenon: protest organizing. By integrating existing theories of  organization 
and spontaneity, I develop a holistic framework of  the organizational dimension in social 
movements. I start in the next section with the most established of  the three concepts: the social 
movement organization as an entity. Second, I turn to the organizationality of  protest and 
juxtapose it to spontaneity. The third section focuses on the main object of  inquiry. I develop the 
concept of  protest organizing, drawing on existing theorizations in the field of  organization studies. 
Fourth, given that I have a particular interest in developments over time, I tackle the issue of  
organizational change. The final section summarizes these three concepts and shows how 
integrating a more diverse range of  organization theories benefits social movement studies 
immensely. 
1.1 Organization 
The social movement organization (SMO) 
Any discussion on organization in contentious politics starts with the concept of  the social 
movement organization (SMO). The term was coined in the 1970s by the proponents of  resource 
mobilization (RM) theory, primarily John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. They defined the SMO 
as a “a complex, or formal organization which identifies its preferences with a social movement 
or a counter-movement and attempts to implement their goals” (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1218).3 
                                                 
3 Note that the classic definition by McCarty and Zald is partly tautological: a social movement organization is an 




As such, it has clear boundaries and membership, rules and (professionalized) roles, as well as 
defined goals and procedures. Prominent examples are the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference in the civil rights movement, or Greenpeace in the environmental movement. The 
SMOs of  a social movement compose its social movement industry (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 
1219) or infrastructure (Kriesi 1996, 153), abbreviated SMI. The SMIs of  all movements in a 
society form its social movement sector (SMS; McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1220). SMOs, SMI, and 
SMS constitute the organizational basis of  social movements. 
For a long time, the RM approach had been the workhorse of  social movement studies in the 
United States. And while the theoretical propositions of  resource mobilization have been criticized 
in recent debates, the SMO as a concept still enjoys some relevance as a central building block, for 
example in the contentious politics paradigm (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 2011; Tilly 
and Tarrow 2015), but also in network analyses of  social movement fields (Baldassarri and Diani 
2007; Diani 2015). The methodological advantages of  focusing on SMOs are obvious: First, formal 
organizations are easily identifiable (Rucht 2013, 171). There are more or less complete lists of  
SMOs, for example the Encyclopedia of  Associations, allowing for the study of  organizational 
populations (Minkoff  2002). Second, when boundaries are clear, it is easier to determine what is 
organizational and what is not. Third, SMOs produce a series of  documents that can be used as 
data. Their representatives can be interviewed as speaking for the SMO.  Finally, studying SMOs 
is not only a convenient matter of  obtaining data, but in many cases SMOs represent the most 
influential groups of  a social movement – precisely because they are formally organized.  
Alternative modes of organization 
Proponents of  the RM approach not only described the properties of  the SMO, they also 
championed its role for effective mobilization. Other researchers were more critical of  formal 
organizations. Often drawing on Robert Michels’ famous Iron Law of  Oligarchy, some authors 
argued that formal organizations over time tend to shift their focus from mobilization to 
organizational maintenance (Piven and Cloward 1979). Over time, the Iron Law has attracted some 
considerable debate with no conclusive empirical results (Breines 1980; Clemens and Minkoff  
2004; Leach 2005; Rucht 1999; Staggenborg 1988; Zald and Ash 1966).4 
Skepticism towards formal organization has not only come from within social movement 
scholarship, activists themselves have often preferred alternative modes of  organization. As early 
as the 1970s, many new social movement groups refused to formalize membership and leadership, 
                                                 




turning to informal modes of  decision making and participation (Curtis and Zurcher 1974; 
Freeman 1970). Other groups did not reject structure completely, but referred to themselves as 
collectives and implemented participatory forms of  organizing instead of  bureaucracy (Rothschild-
Whitt 1979). In contrast to the strategic and instrumental character of  formal organizations, these 
alternative types of  organizing were considered prefigurative, i.e. a goal in themselves and a way of  
bringing about a more democratic and inclusive society (Boggs 1977; Breines 1980; Epstein 1991). 
Prefiguration has become an important value for many subsequent progressive movements around 
the globe. Anarchist and autonomous movements have often rejected any kind of  formal 
organization (Flesher Fominaya 2014; Graeber 2009; Leach 2006; Sutherland, Land, and Böhm 
2014). The global justice movements of  the 1990s and 2000s in particular adopted horizontal and 
loosely structured forms of  organization that emerged as complex transnational networks (Della 
Porta 2009a, 2009b; Haug 2010; Maeckelbergh 2011). Movements in many places have 
championed deliberative and participatory decision making (e.g. Della Porta 2005; Della Porta and 
Rucht 2015; Felicetti 2017; Haug and Teune 2008; Nez 2012). The wave of  Occupy movements 
that accompanied the financial and economic crisis after 2008 were characterized by large 
assemblies in public squares as the primary organizational form (e.g. Baumgarten 2016; Della Porta 
2015; Hardt and Negri 2017; Juris 2012; Maeckelbergh 2012; Tejerina et al. 2013). More recent 
writings have pointed out that these movements, in contrast to descriptions of  earlier scholars, did 
not perceive prefiguration as opposed to strategy, because it represented a means of  implementing 
some of  their goals (Eleftheriadis 2015; Leach 2013; Maeckelbergh 2011; Yates 2015b). 
Of  course, this short review cannot do justice to the vast differences in the ways in which these 
movements organize. What they all have in common, however, is that they reject bureaucracy and 
professionalization, and sometimes formal organization entirely. Hence, the debates around 
organization reflect the dilemmas of  formality versus informality and horizontality versus 
verticality (Della Porta and Diani 2006, 142). The point here is that organizational entities represent 
important collective actors in social movements. This role must be acknowledged by the present 
framework, even if  its purpose is precisely is to distinguish organizations from organizing 
processes.  
In sum, I distinguish four basic organizational components, building on Rucht’s (2013) 
comprehensive discussion of  social movement structures. First, there are small local groups that 
usually do not have any formal structure. Rucht (2013) called them basic action groups, I call them 
grassroots groups or local groups. These must be distinguished from the second category, which is the 
SMO in the narrow sense of  an entity with some degree of  formalized membership, goals, rules, 




things, may vary greatly within this category. The diverse groups and SMOs of  a social movement 
often work together. If  they do so for a limited amount of  time, they may form a campaign network 
or an umbrella organization (Rucht 2013). While Rucht saw these as belonging to distinct types of  
structures, I suggest that the boundaries are fluent. I use the term platform for this category. Finally, 
networks of  local groups, SMOs, and platforms may be more durable, which is why Rucht (2013) 
called them enduring networks. These can consist of  formal or informal interactions and can be 
located at the local or regional level. Although not all of  these organizational units engage in 
protest (Minkoff  1995, 62–63), they often play a crucial role as drivers of  protest action. In the 
next section, I turn explicitly to the idea of  organized protest as opposed to spontaneous protest. 
1.2 Organizationality 
Spontaneous or organized? 
Throughout the first half  of  the 20th century, but also in post-war times, many social scientists 
described protests as unexpected, irrational, and chaotic. As Buechler (2007, 47) wrote, “social 
movements were seen as one subtype of  collective behavior along with panics, crazes, crowds, 
rumors, and riots.” The collective behavior approach considered protests as a result of  strain and 
breakdown of  existing social norms (Blumer 1951; Smelser 1962). Spontaneity was a central element 
of  the collective behavior approach and its emergent norms thesis (R. H. Turner and Killian 1987). 
Drawing on Freeman (1979), Killian (1984, 779) emphasized that “actors can and do make on-the-
spot decisions which are not part of  a plan for continuous action and whose consequences are 
unanticipated.” In response to these strain and breakdown theories of  social movements, 
proponents of  RM theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1973, 1977) claimed that collective action was 
organized and calculated, not spontaneous and chaotic. Tilly argued that  
authorities and thoughtless historians commonly describe popular contention as disorderly 
[…] But the more closely we look at that same contention, the more we discover order. 
We discover order created by the rooting of collective action in the routines and 
organization of everyday social life, and by its involvement in a continuous process of 
signaling, negotiation, and struggle with other parties whose interests the collective action 
touches. The forms of contention themselves display that order. (Tilly 1986, 4) 
Tilly and others disagreed with the earlier view of  protest as irrational behavior driven by 
grievances. Instead they highlighted the organized and often routine character of  collective action. 
The idea of  orderly and purposeful protest has become encapsulated in two concepts. A 
contentious performance is defined as “relatively familiar and standardized ways in which one set 




2015, 14) and the repertoire of  action as the available set of  these “familiar routines” (Tilly 1986, 
4). Even seemingly disorderly actions such as barricades, riots, and political violence were seen as 
conscious choices by challengers. With the dominance of  resource mobilization and political 
process approaches in the field, the view of  protest as organized increasingly replaced the previous 
emphasis on spontaneity (Buechler 2007; Della Porta and Diani 2006). However, spontaneity has 
not fully disappeared as a topic and has even received more attention recently (Cheng and Chan 
2017; Fominaya 2011; Polletta 2006; Snow and Moss 2014; Wagner-Pacifici and Ruggero 2018). 
It is not my goal to bring back the question whether social movements inherently involve 
organized or spontaneous collective action, which has dominated many scholarly debates in the 
past. Neither is it my intention to start a functional or even normative debate whether organized 
or spontaneous action is more useful for social movement to achieve their goals (Piven and 
Cloward 1979).  
My point in this subsection and the next one is that organized protest should not be equated 
with the presence of  organizations. Building on the aforementioned more recent line of  research, 
I understand spontaneity and organization as opposed categories of  the same concept, which may 
vary from one protest event to the other. In short, a protest is organized if  it is preceded by a 
process of  planning and preparation. But let us start with a definition of  spontaneity. 
Spontaneity may best be understood as a cover term for events, happenings, and lines of 
action, both verbal and nonverbal, which were not planned, intended, prearranged, or 
organized in advance of their occurrence. (Snow and Moss 2014, 1123) 
Snow and Moss essentially conceptualized spontaneity as the absence or the opposite of  organized 
action.5 This is why the debates around spontaneity are interesting for the conceptual framework 
of  this thesis: I define spontaneous and organized action as opposed poles within the same 
concept: the organizationality of  protest. However, Snow and Moss (2014, 1126) have warned 
against conceptualizing spontaneity and organization in binary terms, arguing that they “are neither 
dichotomous nor oppositional, but are instead often highly interactive.” Building on this insight, I 
conceptualize the organizationality of  protest as a temporal continuum. On the one end of  this 
continuum, the amount of  time that goes into planning and preparing a contentious performance 
is basically zero. The decision to take an action is made on the spot, i.e. spontaneous. In the middle 
of  the spectrum, one can imagine protests that are organized within a couple of  hours or days. 
The other end of  the continuum is potentially open, because there is no theoretical limit to the 
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amount of  time that can go into organizing protest. In most cases, this is likely to take several 
weeks or months.  
There are two caveats to this concept. The first is that, empirically, the operationalization of  
what counts as spontaneous or organized will depend very much on the duration and timing of  
the protest and its organizing process. This often rests on the researcher’s decision what counts as 
part of  the protest event and its preparation (see chapter on research design). Second, by the 
adjective organized I do not mean that protest is peaceful or constrained. Chaotic riots can be 
planned and prepared ahead of  time, and therefore be organized. In other words, the term refers 
exclusively to the temporal dimension and not to the repertoire of  action. Whether one type of  
action is more prone to spontaneity than others is subject to empirical inquiry. 
In sum, the concept of  organizationality I have developed here acknowledges that protest may 
be spontaneous or organized, depending on whether activists spend time preparing and planning 
or decide to act on the spot. Before I turn more in detail on the process of  organizing, I outline 
how the concept of  organizationality and the idea of  organized protest differs from traditional social 
movement approaches. 
Organized action without organizations 
The concept of  organizationality developed here diverges in its understanding of  organized protest 
from much of  social movement studies. In the classic works of  the political process approach and 
RM theory and later contentious politics, the organized character of  protest essentially meant that 
it was driven by SMOs representing shared interests. In fact, as mentioned above, organizational 
structures were seen as an important precondition for the occurrence of  sustained protest in the 
first place. Or, as Tilly (1995, 32) put it: “whatever stress ordinary people may have endured, the 
critical difference between action and inaction was the extent to which they had become involved 
in organized movements.” Spontaneity was not a concern for political process and resource 
mobilization scholars. Social movements - as a category of  action, not as an actor – were regarded 
as inherently organized, and that meant: based on organizations (Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2004a, 
10; Tilly 2004, 3; Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 11).6  
The emphasis on organizational entities by the dominant streams of  social movement research 
was criticized by other writers in the field. As mentioned before, Piven and Cloward (1979) argued 
in their research on movements of  the poor in the US that organization hindered rather than 
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enabled mobilization. They suggested that formal organizations over time were more concerned 
with their own survival than with effective collective action. Hence, activists refrained from 
disruptive contention, thereby trying to avoid putting the organization at risk. Piven and Cloward 
criticized RM scholars and others for neglecting protest that was not initiated by SMOs. As a result, 
they concluded that protest was “depicted as overorganized in a good many RM case studies. The 
rise of  movements is signified by organizational paraphernalia, such as the formation of  SMOs 
with leaders who make demands and call for demonstrations or lobbying” (Piven and Cloward 
1991, 449). This critique was accepted by some proponents of  the RM approach, who 
acknowledged that “organizations are very important in social movements, but they are not the 
whole story” (Oliver 1989, 1). 
During the last two decades, however, a more fundamental challenge to classic approaches to 
organization in social movements has appeared. This challenge revolves around the impact of  
technological change and digital media in particular on activism. While the discussion on the use 
of  information and communication technologies (ICTs) is a complex one, a common thread in 
the literature is that the traditional concept of  the SMO has increasing difficulties to account for 
recent waves of  mobilization. This conceptual debate has been spurred by a series of  empirical 
observations of  protests that have surged in the 2010s, such as the Indignados in Spain, the Arab 
Spring, or Occupy Wall Street.  
For instance, Anduiza, Cristancho, and Sabucedo (2014, 751) found in their study on the 15-M 
demonstrations in Spain that “traditional mobilization agents played no role whatsoever.“ The 
primary vehicle for mobilization was the online platform Democracia Real Ya!, which bound 
together many little-known activist groups: “The demonstration was not called by large traditional 
organizations, but by ad hoc platforms that acted as loose, flexible structures centered on a 
particular issue that linked people and small organizations without a specific long-term 
commitment or formal membership“ (Anduiza, Cristancho, and Sabucedo 2014, 757). The 
primary organizational structures in the aftermath of  the 15-M were protest camps, neighborhood 
assemblies, and online platforms rather than SMOs in the classic sense.  
While the wave of  protest in times of  global crisis underlined the empirical relevance of  digital 
media for social movement studies, some scholars had tried to come to grasp – both conceptually 
and empirically – with the impact of  ICTs on organization long before. One of  the first attempts 
to capture the impact of  digital media on organizing was the classic work by DeSanctis and Monge 
(1999) on “virtual organizations,“ which are defined as “collection of  geographically distributed, 
functionally and/or culturally diverse entities that were linked by electronic forms of  




influential conceptualization was the notion of  the “hybrid mobilization movement” (Chadwick 
2007, 284): the internet allows organizations to “sometimes behaves like an interest group, 
sometimes like a social movement, sometimes like the wing of  a traditional party during an election 
campaign.” More recently, David Karpf  (2012, 3) has argued that the digital age creates different 
forms of  organizations: Internet-mediated issue generalists, online communities of  interest, and 
neo-federated organizations. These concepts, however, were mostly concerned with how 
organizations as entities were changed by the technological transformations – rather than how the 
nature of  contention itself  changed.   
The most comprehensive answer was proposed by Bennett and Segerberg’s (2012, 2013) work 
on the “logic of  connective action.” The authors suggested that the transformative moment in 
ICTs and social media in particular lies in that they enable individuals to create, share, adapt, and 
reproduce personal action frames online. Instead of  having to overcome the free rider problem 
of  the “logic of  collective action” (Olson 1965), social media incentivize individuals to get involved 
in “connective action.” The spread of  personal action frames allows for coordinated contentious 
action online and offline. Organizations might make use of  both of  these dynamics, creating 
hybrids of  connective and collective action, but the diffusion of  personal action frames also 
functions without the support of  a movement infrastructure.  
Other approaches dispensed with the notion of  organization entirely. It certainly is no 
coincidence that the rise of  social media has been paralleled by the growing popularity of  social 
network approaches to the study of  social movements (for overviews, see e.g. Diani and McAdam 
2003; Krinsky and Crossley 2014). Pavan (2017) for example demonstrated how online networks 
facilitate collective action without making reference to organizations. Bimber, Flanagin, and Stohl 
(2005, 2012) argued that new technologies have created communication channels that were 
previously reserved to formal organizations. Other approaches focused on crowds (Bennett, 
Segerberg, and Walker 2014) and multitudes (Hardt and Negri 2005) as the central units of  analysis. 
Some pundits went as far as to claim that collective action has entered a phase of  “organizing 
without organizations” (Shirky 2009).  
The impact of  technological change showed more openly than ever before that organizational 
entities are not a necessary precondition for contentious action. All protest is not initiated by 
SMOs. This highlights that instead of  taking the presence of  organizations as given, as much of  
political process and resource mobilization theories do, it is necessary to analytically separate 
organizationality from organizations. This distinction opens up the possibility to investigate the 
relationship between organized action and organizational structures. Theoretically, several 




mobs. But in theory SMOs can also call protests without any kind of  planning or preparation. On 
the other hand, organized protest is likely to be prepared by a specific SMOs. However, the 
preceding discussion of  literature on ICTs shows that it is also possible that contentious action is 
organized without the support of  SMOs. This leads us to the central concept to link protest and 
structures: the process of  organizing.  
1.3 Organizing Protest 
The process perspective 
Let us leave aside the issue of  spontaneous protest and focus on organized protest instead. In the 
previous section, I have argued that organized protest should not be confused with SMOs as 
entities but should be understood as collective action that was planned and prepared beforehand. 
What I mean by that can be illustrated using an example from the literature on the Catalan 
independence movement. Kathryn Crameri opened her book on the movement (2015a, 1) as 
follows: 
A campaign entitled “We don’t want to pay” (#novolempagar), organized on Facebook 
and Twitter and reported by the media, succeeded in causing long tail-backs as motorists 
refused to pay tolls. The campaign was launched on 1 May, with organized convoys of 
vehicles targeting various key points around the region.  
This quote shows the ubiquity of  the phrase “to organize.” In the first three sentences of  the 
book, Crameri used it twice. Several observations about the expression can be made. Crameri 
employed it to describe “organized convoys of  vehicles.” This expresses that participants’ behavior 
was not random or chaotic, but exhibited some kind of  pattern. This orderly character did not 
occur by chance, but as the result of  a prior process: the convoy was part of  a campaign that was 
“organized on Facebook and Twitter.” Crameri did not mention any organizations, nor which 
collective or individual actors actually planned and prepared the campaign. This dissertation takes 
into view precisely what the use of  the passive voice obscures here: how contentious action is 
organized.  
I propose the novel concept of  protest organizing to capture how collective actors organize 
contentious action. Theoretically, the concept builds on the process perspective in organization 
studies (for overview, see Langley and Tsoukas 2010, 2016; Poole et al. 2000; Tsoukas and Chia 
2002). This approach has been heavily influenced by the writings of  Karl Weick and his work on 




Organizing [..] is defined as a consensually validated grammar for reducing equivocality by means of 
sensible interlocked behaviors. To organize is to assemble ongoing interdependent actions into 
sensible sequences that generate sensible outcomes. (Weick 1979, 3 emphasis in the 
original) 
Drawing on this basic definition, I develop a preliminary concept of  the organizing process of  
contentious performances. In the following, I briefly discuss its three basic components: sensible 
outcomes, sensible sequences (i.e. process), and reducing equivocality.  
First, it seems best to start from the end of  the definition. In Weick’s view, organizing creates 
sensible outcomes, i.e. something that is meaningful to the organizers. In this part of  the dissertation, 
I am interested in how activists organize protest. This means that I look only at specific kinds of  
organizing processes, namely those that lead to protest, strikes, occupations, or other types of  
contention. Of  course this does not mean that social movements are always oriented towards 
contentious performances. The field has long acknowledged that activists do much more than 
protest (Della Porta and Diani 2006, 168). Organizing can have a range of  different outcomes, 
what matters is that they make sense to the participants. Nevertheless, a viable empirical analysis 
requires narrowing down the focus to a clearly identifiable type of  outcome. Put in Weick’s terms, 
the analysis presented here is concerned only with a particular class of  sensible outcomes.  
Second, organizing is “accomplished by processes,” as Weick (1979, 89) put it. In other words, 
organizing is a series of  activities that constitute the planning and preparation of  contentious 
action. These activities unfold over a certain period of  time before the action. The organizing 
process has a start, a duration, and ends with the onset of  the contentious action. While this might 
seem a somewhat banal statement, it helps distinguishing organized (i.e. prepared and planned) 
contentious performances from other courses of  action. The main point is conceptual: organizing 
consists of  a “sensible sequence“ of  “interdependent actions“  (Weick 1979, 3), which takes place 
prior to the contentious action, whereas spontaneity unfolds during the contentious performance 
itself. 
Third, process theorists suggested that organizing is an attempt to create order out of  chaos 
(Tsoukas and Chia 2002, 570). In Weick’s words, organizing is reducing equivocality and assembling 
other activities. When organizing a contentious performance, activists make plans about how the 
action should unfold: where and when to protest, which claims to bring forward, and what to do 
in case of  confrontation with authorities. Thereby, they try to minimize spontaneous and random 
action. At the same time, it must be stressed that organizing represents only an attempt to reduce 




be a chance for unforeseen events. Bringing together the three components, I define protest 
organizing as: 
The process of reducing equivocality about a future contentious action by assembling 
interdependent actions into a sensible sequence. 
Reducing equivocality means to devise a plan about the contentious action. This plan draws 
together otherwise loose preparatory actions, which can involve activist participation, framing, 
material and symbolic resources. I use the phrases “to plan” and “to prepare a protest” 
interchangeably with “to organize a protest” to make the text more readable. Figure 1 depicts the 
concept. 
 
Figure 1: Protest organizing. 
 
It must be stressed that this concept refers to a very narrow and particular meaning of  organizing. 
It excludes basically all those activities in social movements that are not directly geared at 
protesting. This is not intended as a redefinition of  the concept in instrumental terms. I am well 
aware that there are many processes and practices in social movements that are not immediately 
leading to protests but still might be called organizing.  
For instance, my concept of  protest organizing should be distinguished from the notion of  
organizing in the trade union context or in community organizing. By organizing, writers in this 
tradition meant “to develop organizational structures,” or to build a “mass power organization,” 
as Saul Alinsky (1989, 4) put it. In order to distinguish this kind of  work from protest organizing, 
I refer to it as structuring.  
Until this point, I have treated organizational structures and processes as analytically separate. 




and formal SMOs in particular often have division of  labor, assign roles and responsibilities, and 
sometimes work with rules and sanctions. These elements of  formal organization create routines 
that are useful for protest organizing (cf. Rucht 2013, 183). If  organizational routines are already 
in place, this likely lowers the cost of  the preparatory process. The concept remains a very abstract 
formulation and tells us very little about the concrete activities in organizing that reduce 
equivocality. Therefore, I bring in two other strands of  organization theory to propose two 
practices that are essential in the organizing process: decision making and communication. 
Organizational practices in organizing processes 
In social movement studies, there are only few studies that deal explicitly with the concept of  
practice (Eleftheriadis 2015; Mattoni 2016, 2017; Shoshan 2017; Yates 2015a). In contrast, a larger 
body of  work on practices exists in organizational sociology (for an overview, see e.g. Corradi, 
Gherardi, and Verzelloni 2010; Feldman and Orlikowski 2011; Nicolini and Monteiro 2016). More 
generally, practice theories have developed into an established strand of  social theory over the 
course of  the last 30 years and have proliferated a vast amount of  empirical studies on all sorts of  
practices. Several definitions of  practice have emerged, emphasizing different dimensions of  the 
concept. Many organizational scholars, and also social movement scholars such as Yates (2015a) 
and Mattoni (2017), have drawn on the synthetic concept by Andreas Reckwitz (2002, 249): 
A “practice” (Praktik) is a routinized type of behaviour which consists of several elements, 
interconnected to one other: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, “things” 
and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states 
of emotion and motivational knowledge. 
Practice theories point to the recurring character of  social activities, as well as the relationships 
between their cognitive, emotional, and material elements. Practices cannot be reduced to any of  
these elements or to a single performance. They represent recognizable ways of  doing things, which 
require knowledge, learning, and experience by the practitioner. Organizational practices are 
relevant for the purpose of  this dissertation, because they represent “a primary way to study 
organisation processually” (Nicolini and Monteiro 2016, 110).7  
For practice theorists, the social is made of  practices (Schatzki 2001a, 12). Departing from this 
ontological premise, the researcher is faced with the problem of  isolating practices for analysis 
(Gherardi 2012, 173). I suggest focusing on two broad categories of  practices in the organizing 
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process: communication and decision-making practices.8 This choice is motivated by two bodies 
of  literature that have gained weight in organization studies over the last decade. On the one side, 
the communication-as-constitutive (CCO) approach to organization (Cooren et al. 2011; Fairhurst 
and Putnam 2004; McPhee and Zaug 2000; Schoeneborn, Kuhn, and Kärreman 2019), and, on 
the other side, the Luhmannian approach putting decision at the center (Ahrne and Brunsson 
2011, 2019b; Haug 2013; Luhmann 2011). Building on these literatures, I argue that decision 
making and communication are essential for the organizing process, because they represent 
excellent means of  reducing equivocality. 
First, Ahrne and Brunsson (2011, 8) suggested that a primary way for organizational members 
to reduce uncertainty is through decisions: “Decisions are attempts at creating certainty, at 
establishing what the future will look like.” In other words, decisions suppose a “commitment to 
future action” (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret 1976). Decision also implies a “a choice 
among several courses of  action” (P. H. Rossi 1957, 417; cf. Dahl 1960, 26; Bachrach and Baratz 
1962, 639). Activists have several options for action available, but to reduce uncertainty they must 
rule out all options but one. In this perspective, decision is seen “as the most fundamental aspect 
of  organization” (Ahrne and Brunsson 2011, 3). Or, put the other way round, organizations are 
essentially “decision machines” (Nassehi 2005). This means that decision making represents a 
crucial practice in protest organizing. 
Second, communication practices are fundamental in organizing processes. This assumption 
builds on the claim that “communication is constitutive for organization,” around which an entire 
approach coined by its acronym CCO has developed (Cooren 2000; Cooren et al. 2011; McPhee 
and Zaug 2000; Putnam, Nicotera, and McPhee 2009; Robichaud and Cooren 2013; J. R. Taylor 
and Van Every 2000). In contrast to classic organization theory, which treats an organization as a 
container inside of  which communication happens, CCO views organization as being constantly 
co-produced through communicative interaction. Thus, communication is not a vehicle or tool for 
other ends; “rather, it is the means by which organizations are established, composed, designed, 
and sustained” (Cooren et al. 2011, 1150). Putting communication at the heart of  the analysis 
implies that organized action must be seen “as rooted in process (or array of  processes),” rather 
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than in static “abstract structures” (Putnam, Nicotera, and McPhee 2009, 11). Organizing a protest 
without communicating is impossible. 
What makes these practices organizational? Practice theorists, like ethnomethodologists, have 
emphasized that social life is always already ordered. The structured character of  practices lies in 
their routinization. Reckwitz (2002, 255) stressed that “social fields and institutionalized complexes 
– from economic organizations to the sphere of  intimacy – are ‘structured’ by the routines of  
social practices.” Similarly, Giddens (1984, xxxi) emphasized the role of  routines in the 
structuration of  societies, because they provide “transformation points in structural relations”. 
However, it would be a misconception to understand practices as rigid repetitions that give rise to 
stable systems of  a Parsonian type. In fact, practices are subject to change, they “emerge, persist 
and disappear as links between their defining elements are made and broken” (Shove, Pantzar, and 
Watson 2012, 21). Neither does it imply that all human action is inherently ordered, nor that order 
can exclusively arise through routines.  
This is precisely the point where organizational theory comes in: organizing represents a 
deliberate structuring of  social action. Communication and decision-making practices are 
organizational in that they order other collective actions. They are part of  the effort to create order 
out of  chaos (Tsoukas and Chia 2002) by reducing uncertainty. They are deliberate attempts to 
produce, alter, or even break down the routine order of  practices. This means that practices are 
not simply the invariable result of  routinization, habitualization, and learning, but they can be 
actively shaped by practitioners.  
However, it must be stressed that organizing is a practice itself, too: it exhibits routine patterns, 
requires practical knowledge, and is recognizable to a community of  practitioners. In this sense, 
organizing is not a force that is located outside of  the field of  practices, but represents a specific 
kind of  practice. Organizational practice “anchors” (Swidler 2001) other practices in that it 
regulates the relationships between their bodily, mental, discursive, and material elements. 
Protest organizing is the process of  preparing and planning collective contentious action. It 
consists of  reducing equivocality about the protest event through a number of  practices, in 
particular decision making and communication. Protest organizing naturally unfolds over time, it 
can range from a couple of  hours to several weeks or months. There is a second temporal 
dimension though. The processes of  protest organizing may change from one protest event to the 




1.4 Organizational Change 
Social movement scholars have studied a range of  organizational transformations, in particular 
when resource mobilization theory represented a primary reference point in the field. 
Organizational change can occur on different scales and timeframes. A series of  works has looked 
at the development of  macro processes over extended periods of  time. I have already discussed 
the impact of  technological change on organizations and organizing as a prominent example. 
Others have studied more limited organizational populations (Clemens 1997; Minkoff  1995) or 
even cases of  single organizations, focusing on shorter time periods. Although technological 
change represents an important backdrop, the present study falls in the second camp, studying a 
single movement over a relatively limited stretch of  time.  
Social movement scholarship has addressed a series of  topics within the broad framework of  
organizational change. First, organizational emergence and survival has received some attention. 
Although they are treated as an important precondition for mobilization, SMOs are often born in 
phases of  heightened contention (Tarrow 2011: 122-123). However, few groups that emerge in 
contention actually turn into organizations, and even fewer persist over extended periods of  time 
(Blee 2012; Minkoff  1995). The key to organizational survival lies not only in obtaining material 
resources but also social capital (Edwards and McCarthy 2004; Walker and McCarthy 2010).9 
Second, with regard to changes in the properties of  SMOs, there has been considerable debate 
around the “movement career model” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 65; Zald and Ash 1966), 
which is derived from Michels’ Iron Law of  Oligarchy (1911). The model predicts that, over time, 
SMOs become more bureaucratic, hierarchical, and conservative. This process involves three types 
of  change: goal transformation, organizational maintenance, and oligarchization. Organizations 
shift their goals from social change to their own survival over time, as they simultaneously become 
less participatory. In some cases, this is accompanied by professionalization (McCarthy and Zald 
1973; Staggenborg 1988). Despite a series of  empirical studies that have dealt with the Iron Law 
in one way or another (Breines 1980, e.g.; Leach 2005; Lipset, Trow, and Coleman 1977; 
Rothschild-Whitt 1979; Rucht 1999), there is no consensus about its veracity, mainly because it has 
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been operationalized in various ways and applied to different organizational contexts. Whether it 
represents a general trend in social movements or not, previous research documented many 
instances where SMOs turn at least more moderate, if  not oligarchic over time.  
Moderation is not the only possible organizational transformation though. Another possibility 
is that movement organizations turn more radical over time. This can even occur within the same 
movement. Research on the environmental movement found, for example, that the 
institutionalization and professionalization of  established SMOs in the 1990s led to the emergence 
of  less-structured and more radical groups (Diani and Donati 1999; Rootes 1999). In other cases, 
organizations have even chosen to go underground and adopt violent tactics (Della Porta 1995, 
2013). Tarrow (2011, 207) pointed out that moderation and radicalization may occur 
simultaneously as a cycle of  contention contracts. Thus, they often do not only occur in the same 
movement but also in the same period of  time.  
In sum, social movement studies have produced an impressive body of  research on 
organizational change. However, there are two problems with this kind of  research. I have 
addressed the first one in previous sections of  this chapter already. The notion of  organizational 
change in this research rested on the concept of  organization as an entity. Scholars described 
moderation and radicalization as changes of  SMOs.10 In contrast, in this dissertation I am 
concerned with the change of  protest organizing as the central concept. Put differently, I am simply 
looking at another object of  change. This does not mean that the existing research on 
organizational change in social movement is not instructive for the present study and can be simply 
ignored. Many studies in this literature are relevant, because they did not only look at the structural 
features of  SMOs, but also at their repertoires (Diani and Donati 1999; Kriesi 1996). For example, 
the findings on institutionalization were as much about vertical structures as about moderate 
actions. The combination of  both these dimensions speaks indirectly to how SMOs organize 
protest.  
The second problem is that this body of  work saw the drivers of  change as structural, too. This 
could be the organizational structure itself  (Clemens 1993), or the political opportunity structure 
in the political process model (McCarthy 1996). Concrete actions and practices have not featured 
in the existing approaches to change. This is why in the second part of  this chapter I develop an 
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eventful approach to organizational change in social movements. The next section summarizes the 
sensitizing framework for the study of  protest organizing. 
1.5 Summary 
Social movement scholars following the RM approach suggested that movement infrastructures, 
and SMOs in particular, represent crucial preconditions for contentious action (Klandermans, 
Kriesi, and Tarrow 1989; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1986). As I have outline in section 1.2, 
recent empirical research has shown that not all protest is organized by or in organizations 
(Anduiza, Cristancho, and Sabucedo 2014; Bennett and Segerberg 2013). What does this mean for 
social movement theory? There are two possible responses to this issue. One is to stretch the 
concept of  organization to encompass all sorts of  structures that enable the coordination of  
contentious action. Another one is to dispose of  the concept of  organization entirely, which has 
become broader trend in social sciences, as Ahrne and Brunsson (2011) argued. 
The proposition I have laid out in this section is a different one: I suggest it is more fruitful to 
ask how protests are organized, i.e. to focus on their organizationality and organizing. In the 
previous sections, I have developed the concept of  protest organizing, which is the central object of  
inquiry of  this dissertation. Protest organizing essentially refers to the process of  planning and 
preparing collective contentious action. In this process, activists reduce equivocality about the 
protest event through communication and decision making. It represents an attempt to prevent 
spontaneous or random lines of  action during the protest action. Thus, protest organizing directly 
relates to the concept of  protest organizationality. If  spontaneous and random action is minimized as 
a result of  previous preparations, a protest can be called organized. In contrast, if  protest occurs 
without any kind of  previous organizing, it qualifies as spontaneous.  
This perspective shifts the analytical attention away from the properties of  organizational 
entities to what activists actually do to make protest happen. Staging street demonstrations, calling 
for strikes, and occupying squares often require meticulous planning and a great amount of  
preparatory work. The crucial insight of  this process-based approach is that this work can be done 
within organizations but also between and outside of  organizations, as theorists have pointed out 
(Ahrne and Brunsson 2011, 2019b; Ahrne, Brunsson, and Seidl 2016; Haug 2013). This is why 
defining what is organizational along the boundaries of  organizational entities, as organizational 
ecologists do, is problematic. Or, as Weick (1979, 31) put it:  
The problem with this type of search should be obvious. Events inside organizations 
resemble events outside organizations; sensitivities of the worker inside are continuous 




various portions of their lives as to compartmentalize them, what happens inside affects 
what happens outside, and vice versa. 
The problem of  organizational boundaries is particularly relevant in social movements, where 
multiple membership of  activists, the emergence, disappearance, mergers and factions of  groups, 
and the informality of  many entities render it difficult to draw boundaries in the first place and 
locate practices and processes within them. This is why De Bakker, den Hond, and Laamanen  
(2017, 217) argued that there “is much more organizing in social movements than social movement 
organizations, but much of  social movement organizing is not quite befit with that label.”  
This does not mean that SMOs are irrelevant to the question of  whether protest is organized 
or not. While it emphasized a different angle, the process approach to social movement organizing 
is far from being incompatible with resource mobilization theory. As mentioned before, RM theory 
has long stressed the importance of  organizational structures for mobilization. The SMO should 
not be understood as “a reification of  processes” (Van de Ven and Poole 2005, 1380), as 
“metaphysics” (Ford and Harding 2004) or a “myth” (Weick 1979, 88). Activists themselves would 
outright reject these terms, because for them organizations represent concrete and real objects. 
Thus, the present framework treats organizations as tangible collective actors that may or may not 
be involved in the processes of  protest organizing. 
This framework is not intended to be an accurate description or even a theory of  organizing, 
but to be employed as a sensitizing framework for empirical inquiry. While resource mobilization 
and political process approaches have departed from the structural side of  social movements, my 
framework proceeds in the opposite direction. Starting from a particular protest action, it allows 
to formulate a series of  analytical questions, which I describe more in detail in the chapter on 
research design. The framework shifts the attention precisely to the gap between contentious 
performances and its preconditions (whether structural or of  another kind), which is missing in 
much of  social movement theorizing.  
2 EVENTS, CONTENTIOUS POLITICS, AND ORGANIZING 
There are times when the nation state might seem like a monolith to the ordinary citizen. Its norms 
and institutions, territories and boundaries appear to transcend the experiences of the individuals 
that inhabit it. Mark Beissinger (1996, 104) wrote that in “times of normalized politics,” the 
established structure of the nation state “is backed by the effective authority of the state and is not 




arrangement as unalterable and even natural.”11 During these normalized times, political 
occurrences mostly “reproduce social and cultural structures without significant changes” (Sewell 
1996b, 262, see also 1992; Giddens 1984). Usually, secessionist movements and protest organizing 
follow routines and only change gradually. The relationship between secessionists and the host 
state remains unaltered most of the time.  
This, however, is only one part of the picture. Time and again, nation states around the globe 
witness periods of upheaval during which their territorial integrity is challenged from within their 
own borders. Discontent and grievances turn demands for greater autonomy into claims for 
outright independence. Although these conflicts often extend over several decades, the time during 
which they go beyond the institutional sphere tend to be rather brief. During these “secessionist 
crises” (Bartkus 1999; Basta 2018; Pagoaga Ibiricu 2020), wide-spread mobilization and contention 
threaten the integrity of the state. Using again Beissinger’s terms, the “quiet politics” of 
secessionism give way to the “noisy politics” of secessionism (1996, 100). In a similar vein, Della 
Porta (2018) has recently highlighted the difference between “normal times” and “intense times” 
of protest. Following this idea, I suggest that secessionist conflicts can be divided in normal and 
intense phases.  
The organizational dimension of social movements is subject to change as much as the form 
and frequency of contentious action, previous research found (e.g. Clemens 1993; Kriesi 1996; 
Rucht 1999; Zald and Ash 1966). Protest organizing and secessionist movements, as stable as they 
may seem during times of normalized politics, are never fully static. This is why it is important to 
study how secessionist protest organizing changes over time. The question at the heart of this 
dissertation is: Does protest organizing change in intense times of secessionist conflict? If so, how 
does it change? 
The existing literature on secessionism has engaged only very little with the temporal dimension 
of  secessionist struggles (see chapter 4). In contrast, social movement studies have devoted much 
attention to the trajectories of  protest and organizing over time. Contention unfolds in “cycles” 
(Tarrow 1989, 2011), “waves” (Koopmans 2004), or “tides” (Beissinger 1996, 2002). However, 
much of  this work understood change in structural terms. On the one hand, it focused on the 
change of  organizational structures, and on the other hand, change was seen as driven by structural 
conditions, such as the political opportunity structure.  
The approach of  this chapter follows a series of  writings that emphasize the role of  events in 
the transformation of  contentious politics (Basta 2018; Della Porta 2008, 2018; McAdam and 
                                                 




Sewell 2001; Sewell 1996b, 1996a). Building on this body of  work, I develop an eventful approach 
to organizational change that is sensitive to the cyclical dynamics of  social movements. The central 
idea is that intense contentious episodes can be eventful and transform protest organizing in social 
movements through a series of  mechanisms. This argument is elaborated in four steps. The first 
section introduces the concepts of  cycles and episodes of  contention drawing on some of  the 
crucial contributions in the contentious politics paradigm. The second section clarifies the notion 
of  the event. I follow Basta (2018) and others in making a distinction between three different 
building blocks of  temporality: occurrences, critical junctures, and events. The third section 
presents the core of  the argument. I claim that intense contentious episodes transform protest 
organizing while they unfold and after their conclusion. The fourth section explicates the symbolic 
dimension that is inherent to eventful episodes and their transformative mechanisms. 
2.1 Cycles and Episodes of Contention 
Contentious politics is episodic per definition (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 
2015). Social movement scholars have found that contention concentrates in time (Beissinger 2002; 
Koopmans 2004; Tarrow 2011). It has been observed that periods of  relative tranquility are 
followed by outbursts of  conflict. This pattern has been described as a “cycle” (Tarrow 2011) or 
a “wave” (Koopmans 2004) of  contention.12 Tarrow defined a cycle of  contention as follows: 
A phase of heightened conflict across the social system, with rapid diffusion of collective 
action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors, a rapid pace of innovation in the 
forms of contention employed, the creation of new or transformed collective action 
frames, a combination of organized and unorganized participation, and sequences of 
intensified information flow and interaction between challengers and authorities. (Tarrow 
2011, 199) 
In longitudinal perspective, cycles of contention go through the stages of mobilization and 
demobilization. As such, they “describe parabolas from institutional conflict to enthusiastic peaks 
of contention, to ultimate collapse, or – in the case of successful revolutions – the consolidation 
of new regimes” (Tarrow 2011, 212). Throughout the cycle, three types of mechanisms drive 
mobilization and demobilization: expansion, transformation, and contraction (Koopmans 2004). 
As a result, the repertoire of action changes through accumulation, innovation of experience, and 
external constraints (Tilly 2008, 27). But it is important to stress that the cyclical progression does 
not refer exclusively to protest activity: authorities and other opponents of social movements 
mobilize their resources as well and make use of their available means to respond to challengers 
                                                 




or to try to prevent protest at all. This results in rising levels of repression and facilitation 
throughout the cycle (Tarrow 2011). In sum, what varies throughout the cycle is not just the 
number of protesters, but the relationship between challengers and authorities (Koopmans 2004). 
The main works of  reference to approach secessionist conflict through the lens of  contentious 
politics are the writings of  Beissinger (1996, 1998, 2002, 2007, 2009) on the nationalist 
mobilizations during the final phase of  the Soviet Union. Using two large catalogs of  contentious 
events from a variety of  sources, Beissinger showed that contention spread from early risers, such 
as Armenia and Estonia, to other ethnic groups within the Soviet state, provoking a cycle – or tide 
as Beissinger called it – of  protests. Beissinger’s work highlighted the endogenous dynamics within 
cycles of  contention, where one mobilization can lead to another one. The tide of  secessionist 
protests was not just an expression of  the fragile state of  the Soviet Union, but must be understood 
as a chain of  events that ultimately resulted in the collapse of  the Soviet Union in 1991. Beissinger’s 
work represents an important reference point for the present dissertation, because it highlighted 
the importance of  the temporal dimension of  secessionist contention. Mass protest is not just a 
tactic which secessionists can take out of  their strategic toolbox and employ it easily to advance 
their demands when institutional strategies are exhausted. Like other kinds of  contention, 
secessionist protest erupts in waves that are driven by the interactions between challengers and 
authorities.  
Cycles of  contention often expand over several years (Tarrow 1989). In this dissertation, I focus 
more narrowly on the peak of  the secessionist cycle in Catalonia at the time around the referendum 
on October 1, 2017. This period of  roughly two months can be understood as an episode of  contention 
within the larger secessionist cycle. Contentious episodes are defined as “bounded sequences of  
continuous interaction” (Tilly 2008, 10) between authorities and challengers.13 The single 
components of  this sequence are actions by secessionist challengers and the host state. An action 
by one party triggers a response from the opponent party, and so on (Kriesi, Hutter, and Bojar 
2019). At the peak of  the cycle, these contentious interactions between challengers and authorities 
often occur in a condensed period of  time. Within a few months, weeks, or even just a couple of  
days, social movement actors repeatedly stage protests, occupy buildings, and go on strike. In turn, 
authorities make institutional declarations, sue challengers in the courts, and order the police to 
repress protest. During these heated times, “events suddenly start to fuel themselves, as action 
produces action” (Della Porta 2014b, 30). Sometimes these contentious events happen in such 
quick sequence that the actors involved in contention cannot keep up with the pace themselves – 
                                                 




let alone the external observer. Beissinger (2002, 27) described these phases of  intense contention 
as “thickened history:” 
Indeed, in a period of heightened challenge events can “begin to move so fast and old 
assumptions become so irrelevant that the human mind cannot process all the new 
information” – a phenomenon I refer to in this book as “thickened” history. By 
“thickened” history, I mean a period in which the pace of challenging events quickens to 
the point that it becomes practically impossible to comprehend them and they come to 
constitute an increasingly significant part of their own causal structure […] What takes 
place within these “thickened” periods of history has the potential to move history onto 
tracks otherwise unimaginable, affecting the prisms through which individuals relate to 
authority, consolidating conviction around new norms, and forcing individuals to make 
choices among competing categories of identity about which they may previously have 
given little thought – all within an extremely compressed period of time. 
The quote points to the rapid succession of occurrences that are often too complex to observe in 
real time – what Tarrow (2011, 199) described as “sequences of intensified information flow and 
interaction between challengers and authorities.” In short, episodes of intense contention 
represent a quick and dense sequence of contentious interaction. The next section describes how 
these dense sequences can trigger changes in the course of a conflict. 
2.2 Contentious Episodes as Critical Junctures and Transformative Events 
Research in social movement studies has devoted much attention to the question of how cycles 
and episodes of contention emerge. The contentious politics approach has synthesized previous 
findings on the role of the political opportunity structure (Kriesi 1995; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; 
Tilly 1978), framing (Benford and Snow 2000; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Johnston and Noakes 
2005), and organizations (Lofland 1996; McCarthy and Zald 1977) and embedded them in a 
relational framework. Contentious performances – marches, meetings, strikes – were seen as the 
product of these factors.  
This relationship is reversed in this dissertation. Instead of looking at contentious episodes as 
outcomes, I am interested in how they trigger change. The idea that some political occurrences 
can be transformative was advanced by historical sociologist William H. Sewell and other scholars 
(Abbott 1992, 2001; McAdam and Sewell 2001; Sewell 1996b, 1996a; Wagner-Pacifici 2010). These 
occurrences are called transformative or historical events and are different from routine or normal 
occurrences, because they have exceptional impact on the course of politics and society. In the 
words of Sewell (1996b, 263), “events bring about historical changes in part by transforming the 
very cultural categories that shape and constrain human action.” Building on this insight, Donatella 




can have transformative consequences for the course of movements, institutions, and even entire 
societies. 
Of course not all contentious episodes are necessarily eventful. To appreciate this fact, it is 
helpful to distinguish between occurrences, critical junctures, and transformative events (Basta 
2018). Occurrences are “all instances of political action, from the routine (e.g., regularly scheduled 
elections, or normal legislative or regulatory acts) to the unusual (acts of civil disobedience, 
outbreaks of political violence, corruption scandals)” (Basta 2018, 4). Or, as I would put it, 
occurrences are action-in-time. They are the sum of all political happenings. Many of them go 
unnoticed by analysts and political actors themselves.  
There are two kinds of occurrences that are of special interest, because they represent departures 
from normal politics: critical junctures and transformative events. They are subclasses of 
occurrences, where every transformative event is also a critical juncture (Basta 2018, 6).  Figure 2 
shows the relation among these three categories as a Venn diagram.14  
 




                                                 
14 The diagram naturally represents a simplification, because critical junctures or transformative events in fact 
cannot reduced to a single happening. Sewell (1996a, p. 843) argued that events do not represent single points in time, 
but “should be conceived of as sequences of occurrences”. I do not go into the theoretical details of duration and 
overlap (Abbott, 1992, p. 438) or bounding and unbounding (Wagner‐Pacifici, 2010, pp. 1354–1355) here, but stress 
the point that transformative events and critical junctures represent periods of time that are relatively short in relation 









First, there are windows of  opportunities, during which it appears that the course of  history could 
go either way, towards radical change or the maintenance of  the status quo. In social science, and 
in particular the historical institutionalism literature, these moments of  increased contingency have 
been labeled critical junctures (R. B. Collier and Collier 2002; Mahoney 2002; Roberts 2015) and have 
become a central concept for understanding change and stability in politics. Critical junctures are 
phases when structural constraints on political action are reduced and actors have enhanced agency 
to pursue their agenda (Basta 2018; Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; Mahoney 2002, 7; Soifer 2012). 
In the language of  social movement scholars, a critical juncture can be described as a shift in the 
political opportunity structure (Meyer and Minkoff  2004; Tarrow 2011; Tilly 1995). Even in the 
face of  fierce opposition, protest can produce critical junctures or overturn structural constraints 
entirely (Della Porta 2018). However, as Capoccia and Kelemen (2007, 352) emphasized, critical 
junctures do not necessarily result in political change:  
Tempting as it may be to equate critical junctures and change, this view is not 
commensurable with the emphasis on structural fluidity and heightened contingency that 
are the defining traits of critical junctures. Contingency implies that wide-ranging change 
is possible and even likely but also that re-equilibration is not excluded. 
Taking the concept of  contingency seriously, and not just as a placeholder for opportunity, means 
leaving room for failed transformations. Thus, critical junctures also include negative cases, in 
which a structural opening does not result in long-lasting change.15 Including these “near misses” 
(Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 352) avoids selection bias and also draws the attention to 
counterfactual analysis. Counterfactual scenarios allow us to see critical junctures as “choice 
points” (Mahoney 2002, 6). The shift of  political opportunities that characterizes a critical juncture 
opens several options for political actors, some of  which might lead to radical change, some of  
which might result in a reproduction of  established patterns. Thus, focusing on critical junctures 
is essentially “the analysis of  decision making under conditions of  uncertainty” (Capoccia and 
Kelemen 2007, 354). However, not every political decision represents a critical juncture. What 
makes them critical is that “once an option is selected, it becomes progressively more difficult to 
return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available” (Mahoney 2002, 6–7). In 
other words, the decisions taken during a critical junctures have long-lasting and near-irreversible 
impacts on the future.  
                                                 
15 Contingency has been a major point of debate in research on critical junctures (D. Collier and Munck 2017, 4). 
Other scholars regarded change as a necessary element of critical junctures (R. B. Collier and Collier 2002; Della Porta 




Events represent the second class of  rare occurrences. Whereas critical junctures describe the 
enhanced possibility of  transformation, events are occurrences that do result in profound political 
change, which is why they have been called transformative (McAdam and Sewell 2001).16 Hence, 
transformative events are a subclass of  critical junctures (Basta 2018, 6) that have far-reaching 
consequences for politics and society. Sewell’s (1996a) prime example was the taking of  the Bastille 
as the event that truly started the French Revolution. The taking of  the Bastille led to regime 
change, because it was “interpreted as a direct and sublime expression of  the nation’s will - that an 
act of  popular violence could be articulated directly with sovereignty to form the new political 
category of  revolution” (Sewell 1996a, 861).  
Following this distinction, a contentious episode consists of  series of  political occurrences. 
Contentious episodes of  a certain magnitude – such as the 1-O episode – arguably represent 
critical junctures. In some cases, contentious episodes might even lead to profound political 
transformations, such as the French Revolution. This cannot be simply assumed from the outset, 
however. Whether a contentious episode can be considered critical or eventful is up for empirical 
research, which I turn to in the latter chapters of  the dissertation. 
In the remainder of  this chapter, I develop the theoretical argument that contentious episodes 
as “intense times” may shape the organizational dimension of  social movements and thus become 
eventful. This is a twofold argument. On the one hand, intense contentious episodes shape protest 
organizing already while these episodes unfold. The ways in which secessionists organize protests 
during the accelerated succession of  occurrences differs fundamentally from protest organizing in 
normal times. On the other hand, intense contentious episodes have consequences for protest 
organizing also after the peaks of  contention. How activists organize protests is often affected in 
the long run.  
2.3 Eventful Contentious Episodes and Organizational Change 
What do events transform? When Sewell first formulated the idea of  transformative events, it were 
large-scale changes such as revolutions and other regime changes that he had in mind. He is mostly 
quoted with his definition of  events as “sequences of  occurrences that result in the transformation 
of  structures” (1996a, 843). This is problematic, because reducing the concept of  events to this 
single quote might result in an overly structural approach to transformation. It suggests a binary 
reading that equates events with action and change, and structure with stability. On the very same 
                                                 
16 Following Sewell (1996a) and others I define events as inherently transformative and use the terms “event“ and 




page of  his famous article, however, Sewell wrote that an event “durably transforms previous 
structures and practices” (843, emphasis added). This reflects Sewell’s “dual” understanding of  
structure following the work of  Anthony Giddens (1984). Like Giddens, Sewell held that 
structures ”shape practices, but it is also people’s practices that constitute and reproduce 
structures” (Sewell 1996a, 842, see also 1992). Thus, an event does not just represent a 
transformation of  social structure, it also implies “a surprising break with routine practice” (Sewell 
1996a, 843). What might seem like an ontological debate for social theorists has fundamental 
implications for the empirical research that follows in this dissertation for two reasons. 
First, Della Porta (2008, 2018) argued that transformative events can also have important 
consequences at a lower level of  abstraction. While Sewell and others focus on the impact of  
events on macro-level structures, she suggests that contentious events can have “effects not only 
(and might be not mainly) on the authorities or the public opinions but also on the movement 
actors themselves” (Della Porta 2008, 48). She demonstrated that “many protests have cognitive, 
affective and relational impacts on the very movements that carry them out” (2008, 30). Social 
movements do not just take part in contentious events – contentious events also change social 
movements. I follow Della Porta’s work in that I am interested in how contentious episodes may 
be eventful and result in organizational change in social movements. 
Second, the narrow reading that events transform structures might lead the researcher’s attention 
to organizational structures in social movements and design a study that uses organizational 
entities as the primary units of  analysis. This would imply focusing on SMOs and other elements 
of  the social movement’s infrastructure. However, as outlined in the first part of  this chapter, I have 
taken a different approach to organization in social movements. Given my interest in how activists 
organize protest, I have built a conceptual framework that prioritizes organizational processes 
without neglecting the role of  both practices and structures. In this sense, my approach is 
compatible with Sewell’s dual view of  structure and practices. Events do not just transform 
organizational structures, but also organizing processes.  
Building on these two assumptions, I argue that episodes of  intense contention can be eventful 
and transform the processes and practices of  how activists organize protest. This argument 
comprises two parts. On the one hand, I suggest that intense times have important repercussions 
already as they unfold. Events have the power to transform structures and practices while they 
happen. When contentious interactions occur in dense sequences, organizers are faced with 
heightened contingency, resistance from opponents, and time pressure. As a result, organizational 
processes and practices vary substantively from organizing in normal times. Second, intense times 




events themselves come to a conclusion. While some of  the changes during the contentious 
episode are reverted and normalized afterwards, others solidify over time and become part of  the 
organizational practices of  the movement. In the next two sections, I elaborate further on these 
arguments. 
Organizing during intense times 
“Intense times” are different from “normal times” of conflict. Following this assumption, the first 
argument is that these two kinds of “times” matter for how secessionist movements organize 
protest. In essence, I suggest that protest organizing during intense periods of time differs 
fundamentally from organizing in normal periods of time. As mentioned above, the peaks of cycles 
of contention are characterized by a dense sequence of occurrences. The compressed succession 
interactions has a profound impact on the ways in which social movement actors organize protests 
during intense times.  
In normal times, social movement organizers face a number of  challenges to overcome the 
collective action problem despite the routinization of  interactions with authorities (Della Porta 
and Reiter 1998) and the normalization of  protest (Meyer and Tarrow 1998). Organizing mass 
protest requires a series of  preparatory activities (Rucht 2017). These “kinds of  coordinations, 
complex in normal times, become even more difficult” (Wagner-Pacifici and Ruggero 2018, 2) in 
intense times. When organizers are “faced with an emerging event, individual decisions about 
whether (or not) to continue adhering to normal schedules of  organizational and personal life 
become charged and consequential” (Wagner-Pacifici and Ruggero 2018, 2). This pertains not just 
individual decisions, but also collective ones. Theoretically, there are three factors that shape 
organizing in intense times: resistance from opponents, increased uncertainty, and time pressure. 
First, organizers meet severe opposition from authorities in intense times. It is a general feature 
of  protest that it seeks to disrupt established political practice. Social movements have been 
defined as engaging in conflictual relationships with their opponents (Della Porta and Diani 2006, 
22–23). At the same time, over the past decades, protests have become an everyday feature of  
established democracies. In the course of  this conventionalization of  contentious politics, 
interactions between challengers and authorities have become routinized (Della Porta and Reiter 
1998); institutions might choose, for instance, to simply ignore contention from social movements. 
While these routines shape protest organizing in normal times, they do not uphold in eventful 
times. As cycles of  contention unfold and reach their peak, authorities are more likely to respond 




during phases of  intense contention, they face legal barriers, police action, and counter-
mobilization, all of  which make preparing and planning collective action much more difficult.  
Second, events have sometimes been seen as sudden and unforeseen ruptures or cracks (Della 
Porta 2018). An occurrence becomes an event for observers when the “current state of  the world 
is perceived to be different from the expected state of  the world” (Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 
2005, 409). Unexpected events pose an enormous challenge for social movement organizers. 
During periods of  intense contention, governments, courts, or the police often act without 
previous notice, which may call for an immediate response from challengers. But also the sudden 
eruption of  protest itself  can create a need for organizers to adapt to an unforeseen situation. At 
the peaks of  contentious cycles, these types of  action cluster within short periods of  time, which 
creates a climate of  uncertainty and contingency that has fundamental consequences for how 
movements organize protest in these times.  
Of  course, not all events are unexpected. In some cases, such as scheduled elections, political 
actors can anticipate and prepare for their occurrence. They can try to prospectively frame the 
event in their favor (Basta 2018). Even so, the event remains contingent; its outcome is unclear 
until after it has occurred. In contentious interactions, and in particular at the height of  cycles of  
contention, it is impossible for social movement actors to prepare in advance for all potential 
scenarios. This relates to the previous point on opponents: in eventful periods of  contention, 
authorities are more likely to respond to protest action. The range of  possible government 
responses are usually known to protesters, but the exact nature of  that response remains 
unforeseeable. Consequently, there is a greater level of  uncertainty during protest organizing 
processes. If  organizing is defined as reducing uncertainty (see the first part of  this chapter), then 
one could say that there is simply “more” to organize in eventful times.  
Third, intense times represent dense sequences of  contentious interactions. As mentioned 
before, these chains of  interaction between challengers and opponents rarely unfold in linear 
fashion or at a steady pace, but accelerate as contention intensifies. Thus, organizers must deal 
with their opponents’ actions and increased uncertainty repeatedly over the course of  a short 
period of  time. This creates time pressure for activism in intense times, as Della Porta (2018, 9) 
explained:  
The intensity of extraordinary times reduces the availability of the time that would be 
necessary to collect information, to reflect, to deliberate. In these intense times, activists 
report, crucial decisions have to be made quickly, in the heat of the moment. Time 
accelerates because of the breaking down of previous institutions, rules, and norms. Rather 
than being based on routines, which are perceived as no longer effective, decisions often 
favor creativity and innovation, and the capacity of movement actors to occupy these 




Time pressure has an enormous impact on how activists organize protest. It alters previous routine 
and practices. It reduces the time for deliberation and decision making, but also creates a need for 
innovation, which can ultimately result in transformative consequences.  
These three mechanisms – interactions with opponents, increased uncertainty, and time 
pressure – fundamentally suggest that protest organizing during intense times differs from 
organizing in normal times. The critical reader might raise the concern that the argument suffers 
from endogeneity. Indeed, the suggestion that intense contention influences the ways in which 
activists organize precisely these activities seems either tautological because a large part of  
contention is protest activity, or an absurd reversal of  the relationship: does not the conflict 
become more contentious because activists organize protest? In a positivist view, there might be 
too much conceptual overlap between the two “variables” protest organizing and contention.  
There are at least three answers to this critique. First, waves of  contention and intense times do 
not just describe the density of  protest, but they refer to actions of  both challengers and their 
opponents. Thus, contention should be seen as inherently relational transactions rather than 
isolated behavior of  actors (Emirbayer 1997). It is not the occurrence of  protest, but the relational 
dynamics between challengers and opponents that shape protest organizing. The three 
mechanisms described above all include the element of  oppositional action. The second response 
builds on the first one by adding the temporal element. Protest organizing in contentious episodes 
is not just influenced by a single instance of  protest, but by the course of  contentious transactions 
over time. Events and temporality play a crucial role in this influence. Some of  these events are 
protest events, others are not.  
Third, the more radical answer is that endogeneity, in fact, is a central part of  my argument. 
From an eventful perspective, a series of  protests cannot be understood independently from each 
other nor from their preparatory processes. Beissinger (1996, 126–27) has rightfully pointed out 
that not “only should more frequent efforts to organize mobilization lead to higher levels of  
participation, but successful mobilizations should also lead to more frequent attempts to organize 
mobilization.” This means that when studying how activists organize protest, one must take into 
account that the outcome (i.e. the protest) has an anticipated impact on its own preparation on the 
one hand, and on the subsequent protest preparations in the contentious episode on the other 
hand. The organizing processes that I analyze later on must not be understood as independent and 





The second part of  the argument concerns the idea that the impact of  intense times on organizing 
does not stop once the cycle of  contention contracts. In fact, the notion of  “eventful temporality” 
(Sewell 1996b) carries a much more radical claim than the one I have developed as the first part 
of  my argument. Sewell and others have suggested that outstanding political occurrences often 
affect the course of  politics beyond the very moment in which they happen, leading to 
fundamental changes in political discourse, public policy, or even regime types. This is why they 
have been defined as “very brief, spatially concentrated, and relatively chaotic sequences of  action 
[that] can have durable, spatially extended, and profoundly structural effects” (McAdam and Sewell 
2001, 102). Thus, eventful times are not just ruptures and breaks, after which the course of  political 
action returns to normality as if  nothing happened. Rather, they have lasting consequences for 
social structures and practices. Following this understanding, eventful times are not just 
transformative for protest organizing because of  the specific challenges they pose as they unfold, 
but also for the period of  time that follows.  
Let us assume that the first part of  the argument developed in the previous section holds true: 
opponent action, time pressure, and contingency transform the ways in which activists organize 
protest. It follows that there are, from a theoretical point of  view, three possible trajectories after 
the contentious episode comes to a close.  
First, intense contentious episodes need not necessarily lead to durable transformations. They 
can be critical junctures and change the ways in which activists organize in the very moment, but 
not in the long run. Institutionalist scholars have stressed that critical junctures represent moments 
of  greater possibility for change, but it is not inevitable. Instead, “re-equilibration” (Capoccia & 
Kelemen, 2007, p. 352) can also take place afterwards. Following this idea means that the various 
patterns of  organizing during the intense period of  contention can be exceptional, and once this 
phase is over, activists go back to previous modes of  normal organizing.   
Second, contentious episodes can create what Della Porta (2018) calls “sedimentations:” 
Transformations stabilize and become long-term outcomes. For the organizational dimension, this 
means that some of  the organizational practices that emerge during the peaks of  contention are 
adopted by activists and become part of  their normal repertoire – even when the mechanisms of  
intense contention (time pressure, opponent actions, contingency) become less relevant. This 
means that protest organizing during intense contention was not just an exceptional period. 
Sedimentations can be seen as a continuity beyond the episode of  contention itself.  
 Third, there may be transformations that are different from both re-equilibration and 




mechanisms that are still at play after the episodes is over. The theoretical framework of  the 
contentious politics paradigm highlights five mechanisms that lead to the contraction of  the cycle: 
exhaustion, repression, facilitation, radicalization, and institutionalization (Tarrow 2011, 190). 
These mechanisms and others can theoretically change the ways of  how activists organized during 
the contentious episode, but without bringing them back to their pre-contention state. They may 
produce totally novel forms of  organizing. 
Drawing on this distinction, I suggest that intense contentious episodes can be eventful and 
produce durable changes in the ways in which social movements organize protest. These 
transformations extend beyond the contentious episode itself. The trajectory of  change can take 
two forms. On the one hand, transformations that emerged during the contentious episode can 
sediment and turn into long-term legacies. On the other hand, contentious episodes can produce 
a series of  mechanisms that continue to transform protest organizing in ways that are different 
from those during the contentious episode. 
The twofold argument, which I have developed here suggests that the dynamics of  contention 
produce a series of  mechanisms that can have a transformative impact on how activists organize 
protest. It represents an eventful approach to organizational change and stability. However, there is 
one problem that I have bracketed until this point. Contentious events do not represent objective 
temporal units. Their symbolic dimension is the result of  a process of  social construction. The 
next section tackles this problem and integrates the constructivist level into the argument. 
2.4 The Social Construction of Eventfulness 
Time in itself  is not transformative. It is not “simply an independent and self-evident causal force 
[…] clock time is the medium through which processes unfold, the environment in which 
processes take place” (Grzymala-Busse 2011, 1273). Time does nothing but pass by.  
Neither are events objective. They are not facts out there in the empirical world waiting to be 
discovered. But neither are they pure imaginations of  the researcher’s mind. Rather, occurrences 
become events through a process of  social construction (Basta 2018; Sewell 1996a; Wagner-Pacifici 
2010, 2017).17 The duration and meaning of  an event are results of  collective articulations: 
Social and political actors seek to identify discrete political and historical events and 
entities. They also seek to distinguish between events and entities (sometimes referred to 
as “structures” in social scientific analyses). In and with their documents, speeches, 
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who used the term “symbolic interpretation” among others. Wagner-Pacifici (2010, 2017) has even developed a 




gestures, and images, actors want to be able to bind and map these phenomena, to 
determine their beginnings and endings. (Wagner-Pacifici 2010, 1354–55) 
Events only come into existence through symbolic creation. Most political occurrences go 
unnoticed. Only if  actors devote attention to it and attribute relevance to it, an occurrence 
becomes an event. 
The symbolic level is fundamental for the transformative power of  eventful episodes. In the 
previous sections, I have argued that episodes of  intense contention may shape protest organizing 
in numerous ways. During the episode, time pressure, contingency, and opponent actions may 
impact organizational practices and processes. After the episode, these practices and processes 
may revert or sediment. Or they may be further transformed through exhaustion, repression, 
facilitation, institutionalization, and radicalization as the cycle of  contention contracts. However, 
none of  these mechanisms is self-evident.  They are mediated through processes of  sensemaking, 
interpretation, and narration. In periods of  intense contention – and afterwards – activists must 
constantly make sense of  occurrences and decide how to deal with them. In this interpretive 
process, they construct events and their meaning. This is best illustrated by Sewell’s piece on the 
French Revolution: 
The novel articulation that makes this happening a momentous event in world history is 
an act of signification. Terms - for example, “Bastille” and “revolution,” but also “people,” 
“liberty,” “despotism,” and so on - took on authoritative new meanings that, taken 
together, reshaped the political world. This implies that events are, literally, significant: 
they signify something new and surprising. They introduce new conceptions of what really 
exists (the violent crowd as the people’s will in action), of what is good (the people in 
ecstatic union), and of what is possible (revolution, a new kind of regeneration of the state 
and the nation). The most profound consequence of the taking of the Bastille was, then, 
a reconstruction of the very categories of French political culture and political action. (861) 
As an action, the taking of  Bastille was not decisive in a military way, Sewell argued. But it in a 
moment of  heightened contingency, established meanings of  political structures become unstable 
and thus open for what Sewell (1996a, 861) called “transformative rearticulation.”  
This means that organizational change does not follow mechanically from a given contentious 
event, because that event is, after all, a socially constructed unit of  time. Political occurrences do 
not have consequences on organizational change (or anything actually) by themselves, the link 
between event and transformation is a product of  activist meaning-making. This symbolic process 
is not different from the mechanisms in the dynamics of  contention. In fact they are inherent in 
them. With regards to political opportunity structures for example, McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow 




to potential challengers and b) perceived as an opportunity.” The same goes for other mechanisms 
as well. Repression can only have an effect on activism if  it is interpreted as such. In the face of  
blunt state violence, this can be an unequivocal process, but may be more ambiguous in the case 
of  subtle forms of  repression, such as surveillance.  
Taking the constructivist perspective on events and organizational change seriously has 
fundamental implications for the overall research project. Instead of  looking for objective causal 
relationships, the constructivist approach implies reconstructing organizational change through 
the lens of  participants. Following Bruner (2002), Czarniawska (1998, 6) wrote that “people’s 
nonscientific explanations and interpretations of  life events are grounded in attempts to establish 
a connection between the exceptional and the ordinary.” Studying the relationship between intense 
times and organizing thus requires focusing on activist experiences. It shifts the attention to their 
narratives and interpretations. This allows understanding how and why activists adapt how they 
organize protest. 
2.5 Summary 
In the first part of this chapter, I have outlined an analytical framework to the study of organization 
in social movements. This framework distinguishes between organizations as entities, organizing 
as a process, and organizationality as a property. Based on this distinction, I have developed the 
central concept of this dissertation: protest organizing, which describes the process of preparing and 
planning protest.  
The main research question of this dissertation concerns how protest organizing changes over 
time. The second part of this chapter has conceptualized the temporal dimension of this question. 
Building on cyclical approaches to contentious politics, I have made an analytical distinction 
between two times of secessionist conflict: normal times and intense times. The theoretical 
argument is that intense times can be eventful and have a transformative impact on the ways in 
which activists organize protest. In the empirical chapters of this dissertation, I try to show that 
contentious events are transformative in at least two ways. First, activists organize protest events 
differently during the peaks of cycles of contention in comparison to what can be called normal 
times of conflict. Second, eventful times can have durable effects on protest organizing long after 
the most contentious phases of the cycle.  
This argument represents an eventful approach to organizational change and contentious 
politics. It recognizes the power that some political occurrences may have on the course of  social 
movements. This is very different from the existing research on organizational change in social 




the one hand, organizational change was conceived as change of structures, that is organizational 
entities as a specific materialization of  movement infrastructure. On the other hand, organizational 
change was regarded as driven mainly by structural factors: these can be in the rather immediate 
political opportunity structure or in the large-scale transformations of  societies, such as the 
technological innovation that has driven much of  the theories on digital organizing. Contentious 
events did not play any role in these approaches, at best they are an expression of  structures. The 
theoretical argument I have developed here goes in the opposite direction: it holds that sequences 
of  contingent political events and their associated temporal dynamics may play a central role in 












It is in the nature of  any PhD dissertation, or any research project, that research design and 
methods develop over time. This is particularly true for qualitative social research, which often 
starts with open questions. I began this research project with two broad questions in mind: how 
does the Catalan independence movement organize, and how does organizing change over time? 
Previous research in social movement studies primarily employed organizational entities as the unit 
of  analysis to address these questions, using often large samples of  organizational populations 
(Clemens 1997; Edwards and McCarthy 2004; Kriesi 1996; Minkoff  1995, 2002; Walker and 
McCarthy 2010).  
In the previous chapter, I have outlined several lines of  critique against this kind of  research, 
which led me to pursue a different approach that draws on process and practice theories in 
organization studies. Building on these literatures, I tried to go beyond organizational boundaries 
by studying organizing inside, outside, and between organizations. This unconventional approach 
presented two difficulties for the research process. First, conceptually, there was very little literature 
on organizing in social movement studies that did not focus on organizations and on which I could 
have built. Hence, in the early stages of  the empirical research, the conceptual framework was not 
as developed as presented in the previous chapter. Second, going beyond entity approaches to 
organization meant I could not simply collect data on organizations as cases. This made the start 
of  my fieldwork much more difficult. 
In the absence of  existing literature on organizational practices and processes beyond 
organizations in social movements, I decided to take an open and exploratory approach to the 
empirical part of  my research, which borrows many elements from grounded theory (Charmaz 
2006; Glaser and Strauss 1967; Mattoni 2014). In May 2018, about seven months after the Catalan 
referendum on independence, I embarked on fieldwork in Barcelona with the two broad questions 
mentioned above and a general understanding of  organizing as reducing equivocality. In began to 
explore the field to clarify these questions and concepts, using a combination of  ethnographic 




events, and had a number of  informal conversations with organizers in the independence 
movement. These data were gathered in the form of  ethnographic field notes. On the other hand, 
I spoke to seven experts, mostly activist scholars from the independence movement. These were 
open conversations rather than structured interviews. I derived the topics for these conversations 
from the research problem, the literature, and my previous knowledge of  the case. Besides the 
literal exploration of  the Catalan independence movement as a field of  research, this early stage 
of  research served two primary purposes. First, experts and observations provided a way of  getting 
in contact with key organizers without having to base the data collection on a sampling of  
organizations. Second, and most importantly, the exploratory phase helped me to refine the 
conceptual framework, the unit analysis and the case selection. The next section describes how the 
conceptual framework then translated in defining the unit of  analysis and selecting cases.  
1 UNIT OF ANALYSIS AND CASES 
During the exploratory fieldwork, I realized that in order to go beyond organizational boundaries, 
I needed a different “anchor” for the analysis. Building on readings in organization theory, the 
main design choice of  this dissertation was to focus on protest organizing, which meant to focus 
more narrowly on a specific meaning of  organization (see chapter 2). Focusing on protest 
organizing excluded much of  what might be considered organizational in social movements, but 
it had two crucial advantages. First, it defined the concept much more concretely and distinguished 
it from other meanings of  organization. Second, it allowed bounding instances of  organizing in 
meaningful chunks that could be described and compared empirically.  
The protest event represents the main unit of  analysis for this dissertation. Following Della 
Porta and Diani (2006, 165), I define protest broadly as ”nonroutinized ways of  affecting political, 
social, and cultural processes.” The non-routinized character of  protest lies in the absence of  
formal or institutionalized frameworks for its exercise. This does not mean that there are no 
routines in protest, however. Charles Tilly (1986, 1995, 2004, 2008) pointed out that protest – or 
contentious performances as he called them – is a learned and familiar activity for activists. 
However, innovation is also part of  protesting as social movements often search for novel ways 
of  disruption (Tarrow 2011, 101). Although the repertoire of  contention goes well beyond public 
demonstrations and seems to be ever-expanding, I limited my analysis to the classic “social 
movement repertoire” by Tilly (2004, 3): namely, the “creation of  special-purpose associations and 
coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, 




In the early stages of  fieldwork, my analysis was focused on the case of  the referendum as the 
most relevant recent protest event in the Catalan secessionist conflict. However, I shifted this 
strategy very soon, because this “initial sampling” (Charmaz 2006, 100) was limiting for two 
reasons: on the one hand, it became clear that I needed to dissect the referendum event itself  into 
its different components, distinguishing between administrative actions of  the Generalitat, 
repressive measures by the Spanish state, and contentious actions by the independence movement 
(see chapter 6). As a result, I chose to focus more narrowly on how the defense of  the voting 
stations was organized. On the other hand, it was necessary to expand the cases to other protest 
events if  I wanted to address changes over time and the impact of  the referendum itself.  
Drawing on the initial empirical material I had gathered, I constructed seven cases for the 
central period under study, which I call the 1-O episode of  contention. To refine the analysis 
further, I then expanded the comparison a second time and collected data on one more case before 
the 1-O episode and four more cases after the 1-O episode, which makes a total of  twelve cases. 
Table 2 provides an overview of  these cases. 
The cases included different types of  protest events (demonstrations, strikes, occupations), but 
also five campaigns. Comparing single protest events and campaigns may seem an odd design 
decision at first, because in social movement research, the concept campaign is commonly used to 
describe a series of  protest actions, or sometimes even a social movement itself  (Tilly and Tarrow 
2015, 11). And indeed, the campaigns included here involved a range of  different actions. Their 
focus lied on spreading pro-independence narratives in newspapers, television, and social media. 
However, they also featured demonstrations, public speeches, and concerts. Despite the variety of  
actions, there were three reasons to include them as single cases though. First, and foremost, the 
campaign cases emerged from the data as meaningful categories for the organizers themselves. 
Especially for ANC and Òmnium Cultural, the campaign represented the primary unit of  
contentious action. Second, although the campaigns involved different kinds of  action, they all 
were consistently contained forms of  protest. They could thus be considered a coherent series of  
actions. Third, the various kinds of  action of  each campaign were organized in a single preparatory 
process. The organizations did not plan or prepare them in isolated fashion, but as part of  the 
campaigns. For these reasons, it made more sense to compare campaigns as cases instead of  
dissecting into their components, which would have increased the number of  cases drastically and 
rendered them isolated and potentially meaningless.  
The cases do not represent a sample from a clearly defined set of  protests. Instead, they are the 
result of  an empirically driven casing strategy (Ragin 1992). I constructed these protest events on 




interviews with experts. Case construction and data collection occurred as almost simultaneous 
inductive processes. Even so, casing did not follow automatically from the data, but required the 
active involvement of  the researcher. Centering the analysis on a bounded episode of  consequence 
allowed for a more focused analysis of  the relational dynamics of  contention by identifying the 
processes and mechanisms that led to the sequential unfolding of  interactions. This raised the 
crucial point of  how to delineate both episodes of  contentions and protest events (Tilly 2008, 10). 
I had to dissect the continuous flows of  contention and organizing into meaningful chunks 
through “temporal bracketing” (Langley 1999). While there are no objective criteria for bounding 
and selecting the protests as displayed above (and thereby omitting other instances of  contentious 
action), I tried to follow three rationales in the casing operations: scale, timing, and type of  action. 
The first one was scale. I decided to include primarily large-scale protests and neglect many 
smaller local protests. The reason was that mass protest requires much more organizational effort 
and would thus yield deeper insights into the preparatory process, whereas small protests were 
expected to require less coordination (Rucht 2017). The second principle for constructing these 
cases followed from the research questions. Since I was interested in changes over time and 
especially during phases of  intense secessionist conflict, I focused on the peak of  the cycle of  
contention around the 1-O referendum. Most of  the cases fell into what I defined as the 1-O 
episode of  contention, which lasted from the parliament vote of  the Law on the Referendum on 
Self-Determination on September 6 until the approval of  article 155 on October 27. Four cases 
were selected to reveal transformations during the contraction of  the cycle of  contention that 
followed the 1-O episode. Only a single case (the Ara és l’hora campaign) strictly referred to the 
time before the 1-O episode, because this period had already been studied in the literature (Crameri 
2015a, 2015b; Della Porta et al. 2017; Della Porta, O’Connor, and Portos 2019; Dowling 2018). 
Some of  the cases did not neatly fall into these three temporal categories: Òmnium Cultural’s Crida 
per la Democràcia campaign started before the beginning of  the 1-O episode, but lasted until the day 
of  the referendum. The Diada demonstration and the ANC’s referendum campaign unfolded 
during the 1-O episode, but were prepared mostly beforehand, as I show in the empirical part of  
the dissertation. The Llibertat Presos Polítics campaign by Òmnium Cultural started during the 1-O 
episode, but continued afterwards. This is why the brackets in Table 2 indicating the three periods 
of  time coincide in some cases. A third criterion consisted in including different kinds of  
contentious actions: street demonstrations, occupations, blockades and obstructions, strikes, non-
violent resistance, and media campaigns. The goal was not to develop a typology of  the 





Table 2: Overview of  cases. 
Case Dates Description Period 
Ara és l’hora campaign 17/07/2014 – 09/11/2014 ANC campaign 
 
Crida per la Democràcia 
campaign 
10/07/2017 – 01/10/2017 Òmnium Cultural campaign 
Diada demonstration 11/09/2017 
Massive street rally (Passeig de Gràcia and Carrer d’Aragó 
Barcelona) 
Sì campaign 14/09/2017 – 01/10/2017 ANC campaign 
20-S demonstration 20/09/2017 
Obstruction of  exits of  the Catalan Department of  
Economy (Rambla de Catalunya, Barcelona) and the 
headquarters of  the CUP (Carrer de Casp, Barcelona) 
Occupation University of  
Barcelona 
22/07/2017 – 02/10/2017 
Occupation of  the Historic Building of  the University of  
Barcelona (Plaça Universitat, Barcelona). 
Defense of  the voting 
stations 
29/09/2017 – 01/10/2017 
Occupation of  voting stations and resistance against 
police intervention 
3-O general strike 03/10/2017 Strikes, pickets, mass rallies and marches 
Llibertat Presos Polítics 
campaign 
17/10/2017 – 05/04/2018 Òmnium Cultural campaign 
8-N general strike 08/11/2017 Highway and railway blockades, strikes, pickets, marches 
March 2018 protests 23/03//2018 – 31/03/2018 Highway and railway blockades, marches, rallies 











Organizing a strike was expected to require a different kind of  preparation than the occupation of  
a university building. Including and examining different actions thus provided a more 
comprehensive picture of  protest organizing.  
This casing strategy allowed for comparisons of  protest organizing in three different time 
periods: in what Beissinger calls “normalized times” (1996, 104), during the 1-O episode of  
contention, and the period afterwards. Through the analysis of  this time frame, I addressed the 
question of  how protest organizing changed in periods of  intense contention and afterwards. 
Including different types of  protest allowed going beyond the specific preparations of  one single 
type. At the same time, the low number of  cases allowed studying the protest organizing processes 
in depth. However, the casing strategy had one main limitation: it covered only a limited time span. 
Most of  the cases fell into the nine months of  the second half  of  2017 and the beginning of  2018. 
This is why the findings on changes after the 1-O episode of  contention must be considered with 
care. I discuss the question of  whether these constitute durable transformations in the concluding 
chapter.   
2 DATA COLLECTION 
In order to describe these twelve cases and their organizing processes, I employed what Langley 
(2010, 411) called the “big three of  qualitative research:” observation, interviewing, and document 
research. More precisely, I drew on four types of  qualitative data: direct observations, expert 
interviews, semi-structured interviews with organizers, and documents. I have already described 
the collection of  direct observations and expert interviews during the exploratory phase above. 
This section describes how I collected the semi-structured interviews with key activists and a series 
of  documents about the protest events. 
2.1 Semi-structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews represented the main data source for this dissertation. The reason why 
I focused primarily on semi-structured interviews lies in my approach to the main research 
question. As I have described in the conceptual framework, transformative events emerge through 
a process of  social construction. This means it is necessary to study the role of  events, such as the 
1-O referendum, for organizational change through the lenses of  participants. I wanted to know 
how activists themselves understoond the referendum and its impact on the movement. This 
interpretive approach thus required a method that was able to produce these kinds of  




Between May 2018 and March 2019, I conducted 30 interviews with key organizers from the 
Catalan independence movement. I define organizers as activists who regularly engage in the 
planning and preparing of  collective contentious action. Organizers attend meetings, communicate 
with other activists and organizers, make decisions where and when to protest, choose frames and 
tactics, and mobilize resources and participants.18 This distinguishes organizers from activists that 
merely participate in protests or only occasionally in the preparatory process.  
The figure of  the organizer overlaps with other activist categories. First, organizers often hold 
positions in organizational entities, for example on boards or executive committees. These offices 
may authorize them with the power to make decisions. But organizers who are not “officers” may 
also exercise influence in the organizing process, especially when such positions are fully absent 
for lack of  formalization. Second, organizers may or may not be professional staff  in organizations 
(cf. Staggenborg 1988).  Third, organizers are often social movement leaders, who have been 
defined as those activists “accepting responsibility to create conditions that enable others to 
achieve shared purpose in the face of  uncertainty” (Ganz 2010, 527). I distinguish organizers from 
leaders, because leaders do more than protest organizing: they build relationships, create narratives, 
devise strategies, and construct structures (Ganz and McKenna 2017). Conversely, some organizers 
might not necessarily be considered leaders of  the movement. 
Building on this understanding, I targeted organizers in the various milieus of  the independence 
movement for interviews. The main selection criterion for the interviewees was that they were 
actively involved in at least one preparation of  the twelve cases. My starting point for data 
collection was asking experts about potential interviewees, which yielded a series of  contacts, from 
which I proceeded through theoretically controlled snowballing (see below). Even so, the extent 
to which interviewees were involved in organizational tasks themselves and could talk about it 
could only be determined in the interview. In a few instances, I discovered only during the 
interview that the respondent had only been marginally involved and I had to exclude them from 
the database afterwards. 
As mentioned above, I started with a focus on the case of  the defense of  the voting stations 
and gradually expanded the cases. This allowed to structure the data collection around comparable 
instances of  organizing. At the same time, my aim was to keep an open approach. In order to 
                                                 
18 There is a subtle difference between this understanding, and the one by Han (2014, 8), which distinguishes 
between organizers and mobilizers: “Organizers invest in developing the capacities of people to engage with others in 
activism and become leaders. Mobilizers focus on maximizing the number of people involved without developing 
their capacity for civic action. The high-engagement chapters did both”. Her approach is closely related to what I like 




include a series of  organizational perspectives and experiences, and to go beyond organizational 
boundaries, I needed to maximize the variety of  organizational affiliations. This involved several 
criteria.  
First, I selected interviewees from different organizational entities. I put emphasis on the three 
most important ones (ANC, Òmnium Cultural, CDRs), but included also smaller actors, such as 
student and youth groups (Universitats per la República, Arran, Sindicat d’Estudiants dels Països 
Catalans, La Forja), one trade union (CSC-Intersindical), a profession-based group (BxR). I also 
included some organizers that had no organizational affiliation at the time but were nevertheless 
involved in some of  the protest preparations. Second, I tried to achieve variation on the 
organizational level at which organizers were active. This included the local level (neighborhood, 
village, town), some intermediate levels (city, district, province), and the regional level (Catalonia).19 
Third, the interviewees came from different geographical contexts. This includes different 
neighborhoods of  Barcelona, its suburbs (L’Hospitalet de Llobregat, Gavà), some mid-sized towns 
(Girona, Tarragona, Sabadell), and some smaller towns, which I have anonymized to protect the 
identity of  the interviewees (Fastiada, Montanya). Fourth, with regards to individual biographies, 
I selected interviewees from different activist generations and with different organizational 
“careers.” Some of  them had remained with one organization for a long time, others had switched 
several times or were active in multiple entities. Finally, I tried to achieve some balance on age and 
gender. The sample was far from perfect, however: there certainly was a bias towards left-leaning 
activists with a university education.  
All interviews were conducted face-to-face in Spanish, but some interviewees would employ 
Catalan vocabulary here and there.20 The interview guide consisted of  five parts. First, I asked the 
respondents about their “activist history:” how they got involved in the movement, which groups 
they had been participating in. Second, I was interested in the organizing processes they were 
involved in. In the beginning, this revolved around the 1-O referendum but expanded to other 
cases later. The third part consisted of  questions about the internal life of  the groups the 
interviewee participated in. These questions referred primarily to the two categories of  practices 
presented in the conceptual framework: decision making and communication. Fourth, I asked 
open question about how practices, organizational entities, and organizing processes had changed 
                                                 
19 Of course, independentists refer to this as the “national” level. In this dissertation, I employ the term “regional” 
instead, unless it is a proper name such as the National Assembly of the Committees for the Defense of the Republic. 
20 I chose to do the interviews in Spanish, because my Catalan was rather poor at the beginning of the fieldwork. 
Surprisingly, the choice of language was never an issue. None of the interviewees declined to respond in Spanish. This 




over time, and in particular after the 1-O referendum. The final part consisted of  questions about 
why the interviewee wanted Catalonia to be independent, and how they thought this goal could be 
achieved. As it is convenience in qualitative interviewing, these questions were not standardized 
and led to many follow-up questions in between. 
The weight and order of  these topics changed throughout the interviewing process. In the 
beginning, I opened the interview with questions about the referendum on October 1, as an anchor 
to get hold of  organizational processes and practices. When I felt that there was some satisfaction 
in the answers on the referendum itself, I shifted the focus of  the interviews and included other 
protest events as cases. In this second phase of  interviewing, I would begin the interviews with 
some questions about their activist history and then turn to the other sets of  questions. Despite 
the shift in the emphasis, the two interview phases rendered similar data. 
Studying protest organizing through qualitative interviews had two disadvantages. The first one 
was that I carried out all interviews after the protest cases had occurred, with the exception of  the 
ANC’s Primaries campaign which was still ongoing during my fieldwork in Catalonia. Thus, the 
interviews represent retrospective views on the cases under study, which bears problems of  
memory, narrative, and ex post rationalization. The second disadvantage was that the interviews 
could only capture individual perspectives on organizing as an essentially collective phenomenon. In 
other words, organizational interactions and practices, which usually involve groups of  people, 
were only tangible through interviewees’ representations. Both these limitations were somewhat 
remedied by the use of  documents as collective and temporarily situated data (see next section). 
Moreover, most of  the cases were covered by several interviewees, which allowed for cross-
validation within the data. Even so, there remained a retrospective bias in the data that I make 
transparent throughout the empirical analysis wherever necessary.  
The limitations of  the interview data were outweighed by their advantages. First of  all, despite 
their retrospective bias, semi-structured interviews offered a flexible access to the past. While 
observations are bound to the present, and documents to the past, qualitative interviews are 
“temporally versatile in that respondents can draw on their memories and link phenomena across 
time” (Langley 2010, 411). Thus, they are “are able to provide a longitudinal window on social 
movement activism” (Blee and Taylor 2002, 95). Through organizers’ accounts, qualitative 
interviews allowed accessing different cases of  protest organizing.  
  The second strength of  qualitative interviews is their level of  detail with regards to the 
research object. Della Porta (2014a, 228–29) suggested that for researching internal processes in 
social movements “in-depth interviews are to be preferred, especially where the researcher is 




the organizational processes and practices that were the core interest of  this thesis. Qualitative 
interviews offered the potential to make use of  organizers’ knowledge, which would not be 
accessible to same extent through observation or documents. 
Third, collecting data through organizers meant prioritizing their agency. In-depth interviews 
were particularly well suited to reveal individuals’ agency and the sense they attribute to their 
actions (Blee 2013; Della Porta 2014a; Rathbun 2009). They revealed the organizers motivations, 
interpretations, evaluations, and strategies. Most crucially, more than organizational documents or 
direct observation, semi-structured interviews allowed organizers to elaborate on how they 
perceived episodes of  intense contention and how they translated them into action. As I have 
described in the conceptual framework, events are not objective facts that are ready to be 
discovered through the researcher. Rather, I needed the interviewees to do that kind of  work for 
me. 
The interviews were fully transcribed, with the exception of  two. Two interviews involved two 
respondents, the rest were individual interviews. The raw interview data amounts to 2451 minutes 
of  audio recordings and 555 pages of  transcripts. The appendix shows a full list of  the interviews 
with the interviewees’ organizational affiliations. 
2.2 Documents 
In addition to the interview data, I collected three types of  documents: governmental and legal 
documents, press articles, and documents produced by SMOs. First, the eight governmental and 
legal documents referred primarily to actions of  state institutions, for example the activation of  
article 155 by the Spanish senate, but also other institutionally produced documents such as the 
official results of  the 1-O referendum. Second, the 26 press articles came from three (online) 
newspapers in Spanish and Catalan: Vilaweb, El País, La Vanguardia. These articles were reports 
about contentious actions taken by the various actors in the secessionist conflict. Third, the data 
included 16 documents produced by the SMOs of  the independence movement: press releases 
announcing some of  their actions, internal organizational rules, and organizational histories.  
The first two types, governmental/legal documents and press articles were gathered on the 
basis of  the case selection. After I had constructed the protest cases and the other contentious 
actions on the basis of  the exploratory and the interview data, I searched official sources for 
documents with complementing information on these cases – for example the exact wording of  
the Law on the Referendum on Self-Determination. I proceeded in similar fashion for the press 
articles, performing a web search of  the online newspapers Vilaweb, El País, and La Vanguardia 




selected on the basis of  interviewees’ affiliations, but for some loosely structured groups, such as 
the CDRs, no documents were available. 
The final document catalog did not represent a comprehensive sample of  any of  the three 
categories. Instead, the catalog was a qualitative selection of  the most relevant documents. 
Documents – even those produced by SMOs themselves – tell us very little about organizational 
practices and processes. I used these documents primarily to crosscheck what interviewees told 
me about contentious events and to add more data on the cases. The documents were downloaded 
and archived in PDF format. The appendix includes an overview of  them with links to their web 
sources.  
3 DATA ANALYSIS 
In qualitative research, data collection and data analysis are intertwined parts of  the research 
process. As I have described in the previous sections, the data I collected in the exploratory phase 
through observations and expert interviews served then as a basis for the construction of  the cases 
and the selection of  organizers for interviews. These two operations did not occur at one point in 
time, but over the course of  the ten months of  fieldwork, and in conjunction with the analysis of  
the already collected data. This was a complex and multilayered process that involved a back-and-
forth between data, cases, and concepts. In this section, I describe the central features of  the 
interpretive process, which took place on three levels of  analysis: the case level, the practice level, 
and the eventful level. These analyses were performed in MaxQDA and involved different coding 
and summarizing strategies, which I explain more in detail where adequate. 
3.1 Tracing the Cases 
The basic analytical task consisted in describing the twelve cases of  contentious action and their 
preparatory processes. This descriptive analysis started from the outcome (the case of  protest 
action) and traced their organizing processes backwards in time. Therefore, the technique 
resembled “case-centric process tracing” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 9–11), although it did not 
share the focus on causal inference of  political science process tracing. Instead, I followed a series 
of  guiding questions, which referred to the different concepts outlined in the framework (see 
chapter 2, but also Killian, 1984): 
 
1. Organizationality: Was the protest case spontaneous or organized? 
2. Organizing: How was the protest case organized?  




First, it was important to determine whether a contentious performance had been organized at all, 
i.e. whether it was the result of  deliberate planning in advance or could be characterized as 
spontaneous or even random action. Second, if  they were organized, how so? This was the central 
step in the tracing of  the organizing process. Collier (2011, 824) insisted that the description of  
processes “begins not with observing change or sequence, but rather with taking good snapshots 
at a series of  specific moments,” which requires “to characterize key steps in the process.” This 
involved a series of  more specific questions: What were the various preparatory activities? How 
did organizers try to reduce uncertainty about the action? What was the sequence of  these activities 
and did it matter for the outcome? The third step of  the analysis addressed the role of  the actors 
involved in the process. Most importantly, it focused on existing and emergent structures in the 
process. 
This set of  analytical questions guided the coding process. Most of  the codes that emerged 
from the data were rather general, because I used them primarily to organize the raw data instead 
of  generating categories in grounded theory fashion. The goal was not so much to arrive at a more 
general model of  the preparatory process, such as the one by Rucht (2017). Rather, I wanted to 
create an accurate account of  each case, following what Langley (1999) called a “narrative strategy” 
for the analysis of  qualitative process data. This is why I used the codes primarily to produce short 
descriptive summaries of  each case, using the “summary grid” and “summary table” in MaxQDA. 
These descriptive summaries represented the basic analytical unit for the further analyses, which I 
describe in the next two sections. 
3.2 Identifying Organizational Practices 
The second part involved the analytical construction of  organizational practices from the empirical 
data. This analysis was the one which closest followed the procedures of  grounded theory – and 
in particular its constructivist variant (Charmaz 2006) – because I departed only from a minimum 
of  conceptual premises. From the review of  the relevant literature, I knew that decision making 
and communication were central features in two strands of  organization theory. Apart from this 
idea and a general notion of  practice, the process was driven by the empirical data. 
This was a complex process, because for practice theorists, the social is made of  practices 
(Schatzki 2001a, 12). Departing from this ontological premise, I found myself  faced with an 
abundance of  practices in the data. These practices “overlap and connect” (Schatzki 2005, 474) 
and can be located at various levels of  abstraction. I approached organizing as a field of  practices 
(see chapter 2). Gherardi (2012, 75) defined a field of  practices “as composed of  activities and 




connections between practices and the arrays of  these connections, which Gherardi called “texture 
of  practice.” Drawing on this definition, organizing represents a field of  different organizational 
practices. Gherardi (2012, 173) underlined that “isolating a practice within a texture of  practices is 
a heuristic operation by the researcher who, depending on his/her research interests, delimits a 
field of  analysis.” In addition, practices, as well as the “texture” they form, will depend very much 
on the organizational setting in which they are located. For instance, strategizing and decision 
making will not only work differently in a business organization than in an academic department, 
but also the ways in which they are combined will vary substantively.  
As Gherardi (2012, 155) pointed out, a methodological advantage of  this approach lies in 
recognizing the interconnection of  practices, which allows to “shift the analysis from a practice to 
a field of  practices which contains it, and vice versa.“ My aim was to focus primarily on the series 
of  organizational practices in a social movement at a given point on time. This meant tackling a 
lower level of  abstraction, trying to identify concrete practices within the case of  the Catalan 
independence movement, which could then be described with a higher level of  accuracy. These 
practices are described in detail in chapter 5.  
The data analysis departed from the very broad sensitizing concept of  organizational practice 
outlined above. I have already mentioned the difficulty of  delineating this concept. This involved 
both differentiating organizational practices from other practices, as well as mapping the “texture” 
(Gherardi 2012) of  the field of  practices. I approached the empirical data with the operational 
definition of  organizational practice as a practice that deliberately orders other activities and practices by 
reducing equivocality. But the larger part of  the analytical process consisted in induction from the 
empirical materials. Methodologically, the inductive analysis was informed by grounded theory 
(Charmaz 2006; Glaser and Strauss 1967; Mattoni 2014). 
For recognizing practices in the empirical data, linguistic cues were particularly helpful. In the 
Spanish language there is a basic difference between two past tenses: while the preterit (indefinido) 
highlights completed actions in the past, the imperfect (imperfecto) refers to habitual or repetitive 
activities (Frantzen 1995). This was not a strict rule that was always followed by the interviewees, 
but it often revealed whether they meant an action at a specific moment in the past (using preterit 
often in combination with a temporal marker) or one that was repeated over a period of  time 
(using imperfect). Using imperfect, interviewees often signaled that they referred to a practice of  
doing things rather than a single concrete action.  
This linguistic element represented a resource for analysis, but also pointed to a methodological 
problem: how to delineate the temporal frame of  practices. Since the imperfect does not directly 




interviewees often did not make transparent in which period of  time they were doing a certain 
action. However, this also reflected the idea that practices represent somewhat generalized ways 
of  doing things that transcend a particular moment in time. The only way to deal with this 
analytically was to infer from the context in which an interviewee’s statement was placed.  
With regard to the analytical procedures, I started by identifying four organizational practices 
through the coding of  interviewee data and field notes. This analytical step was performed after 
the explorative rounds of  coding and the coding of  the preparatory processes described in the 
previous chapter. Initially, I worked with the parts of  the data that referred to the process of  
organizing the defense of  the voting stations. From there, I expanded the analysis to the other 
organizing processes described previously. This served two purposes: on the one hand, to get a 
sense of  what the generalized features of  the practices were, and on the other hand, how these 
features might have change over time. I address the latter issue in the empirical parts of  the thesis.  
3.3 The Change of Protest Organizing 
After tracing of  the twelve cases and identifying four relevant organizational practices, I turned 
more explicitly to the question which is at the heart of  this dissertation: how do periods of  intense 
contention shape protest organizing? This question tackles another level of  process: the change 
and stability of  protest organizing over time. More precisely, I analyzed the development of  the 
four central concepts (organizationality, organizing, organizations, and practices) using two 
techniques.  
First, I compared the narrative summaries of  the twelve cases, which I have described in section 
2.2, with regards to the four analytical categories. I employed summary grids and summary tables 
in MaxQDA. Focusing on the four concepts, this allowed to establish descriptive patterns of  
changes and continuity over time. For example, I could check whether one communication practice 
was employed more or less frequently by activists in some cases and whether there was a difference 
during the 1-O episode of  contention.   
Second, I focused on direct statements on change and stability in the data. This was done 
primarily in the interviews with experts and key organizers. I asked these interviewees explicitly 
about changes over time. The responses to these questions were often quite analytical already and 
helped a lot to enrich the cross-case comparisons. For example, some interviewees described how 
deliberation as a practice became more important in organizing processes after the 1-O 
referendum. I coded these explicit statements on change and stability and summarized them, using 




Afterwards, I brought the summaries of  the two techniques together and produced analytical 
narratives on changes and stability of  protest organizing in the independence movement. The final 
phase consisted in reconnecting these results with the theoretical approach to the temporal 
dimensions. This involved two steps: first, I analyzed the narrative summaries with regards to the 
dynamics of  contention, checking whether there was evidence on how these dynamics shaped 
changes in protest organizing. These findings are displayed in chapter 9. Second, I checked how 
changes in protest organizing were connected to specific contentious occurrences and their 
meanings. This was done to reveal whether there were any transformative events in the 1-O 
episode of  contention. 
These were the most important steps in addressing the question of  organizational change 
during and after the contentious 1-O episode. As the reader will have noticed this involved both 
splitting the data into workable pieces and a series of  isolated analytical coding and summarizing 
techniques. However, in line with the rationale of  qualitative research, I tried to maintain a holistic 
approach to the research object by constantly crosschecking the different procedures and 
acknowledging the discursive and temporal context of  the pieces of  data. Finally, I have not 
described here the many failed deviations of  the analysis that were part of  this research process. 
Qualitative research is an ongoing engagement between empirical data, theory, and the researcher 


























THE CONTENTIOUS POLITICS OF SECESSION IN CATALONIA 
 
 
Throughout the world, a number of  regions strives to break away from existing countries and 
form sovereign states of  their own. In particular after World War II, the struggle for independence 
became such a common feature of  global politics that Buchanan (1991) called it the “age of  
secession,” a trend that has continued after the fall of  the Berlin Wall (Griffiths 2016). Countries 
as diverse as Papua New Guinea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Serbia, and the UK have recently faced 
secessionist challengers who aim to redraw the borders of  these states. The protests that took 
place in the time around the 1-O referendum in Catalonia can be seen as part of  this global 
phenomenon. 
In political science, the challengers of  existing states are commonly called secessionist movements. 
Despite the use of  this term, the literature has actually engaged very little with work on social 
movements and contentious politics. Vice-versa, social movements scholars have largely turned a 
blind eye on the dynamics of  secessionist conflict, with some notable exceptions (Beissinger 1996, 
2002; Della Porta et al. 2017; Della Porta, O’Connor, and Portos 2019; Huszka 2014). Not just 
with regards to secession, but also more broadly, “research on ethno-nationalist conflict and social 
movements has remained regrettably separate” (Muro 2015, 2). The goal of  this chapter is to 
situate the secessionist challenge in Catalonia within this broader context by bringing together 
research on secessionism and social movement studies. The chapter has two parts. 
First, I review the relevant literature on secessionism and social movements to clarify the some 
of  the key terms that are used throughout the dissertation. Instead of  providing an exhaustive 
review, I discuss a series of  key concepts that are necessary to clarify the research questions of  the 
dissertation. This means I largely omit, for instance, the literature on the drivers, dynamics, and 
outcomes of  secessionist conflict. The present chapter devotes more attention to what secessionist 
movements are and what they do: I discuss the concepts secessionist movement, secessionist strategy, and 
secessionist contention. 
The second part of  the chapter focuses on secessionist contention before the 1-O episode of  




and Rodríguez-Teruel 2017; Ferreira 2021; Griffiths 2015; Pagoaga Ibiricu 2020), referendums 
(Della Porta et al. 2017; Lecours 2018, 2020; López and Sanjaume-Calvet 2020; Qvortrup 2014b), 
strategies (Butt 2017; Cortés Rivera 2020; Griffiths and Muro 2020b; Griffiths and Wasser 2019; 
Sorens 2012), and the international arena (Doyle 2010; Holesch and Jordana 2021; Muro, Vidal, 
and Vlaskamp 2019; Saideman 1997). Only few studies have treated secessionist contention in its 
own right (Beissinger 2002; Della Porta, Gunzelmann, and Portos 2021; Della Porta, O’Connor, 
and Portos 2019). This chapter falls within the last category of  studies. I describe how the historical 
hegemony of  autonomism in Catalonia was slowly replaced by demands for independence after 
2003. Drawing on the existing empirical literature on Catalonia as well as on my own data, I show 
how secessionist challengers used massive street performances and referendums to advance their 
claims in the period from 2009 to 2017.  
These two parts introduce the Catalan independence movement as a case of  a secessionist 
movement. By describing the most recent history of  the self-determination struggle in the region, 
the chapter shows how secessionist demands were shaped by institutions, parties, and movements 
over time. This interactive and conflictual process has often been linked to the political, economic, 
and territorial crisis in Spain after 2008 (Della Porta et al. 2017; Ubasart-González 2021). This 
“triple crisis” represented an important background for the emergence and evolution of  
secessionist contention in Catalonia. The notion of  crisis also conveys a sense that the time after 
2008 was exceptional. In contrast to this reading, I suggest that the actual secessionist crisis did not 
unfold until 2017 (cf. Ferreira 2021).  
Empirically, the main point of  the present chapter is that the secessionist cycle of  contention 
before 2017 can be seen as what Beissinger (1996, 2002) called “normalized times” of  conflict – 
in comparison to what followed afterwards. Interactions between secessionist challengers and the 
state mostly followed contained trajectories. Movement actors seldom employed disruptive tactics 
and state actors limited themselves to soft repression and counter-secession in the courts.  
Before tackling the two parts of  the chapter in detail, it is necessary to clarify one question: 
what is secession actually? Pavković and Radan (2007, p. 5) defined secession as “the creation of  a 
new state by the withdrawal of  a territory and its population where that territory was previously 
part of  an existing state.” This is a quite straightforward definition, yet there are some caveats to 
it. First, as Hechter (1992) pointed out, not all secessionists want to form their own states. The 
goal of  irredentists is to secede from a state to join another state – very often one that they 
previously have been part of. These efforts may be supported by the state that wants to reclaim 
the seceding territory (Sorens 2012). Second, the definition refers to states as sovereign entities of  




entity at a lower level (e.g. from a Swiss Canton or a German Bundesland) without leaving the 
federation (Seymour, 2011). Third, some authors treat states that were created in the aftermath of  
large multinational states (such as the Soviet Union or the Austro-Hungarian Empire) as cases of  
state fragmentation, because of  the collapse of  the previous polity (Hechter 1992). States that 
result from decolonization are sometimes considered a different outcome as well, as colonies were 
never fully integrated into their respective host states. However, I follow Griffiths (2016) in seeing 
state fragmentation and decolonization as cases of  secession, too, while acknowledging that there 
is a variety of  contexts in which secession can occur. 
1 SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS 
Territorial conflicts in regions as diverse as Bougainville, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Azawad have 
recently caught the attention of  international observers. In political science, challengers seeking 
withdrawal from an existing state are commonly called secessionist movements. Despite the use 
of  this term, the literature on secessionism actually engages very little with research on social 
movements and contentious politics.  
As a result of  this disconnect, secessionist movements are still poorly conceptualized in political 
science. Much of  the existing literature does not define secessionist movements at all. Authors 
who do define them neglect their internal complexity by understanding them broadly as nations 
or narrowly as organizations. Most importantly, none of  the existing conceptualizations explains 
why secessionist movements are movements. This is not just a problem of  labels. Proper 
conceptualization is utterly important, because concepts represent the building blocks of  political 
inquiry (D. Collier and Mahon 1993; Sartori 1970). The concept of  secessionist movement is often 
taken for granted or even poorly understood. The existing conceptualization of  secessionist 
movements can be categorized into three approaches.  
First, a series of  empirically-oriented studies uses the term secessionist or separatist movement 
but does not define it explicitly. This pertains both single case studies (e.g. Boylan 2015; Musgrave 
2003) and comparative case studies (e.g. Butt 2017), as well as large-n quantitative works (e.g. 
Giuliano 2006; Saideman 1997; Siroky and Cuffe 2015). Cases are either assumed to be secessionist 
movements, or selected from existing data bases in which they appear as such. There is no 
conceptual discussion what a secessionist movement entails and what sets it apart from other 
concepts.   
The second approach defines secessionist movements very broadly. For instance, Griffiths 
(2016, 50) defines a secessionist movement as “a nation that actively seeks to obtain independence 




rule over at least 100 square kilometers, has a flag, and has formally declared independence. This 
is problematic, because the highly contested notion of  a nation anchors the concept but remains 
unspecified. It implicitly assumes that the nation represents a unified entity, but there are abundant 
examples of  seceding territories where large portions of  the nation’s population are firmly 
opposed to secession. Moreover, there are a couple of  cases where secessionist efforts are not 
based on a distinct national identity (Pavković and Radan 2007). A second approach is to define 
secessionist movements more narrowly. One example is Sorens (2012, 9), who holds that “a 
secessionist movement is an organization” that aims at enhancing internal sovereignty and does 
not reject the achievement of  external sovereignty. The problem with Sorens’s definition is that it 
reduces secessionist movements to a singular organization. The same problem also creeps up in 
research on specific secessionist entities, which are then taken to represent “the movement.”  
The literature in these three approaches focuses primarily on empirical problems of  
secessionism. The minimal conceptual effort may be adequate for these research goals, but it 
carries two problems: it neglects internal complexity and fails to apprehend the movement 
character of  secessionist movements. 
First, the existing approaches abstract from much of  the internal complexity of  secessionist 
movements. Whether defining them broadly, narrowly, or not at all, the existing conceptualizations 
assume that secessionist movements represent unitary actors. Gallagher Cunningham (2014, 18) 
discussed this prominently in her book on self-determination (SD) groups: 
The central problem with this body of work is that it tends to treat these groups and, to a 
lesser extent, their host states, as essentially unitary. In these studies the “movement” or 
ethnic “group” has preferences, the “group” is a certain size, and the “group” is relatively 
poor or rich. Similarly, “states” face a certain number of challengers and are either 
democratic or authoritarian (or open or closed) but are generally treated as similar within 
these categories. In reality, there is often as much (or more) disagreement about self-
determination within SD groups and states as between them. 
Like other self-determination movements, secessionist movements are usually assumed unitary 
actors while in reality they are composed of  various collective actors. This may be a problem when 
assessing findings from different studies if  secessionist movements are defined in very different 
ways or not defined at all. Ignoring internal complexity might be fine for large-n comparative 
research, which is more concerned with generalizability across cases than the accuracy of  the 
operationalization for each individual case. Other approaches, however, might be interested 
precisely in studying this internal complexity of  secessionism. What is thus required for such 





Second, the existing concepts tell us nothing about why secessionist movements are movements. Why 
not just call them secessionist nations or secessionist organizations? What is it that makes them a 
movement and not just a group of  people? Labels matter in the social sciences: a reader who is 
not familiar with the literature might associate the term secessionist movement with politics from 
below, massive mobilization, and extra-institutional action. The word movement carries a different 
normative connotation than secessionist elites, parties, or entrepreneurs for instance.  
However, it is not my intention to argue that the label movement should be dropped. In fact, 
there are good reasons to define secessionist movements as social movements and some writers 
have done so. Huszka (2014, 4) has defined secessionist movements as “a particular type of  social 
movement with a specific political goal: independence.” But she has not further specified what a 
social movement is, nor why secessionist challengers should be considered social movements. In 
the next section, I draw on social movement theory to develop a concept of  secessionist 
movements that highlights their social movement character.  
The concept of  social movement is complex. In political science, social movements are often 
seen as a specific category of  political actor. They are distinguished from other political actors, 
such as political parties or interest groups on functional and organizational grounds (Rucht 1993; 
J. Wilson 1973). In contrast, I build on the concept by Della Porta and Diani (2020, 21) that views 
social movements as a “distinct social process” in which actors “hold conflictual orientations to 
clearly identified opponents, connect through dense, informal networks” and “share a distinct 
collective identity.” Merging this concept with Pavković and Radan’s (2007) understanding of  
secession, I define a secessionist movements a 
a distinct social process in which actors seek the withdrawal of a territory from an existing 
state, hold conflictual orientations with that state, connect through dense, informal networks 
and share a distinct collective identity. 
This definition appreciates the movement character of  secessionist movements. Secessionist 
movements do not constitute a kind of  collective actor, but a complex and distinct process. This 
process involves three dimensions. 
First, secessionist movements engage in conflictual relationships with the host state. Pavković 
and Radan (2007, 38) emphasized that in “many cases, even those of  peaceful secessions [...] there 
is often a political contention and/or conflict between the secessionist movement and the 
authorities and political parties of  the host state.” The present concept goes even beyond Pavković 
and Radan and includes the involvement in conflictual relationships as a necessary criterion for a 
secessionist challenge to be considered a movement. In addition, these conflictual relationships 




sustained campaign of  claim making, using repeated performances that advertise the claim.” Thus, 
it is not enough for secessionist movements to declare independence a single time, as Griffiths 
(2016, 50) holds, but they do so repeatedly through public actions. Very often, secessionists only 
achieve independence after a long struggle, which can span several decades.  
Second, secessionist movements are bound by a shared identity.  They are based on a common 
culture and tradition, which fosters solidarity among its individual and collective actors. Movement 
identity, culture, and tradition should not be considered stable objects. Rather, they are constantly 
reproduced and redefined by activists and play a crucial role in the constitution of  a movement as 
a collective (Melucci 1996). Many secessionist movements are based on the idea of  a shared nation 
or ethnicity, but there are some exceptions to it, such as the Confederate States of  America or 
Western Australia (Musgrave 2003; Pavković and Radan 2007). However, all secessionist 
movements face the question of  who belongs to the demos of  the claimed independent state (A. 
E. Buchanan 1991). 
Third, and most importantly, secessionist movements are informal networks of  actors (Della 
Porta and Diani 2006, 25–28; Diani 1992). They are composed both of  individual and collective 
actors, ranging from informal grassroots groups and voluntary associations to professional 
organizations and political parties. Most of  the literature on secessionist movements fails to 
apprehend this point. Oliver (1989, 4) pointed out that 
all too often we speak of movement strategy, tactics, leadership, membership, recruitment, 
division of labor, success and failure-terms which strictly apply only to coherent decision-
making entities (i.e., organizations or groups), not to crowds, collectivities, or whole social 
movements. 
Building on Oliver’s argument, secessionist movements should not be put in the same category as 
secessionist parties, organizations, or interest groups, because they lack overall coordination and 
decision making that these actors have. It also shows how Sorens’s (2012) definition clashes with 
one of  the basic conceptual assumptions in the field of  social movement studies that “social 
movements are not organizations, not even of  a peculiar kind” (Della Porta and Diani 2006, 26).  
This definition of  a secessionist movement as a social movement is narrower than the existing 
concepts in research on secessionist conflicts. It reserves the term secessionist movement to a 
distinct social process that involves a plurality of  actors and individuals that are bound by a shared 
identity and repeatedly engage in conflictual relationships with the host state by demanding 
independence.  
This concepts allows distinguishing secessionist movements from other political phenomena. 




there is no need to call a single secessionist party, organization, or interest group a secessionist 
movement. The conceptual terms and tools to describe these collective actors are already available. 
Empirically, however, it appears likely to encounter a variety of  actors pushing for independence 
as a common goal, as Pavković and Radan (2007, 45) pointed out: “In many cases, the core 
organizational base of  a secessionist movement is in fact a coalition of  political parties and cultural 
organizations with little if  any coordination among them.” Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham (2014, 
5) showed that self-determination movements “often contain multiple internal factions.” It is 
precisely this lack of  central coordination between (often conflicting) actors that requires the 
concept of  secessionist movement.  
Second, on the basis of  the conceptualization presented here, secessionist movements can be 
distinguished from other social movements. Secessionist movements are distinct in that they are 
defined by the very goal they pursue: gaining independence from the host state (Huszka 2014, 4). 
In contrast to other social movements, where goals are often multiple, ambiguous, or ill-defined, 
secessionists usually have a clear idea of  what they want. Pavković and Radan (2007, 38) formulated 
these differences in goals as follows:  
First, non-secessionist and non-autonomist parties and movements aim at changes in the 
policies and social/political structures within the host state while secessionists want only 
to escape from it. Second, their escape involves a withdrawal or detachment of a territory 
and its population from the host state. Non-secessionists have no such aims.21 
Despite these differences there is some substantial conceptual overlap of  secessionist movements 
with other movements. Secessionist movements can be regarded as a subclass of  self-determination 
movements. Self-determination is defined as the “desire [of] greater control over their own affairs 
(which at the extreme can entail demands for their own independent state)” (K. G. Cunningham 
2014, 4). Another form of  self-determination are autonomist movements, which also strive for 
greater self-government, but do not seek the proclamation and recognition of  independence 
(Pavković and Radan 2007, 36–37).22  
Most secessionist movements are based on national identity, which is why they are sometimes 
treated as part of  a broader class of  racial, ethnic, and nationalist movements (Brubaker 2009; 
                                                 
21 For self-determination movements, Gallagher Cunningham (2014, 18) similarly argued that they “are somewhat 
unique among social movements because they challenge the basic legitimacy underpinning the state system, and make 
appeals only on behalf of a bounded group.” 
22 Radical secessionist demands can be employed as a strategy to obtain greater autonomy, however (Jenne, 




Muro 2015; Olzak 1983). Notwithstanding the importance of  the nation as a basis for secessionist 
movements’ identities, there are some notable cases that are not grounded on this category 
(Pavković and Radan 2007, 44). A well-known example is the Confederate States of  America, a 
less well-known is the case of  Western Australia in 1932 (Musgrave 2003). Conversely, not all 
nationalist movements aim at secession – in fact many nationalist movements engage in counter-
secession on the side of  the host state. This is the primary reason why secessionism should be 
considered a political phenomenon in its own right. 
Secessionists themselves usually avoid the use of  the word “secession,” because it bears the risk 
of  invoking the breaking of  the UN charter and international law. Instead, many secessionist 
movements refer to themselves as “independence” or “pro-independence” movements, which has 
a more positive undertone (Pavković and Radan 2007, 35). I use the terms secessionist movement 
and independence movement interchangeably. I also employ the term separatism as synonymous to 
secessionism (Huszka 2014), although some authors  (Bartkus 1999; Hechter 1992) see separatism 
as a non-secessionist form of  autonomism.   
Third, secessionist movements should be regarded as distinct from the types of  action they 
employ. Social movements have often been linked, and sometimes been equated with, protest 
behavior. Tilly (2004, 3) called vigils, demonstrations, petitions, pamphleteering etc. the “social 
movement repertoire.” Activists often use these extra-institutional and “unconventional” (Barnes 
and Kaase 1979) forms of  political participation, because they lack direct access to governments. 
Despite this affinity, it is important to stress that “social movements certainly do not use protest 
alone and do not have a monopoly on protest” (Della Porta and Diani 2006, 168). Mc Adam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly  (2001, 7) stressed that “boundaries between institutionalized and non-
institutionalized politics are hard to draw with precision” and “interact incessantly.” The same is 
true for secessionist movements. The literature has pointed out that secessionists use violence, 
non-violent actions, and institutional channels for their aims, often combining several of  these 
methods (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; K. G. Cunningham 2013; Griffiths and Wasser 2019). I 
discuss these strategies in the next section. 
2 SECESSIONIST STRATEGIES 
Michael Hechter (1992, 277) pointed out that a “key fact about secession is that it is among the 
rarest of  major political outcomes.” If  secession is regarded as distinct from decolonization and 
state fragmentation, only a handful of  successful cases remain. In established democracies, 
secession appears to be virtually impossible. The closest cases are the independence of  Norway 




but these secessions happened only a few years after the introduction of  universal suffrage (Dion 
1996). Also, they took place about a century ago and are hardly comparable to contemporary 
examples. Recent examples include the cases of  East Timor (2002), Montenegro (2006), and 
Kosovo (2008), which broke away from Indonesia and Serbia respectively, both of  which are 
countries with a mixed democratic record at that point (Griffiths and Wasser 2019). Overall, 
established democracies have been quite successful at dealing with secessionist challengers through 
accommodation or repression. Yet, there currently is a number of  serious endeavors to pursue 
statehood in democracies as well – from Scotland and Flanders to this dissertation’s object of  
inquiry, Catalonia. Given the low chance of  success, it seems puzzling that secessionist movements 
pursue the goal of  independence. How do they want to achieve independence in the face of  severe 
opposition from the state? This question draws attention to secessionist strategies.  
Strategy is broadly conceived as “a plan of  collective action intended to accomplish goals within 
a particular context” (Maney et al. 2012, xvii).23 The literature views strategy as long-term, whereas 
tactics refer to the means to advance a strategy in the short run (Jasper 2006, 14; Nepstad and 
Vinthagen 2012; F. M. Rossi 2017, 35). In theory, secessionists and other social movements may 
pursue a range of  strategies and tactics to achieve their goals. Both social movement studies and 
research on secessionism have devoted a great deal of  attention to the strategies and tactics of  
social movements and secessionists in particular. In social movement studies, two approaches to 
strategy can be identified (F. M. Rossi 2017, 36). On the one hand, Charles Tilly (1986, 1995, 2004) 
and others have championed the idea of  the repertoire of  contention: in given time and place, activists 
have a limited range of  learned and practiced options for contentious action available. A 
movement’s repertoire is intrinsically linked to the dynamics of  contention over time. On the other 
hand, authors such as James Jasper (2004, 2006) have focused more on how activists make choices 
within the available repertoire. While Tilly’s approach focused on the structural limitations of  
strategies, Jasper highlighted a number of  general dilemmas that activists face in many contexts. 
Jasper also put emphasis on short-term choices, while Tilly’s work paid more attention to the 
historical dimension of  strategy (F. M. Rossi 2017, 36). 
Are the strategies and tactics of  secessionist movements any different from other social 
movements? Muro (2015) suggested that ethnic and nationalist movements – a category in which 
secessionist challengers often fall – do not employ different means to pursue their goals than other 
kinds of  social movements. In the literature on ethnic conflict, much attention has been devoted 
                                                 
23 For similar definitions see:  Maeckelbergh (2011, 6), Griffiths and Wasser (2019, 6), Jasper (2006, 4–5), Smithey 




to the question of  violent strategies. About half  of  the 150 self-determination campaigns recorded 
since 1960 have turned into civil wars (K. G. Cunningham 2014, 14; see also Fearon and Laitin 
2003; Griffiths 2016; Sorens 2012). Barbara Walter (2009, 3) even claimed that secessionism is the 
major source of  political violence around the world. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argued that 
non-violent repertoires of  action are ultimately more effective than violent means in political 
conflict, although this is not the case in self-determination struggles. However, much of  this 
research ignores institutional means (K. G. Cunningham 2013; Griffiths and Wasser 2019). In 
contrast, drawing on McAdam and Tarrow (2000), Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham (2013) 
distinguished between three categories of  tactics that self-determination groups can pursue: 
Conventional/institutional politics, nonviolent extra-institutional politics, and political 
violence/civil war. Griffiths and Wasser (2019) used this work to develop a typology of  secessionist 
movements based on which (combinations of) tactics they employ. 
 
 State-Based (Institutional Only) 
 Civil/State (Institutional plus Extra-Institutional Nonviolent) 
 Armed State (Institutional plus Extra-Institutional Violent) 
 Full Movement (Institutional plus Extra-Institutional Nonviolent and Violent) 
 Protest (Extra-Institutional Nonviolent) 
 Armed Insurgency (Extra-Institutional Violent) 
 Rebellion (Extra-Institutional Nonviolent and Violent) 
 
This typology highlights that secessionist movements may use combinations of  different tactics 
or focus on a single category alone. How do secessionists choose among the three categories and 
their combinations? In contrast to research on social movements, which has highlighted the role 
of  traditions and dilemmas (as described above), the literature on secessionism has approached 
this question from the rational choice paradigm. In her work on self-determination groups, 
Cunningham (2013, 292) theorized strategic choice as follows: 
I argue that groups pick strategies based on the costs of those strategies and their 
anticipation of achieving success through them. Operating through conventional politics 
is generally less costly; however, institutional channels do not exist in all states and, even 
if they do, not all groups can anticipate achieving their objectives through them. Irregular 
political strategies (such as mass nonviolence or violence) are likely to be more costly than 
conventional politics but each may be more attractive to SD groups given certain 




This line of  reasoning is exemplary for theories of  secession, which “often treat the phenomenon 
in terms of  a 'cost/benefit' analysis” (Crameri 2015a, 2). Approaches to secession coming from 
the field of  international relations have highlighted that secessionist movements do not operate in 
a vacuum. In an important contribution to the field, Griffiths and Muro (2020a) proposed the idea 
of  a strategic playing field of  secession and counter-secession. Three players interact on this playing 
field: the secessionist movement, the host state, and the international community. The secessionist 
movement pursues the goal to become an independent state. It can either convince the host state 
to grant independence to the seceding region or circumvent the host state by lobbying the 
international community. The host state tries to counter-act the secessionist movement’s efforts 
internally, but also at the international level. The international community is a crucial actor in that 
the independence of  the seceding region ultimately depends on recognition by other states, and 
UN membership as a formal status. Both secessionists and the host state employ various strategies 
to pursue their goals and to influence the international community. Thereby, the strategic playing field 
does not focus on the challenger side alone, but embeds movement strategies in their environment, 
especially taking into account the international community as a third player category. 
One important party remains excluded in the scheme, however: the population of  the 
secessionist region. While the population of  the potentially seceding territory might not qualify as 
an agent in secessionist politics, it does represent an important audience for both secessionists and 
the host state. It is evident from referendum results and widely available public opinion surveys 
that in many regions – particularly in advanced democracies – the population is split on the issue 
of  independence. In these cases, secessionists must persuade the local population that 
independence represents a desirable and viable goal (Lecours 2020, 144). Thus, secessionist 
strategies do not only target the host state and the international community, but also their own 
constituency. In cases in which secessionist can count more firmly on the support of  the 
population, they might be able concentrate their efforts on interactions with the host state and the 
international community. This is why I expand Muro and Griffiths’s (2020a) idea of  the playing 
field by including the local population. Figure 3 depicts the adapted strategic playing field. 
Finally, as has been argued above, one should be careful to conceptualize secessionist 
movements as unitary actors. Describing secessionist challengers usually requires the concept of  
social movement precisely because they are composed by separate collective and individual actors 
that are bound by the goal of  independence, but might otherwise not have much in common. 
These actors might even pursue different strategies. Within the same movement a rebel group 
might employ violent actions, while a related party contends in the institutional arena. The typology 




strategic playing field (Griffiths and Muro 2020a). Internal differentiation is important to 
understand the relationships among challenger groups and why some of  them might pursue a 
particular strategy or not.  
 
Figure 3: The strategic playing field of  secession. Adapted from Griffiths and Muro (2020a). 
 
 
3 SECESSIONIST CONTENTION 
Within the framework of secessionist and counter-secessionist strategy outlined in the previous 
section, the present dissertation focuses on two specific aspects. On the one hand, it deals primarily 
with the actions of secessionist challengers. On the other hand, it leaves violent and institutional 
action aside and studies secessionist protest instead. This narrow focus does not mean that the 
other elements in the secessionist conflict – the host state, the international community, the 
regional population – do not matter for the research question. Quite the contrary: I adopt a 
relational approach to the study of secessionist conflict, in which the interactions between 
challengers and the host state play a central role in how protest is organized over time. This 




and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 2011, 2013; Tilly 2008; Tilly and Tarrow 2015). According to Tilly and 
Tarrow (2015, 7), the concept contentious politics refers to: 
Interactions in which actors make claims bearing on other actors’ interests, leading to 
coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are 
involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties. 
Following this definition, the contentious politics of secession involves secessionists claiming 
independence from the host state on the one hand, and the political actors of the host state making 
contrary claims. With its focus on interactions between claimants and their opponents, the 
contentious politics paradigm represents a comprehensive relational approach to political conflict 
and social movements. Contentious politics shares the focus on conflictual relationships with 
much of the recent work on secessionism outlined in the previous section. This work has gone 
beyond merely considering secessionist actors and toward a more dynamic analysis of interactions 
between host states, secessionists, and international actors (K. G. Cunningham 2011; Griffiths 
2016; Griffiths and Muro 2020b). However, the contentious politics paradigm provides a 
conceptual vocabulary to describe these dynamics, which the existent work in secessionism has 
often been lacking. Most importantly, the approach is more sensitive to temporal dynamics, while 
the work on secessionism has been rather static.   
As outlined in the previous section, secessionists may pursue a number of paths toward 
independence. Secessionists can try to achieve independence through the regular channels of the 
political system: winning elections, obtaining seats in parliament, and promoting constitutional 
change in the legislature. This path is not available to them in authoritarian regimes, but also in 
established democracies there are limits to institutional means. Secessionist groups usually 
constitute a minority within the host state, which is why they cannot win elections at the state-
wide level. Both democracies and authoritarian regimes will go great lengths to maintain control 
over a secessionist region and engage in counter-secessionist efforts (Butt 2017; K. G. 
Cunningham 2011; Griffiths 2016). In short, the road of conventional politics is often blocked for 
secessionists. This may be an explanation why Griffiths and Wasser (2019, 13) found that “only 
nine movements sought independence using purely institutional methods” in their data set of 136 
secessionist movements around the world. Instead of purely institutional disputes, “there is often 
a political contention and/or conflict between the secessionist movement and the authorities and 
political parties of the host state” (Pavković and Radan 2007, 38). Most secessionist movements 
employ some form of contentious politics, although they often combine them with institutional 




Contention is broadly defined as “making claims that bear on someone else’s interests” (Tilly and 
Tarrow 2015, 7). Secessionist contention can thus be understood as claiming the withdrawal of a 
territory and population form a host state. Tilly and Tarrow emphasize that contention occurs in 
many non-political realms of society. However, the claim to independence is inherently political, 
because it addresses the issue of sovereignty, which is fundamental to the modern nation state. 
Contention is not just any kind of  claims making, however. What distinguishes contentious 
from conventional politics is that is inherently episodic and thereby “excludes regularly scheduled 
events” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 5). This means that much of  institutional politics – 
regular elections, parliamentary votes, or party conventions – fall outside of  the realm of  
contentious politics (Tarrow 2013). Instead, “at the core of  contention is the power to disrupt 
through the invention of  innovative ways of  performing protest” (Tarrow 2011, 101). As 
mentioned above, the institutional road to independence often is not an option for secessionist. 
This is why they turn to protest – or contentious performances, as Tilly and Tarrow called it. 
Contentious performances are understood as “relatively familiar and standardized ways in which 
one set of  political actors makes collective claims on some other set of  political actors“ (Tilly and 
Tarrow 2015, 14). Examples of  such performances range from street marches and sit-ins to 
boycotts, strikes, and petitions. I subsume all these forms of  contention under the term protest 
(see also the chapter on research design). 
Secessionists use various forms of  protests to claim independence, challenge the host state, and 
put pressure on their own elected representatives. But the power of  contention must be 
understood even more broadly. Tilly and Tarrow used the metaphor of  theatrical performances, 
because contentious collective action always has an audience in mind.24 Tarrow underlined that all 
protest bears some performative element. 
Modern forms of contention are aimed at demonstrating a claim, either to objects of the 
claim, to power holders, or to significant third parties. This makes contentious politics a 
form of representative politics – however disruptive – and instills in it symbolic and 
cultural elements, even in the most violent forms such as terrorism, guerilla warfare, and 
civil war. (Tarrow 2011, 119) 
In the previous section, I have highlighted two important audiences for secessionist conflicts: the 
international community on the one hand, and the population of  the secessionist region on the 
other hand. Audiences are not an irrelevant side aspect of  secessionist contention. To achieve 
                                                 
24 The theatrical element sets contentious performances apart from direct forms of collective action, which do not 




independence, territories must necessarily be recognized as sovereign by the international 
community (Griffiths and Muro 2020a; Pavković and Radan 2007). Convincing the local 
population is a democratic necessity (Lecours 2020). Contentious performances thus play a key 
role in drawing attention to secessionist demands, increase their legitimacy, and pressure the 
international community to intervene. 
Social movements do not employ contentious performances randomly. Instead, performances 
“cluster into a limited number of  recurrent, well-defined type” (Tilly 2008, 27).  As I have 
mentioned above, this concept has been called repertoires of  action (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) 
or contentious repertoires (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 14). Tilly (2008, 4) suggested that “people learn a 
limited number of  claim-making performances, then mostly stick with those performances when 
the time to make claims arrives.” In other words, out of  all the potentially available performances, 
activists only make use of  some of  them at a certain point in time. The basic categorization of  
repertoires distinguishes broadly between contained and disruptive (sometimes called transgressive) 
repertoires: while contained performances unfold within the accepted rules and norms of  a 
regime, disruptive performances challenge them (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 7). In addition 
to contained and disruptive repertoires, Tarrow (2011, p. 99) included violent repertoires in his 
typology.  
The focus on repertoires of  action is where the contentious politics paradigm overlaps with 
research on secessionist strategies (K. G. Cunningham 2013; Griffiths and Wasser 2019). However, 
contentious politics encompasses not only the strategies of  movements and regimes, but their 
interactions more broadly. The central idea of  contentious politics is that the relationship between 
challengers and authorities fundamentally impacts the form, scale, and frequency of  contentious 
performances. In the words of  Tilly and Tarrow (2015, 111), “claims and counterclaims do not 
occur randomly; they take their shape from surrounding regimes, cultures, and institutions. They 
respond to a regime’s opportunities, threats, and constraints.” This means that approaching 
secessionist conflict from a contentious politics perspective must take into view the relationships-
in-interaction of  secessionist movements and host states, and how these connect with the 
international community and the regional population. 
The next section turns to the empirical case of  this dissertation. It first provides some historical 
context for the emergence of  secessionist claims in Catalonia after the turn of  the century. Then, 
it describes how political actors in Catalonia used public performances to voice demands for 




4 THE SECESSIONIST CYCLE OF CONTENTION IN CATALONIA 2009 – 2017 
For about three decades since Spain’s transition to democracy (1975-1978), demands for Catalan 
independence were a minor issue on the region’s political agenda. Autonomism was the territorial 
ideology of  the region’s major party coalition, Convergència i Unió (CiU), whose leader Jordi Pujol 
governed Catalonia from 1980 until 2003. When CiU’s rule came to an end and Pujol’s government 
was replaced by a coalition of  the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC, socialdemocrats), 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC, republican left), and Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds 
(ICV, greens), pro-independence claims surpassed autonomism within the following ten years. 
After the 2012 regional elections, the Catalan parliament featured a pro-independence majority, 
including the formerly autonomist CiU, which had shifted its stance on the matter (Rico and 
Liñeira 2014). By 2014, surveys indicated that 45 percent of  Catalans supported secession from 
the Spanish state (Muñoz and Tormos 2015). The blue graph in Figure 4 shows the sharp rise in 
support for independence, especially in 2012. 
 
Figure 4: Support for independence in Catalonia. Source: Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió.  
 
Question: Do you believe Catalonia should be a) a region of  Spain b) an autonomous community 
of  Spain c) a state within a federal Spain d) an independent state. 
 
The determinants of  the rise of  secessionism in institutional politics and public opinion have been 
discussed extensively elsewhere (Álvarez Pereira, Portos, and Vourdas 2018; Basta 2018; Burg 2015; 
Guinjoan and Rodon 2016; Muñoz and Guinjoan 2013; Serrano 2013). In contrast, I focus on how 




contentious actions. I describe in this section how the secessionist cycle of  contention (Della Porta, 
O’Connor, and Portos 2019; Tarrow 1989, 2011) unfolded, focusing on the main actors and 
contentious events until the announcement of  the 2017 referendum. The following section is 
dedicated to protest organizing during this period. 
Demands for self-determination have a long tradition in Catalonia. Hank Johnston (1991), for 
example, described how working-class immigrants and bourgeois nationalists overcame their 
prejudices and forged an alliance against Francoism. During Spain’s transition to democracy, 
protesters demanded greater self-determination for Catalonia, which resulted in the region’s first 
statue of  autonomy in 1980. Nevertheless, the clandestine violent group Terra Lluire continued to 
fight for independence and organized several terrorist attacks in the 1980s (Vilaregut 2004).    
But pro-independence efforts remained marginal in Catalan politics for most of  the second 
half  of  the 20th century. Autonomism dominated the political landscape in the region after Spain’s 
transition to democracy. In his seminal book Nations against the state, Michael Keating described 
nationalist civil society as “rather fragile” and splintered into many small groups (Keating 2001, 
265). More radical claims only came to the foreground of  the region’s politics after the turn of  the 
century when self-determination groups started to voice their demands with more frequency and 
vigor. An early effort to bring these diverse groups together was the foundation of  the Platform 
for the Right to Decide (Plataforma pel Dret de Decidir, abbreviated PDD) at the end of  2005 
(Vilaregut 2010, 131). The PDD was constituted as a formal organization, but because of  its 
intention to represent a wide spectrum of  self-determination groups, it also featured some 
elements of  a federation. At the same time, the PDD also championed norms of  internal 
democracy. The failure to turn these principles into formalized decision-making processes 
represented one of  the weaknesses of  the organization and contributed to the rise of  internal 
conflict (Vilaregut 2010, 154; 183–84). In 2007, the PDD internally split into two factions and 
remained paralyzed for the two following years. Nevertheless, the PDD and its promotion of  the 
right to decide can be considered an “early riser” (Tarrow 2011, 201) that paved the way for more 
radical secessionist demands that followed.  
There was no agreement among expert interviewees with regards to what could be considered 
the starting point of  the secessionist cycle of  contention. Some of  them included the PDD, but 
most pointed to September 13, 2009.25 On that day, the municipality of  Arenys de Munt held a 
nonofficial referendum on Catalan independence. According to Mayor Carles Móra, the goal of  
the consultative plebiscite was to achieve that the “self-determination of  peoples could be talked 
                                                 




about with normality, and that it could be demanded without fear or taboos.”26 More than 41 
percent of  the small town’s inhabitants participated in the referendum, voting largely in favor of  
independence. Most importantly, the event received a lot of  media attention, which helped spread 
the idea of  a micro-referendum beyond the local context (Muñoz and Guinjoan 2013). Three 
months later, on December 13, another 166 Catalan towns and cities held referendums, which 
Guibernau (2013, 17) identifies as the “origin of  the pro-secessionist movement.” The referendum 
in Arenys de Munt and other municipalities were formally initiated by the city council, which 
passed a law to initiate the referendum. However, the referendums were “organized mainly from 
the civil society” (Muñoz and Guinjoan 2013, 45). Throughout the region, local initiatives emerged 
to promote the referendums and demanded the right to decide.  
Shortly afterwards, mayors from many pro-independence municipalities and members from the 
PDD, which had overcome its internal conflict, founded a platform to coordinate local 
referendums following the model of  Arenys de Munt (Vilaregut 2010, 167). Within the next two 
years, 552 of  947 Catalan municipalities organized unofficial referendums on independence 
(Muñoz and Guinjoan 2013). The PDD had pushed the right to decide as a collective action frame, 
and the referendums helped spread it across the Catalan region. They established the idea that a 
referendum represented the preferred way to achieve independence. Moreover, the local 
referendums not only contributed to the diffusion of  the right to decide as an idea, but were also 
an important means of  putting this idea into practice. As such, they can be understood as a 
prefigurative practice, demonstrating the viability of  the referendum as a type of  collective action.  
The first major contentious event at the regional level took place on July 10, 2010 (abbreviated 
10-J). Over a million people protested in Barcelona, claiming Som una nació. Nosaltres decidim (“We 
are a nation. We decide”). This event was organized by the cultural association Òmnium Cultural 
in response to a ruling of  the Spanish Constitutional Court some weeks before. After an appeal 
of  the conservative Partido Popular (PP), the Court removed substantive parts of  the Catalan 
Statute of  Autonomy, which had been in place since 2006. The ruling represented a transformative 
event in the secessionist cycle in that it aggravated the existing territorial grievances (Basta 2018; 
Ubasart-González 2021). This was visible in the 10-J protest as an immediate reaction. The 10-J 
protest was the largest protest for self-determination since the mobilizations at the end of  the 
Franco regime (Johnston 1991) and Spain’s transition to democracy (Guibernau 2004). It also 
became a strong symbol, as it brought together collective actors of  many different political 
                                                 




orientations (Della Porta et al. 2017, 60). Finally, it marked the beginning of  mass-protest 
performances in favor of  self-determination and independence in Catalonia.  
In 2011, an explicitly secessionist organization emerged from the coordinating group of  the 
local referendums and the rests of  the PDD: the Assemblea Nacional Catalana (ANC). The 
following year, the newly founded ANC organized a large demonstration for the National Day of  
Catalonia on September 11 (called La Diada), shortly before parliamentary elections in the region. 
The protest under the slogan “Catalonia, new state of  Europe” was supported by Òmnium 
Cultural and other SMOs. It mobilized even more people than the 10-J (Crameri 2015b). On the 
same day of  2013, the ANC organized the so-called Via Catalana. The Via Catalana was a huge 
human chain along the ancient Via Augusta from the French border through the entire Catalan 
territory to Alcanar in the Autonomous Community of  Valencia. Around 1.6 million people 
participated in the 400-kilometre demonstration (Della Porta, O’Connor, and Portos 2019, 6). The 
2014 Diada formed part of  the campaign Ara és l’hora (“Now is the time”) jointly organized by 
ANC and Òmnium Cultural. Nearly two million protesters filled two of  Barcelona’s largest 
intersecting avenues to form a giant “V” (for “Votar, Voluntat, Victòria – Vote, Will, and Victory”).  
The Diada became a regular event of  the Catalan political calendar, mobilizing over a million 
people in the following years. The Diadas were performances in the very sense of  the concept, as 
interviewee Daniel put it: 
All the mass mobilizations have been perfect from a standpoint of public order, there was 
never any problem. Everything was like a magnificent, happy performance. You took a 
picture and participated, you were happy and that’s it [...] Perfect for television, for 
propaganda. 
Similarly, an interviewee quoted by Della Porta, O’Connor, and Portos (2019, 8) described the 
Diada as “activism-for-the-picture.” Participants had to perform a certain activity, for example 
raising their hands at a certain time. These features classified the Diada as a contained type of 
performance. In fact, one could go as far as to argue that the yearly repetition removed the 
contentious character from the event. According to McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001, 5) 
contentious politics “excludes regularly scheduled events” such as the Diada. At the same time, 
the routinization of the Diada contributed to the stabilization of the pro-independence demands 
that emerged after the ruling on the Statute into a sustained secessionist movement. 
In 2014, the Catalan autonomous institutions and civil society actors lifted the local 
referendums to the regional level. This process started two weeks after the massive 2012 Diada, 
when Artur Mas, at the time president of  the Generalitat, dissolved the parliament and called for 




determination. About a year after Mas’s reelection, the Generalitat called for a referendum on 
Catalan independence, which would take place on November 9, 2014 (called 9-N). However, the 
Spanish government resorted to the Constitutional Court, which eventually suspended the 
referendum (Martí and Cetrà 2016). In response to the Court’s decision, the “Catalan government 
decided to set out a popular non-binding consultation instead of  a referendum, delegating the 
organisation to civil society actors, while using the regional government’s resources” (Della Porta 
et al. 2017, 61). Finally, 80.7 percent of  the 2.3 million Catalans casting their ballots voted for 
independence, but the vote had no effect (Martí and Cetrà 2016). The preparation of  the 9-N 
unfolded as a participatory process, which is why Della Porta et al. (2017) dubbed it a referendum 
“from below”.  
Using David Altman’s (2011, 8) typology, the 9-N and the local referendums can be categorized 
as facultative (i.e. not constitutionally mandatory), consultative (i.e. non-binding), and proactive 
(i.e. law-changing rather than conserving). Formally, they were called for by local and regional 
institutions and can therefore be considered consultative plebiscites. However, because of  the 
broad participation of  civil society actors, they were actually closer to facultative initiatives. 
Importantly, Altman (2011, 17) noted about non-binding initiatives: “These are odd in that 
significant efforts have been made to force a vote, yet the measures do not make the results 
binding. Why is this so?” From a decision-oriented political science perspective, this is puzzling 
indeed. Altman suggested that the “the answer is generally found in the constitutional texts of  
some countries.” The Spanish constitution does not allow for referendums at the substate level 
nor for putting territorial questions for debate. In this context, holding a referendum – even just a 
consultative initiative or plebiscite – on independence became a demand itself  and its execution 
an act of  civil disobedience. 
In sum, after reforms of  autonomy failed in the first decade of  the new century, an increasing 
number of  Catalans began to support independence for the region. New pro-independence 
organizations such as the ANC emerged. Other actors such as CiU or Òmnium Cultural shifted 
toward secessionism. These challengers voiced their demands for Catalan independence through 
a series of  public actions – what Tilly (2008) called contentious performances. Two tactics were 
particularly successful in mobilizing supporters: referendums and mass demonstrations. These 
contentious performances were organized by an emerging pro-independence civil society. In the 
next chapter, I describe this network of  organizations and how they organized protest in the time 





This chapter has provided an overview of  the secessionist cycle of  contention in Catalonia from 
2009 through 2017. Drawing on the existing literature and my own empirical data, I have traced 
the emergence of  the independence movement and its most important contentious performances. 
I have also reviewed the relevant literature to clarify some of  the key terms of  this dissertation and 
provide a bigger picture for this study. First, I have used literature from mainly political science 
and international relations on secessionism to develop the concepts of  secession, secessionist 
movement, and secessionist strategies. Second, I have focused more narrowly on secessionist 
protest, drawing on literature in social movement studies and the contentious politics paradigm 
more specifically. 
In this dissertation, I seek to explain how actors organize the latter category of  secessionist 
action, which I refer to as protest, contention, or contentious performances. This focus does not 
fully omit institutional actions by the independence movement, but it relegates them to a secondary 
role. The body of  literature on secessionism I have reviewed here treats protest as one strategic 
option of  secessionist movements. In this view, the choice to protest is based primarily on a cost-
benefit calculation. In contrast, my approach follows the work of  Beissinger, Tilly, Tarrow, and 
others by focusing on the relational and cyclical dynamics of  secessionist protest in Catalonia in 
the time around the referendum on independence on October 1, 2017.  
The chapter has revealed two further blind spots in the literature on secessionism. First, the 
literature on secessionism treats tactics as immediately available to secessionist challengers. 
Pursuing one tactic or another is primarily a cost-benefit calculation. How these tactics are realized 
is omitted from the view. In the case of  secessionist protest, this is not an irrelevant matter. A first 
open question is: How do secessionist movements organize protest? Social movement studies have 
highlighted that overcoming the collective action problem is no small feat for activists. This is 
precisely the problem that this dissertation seeks to address.  
Second, the literature on secessionism largely neglects the temporal dimension of  secessionist 
struggles. The idea of  the strategic playing field is a static one (Griffiths and Muro 2020a). The 
choices of  tactics are treated as independent from time (K. G. Cunningham 2013). But strategies 
and tactics are likely to change over time. If  one strategy does not lead to independence, 
secessionist might try another one. Movements may institutionalize or radicalize. This is 
particularly true for secessionist protest: Beissinger (2002) has found that secessionist protest 
occurs in tides. The second open question thus is: How do secessionist strategies, protests, and 




secessionist protest.  These two blind spots are the central concern of  this dissertation. I have used 
the conceptual chapter of  this dissertation to develop a theoretical approach to these questions.  
In contrast, this chapter has provided some first empirical answers to these questions. I have 
shown that between 2009 and 2017, despite the repeated engagement in contentious action, the 
relationship between secessionist challengers and the host state remained relatively stable. The 
independence movement refrained from disruptive action that would truly threaten the territorial 
integrity of  the Spanish state, which in turn engaged primarily in legal actions but did not actively 
intervene in Catalan politics. Following Beissinger (1996, 2002) and Della Porta (2018) I call this 
period the “normal times” of  the secessionist conflict in Catalonia. The notion of  “normal times,” 
as I employ it, neither designates that the state of  the conflict was permanent or static, nor that it 
was normatively acceptable or even desirable. It is purely meant to be understood in differentiation 
to the secessionist crisis that would follow in 2017. 
The normal times of  the conflict were best exemplified by the Diada demonstration. The ANC 
has been organizing this massive street performance on each September 11 since 2012. The Diada 
became a routine event in the calendar of  the independence movement. It was a symbolic protest 
that served as a perfect WUNC display (Tilly 2004). In the first three years it put pressure on the 
movement’s representatives. This was condensed in Carme Forcadell’s “President, posi les urnes!” 
(President [Mas], put the ballot boxes) at the 2014 Diada, which pushed the Generalitat to hold a 
binding referendum. However, it always remained a contained tactic that did not disrupt 
institutional politics in the Spanish state. Over time, it became more of  a festive ritual rather than 
a contentious performance – the Diada became a “normal” event. As such, it reflected the 
routinization and normalization of  protest, which many scholars of  social movements have 
diagnosed since the 1990s (Meyer and Tarrow 1998). As a normal protest, the Diada did not 
challenge the relatively stable relationship between secessionist challengers and the host state. 
The next chapter goes one step further in addressing the two questions mentioned above by 
tackling the organizational dimension of  the Catalan cycle of  contention. It describes how civil 
society actors emerged, as support for independence started to grow in Catalonia after 2009. 
Drawing on the existing literature and my own empirical material, I show how these civil society 









ORGANIZING SECESSIONIST PROTEST IN NORMAL TIMES  
 
 
When academics or the media observe social movements, they often describe what is most visible 
to the public eye: activists marching in the streets, shouting their demands, occupying squares, and 
fighting the police. Melucci (1994, 107) called this perspective on social movements the “myopia 
of  the visible.” There is much more to social movements than their public expressions. Many 
protests would not be possible without hours of  previous preparations. Activists often spend much 
more time organizing protests than in the streets (Haug 2010; Haug, Haeringer, and Mosca 2009; 
Polletta 2002; Rucht 2017). 
The previous chapter has described how Catalan secessionists employed contentious 
performances, in particular mass protests and referendums, to demand independence from Spain. 
This is only the public side of  the secessionist cycle of  contention – what some have called the 
“frontstage” of  protest (Haug 2013; Rucht 2017). This chapter, on the other hand, turns to the 
“backstage” of  secessionist contention before 2017. It describes the organizational dimension of  
the secessionist cycle of  contention. Catalan pro-independence activists invested significant 
organizational efforts into sustained mobilization. The chapter is structured along the three levels 
of  analysis introduced in the conceptual framework. 
The first part focuses primarily on organizations as entities. It describes the main organizational 
actors and dynamics that led to the emergence of  a pro-independence civil society after 2009. The 
second part looks at the processes of  protest organizing in normal times. Using the case of  the Ara 
és l’hora campaign, I show how the major SMOs, ANC and Òmnium Cultural, organized protest 
in detailed, professionalized, and highly-structured processes. I also discuss how organizations of  
the independentist Left championed horizontal organizing. The third part focuses on organizational 
practices. It first provides a general and abstract account of  organizational practices in the 
independence movement rather than at a specific point in time. Drawing on the empirical data, I 
identify four core organizational practices in the independence movement: public assemblies, 




these practices in normal times. The three parts of  the chapter provide the basis for the chapters 
that engage directly with the secessionist crisis in 2017.  
1 THE RISE OF AN ORGANIZED MOVEMENT 2009 – 2017 
In 2009 the demands for Catalan independence picked up momentum through a wave of  local 
referendums that swept many towns of  the region (Muñoz and Guinjoan 2013). Although these 
referendums normally were formally introduced by the local town halls and pro-independence 
parties, they were often prepared by civil society actors. Organizationally, the local referendums 
were important in two ways. Expert interviewees reported that the preparations of  the referendum 
brought together activists from different organizations and political parties at the local level. At 
the Catalan level, the coordinating platform for the local referendums represented the nucleus for 
a new organization: the Assemblea Nacional Catalana (ANC). In fact, the origin of  the ANC goes 
back to the day of  the first local referendum in Arenys de Munt. Back then, two experienced 
activists, Pere Pugès and Miquel Strubell, discussed the idea of  a new platform to unite the 
different sectors of  the independence movement. They joined forces with two other organizers, 
Enric Aïnsa and Miquel Sellarès. The latter had been one of  the founders of  the anti-francoist 
Assemblea de Catalunya, which served as a historical reference for the new organization. In early 
2011, the four activists organized the Conferència Nacional per l’Estat Propi (National Conference 
for the own State), which was attended by over 1,500 people, and where a provisional leadership 
group was elected. Simultaneously, participants and organizers of  the unofficial referendums were 
recruited into local assemblies (Crameri, 2015). About a year later, 7,000 participants officially 
founded the ANC in a constitutive assembly. Within the next three years, the ANC experienced 
an unprecedented organizational growth and established itself  as a major collective actor within 
the independence movement (Crameri, 2015). 
The other large civil society organization, Òmnium Cultural, was founded as a cultural 
association by progressive members of  the Catalan bourgeoisie and intellectuals in 1961. In 2010, 
Òmnium Cultural started to get involved in contentious politics and organized the first large 
protest in the cycle of  mobilization. The 2010 protest was indicative of  a fundamental change that 
Òmnium Cultural went through as an organization. While occasionally participating in pro-
independence campaigns (e.g. Free Catalonia in 2004), the self-understanding of  Òmnium Cultural 
had always been resting on the promotion of  Catalan culture and language. However, the failure 
of  the Statute of  Autonomy, as well as the wave of  unofficial referendums confronted the 




organization was its General Assembly of  in Santa Coloma de Gramenet in 2012, when it officially 
decided to push for Catalan independence.  
After 2012, the ANC and Òmnium Cultural became the two most important civil society actors. 
In this time, they were successful in recruiting members and resources, founding dozens of  local 
chapters throughout Catalonia and even abroad. Organizationally, this implied a change from the 
initial grassroots phase to formal and large organizations under the strong leadership of  Carme 
Forcadell (ANC) and Muriel Casals (Òmnium Cultural) (Dowling 2018, 99–100).  
Around ANC and Òmnium Cultural as the two main SMOs emerged what expert interviewee 
Eduard called a “diffuse magma” of  individuals, smaller groups, and organizations. This magma 
could be distinguished into two important organizational networks. On the one hand, the groups 
that initiated the wave of  local referendums persisted as loose networks in the neighborhoods of  
Barcelona and other cities, and especially in small towns and villages. On the other hand, there was 
a series of  groups and organizations that were often subsumed under the term independentist Left 
(Esquerra independentista). The left-wing struggle for independence has a long history in 
Catalonia, but has usually been split into a number of  organizations, parties, and grassroots groups 
(Bassa 1994). After 2009, these groups coalesced into the CUP (Candidatura d’Unitat Popular), a 
movement party that previously had only been running in local elections and had no organizational 
structure at the regional level, which is why it was often called in plural (Les CUP). In 2012, the 
CUP made the leap into the Catalan parliament and obtained three seats. It even enhanced its 
representation to ten seats in 2015. In this time, the CUP was connected to a network of  smaller 
left-wing organizations and grassroots groups: this included trade unions (CSC-Intersindical and 
Coordinadora Obrera Sindical), youth organizations (Maulets and Coordinadora d'Assemblees de 
Joves de l'Esquerra Independentista, who later formed Arran and then La Forja), a student union 
(Sindicat d'Estudiants dels Països Catalans), and the CUP’s two branch organizations Poble Lliure 
and Endavant. These organizations formed a dense network and many activists participated in 
several of  them at the same time. Moreover, there was considerable overlap of  the independentist 
Left with the aforementioned local networks, but also with ANC and Òmnium Cultural. 
In sum, there were five organizational dynamics that sustained the contentious performances 
described in the previous section: The emergence of  the PDD as an early riser, the formation of  
dense local networks through the local referendums, the subsequent foundation of  the ANC, 
Òmnium Cultural’s shift towards a secessionist stance, and the solidification of  the independentist 
Left into the CUP. These five dynamics outlined above established two large SMOs (ANC and 
Òmnium Cultural), dense civic networks at the local level, and a series of  smaller organizations. 




civil society. As a result, some have attributed civil society organizations “a stronger leadership 
than the political parties” (Ordeix & Ginesta, 2014, p. 929). In fact, Catalan civil society played a 
key role in the preparation and planning of  collective action throughout the cycle of  contention. 
The next section describes how these civil society actors organized protest actions until 2017. 
2 PROTEST ORGANIZING IN NORMAL TIMES 
From 2009 to 2017, Catalan secessionists repeatedly voiced their discontent with the region’s 
territorial arrangement through a series of  contentious performances. At the same time, a number 
of  smaller organizations and dense activist networks emerged at the local level to sustain these 
contentious performances. The previous literature and interviewees in my data highlighted the 
central role of  the two large SMOs, ANC and Òmnium Cultural, in protest organizing during this 
period of  time (Crameri 2015b; Della Porta et al. 2017; Della Porta, Gunzelmann, and Portos 2021; 
Dowling 2018; Ubasart-González 2021). Often, the two organizations jointly mobilized for 
protests and their leaders – Carme Forcadell and Muriel Casals until 2015, Jordi Sànchez and Jordi 
Cuixart afterwards – frequently appeared together in public. However, there were some important 
differences in how these organizations worked.  
Òmnium Cultural was led by a Board of  24 volunteer directors (Junta directiva). Six of  them 
formed the Executive Committee (Comitè Executiu): the president of  the organization, the treasurer, 
the secretary, and three vice presidents. The Board met once a month and the Executive 
Committee once a week, in person or via messenger. Around the time of  my fieldwork, Òmnium 
Cultural had more than 80 paid staff  members. Interviewees reported that there were fewer staff  
members before 2017, but they already played an important role in the organization. Staff  worked 
in a series of  different areas, from event management and stage production to social media 
outreach and graphic design. The organization always had a large and growing membership pool, 
which rose even more after 2015 and has reached over 180.00 members at the time of  writing. The 
large membership provided an important funding basis. However, the large majority of  these 
members did not participate actively in the organization. Members could get involved in one of  
the 45 local chapters, but had little influence on the leadership apart from internal elections and 
the yearly membership assembly. In short, Òmnium Cultural was a highly professionalized SMO 
based on strong leadership and concentrated decision making.  
The ANC’s structure blended horizontal and vertical elements in the phase between 2012 and 
2017. On the one hand, there was a strong leadership like in Òmnium Cultural. The ANC had a 
National Secretariat (Secretariat Nacional), which consisted of  77 elected secretaries. Each secretary 




each committee formed the Permanent Committee (Comitè Permanent), together with the president, 
vice president, secretary, treasurer, and the leaders of  the organizations’ administration. The 
National Secretariat met once a month and the Permanent Committee once a week. This leadership 
group was supported by a large paid staff. On the other hand, the ANC was a decentralized 
organization. It created more than 500 local chapters (Territorials) throughout the region and even 
abroad and professional-interest-based groups (Sectorials). Each of  these chapters had its own 
board and regular meetings. The local chapters provided an opportunity for the 40.000 paying 
members (as of  2015) and registered volunteers to participate in the organization’s decision 
making. Local chapters had some autonomy, which meant that they could decide in which actions 
of  the organization they would take part and whether they wanted to organize actions 
independently at the local level. Most members of  the National Secretariat were elected through 
the local chapters, thus connecting the central and local structures of  the organization.  
Both organizations had in common that they organized their contentious actions in what their 
organizers called campaigns (campanyes). Campaigns represented bundles of  different collective 
actions that were connected through a common theme or message and that extended over a 
determinate period of  time. Due to this structuring, it made more sense to consider the organizing 
processes of  entire campaigns rather than single actions (see chapter on research design). Between 
2012 and 2017, both organizations engaged in a range of  different campaigns. I focus here on the 
Ara és l’hora (“Now is the time”) campaign which was jointly organized by the two organizations 
for the informal referendum on November 9, 2014. This campaign consisted primarily of   
macro-events, mass demonstrations and symbolic performances that would attract 
participants form across Catalonia, as a means to communicate, raise awareness and gain 
salience, employing a more protest-oriented campaign in a context of apathy and defiance 
of the rule of law by the Spanish elites. (Della Porta et al. 2017, 78) 
The major protest event of  the campaign was the Diada on September 11, 2014, when participants 
formed a giant “V” on the streets of  Barcelona. This was accompanied by many smaller protest 
events, but also diffusion of  messages in the media and on street stands. In the Ara és l’hora 
campaign, both organizations relied less on traditional media outlets such as newspapers and TV 
stations, but increasingly on ICTs and messengers applications in particular. This allowed them to 
operate independently of  editorial lines and establish a direct communication with their 
supporters. Finally, both Òmnium Cultural and ANC engaged in direct lobbying, holding meetings 
with the pro-independence parties.  
Overall, the campaign consisted of  persuasive and contained actions with very low levels of  




movement the “Smiling Revolution” (La Revolució dels Somriures). Activists often dubbed themselves 
as gent d’ordre (literally “people of  order”) or gent de pau (“people of  peace”), because of  the 
movement’s peaceful and orderly repertoire of  action. Also the preparations of  these actions were 
well-coordinated and orderly. From the analysis of  the empirical data, five steps in the organizing 
process of  the campaigns were identified.  
The first step in the campaign was to establish a working group or a committee, which was 
responsible for taking the central decisions and carrying the load of  the preparatory work. Each 
organization formed a group of  volunteers and professionals but also a joint committee to 
coordinate the process. Òmnium Cultural organizer Beatriu emphasized the need to include 
“people with different skills” in the committee, also hiring people from outside the organization. 
Second, the preparations of  the campaign started with “establishing a story,” as Òmnium Cultural 
staff  member Alex said. This meant clarifying what the central message of  the campaign was. The 
slogan “Ara és l’hora” created a sense of  urgency for the right to self-determination. The goal was 
to promote the referendum on independence and maximize turnout for the vote. Organizers also 
had think about how to develop narratives and frames in line with the slogan, and how they would 
be received in a given context. Third, just like any larger campaign, Ara és l’hora had to obtain 
resources. For ANC and Òmnium, which both had a large and growing paying membership, this 
did not represent a particularly great obstacle. In addition to membership fees, money was raised 
through selling merchandising material. Fourth, the campaign committee developed a calendar for 
the campaign. As mentioned above, the campaign consisted of  a series of  events (actes): for 
example public talks, street gatherings, and massive performances. Every event required its own 
material preparation. Depending on the type of  action, speakers had be contacted, stages built, 
and messages sent out. Fifth, the campaign was also implemented at the local level. As mentioned 
above, the ANC in particular had strong roots in neighborhoods and small towns, organized as 
territorial sections. Many of  these local chapters did the grassroots work of  the campaign with 
weekly stands in the streets (parades), where they talked to interested citizens and distributed leaflets 
all across Catalonia. The leaderships of  both organizations tried to mobilize the local level as much 
as possible. This included not only passing materials and resources to the territorial sections, but 
also synchronizing frames, narratives, and events with the Catalan level.  
These five steps emerged from the empirical data. They resemble the model of  the organizing 
process proposed by Rucht (2017). Given that the analysis was based on representational data the 
five steps are not a fully exhaustive list of  preparatory activities. Interviewees likely omitted more 
mundane activities that they took for granted. The five elements should be considered overlapping 




that was crucial in mobilizing the Catalan population for the 9-N referendum (Della Porta et al. 
2017). The success of  the organizing process made Ara és l’hora a blueprint for all following 
campaigns, as Òmnium Cultural organizer Beatriu explained. 
And this campaign [Ara és l’hora] worked super well. Through this learning process, we 
have applied it to all campaigns afterwards. Not only pro-independence campaigns, but 
also from Lluites Compartides to Demà pots ser tu, which are campaigns with more social 
content. 
Ara és l’hora was obviously not the only campaign in the period from 2012 until 2017. But Beatriu’s 
statement suggested that it can be considered representative for the ways in which ANC and 
Òmnium Cultural organized protest in this period of normal secessionist politics. Their repertoire 
of action was characterized by massive symbolic performances which were planned and prepared 
in a meticulous organizing process. Over these years, as both organizations increased their 
membership and staff, organizers improved this process and their contentious capacity. In this 
way, the two organizations became the most important civil society actors of the independence 
movement and the main drivers of contentious action. 
This is only part of the picture though. The massive protest actions by ANC and Òmnium 
Cultural represented only the tip of the iceberg of contentious activities in the period from 2009 
to 2017. There was a large number of smaller, often local protest actions in this time, which were 
harder to trace systematically through qualitative data. These protests were often organized by two 
categories of actors that I have described in the previous section: the local networks that emerged 
from the wave of referendums and the independentist Left. The data suggested that these actors 
organized protests differently from the professionalized, structured, and often very vertical ways 
of Òmnium Cultural and ANC. Interviewees highlighted the emphasis on deliberative decision 
making, open assemblies, and volunteer work. This form of protest organizing was closely 
connected to the tradition of Catalan left-wing movements, some interviewees said.  
In their research on the secessionist cycle of contention until the 9-N, Della Porta et al. (2017, 
70) found that  pro-independence “mobilisations were characterised by a focus on horizontality, 
democratic decision making and inclusivity.” This was certainly true for smaller protests organized 
by local networks, the independentist Left, and (to some extent) the ANC, who all championed 
prefigurative ways of protest organizing. However, the preceding discussion on the Ara és l’hora 
case shows that there was another, more dominant mode of protest organizing: organizing large 
campaigns focusing on mass protest involved very structured and often top-down processes that 




Despite the successful mobilization of  Òmnium Cultural and ANC, the 9-N referendum in 2014 
did not have any binding effects. In the end, the referendum was organized by volunteers and was 
termed a “participatory process” without legal value. Afterwards, the main focus the secessionist 
conflict shifted to the parliamentary and electoral arena, but debates about another, this time 
binding referendum would soon reemerge, as I show in the next chapter. The remainder of  the 
present chapter tackles the level of  organizational practices. 
3 ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICES IN THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT 
Practice theorists, like ethnomethodologists, have emphasized that social life is always already 
ordered. The structured character of  practices lies in their routinization. Reckwitz (2002, 255) 
stressed that “social fields and institutionalized complexes – from economic organizations to the 
sphere of  intimacy – are ‘structured’ by the routines of  social practices.” Similarly, Giddens (1984, 
xxxi) emphasized the role of  routines in the structuration of  societies, because they provide 
“transformation points in structural relations.” However, it would be a misconception to 
understand practices as rigid repetitions that give rise to stable systems of  a Parsonian type. In fact, 
practices are subject to change, they “emerge, persist and disappear as links between their defining 
elements are made and broken” (Shove, Pantzar, and Watson 2012, 21). Neither does it imply that 
all human action is inherently ordered, nor that order can exclusively arise through routines. This 
is precisely the point where organizational theory comes in: organizing represents a deliberate and 
decisive structuring of  social action. If  organizing represents “an attempt to order the intrinsic flux 
of  human action” (Tsoukas and Chia 2002, 570), then it refers to deliberate efforts to produce, 
alter, or even break down the routine order of  practices. This means that practices are not simply 
the invariable result of  routinization, habitualization, and learning, but they can be actively shaped 
by practitioners.  
However, it must be stressed that organizing is a practice itself, too: it exhibits routine patterns, 
requires practical knowledge, and is recognizable to a community of  practitioners. In this sense, 
organizing is not a force that is located outside of  the field of  practices, but represents a specific 
kind of  practice. Organizational practice “anchors” (Swidler 2001) other practices in that it 
regulates the relationships between their bodily, mental, discursive, and material elements. 
In this section, I describe four organizational practices in the Catalan independence movement: 
public assemblies, instant messenger use, deliberation, and directing. Of  course, these four 
practices do not represent a comprehensive picture of  all organizational practices in the 
independence movement. One could write an entire book on each of  these practices, but the 




The four practices relate to two important dimensions of  organizing, which I have mentioned in 
the conceptual chapter: communication and decision making. On the one hand, the practices of  
public assemblies and instant messenger use are part of  the communication side of  organizing. 
Other communicative practices would be writing emails and making phone calls, but they were far 
less prominent in the data. On the other hand, deliberation and directing constitute the decision-
making side of  organizing. Another decision-making practice that came up in the data was voting, 
but deliberation and directing were more relevant. Table 3 provides an overview of  these 
organizational practices.  
 
Table 3: Dimensions of  organizational practices in the independence movement. 
Communication Decision 
Public assemblies Deliberation 
Instant messenger use Directing 
 
These dimensions speak to two different strands in organization theory: the communication-as-
constitutive (CCO) approach to organization (Cooren et al. 2011; Fairhurst and Putnam 2004; 
McPhee and Zaug 2000; Schoeneborn, Kuhn, and Kärreman 2019) on the one side, and the 
“Luhmannian” approach putting decision at the center (Ahrne and Brunsson 2011, 2019b; Haug 
2013; Luhmann 2011; Seidl and Becker 2006). However, I want to stress that the two dimensions 
are not intended as a generalizable typology in which all organizational practices must fit. The 
dimensions emerged as categories from the empirical material and help to analytically make sense 
of  how organizing works in the independence movement.  
The two strands of  organization theory set the broad scope for the analysis of  practices. They 
provided a sensitizing frame for which practices to look for. However, the four practices as such 
emerged inductively as grounded theory from the empirical data. I coded observations, interviews, 
and documents to find categories of  communication and decision-making practices (see chapter 
on research design). What I present are generalized accounts of  these practices. This means that 
these descriptions cover many empirical observations in different organizational contexts over 
time. As such, they are distinct from the other empirical descriptions in this dissertation, which all 
refer to a specific period of  time.  
The repetitive character of  practices means that they are relatively robust over time. This 
suggests that the four practices described here are likely to work in the same ways throughout 




ways of  doing things – no single performance of  a practice is identical. Also, the accounts are 
located at a fairly high level of  abstraction. How they look “in practice” will depend to some extent 
on timing and organizational context. 
What changes over time is how activists combine certain practices at given times. Organizing 
requires both communication and decision making. But practices can also be combined within the 
two dimensions. For example, activists often use both face-to-face communication and digital 
means at the same time (Kavada 2010). The four practices are part of  the organizational repertoire 
of  the independence movement. From this repertoire, activists choose and combine different 
practices at different times, resulting in different textures of  the field of  practice. The next four 
sections describe each of  the practices. The final section shows how activists combined these 
practices in normal times of  conflict. 
3.1 Public Assemblies 
In the literature, an assembly has been described as a large meeting that lets participants to engage 
in some “side involvement” with other participants (Goffman in Haug 2013: 710). Only recently, 
meetings, gatherings, and assemblies have received increased scholarly attention in social 
movement studies. A meeting is defined as a temporary gathering of  at least three people in which 
communication is oriented to some common business (Boden 1994, 90–99; Haug 2010, 80, 2013, 
709; Schwartzman 1989, 7). As such, the meeting has a double character “as event and structure, 
and as actor and space” (Haug 2013, 710). I suggest meetings can also be viewed as practice. 
Translated into Reckwitz’s (2002) terms, there are certain ways of  doing meetings, which combine 
cognitive, bodily, and emotional elements. Drawing on the empirical material, I identify nine 
elements of  public assemblies in the independence movement.  
First, like any kind of  meeting, public assemblies, are “by their very nature, talk. Talk, talk, talk 
and more talk,” as Boden (1994, 82) puts it. Second, public assemblies involve participants 
gathering physically in the same space and engaging in face-to-face communication. Third, these 
spaces must be open and accessible, giving a public character to the assembly. Fourth, participants 
normally do not speak whenever they want, but turns of  talk are facilitated by one of  the 
participants. Fifth, the assembly follows an agenda which defines the main talking points. Sixth, 
the main points of  the discussion are collected in the form of  meeting minutes. Seventh, the 
assembly and its agenda are prepared and announced by some of  the participants. Eighth, public 
assemblies as practices are not one-time events, but are performed repeatedly, normally in a fixed 
rhythm (e.g., weekly, bimonthly, or monthly) that does not preclude extraordinary assemblies. 




meeting to another. Table 4 displays the nine features of  the practice that emerged from the 
analysis of  the interview data. 
These elements emerged from the interview data. They represent an abstract account of  the 
practice of  public assemblies in the Catalan independence movement. Not every one of  these 
elements might necessarily be part of  every assembly (as a single performance), nor did every 
interviewee mention every component of  the practice. The series of  elements could also be further 
expanded. Some interviewees mentioned emotional care among participants, reflexivity on how to 
debate, and relations to other meeting settings, especially committees, but none of  them placed 
them at the core of  the practice.  
 
Table 4: The practice of  public assemblies in the independence movement. 
Element Description 
Communication Multiparty talk  
Co-presence Face-to-face communication in a common space 
Openness Public announcement and accessible setting 
Facilitation Assignment of  turns of  talk by a participant 
Agenda Pre-defining points of  debate 
Minute-taking Recording of  main talking points 
Preparation Planning and announcing the assembly 
Rhythm Periodic repetition of  the assembly, e.g., weekly 
Rotation Alternation of  responsibilities among participants 
 
Many of  the elements of  the practice of  public assemblies can also be found in other types of  
meetings. What sets public assemblies apart from other kinds of  meeting practices? First, openness 
is crucial to this specific practice. At least theoretically, people from the outside should be able to 
join and participate in the assembly. Second, there must be some degree of  internal order to the 
assembly in the form of  facilitation. Turns of  talk cannot be fully self-allocated. Third, 
communication must take place face-to-face in physical co-presence. This excludes all kinds of  
online meetings. 
These features distinguish the practice of  public assemblies from other meeting practices, many 




First, an interorganizational meeting was called “assembly” at times, but it is based on 
organizational membership and therefore not open to all activists. Second, national meetings of  
organizations were often called assemblies. This is the setting where local sections of  those 
organizations or different groups with the same affiliation meet once or twice a year. These might 
be open for outsiders to attend, but decision making is based on organizational units. Third, some 
organizations or groups called themselves “assemblies” – most prominently the ANC. They might 
have open assemblies, but usually they are limited to members. Finally, some interviewees spoke 
of  “online assemblies,” which are different because they lack face-to-face contact. Also, they very 
likely lack the minimal degree of  openness, because they are not publicly announced. In sum, not 
everything that was called “assembly” in the data actually referred to the narrow kind of  practice 
that I described before.  
Interestingly, the size factor mentioned at the outset of  this section did not seem to bear much 
importance empirically. Interviewees did not describe assemblies as necessarily large meetings, 
except for one instance, where an interviewee criticized a CDR for maintaining facilitation in a 
small assembly. Instead, there were some references to the challenges posed by large assemblies, 
as participation can be limited and facilitation is harder until the point where a large assembly 
might become unviable. How do public assemblies work in practice? Consider this passage from 
an interview with a young activist called Ruben: 
I: Was the assembly very regulated? How did it work, with turns of talk and all that? 
R: Yes, well, in the beginning, in 2013 and 2014, we were only a few and we hadn’t learned 
anywhere how to be politically active, so we had to learn how to do it. So basically we used 
turns of talk, no? The forms of facilitation, and well, there are different committees that 
divide the tasks. Everybody put themselves in a committee or a concrete task and then in 
the assembly the person who would coordinate and facilitate the assembly would be the 
one in charge of assigning turns of talk and collecting the contents in the minutes. Yeah, 
these kinds of tasks. Then, after some time, when more people joined and we were more 
people, we became more gender-balanced, there were guys and girls, it was more diverse. 
So we started to see that sometimes in the assembly participation was a bit unequal. This 
is where we started to work on dynamics in the assembly, such as discussing things in small 
groups first and then with everyone in order to facilitate participation from everybody. 
Thus, we have a collective, which is not very regulated now, or rather, we have some 
informal norms of how we work for what concerns participation and the respect towards 
those who want to speak. We do have a guideline that every assembly has. An agenda and 
that’s always the same. 
I: So it’s the group of facilitators [grupo dinamizador] who prepares?  
R: That’s it. Yes, there are two committees that are responsible for each aspect of the 




somebody’s uncomfortable with something or any type of confrontation, we work that 
out very openly and give it a lot of attention so that the group is always cohesive.  
This quote from the interview with activist Ruben should sound quite familiar to both activists 
and students of  social movements and meetings in general. It points to some of  the elements of  
the practice described above: an assembly as a debate with facilitated turns of  talk, which is open 
to new participants. It is prepared by some of  its members and has an agenda and minutes. Beyond 
these features, there are two further aspects that highlight the practice character of  public 
assemblies: informality and learning. 
First, the passage from the interview stresses the role of  informality in the assemblies. While 
Ruben said that they had guidelines and an agenda, he also stated that they had “some informal 
norms of  how we work for what concerns participation and the respect towards those who want 
to speak.” This points to the “practical consciousness” (Giddens 1984) that participants have. Not 
everything is made explicit and written down as rules, but much is left to the practical knowledge 
of  the participants of  how to do an assembly.  
Second, this kind of  practical skill and knowledge of  how to do an assembly is not readily 
available, as the interview shows. Ruben described how in the beginning they had no prior activist 
experience and had to learn how to manage their assemblies: how to prepare the agenda, how to 
facilitate turns of  talk, and so on. He also recounted how the activists, after some time, 
encountered problems in the form of  gender imbalances, and how they adapted their practice in 
response. This shows that the skill and knowledge necessary for public assembly have to be practiced 
over time.   
Finally, the piece of  talk from the interview with Ruben is also interesting because it leaves 
unmentioned one feature that is commonly associated with assemblarian practices: deliberative 
decision making. When studying social movement assemblies, most of  previous research has 
focused on the dynamics of  democracy, and on consensus and deliberation in particular (Della 
Porta and Rucht 2015; Haug 2015; Haug and Teune 2008; Polletta 2002). Readers will have noticed 
that I have not made any references to these elements. Although there is a tight connection 
between assemblies and deliberation, both conceptually and empirically, I treat them as analytically 
different for now. The reason is that I would like to show how activists break and reestablish this 
connection over time. Before elaborating on deliberative practices in section 3.3, I describe the use 




3.2 Instant Messenger Applications 
In the past decade, activists around the globe have increasingly made use of  information and 
communication technologies. Social movements have relied on different kinds of  digital media for 
mobilizing constituents, building a collective identity, framing grievances and issues, as well as 
organizing themselves. The Catalan independence movement is no exception to this phenomenon. 
In the interviews, organizers mentioned the usage of  social media such as Twitter and Facebook, 
as well as more classic forms such as emails and websites. Above all, interviewees highlight the 
importance of  instant messenger applications (IMAs). CDR organizer Xavi, for example, 
described the role of  messengers in communication and media use as follows: 
A lot of WhatsApp – a lot of WhatsApp, a lot of Telegram, like really a lot. I would say, by 
order it would be WhatsApp and Telegram, they were “steaming.” Then Twitter, and then 
other networks, like Facebook or whatever and I would say that the traditional media were 
lagging behind 
Instant messengers are used primarily through mobile phones, which have become a key 
technology for protesters because of  their versatility, allowing for communication with other 
activists, authorities, and the wider public (Neumayer and Stald 2014). Instant messaging, like any 
other communication technology, can be used for an infinite variety of  purposes. It is not my 
intention to draw a comprehensive picture of  all their potential uses in social movements, but to 
focus on their role in organizing, which became apparent throughout the interviews. In particular, 
I highlight three features of  IMAs that structure their affordances: level of  (perceived) security, 
directionality, and accessibility. Then I turn to how pro-independence organizers exploit them for 
organizational purposes. 
Activists in the Catalan independence movement use three IMAs: WhatsApp, Telegram, and 
Signal. The applications work in similar ways, but differ to some extent with regard to three 
properties. The first is the perceived level of  their security. Although by the time of  the research, 
all of  these services offer end-to-end encryption, activists perceive them as offering different 
standards of  protection. In an interview, Òmnium Cultural organizer Beatriu told me that some 
years ago the organization was working primarily with emails, but at the time of  1-O episode 
organizers were using Telegram instead. When I asked her about this shift, she emphasized the 
safety of  Telegram in contrast to WhatsApp: 




R: Well, I think it was very natural, because there was a time when we were using 
WhatsApp, but only briefly, because we saw that it was not a very safe network. It was not 
a safe channel, there could have been leaks really easily. And Telegram is a bit more secure. 
This reflects a general pattern throughout the interviews. WhatsApp is generally considered the 
least secure, while Telegram and Signal in particular are considered safer. During the 1-O episode 
of  contention, many organizers made the transition from WhatsApp to Telegram or Signal. 
Second, the applications offer different directionalities of  communication, i.e., unidirectional, 
bidirectional, and multidirectional. For activists, and organizers in particular, the crucial function 
of  IMAs is that they allow creating group chats with several hundred participants. These group 
chats are used by organizers in two different ways. On the one hand, many group chats allow for 
multiparty communication. In other words, any participant can send their message in the chat 
without any restrictions. All three applications offer this multidirectional form of  communication. 
On the other hand, organizers use group chats as one-way tools. They create groups with a single 
sender and multiple receivers who cannot send messages to the group. The group chat functions 
basically as a news feed, which is an affordance that was particularly appealing to organizers in the 
1-O period. Activist Oriol from the interorganizational platform in Fastiada described a meeting 
where organizers decided to use digital technologies to prepare the defense of  the voting stations: 
So what we proposed and what was accepted was, in the first place, to create a 
communication channel, which obviously had to be Twitter, Facebook, but also a more 
direct messenger channel. So what happened here and in many other places is that 
WhatsApp did not allow to create lists for diffusion, only groups. Hence, we had to use a 
tool that was much less popular, which was Telegram. Because it allowed to make lists 
with a single sender, or four or five and as many recipients as you want. But of course, 
with the problem that Telegram in that moment was not a tool that people were familiar 
with, neither installed nor for communication. But well, what we proposed was basically a 
direct channel.  
Telegram was the perfect tool for one-way communication and diffusion of  information, but it 
had the problem that it lacked popularity. Oriol went on to tell that they tried to overcome this 
issue by telling people on other media platforms explicitly how to download and install the app. 
Third, access to these messenger groups differs. Basically, the group can be open or closed. In 
part, access depends on the features of  the IMAs. Users can only join WhatsApp or Signal groups 
if  invited by the group administrator either via their phone number or a link. On Telegram, users 
can search for open groups and join them directly. However, openness and closure depend mostly 
on the decisions of  organizers who run the group chat. This includes a range of  different cases: 
based on membership in a group or organization, being part of  a network, or completely open. 




the issue of  access is more complex than a binary open or closed. Moreover, it is closely related to 
how organizers want to use the chats, i.e., what practices they are part of. Many interviewees 
stressed the role of  IMAs in organizing. When I asked organizer Berta whether IMAs make 
organizing easier, she responded enthusiastically:  
R: Yes man, it’s wonderful to have these technologies now! Of course, you can send 
information in such a fast way – if only we had had them in previous battles!  
Instant messengers facilitate communication by creating a common forum for activists – the group 
chats can function like virtual meetings. Most importantly, IMAs allow for fast communication 
among organizers, which was instrumental in contentious performances that require quick 
reactions, such as the 20-S. Òmnium Cultural organizer Beatriu described the use of  IMAs for 
their organizing and campaigning as “revolutionary.” At the same time, she stressed that it was a 
“learning process” for the organization how to use them effectively. The same goes for organizer 
Quim describing the Telegram use in the CDR: 
R: No, hmm, we had to put some norms like “please, Telegram is to communicate.” It’s 
not for debate. It’s not for discussion […] This took a lot […] People have learned how 
to use Telegram the same as they have learned to be in the assembly. And now it works. 
This shows that the advantages of  IMAs are not readily available to activists, but the skill to use 
them properly must be practiced and acquired over time. In the next section, I describe the practice 
of  deliberation in the independence movement. 
3.3 Deliberation 
The third organizational practice in the independence movement I describe here is the practice of  
deliberation. Deliberation, as it emerged from the interview data, refers to overcoming conflict or 
disagreement through the exchange of  arguments, narratives, or testimonies to reach a consensus. 
Previous research has revealed the role of  deliberation in many progressive social movements, 
such as the global justice movements (Della Porta 2009a; Della Porta and Rucht 2015), the Spanish 
indignados (Della Porta 2015; Flesher Fominaya 2014; Nez 2012), and the French nuit debout 
protests (Felicetti and Della Porta 2018). The Catalan independence movement was found to 
endorse deliberative democracy in its framing during the 9-N referendum campaign (Della Porta 
et al. 2017).  
In the interview data, deliberation as a practice emerged through two sets of  codes. First, 
interviewees referred frequently to internal debates. This signaled both disagreement but also 




contexts, but in particular from left-wing groups, stressed the importance of  consensus decision 
making. These elements and the connections among them were fairly abundant in the data. There 
was rich evidence of  disagreements, debates, and consensual decisions. However, interviewees 
almost never called this practice deliberation. They would refer to this process as consensus 
decision making, or democratic or participatory practice. Or, in fact, they would call this practice 
assemblarian. It is true that deliberation occurs first and foremost in assemblies, but I have argued 
that is necessary to analytically distinguish the practice of  assemblies from the practice of  
deliberation. Let me elaborate on its elements. 
First, in all interviews, organizers reported instances of  debate and discussion among activists. 
Debate can happen at various levels: at the movement level, in an organization, between 
organizations, in meetings, in emails, or in private conversations. Interviewees use the term to 
describe two related things. On the one hand, debate means that there is a minimum of  
disagreement. It describes a situation where there are different proposals, positions, or ideas. On 
the other hand, this disagreement is not just a matter of  mental states or isolated opinions, but it 
becomes manifest in the interaction among activists. Interviewees referred to the debates as 
exchanges of  arguments, narratives, or testimonies. 
Second, interviewees not only described the debates, but also highlighted the need to overcome 
disagreement and find a consensus. Many groups in the independence movement champion 
consensus as the preferred mode of  decision making. SEPC organizer Irene, for instance, stressed 
that “it’s true that sometimes there are intense debates, but we always come to a consensus, to an 
agreement.” For CDR activist Jordi, consensus was essential in the organizing process: 
Of course, it needs time, because the assemblarian movement – well it is difficult, it takes 
a lot to reach an agreement and there are opinions here and there, etc., etc. and until there 
is no consensus for a concrete action and we see that we can’t do it, then we don’t do it. 
It is that simple, be it for security, for visual appearance, for everything.  
In this quote from the data, Jordi highlighted the need for consensus in the CDR, but also how 
difficult it is to reach it at times. How do activists manage to overcome disagreements? In the 
interviews, organizers reported that it is important to discuss openly and to make arguments clear. 
Some stressed that it requires active efforts of  all participants to accommodate. When asked about 
how to maintain the group in the face of  conflict and tension, CDR activist Gabriel said the 
following: 
It works because there is always people who mediate. There is always people seeking a 
middle ground between two confronted positions. This way, the assembly always finishes 




In other words, deliberation means an interactive effort to reach agreement in the face of  conflict. 
This requires skill and knowledge, which are acquired through learned experience. Just like the 
practices of  assemblies and messenger use, there are informal, often tacit norms structuring 
deliberation. These are not readily available to activists, but have to be “developed with 
experience,” as Gabriel put it. 
Of  course, consensus is not the only means to settle disagreement: in the data, there was also 
evidence about other solutions, such as voting, exit (of  some participants), or silencing dissent. 
Conversely, consensus need not always be the result of  deliberation. Moreover, as other researchers 
(Haug 2015; Urfalino 2010) have pointed out, consensus only represents the closure of  the 
decision-making process. Hence, focusing on consensus alone would miss essential parts of  the 
practice. 
Deliberation in the independence movement happens in and across different settings. First, like 
organizing in general, deliberation can occur inside, between, or even outside organizations. Who 
deliberates in which context obviously is of  great importance for how the practice looks 
empirically. The pieces of  data shown above came from the CDRs, where the practice of  
deliberation was widespread, but it could also be found in other organizational settings. Yet, the 
interview data did not allow reconstruction of  a comprehensive picture of  deliberation in the 
independence movement. Second, as mentioned before, deliberation is generally tightly connected 
with the practice of  public assemblies and other sorts of  meetings. An instance of  this connection 
is the fact that interviewees sometimes called deliberative practices “assemblarian.” However, there 
was also some evidence in the data on online deliberations, for example in the BxR group.  Third, 
deliberations happen across time. They can be long or short; they can occur in one stretch or 
scattered over a period of  time.  
Finding consensus through deliberation is highly organizational. It reduces complexity, because 
it consists in a move from several positions among participants to a common one. This means 
discarding other options and committing to a single line of  action. Thereby, deliberation orders 
other movement activities. However, it is not the only way to reduce complexity. In the next 
section, I describe the practice of  directing in the independence movement. 
3.4 Directing 
Despite the important role of  deliberative practice described in the previous section, the empirical 
data also contained rich evidence on another practice that almost could not be more opposed to 




From the data, four codes emerged as the basis of  this practice. The Spanish codes were “dar una 
consigna,” “dar una instrucción,” “dar una directriz,” and “dar una orden.” The first three translate 
roughly as giving “directives” or “instructions,” while the fourth is quite literal for “giving orders.” 
Although the binding character of  the terms varies, interviewees employed them fairly 
interchangeably. This is why I subsumed them under the practice which I call directing or giving 
directives. Directing simply means that organizers tell other people what to do. To describe this 
practice more in detail, I provide some empirical illustration. The following quote is from an 
interview with activist Gabriel who participated in the preparation of  the defense of  the voting 
stations. I asked him whether there were organizers coordinating the participants: 
I: Were there people who were coordinating, like “you do this, you do that” or was it 
different? 
R: Yes, maybe for a question of character. There were many people much more prone to 
give orders and other were more – felt better to receive them, simply knowing “OK, what 
do I have to do? Good!” There were a couple of people who were very leaderish, but also 
very open in the sense of “we have to protect our school” and in any moment “if we have 
to close the door we close it, if we have to put ourselves in front of the door we have to 
be fast.” Maybe there was a profile of people, related with their character. 
 I: What kind of people were they? 
R: Older probably, with an – with life experience we could say, no? They weren’t young 
people. In my school it was older people who spoke well, knew how to communicate, and 
were convincing. 
I: And that was respected. 
R: Yes, yes. 
I: there was nobody who– 
R: –without being rude, without being a person like “This like this.” No, no. “We have to 
do this, because of course like this we know–” “OK, let’s go, bam!” – “OK, the team for 
the voting tables.” A bit more like this. 
I: There weren’t people who were saying “who are you to tell me?”  
R: No, no, no. 




R: Well, sure there were suddenly people who nobody knew who they were and who 
wanted to be involved in the organizing. So we asked “listen, did you come at four in the 
morning, do you know how this works?” – “OK, no, no, no” – “well we got this, there’s 
no need – if you want to vote, OK, but we have figured out the organigram already.” 
This account paints a picture that is very different from the deliberative practice described in the 
previous section. Instead of  arriving at a common decision through discussion, some people 
simply tell others what do to. This is the minimal description of  the practice of  what I call directing. 
Let me elaborate on some of  its features. First, of  all, directing is a relational practice; it cannot be 
performed by individuals in isolation. It establishes a relationship between those who direct – 
which I will call directors – and those who are directed.  
Second, directing other people means to exercise power. However, it refers to a relationship 
where those directing other activists do not have coercive means to actually impose their will on 
them. Interviewees sometimes speak of  “giving orders,” but these orders require the compliance 
of  other participants, rather than disobedience. This is why I prefer the label directing over the more 
coercive-sounding ordering. The latter also exists in the independence movement, in particular in 
the professionalized organizations ANC and Òmnium Cultural. Their employees can be forced 
into action through sanctions. Apart from these contexts, and in particular outside the boundaries 
of  organizations, organizers depend on the voluntary efforts of  other participants (cf. Andrews et 
al. 2010).27 
Third, while directing does not involve coercion, it does not mean that directing cannot rest on 
some sort of  formalized authority. SMOs delegate decision making to boards of  directors and 
other forms of  “organized power” (Ahrne and Brunsson 2011), which often direct other 
participants. However, the two should not be equated. Activists who hold formal authority in social 
movements might still seek deliberation with other participants. Conversely, even activists who do 
not occupy a formal role might direct others at times. 
Fourth, the narrow practice of  directing is closely related to the notion of  leadership – but it 
should also be distinguished from it. Indeed, one could rush to conceptualize the relationship of  
directors and directed as leaders and followers. This also becomes apparent in the interview, as 
Gabriel described the people who were directing the defense of  the voting station as “leaderish.” 
And in fact, a big part of  what leaders do is to direct their fellow activists.  
                                                 
27 This is why directing is a form of “soft” power, which is “based on arguments and/or the appeal to experiences 
and/or emotions by the use of narratives or symbols” (Haug, Rucht, and Teune 2015, 38). In this regard it is actually 
quite similar to deliberation, which is also a form of soft power. However, deliberation is fundamentally based on the 




However, the concept of  leadership is broader than the narrow practice of  directing. Ganz (2010, 
527) defined leadership as “accepting responsibility to create conditions that enable others to 
achieve shared purpose in the face of  uncertainty.” Rather than resting on formal authority or 
inherent qualities of  the leaders, leadership should be understood as a “set of  practices related to 
one’s own part of  the work as well as that of  a collective” (Ganz and McKenna 2018, 189). This 
line of  research focuses on what leaders do instead of  what they are. Also in the interview, Gabriel 
shifted the attention from the qualities of  leaders (older, experienced) to what they did and in 
particular to how they communicated (convincing, without being rude). But leaders do much more 
than direct other people. For instance, Ganz and McKenna (2017) described five types of  
leadership practices: relationship building, narrative, strategy, structure, and action. All of  these 
can involve directing, but it is not a necessary part of  them. 
3.5 Weaving the Texture: Combining Practices in Normal Times 
Activists in the independence movement employ a broad variety of  practices to organize 
contentious action. Within the broader field of  practice, I have identified and selected four basic 
organizational practices: public assemblies, instant messenger use, deliberation, and directing. 
However, organizers rarely use these practices in isolation, but combine them. Theoretically, there 
are four mixed types combining different practices:  
 Deliberative assemblies 
 Directed assemblies 
 Diffusion of directives 
 Messenger deliberations 
 
These four types combine different forms of  communication and decision making. First, the most 
typical association is between deliberation and assemblies: activists overcome their disagreements 
and find consensus by debating face-to-face in a public space. But there are also other possibilities. 
As I show in chapter 8, public assemblies can be used by organizers to give instructions to other 
activists. Directing can be combined with the use of  instant messengers. Fourth, activists can use 
instant messengers to deliberate in group chats.  
Beyond these simple combinations of  two practices, more complex connections are possible. 
For example, activists often integrate face-to-face and online communication (Kavada 2010). Some 
groups in the independence movement deliberate in public assemblies but use messengers as a 
supporting practice to share documents (for example agendas and minutes) for these assemblies. 
Conversely, some interviewees mentioned assemblies for preparation of  the diffusion of  directions 




call, following Gherardi (2012), the texture of  organizational practices. While the four practices 
represent relatively stable constructs, their combinations, and thus the texture of  practice, are more 
flexible. Combinations can change over time and also according to the organizational context.  
It was difficult to precisely trace organizational practices for the different sectors of  the 
independence movement for the entire period from 2012 until 2017. However, there was some 
evidence in the data about which of  these practices were more or less common in this normal time 
of  the secessionist conflict. As I have described in section 2 of  this chapter, there were two major 
modes of  protest organizing. On the one hand, ANC and Òmnium Cultural prepared mass 
protests in long and detailed preparations. Deliberation was an important decision-making practice 
in both these organizations. These deliberations took place among leaders in the Boards of  
Directors or the Executives of  both organizations. Deliberation was often combined with voting, 
which was less relevant for interviewees though. Messenger applications were important to diffuse 
decisions as directives to the local and sectorial levels of  both organizations. The ANC also used 
deliberative assemblies in the Secretariat and at the local level. In both organizations, these 
practices were embedded in a professionalized formal organizational structure, which regulated 
the use of  these practices. On the other hand, the groups and organizations of  the independentist 
Left used these practices in both formal and informal ways. The most important organizational 
practice in these groups were deliberative assemblies. As mentioned above, interviewees from the 
independentist Left emphasized the importance of  assemblies as a participatory decision-making 
space. Of  course, some organizations had leadership groups that used directing, but this was less 
frequent. In general, directed assemblies and diffusion of  directives were rather uncommon 
textures of  practice in this normal time of  conflict.  
4 CONCLUSION 
In a number of  regions across established democracies, significant parts of  the population support 
secession from their respective host states (Álvarez Pereira, Portos, and Vourdas 2018; Sorens 
2005). However, support for independence does not always correspond with the emergence of  a 
secessionist movement. The reason is that “even when popular desires for autonomy or 
independence emerge, they do not automatically translate into political action. Individuals must 
overcome the collective action problem to organize secessionist movements” (Sorens 2012, 7). In 
spite of  this fundamental insight, most of  the existing research on secessionist movements has 
focused on their public expression, as I have shown in the previous chapter. The present chapter 




movement in what I have called “normal” times of  secessionist politics. It has done so along three 
dimensions: organizations as entities, organizing as a process, and organizational practices.  
The first section has focused on the organizational infrastructure of  the independence 
movement. Catalan secessionists have been quite successful at establishing a proper movement for 
independence both in civil society structures and contentious actions. Building on early risers such 
as the PDD, a network of  civil society organizations has emerged after 2009. At the local level, 
civic networks solidified with the wave of  unofficial referendums throughout the region. After 
2012, the movement was dominated by two SMOs: ANC and Òmnium Cultural. These 
organizations experienced massive growth and professionalization until 2017. Around these two 
poles, a network of  smaller organizations formed, mainly from the independentist Left. 
The second section has shed light on protest organizing processes in normal times. ANC and 
Òmnium Cultural focused on massive symbolic street performances on the one hand. I have 
focused primarily on the case of  the Ara és l’hora campaign for the 9-N referendum in 2014. The 
campaign was prepared in a meticulous and detailed process. ANC and Òmnium Cultural were 
able to collect financial and human resources to achieve massive turnout for the campaign. There 
were also a number of  smaller protests at the local level, which were difficult to capture on the 
basis of  the qualitative data.  
The third section has described organizational practices in the independence movement. First 
I have provided a generalized account of  four selected practices: deliberation and directing as 
forms of  decision making on the one hand, and public assemblies and messenger applications as 
forms of  communication on the other hand. These descriptions emerged from the empirical 
material and are not tied to a specific period of  time. They can be read as abstract models that are 
relatively stable over time. At the same time, they can be adapted to specific contexts and combined 
in different ways. Second, I have described the concrete combination – or texture – of  these 
practices in normal times of  the Catalan secessionist conflict. Previous literature highlighted the 
role of  prefigurative organizational practices in the movement (Della Porta et al. 2017). This is 
certainly true for the independentist Left and local networks that emerged from the wave of  
unofficial referendums, which championed more horizontal forms of  protest organizing through 
deliberation and open assemblies. However, this chapter has shown that, after 2012, ANC and 
Òmnium Cultural mainly used deliberation at the leadership level and relied more on directing. 
Both of  these practices were embedded in formal and professionalized structures. This texture of  





In short, there were two primary modes of  protest organizing the normal period from 2012 until 
2017: On the one hand, leadership and professional staff  played a major role in the long and 
structured processes of  ANC and Òmnium Cultural. On the other hand, leftist organizations and 
small networks relied mainly on deliberative assemblies to organize local protests. 
This overview of  the secessionist cycle of  contention provides the basis for the more analytical 
chapters that follow. It has introduced the historical context, the main actors, and events in the 
territorial conflict, and how it escalated into intense contention after the announcement of  the 1-
O referendum. I have described how collective actors organized protest during the normal times 
of  secessionist conflict in Catalonia. This description serves as a point of  comparison for the 
analysis of  protest organizing during the 1-O episode, which follows in the subsequent chapters.  
Beyond its purposes within the present study, the chapter has demonstrated why the Catalan 
independence movement could be considered an ideal case of  an organized secessionist movement 
in the time between 2012 and 2017. The movement was based on a solid and diverse organizational 
infrastructure, which involved both large professionalized organizations and smaller loosely 
structured groups. This structure may have been a key to the movement’s success: it distinguishes 
the Catalan case from other movements that exclusively rally around a single organization or party 
and from movements that are only loosely structured and do not feature any formal organizations 
at all. This heterogeneity allowed the movement to use the advantages of  professionalized 
organizations without fully depending on them. In addition, the movement relied on a variety of  
organizational practices. The various movement actors have also known to translate these 
structures and practices into action. In this view, the diverse and consolidated organizational 
dimension has not only been key to the movement’s success but also made it an example for other 


























CONTENTION, STRATEGY, AND THE 1-O REFERENDUM 
 
 
On June 9, 2017, the president of  the Catalan Generalitat, Carles Puigdemont, gave a long-awaited 
press conference. It took Puigdemont only two minutes to announce a referendum on Catalonia’s 
independence, which would take place on October 1 of  the same year. Despite its briefness, the 
statement had far-reaching connections in both its past and future. On the one hand, it represented 
a condensation of  a long struggle of  the independence movement for Catalan sovereignty, which 
I have described in the previous chapter. On the other hand, the statement kicked off  an 
unprecedented contentious episode between the independence movement and the Spanish state. 
In this chapter, I turn precisely to this phase, which I call the 1-O episode of  contention. I describe 
how Puigdemont’s announcement shifted the secessionist conflict from “normal times” to 
“intense times”. 
The October 1 referendum is at the heart of  this intense episode. Referendums are broadly 
defined as “popular votes on bills before they become law” (Qvortrup 2018, 1). As such, they 
represent an “opportunity for electors to participate in a decision making process by voting on an 
issue more or less specific and determined” (Uleri 1996, 2). However, researchers have pointed out 
that the “concept of  referendum refers to a wide range of  institutions that give rise to a variety of  
political interactions” (Setälä 2009, 4), and therefore “the ‘referendum’ label includes a variety of  
situations and usages which bear only a superficial similarity to one another” (Smith 1975, 294).  
Scholars of  direct democracy have studied referendum mechanisms, outcomes, campaigns, and, 
in particular, the relationship between direct and representative democracy (Setälä and Schiller 
2009). However, referendums have barely been linked to contentious politics, as Della Porta et al. 
(2017) have lamented. This chapter connects the October 1 referendum to the larger secessionist 
cycle of  contention. It examines the double role of  the referendum as a strategic device used by 
secessionists to advance their claim and as an opportunity that sparked secessionist contention. 
This is why I call the 1-O a contentious referendum. 
The next section explores the contentious and unusual character of  the 1-O referendum in 




strategy to hold a binding and unilateral referendum emerged after the movement had abandoned 
this idea for some time. This includes the campaigns of  the two major SMOs. The third section 
addresses how the announcement of  the referendum kicked off  an unprecedented episode of  
contention. It examines three types of  actions: those of  the Spanish state, secessionist institutional 
action, and secessionist protest action. 
1 THE CONTENTIOUS 1-O REFERENDUM 
Referendums on independence are a specific type of  referendum. They are sometimes included in 
the broader groups of  ethno-national referendums (Qvortrup 2012, 2012) or sovereignty 
referendums (Mendez and Germann 2018). Scholars have compared the practice of  independence 
referendums across countries and time (Mendez and Germann 2018; Qvortrup 2012, 2014b; 
Requejo et al. 2019). Part of  this literature has been interested on procedural matters, e.g. voter 
registration, majority requirements, or question wordings (Qvortrup 2014b; Rocher and Lecours 
2017). Another focus has been on the proliferation of  independence referendums over time. 
Qvortrup (2014b, 63) noted that until 2011 independence referendums “have come in waves.” In 
particular after the fall of  the Soviet Union, these referendums have become more common than 
before. The increasing number of  independence referendums thus coincides with the “age of  
secession” (A. E. Buchanan 1991; Griffiths 2016). Despite this proliferation over the last 30 years, 
independence referendums are still rare events (Lecours 2018; López and Sanjaume-Calvet 2020). 
Table 5 (on the next page) provides an overview of  the referendums worldwide in the last 10 years. 
Independence referendums are thus outstanding occurrences. Only 14 have occurred in the last 
ten years around the globe. One reason is that territorial sovereignty generally represents an 
extremely valuable good to nation states, who are thus reluctant to put the secession of  regions 
under scrutiny. Very few states have constitutional rules regarding self-determination of  substate 
units (López and Sanjaume-Calvet 2020). Most referendums on independence are thus unilateral, 
i.e. they are held by regional authorities without the consent of  the host state. One recent example 
is the 2017 referendum in the Kurdistan region of  Iraq, which occurred without an agreement 









Table 5: Referendums on independence 2011-2021.  
Region Host state Year Turnout % Yes Vote % 
South Sudan Sudan 2011 97.6 98.8 
Puerto Rico USA 2012 78.2 5.5* 
Sint Eustatius Netherlands 2014 45.4 0.4* 
Catalonia Spain 2014 N/A 80.76 
Scotland United Kingdom 2014 84.6 44.7 
Crimea Ukraine 2014 83.0 97.5 
Donetsk oblast Ukraine 2014 74.9 89.8 
Luhansk oblast Ukraine 2014 75.0 96.2 
Kurdistan Iraq 2017 72.2 92.7 
Catalonia Spain 2017 43.0 90.2 
Puerto Rico USA 2017 22.2 1.5* 
New Caledonia France 2018 80.6 43.3 
Bougainville Papua New Guinea 2019 86.9 98.3 
New Caledonia France 2020 84.6 46.7 
*multiple questions and/or responses 
Sources: Requejo et al. (2019); Centre for Research on Direct Democracy (https://c2d.ch/) 
 
In a comparative perspective, the rareness of  independence referendums makes the 1-O 
referendum an interesting case to study. Even among independence referendums, the 1-O is a 
unique case, as López and Sanjaume-Calvet stressed: 
Both the 2017 unilateral referendum and its repression were extremely unusual events in 
a liberal democracy. In fact, there is no record of similar cases in this context. In the most 
similar situations in which secessionist parties obtained a regional parliamentary majority 
and a mandate to hold an independence referendum, Quebec and Scotland, the parent 
state allowed for de jure referendums to occur and secessionist leaders did not call for a de 
facto referendum. (López and Sanjaume-Calvet 2020, 13) 
The 1-O was an outstanding referendum, because of  the interactions between secessionist 
challengers and the host state were so different than in other cases. Few secessionist movements 
in established democracies have had enough support to pursue binding referendums on 




either sought an agreement with them (the UK with Scotland) or chosen to ignore challengers 
(Italy and the Padania referendum). The 1-O was exceptional because secessionist pushed for a 
unilateral referendum and the host state actively tried to prevent that referendum.  
The few existing studies on the 1-O have underlined the role of  the secessionist and counter-
secessionist action as an explanation for this unusual event. López and Sanjaume-Calvet (2020) 
argued that a combination of  rational action and strategic culture (see next section) explained the 
behaviors of  Catalan secessionists and the Spanish governments. In their view, both challengers 
and authorities responded to the preferences of  their constituencies. Ferreira (2021) claimed that 
the referendum unfolded in this unique way, because both the regional and the central government 
sides stuck to previous political choices. Whereas secessionists had promised independence, the 
Spanish government had reiterated its firm opposition. Both sides had already dedicated too much 
political capital to their course of  action and were unable to depart from it. Building on this body 
of  research, section 2.1 of  this chapter describes how the idea of  the 1-O referendum emerged. 
 The studies by López and Sanjaume-Calvet (2020) and Ferreira (2021) focused primarily on 
the motivations of  institutional actors (regional governments and parties) when calling for 
referendums on independence. Secessionist contention only plays a minor role in the two articles. 
In contrast, Della Porta et al. (2017, 2) suggested that referendums on independence represent 
formidable opportunities for civil society actors to forward their claims in campaigning for one of  
the choices in the referendums. Secessionist movements may employ referendums as instruments 
to mobilize citizens around territorial grievances, put pressure on the host state, and, eventually, 
achieve independence (Della Porta et al. 2017, 31). The authors coined the notion of  referendums 
from below. 
We have defined them as referendums that are promoted or at least see a large 
commitment by civil society actors – other than the traditional intermediary institutions 
of representation (for example, unions, parties, church and so on) or governments. (Della 
Porta et al. 2017, 2) 
Della Porta et al.’s approach to independence referendums differed from writings in research on 
direct democracy, which often regarded referendums as elite-driven mechanisms. Empirically, they 
categorized the 9-N in Catalonia and the 2014 referendum in Scotland as referendums from below.  
The present chapter combines the insights of  these previous studies by seeing the October 1 
as a product of  the interactions between the host state, the regional government, and extra-
institutional secessionist contention. This builds on an earlier contribution by Letamendia (2018), 




I suggest the 1-O referendum should be understood as a contentious referendum. The adjective 
contentious refers to two properties of  such referendums. First, contentious referendums are 
contested. Their legitimacy is not recognized by all parties concerned by the referendum. The 
Spanish state, unionist parties in Catalonia (Ciutadans and PP), and large segments of  the Catalan 
population did not accept the 1-O referendum as legitimate. Second, contentious referendums are 
part of  an episode of  contention. As I show in this chapter, the 1-O referendum was accompanied 
by a series of  different protests: street rallies, occupations, marches, non-violent resistance, and 
strikes.  
What follows from this concept is that contentious independence referendums can be 
approached both as an outcome and a driver of  secessionist conflict. On the one hand, they 
represent strategic tools that are used by secessionist challengers hoping to make a decisive step 
toward independence. On the other hand, independence referendums also represent opportunities 
for civil society actors to mobilize and can thus spark secessionist contention. 
The remainder of  this chapter reflects both sides of  the October 1 referendum. Section 2 
focuses on how secessionist challengers, both institutional and non-institutional, pushed for a 
binding referendum as a means to advance their goals. As a result of  this strategizing process, 
Carles Puigdemont announced the 1-O referendum on June 9, 2017. Section 3 shows how the 
announcement of  the referendum escalated the secessionist conflict. It describes the 1-O episode 
of  contention as a triple interaction of  Spanish state actors, the Catalan autonomous institutions, 
and secessionist civil society actors.  
2 THE ROAD TO OCTOBER 1. THE REFERENDUM AS A STRATEGY 
2.1 The Return of the Referendum Strategy 
The existing literature has sought to understand the occurrence of  independence referendums 
from different angles. Some studies have treated referendums as strategic tools. López and 
Sanjaume-Calvet noted that independence referendums are  
used by political actors involved in territorial crisis for various purposes in different 
institutional and legal contexts, even without a clear legal framework as a mechanism to 
implement an electoral mandate on sovereignty issues through political agreements (e.g. 
Scotland, 2014; Quebec 1980, 1995); as a way to reinforce the legitimacy of unilateral 
independence demands (e.g. Kurdistan, 2014), as a legitimation of a de facto status quo 





The authors described two theoretical approaches for studying the political use of  independence 
referendums. First, following a rational choice approach, Qvortrup (2014a) proposed a competition 
proximity model to explain under what conditions ethnic and nationalist groups call for referendums. 
In the model, the decision to call for a referendum is a function of  the competition (political, 
military, or electoral) the initiator faces and the proximity of  the median voter to the initiator’s 
policy position. In other words, secessionist actors are more likely to pursue a referendum on 
independence when they face competition and feel that their policy represents a majority of  voters. 
Second, Coppieters (2010, 239) highlighted the role of  strategic culture instead of  rational action. 
He argued that decisions to employ referendums on independence “are made not on the basis of  
formalized doctrines of  past secessionist conflicts but with the help of  individual historical 
experiences.” In this perspective, the experience and memory of  previous territorial conflicts 
impact how a host state treats secessionist challengers and vice versa. 
Whereas Qvortrup’s model and Coppieters’s cultural argument provided rather general 
approaches to independence referendums, other authors focused on more specific strategies.  
Cortés Rivera (2020) theorized four benefits that secessionists can gain from independence 
referendums. First, the referendum “transfers power away from political leaders to include citizens 
and from the central government to the territory under dispute” (Cortés Rivera 2020, 2). Second, 
when a concrete date for the referendum is announced, the government of  the host state can no 
longer ignore the matter. Third, secessionist can frame the referendum as their right to decide, 
“placing the central government in the difficult position of  publicly denying these rights” (Cortés 
Rivera 2020, 2). Fourth, the referendum campaign helps mobilizing the identity of  the secessionist 
community. The first three of  Cortés Rivera’s points are benefits that secessionist may gain vis-à-
vis the host state. The fourth refers to the local population. Likewise, Lecours (2020, 144) noted 
that a “central aim of  secessionist actors during an independence referendum campaign is to 
convince members of  the minority national community of  the desirability of  secession.” These 
studies underlined that independence should not be merely regarded as neutral decision-making 
mechanisms to democratically settle secessionist conflicts. Rather, they showed that referendums 
themselves may be employed as strategies to advance secessionist claims.  
Catalan secessionists have been using civil-society-initiated referendums to advance their 
independence claim since the beginning of  the secessionist cycle of  contention in 2009. Neither 
the local referendums nor the 9-N were binding referendums. As I have mentioned in the previous 
chapter, these referendums can be considered facultative initiatives, because in addition to non-
binding they were not constitutionally mandatory, pro-active, and initiated by civil society (Altman 




referendums and the 9-N, as pushing the secessionist claim one step further and attempting a 
binding vote on independence. In Altman’s terms it would have meant holding a facultative plebiscite 
on independence: a pro-active, top-down, and binding vote.  
However, this reading of  the events represents a shortcutting of  the most recent history of  the 
secessionist struggle, as my data showed. Interviewees pointed out that in fact both the regional 
government and the independence movement had abandoned the idea of  another referendum 
after the 9-N. It was only after the 2015 elections that the strategy to pursue another, this time 
binding referendum emerged – rendering everything prior “just gymnastics,” as one interviewee 
called it. In this section, I illustrate how the idea to hold the 1-O referendum emerged. 
In the early phase of  the pro-independence cycle of  contention, there had been only little 
confrontation with the Spanish state, which mainly chose to ignore the efforts of  the independence 
movement. When faced with opposition by the state, secessionists decided to avoid open conflict 
and give in, such as in the preparations for the 9-N referendum in 2014. The politics of  secession 
played out in rather contained fashion. This changed substantially in 2015, when regional elections 
in Catalonia were held. Pro-independence parties tried to frame the vote as a de facto referendum 
for independence and committed to an 18-month process of  unilateral secession from the Spanish 
state in the case of  electoral success (Martí and Cetrà 2016). Before the election, CiU disbanded. 
The smaller partner Unió Democràtica de Catalunya chose to leave the coalition, which had lasted 
35 years. The other partner, Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, formed a coalition with 
long-time rivals ERC instead. The new coalition, called Junts pel Sí could not obtain a majority of  
seats in the Catalan parliament and needed the votes of  the CUP to form a government. Despite 
a majority of  seats for these parties, secessionists moreover failed to win the popular vote (Orriols 
and Rodon 2016). In the inaugural session of  the legislature, the CUP denied incumbent Artur 
Mas the necessary support to be voted in as regional president, mainly because Mas had been 
accused of  corruption. Finally, a suitable candidate was found in Carles Puigdemont, previously 
mayor of  Girona. A few months later Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya dissolved and was 
refounded under the name Partit Demòcrata Europeu Català (PDeCAT).28 
                                                 
28 In 2017, the PDeCAT was part of the Junts per Catalunya (JxR) coalition for the December 21 election. In 2020, 
Junts per Catalunya was established as a proper political party under the leadership of Puigdemont and ran in 
competition to the PDeCAT in the 2021 regional elections. Even most of the interviewees had trouble keeping up 
with these splits and mergers in the post-CiU era. Most of them referred to the PDeCAT and Junts per Catalunya 
simply as “Convergència.” Or, as interviewee Oriol jokingly said: “Convergència i Unió – or whatever they are called 




Shortly after the 2015 election, the independentist majority in the Catalan parliament passed a 
motion to start secession from Spain. The Spanish Constitutional Court quickly suspended the 
motion, which meant that the unilateral strategy promised before the elections had reached an 
impasse. The ruling of  the Court and the tumultuous election episode sparked a new debate within 
the independence movement about how to proceed further.  
Several interviewees stated that the idea of  another referendum, this time with binding effects, 
was brought up by the CUP in the discussion. Initially, the proposal was met with both support 
and opposition within the movement. Interviewee Gerard, for example, said that the referendum 
was “something that the movement had already abandoned” at that point. In his view, it was a 
position of  Catalunya en Comù back then. Among secessionists, in contrast, “there was a little bit 
of  ‘what are we doing here?’” Also ANC organizer Judit said that “after Puigdemont won [the 
parliament vote], it was like ‘let’s see what happens.’” Also within the ANC’s leadership, there was 
a group demanding another referendum. Another part of  the leadership was opposed to that 
strategy, arguing that the only option would be a unilateral declaration of  independence. The 
leadership solved this internal debate by consulting the ANC membership. An internal poll was 
carried out, asking whether the ANC should demand the government to call for a referendum. 
The referendum option clearly won the vote and the ANC as an organization officially pronounced 
itself  in favor as well. Subsequently, both the CUP and the ANC but also other actors pressured 
the government to pursue this strategy. The CUP even threatened to withdraw their parliamentary 
support for the 2017 budget of  the autonomous community, which would have meant an early 
ending to Puigdemont’s tenure. 
After surviving a vote of  confidence in the Catalan parliament on September 28, 2016, 
Puigdemont changed his original course and vowed to call a referendum on independence in 2017. 
The announcement ended the debate and the movement rallied around the referendum strategy, 
as expert interviewee Ivan explained: “When Puigdemont said he would do it, everybody aligned 
with this idea.” This was a common thread throughout the interviews. Organizers highlighted that 
the goal to hold another referendum was shared among all movement actors in the year before the 
1-O. Or, as CDR organizer Sergi put it: “For the 1-O, it was important that all strategies converge 
in one.” This also meant to table other discussions, as interviewee Berta pointed out: 
Then, the models? About the models, the people will decide. I know already what model 
I want for my city, for my country, but maybe another person wants another one. Well, 
this is democracy, right? 
Thus, overall, there was not a lot of  strategic debate within the movement in the year before the 




actors to concentrate their efforts on campaigning, organizing, and mobilizing. Also, all sectors of  
the movement pursued the idea to hold a binding referendum resting on an agreement with the 
host state, like in Scotland or Québec. Òmnium Cultural initiated the Pacte Nacional pel 
Referèndum, a campaign to gather signatures demanding an agreement between the Catalan 
institutions and the Spanish state. However, it soon became clear that this would not be possible. 
Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy declared repeatedly that he would not agree to a referendum 
in Catalonia and that he would be willing to take all necessary steps to prevent a unilateral 
referendum organized by the regional institutions. In the face of  such strong opposition from the 
Spanish state, it became unclear to most activists how the referendum strategy would play out in 
practice. This did not alter the strategy, however. In the words of  ANC organizer Berta, the goal 
was still clear: “to make the referendum work.” The Catalan government tried to negotiate an 
agreement until the last moments, but decided, in September 2017, to carry out the referendum 
against all legal and institutional obstacles. This would require a massive mobilization by the 
Catalan pro-independence civil society to occupy and defend the voting stations against police 
intervention.  
I have traced here how the Catalan independence movement went through a strategizing 
process after the 2015 regional elections that resulted in the announcement of  the 1-O as a binding 
but unilateral referendum. Although the referendum strategy built on previous actions and frames, 
in particular the previous referendums and the related right to decide, it was the product of  an 
extensive debate among several movement actors and the regional government. There were some 
differences in how the referendum was framed by the movement actors in their respective 
campaigns, as I show in the next section.  
The referendum strategy was an important frame for the independence movement as the 
secessionist conflict escalated from normal times to the intense 1-O episode. As I show in the next 
chapters, the referendum strategy crucially shaped the ways in which the secessionist movement 
organized protests. Before the 1-O, the referendum strategy as a shared frame played an important 
role facilitating the organizing processes. Della Porta, O’Connor, and Portos (2019, 9) pointed out 
how this frame functioned: 
The 1-O referendum campaign allowed Catalan secessionist activists to give priority to the 
fighting of specific, smaller battles and to set more easily attainable goals, such as 
preventing the police from entering polling stations, and actually succeeding in holding 
the vote. 
The goal was clear to organizers and activists, which reduced internal conflict, required less 




endpoint of  the referendum strategy as frame around which the movement could unite. The 
contested character of  the referendum resulted in different interpretations of  the event, which 
made protest organizing after the 1-O much harder. I discuss these dynamics much more in detail 
in chapter 10. The next section turns to referendum campaigns of  Òmnium Cultural and ANC 
respectively. 
2.2 Contentious Campaigning 
Mobilizing citizens for a referendum typically unfolds in campaigns. As Kriesi (2011, 11) observed, 
“direct-democratic campaigns typically give rise to the confrontation between two opposing 
camps.” This was not quite the case in any of  the referendums discussed here. As mentioned in 
the previous section, the local referendums and the 9-N were promoted exclusively by the pro-
independence camp and not accepted by those who oppose secession. The demand for a vote was 
met with opposition by the Spanish government who rejected any binding referendum on 
independence in Catalonia. Interviewees reported that much of  the campaigning efforts before 
the 1-O actually aimed at reaching a binding referendum in the first place, reclaiming the “Right 
to Decide” (Dret de Decidir) as a normative foundation (cf. Della Porta et al. 2017). However, the 
referendum was not only a normative commitment but also a strategic consideration. As I show 
in this section, there were two ways of  embedding the referendum in the strategic context. These 
were represented by the campaigns of  ANC and Òmnium Cultural, respectively. First, I describe 
these campaigns and then I turn to their organizing process. 
The ANC portrayed the vote as the crucial step towards Catalonia’s independence. The 
organization’s Yes campaign (Campanya del Sí) was focused on arguments for secession from Spain. 
For the ANC, as an organization that was founded for the goal of  independence, this framing was 
a continuation of  previous campaigns. The campaign involved the typical repertoire of  action that 
was already employed for the Ara és l’hora campaign: spreading arguments for independence 
through social media, leaflets, and stands in the street; massive performances such as the Diada; 
lobbying with representatives.  
Other movement organizations argued that the goal of  the referendum was not so much 
independence itself  but self-determination. Òmnium Cultural, for example, mobilized for its 
Democràcia campaign. In the interview, organizer Beatriu underlined the differences in how the 
movement actors framed the referendum. She claimed that Òmnium Cultural was 
the first one to say “the referendum is not about Yes or No. It doesn't matter whether Yes 
or No wins, the important thing is to vote, that the people of Catalonia can express 
themselves in a legal vote.” Jordi Cuixart was the first one to say “this is not about 




Whether they were the first ones to emphasize democracy is debatable, since self-determination 
as an expression of  democracy already had a tradition in Catalonia before the Òmnium Cultural 
campaign (from the PDD to the previous referendums). Other actors also framed the referendum 
primarily in democratic terms as well. The CDRs in the days before the referendum emerged 
primarily to guarantee the voting process and less as a means to fight for independence. On 
September 27, the group BxR put up an enormous banner claiming “Love Democracy” at the 
Naval Museum in Barcelona. Also the AMPAs and the campaign Escoles Obertes used the 
democracy frame to mobilize for the occupation of  the voting stations. Framing the referendum 
as democratic self-determination meant putting normative principles in practice, but it was also a 
conscious strategic decision. This became evident in the interview with Isabel, who at the time was 
part of  Òmnium Cultural’s professional staff.  
Here the ANC and us, we divided roles. The ANC and Òmnium, we have the same final 
goal, but very different ways of seeing the path. We said “well if the ANC exists and already 
talks about [independence], then the function for Òmnium is speaking to those who we 
believe no one is speaking to.” 
“Speaking to those who we believe no one is speaking to” meant launching a message that the 
campaign was not about independence but about democracy. Framing the event in this way had 
two advantages in her view. First, as the quote showed, the democracy frame had a stronger appeal 
outside the pro-independence camp. It was designed as a message for those sectors of  the Catalan 
population opposed to outright independence but in favor of  self-determination. Second, the 
democracy frame drew its strength from its normative underpinnings. Or, as Isabel put it: 
“Everybody has to agree about democracy.”  
In short, ANC and Òmnium Cultural “split the roles, ANC did the Yes Campaign and we did 
the Democracy Campaign [...] the same strategy, different areas,” as Isabel said. This meant that in 
contrast to the Ara és l’hora campaign described above, the respective referendum campaigns for 
the 1-O were organized separately by the two organizations. Taking into account the differences 
in how the two organizations work, the empirical data suggested that the organizing processes 
were fairly similar. As mentioned before, Ara és l’hora served as a blueprint for these campaigns. 
Interviewees did not report any major changes to this scheme. ANC and Òmnium Cultural mostly 
stuck to the established processes and practices and relied on their enormous organizational 
capacity. This allowed them to prepare and plan two impactful campaigns, whose organizing 
processes started in the summer before the referendum, but extended well into the 1-O episode 
of  contention. In the next section I describe this contentious episode and how it intensified the 




3 DYNAMICS OF SECESSIONIST AND COUNTER-SECESSIONIST ACTION 
The announcement of  the 1-O referendum by Puigdemont in early June 2017 changed the 
contentious politics of  secession. Until this point, both challengers and the host state mostly 
employed a contained repertoire of  action. After the 9-N referendum, and especially after the 2015 
regional elections, institutional politics dominated the conflict. Puigdemont’s push for a binding, 
and if  necessary unilateral referendum triggered a shift from institutionalized and contained 
interactions toward disruptive contention.  
In this section, I turn to the episode of  intense contention that unfolded during the second 
half  of  2017, which is at the heart of  this inquiry into secessionist collective action. I focus on 15 
occurrences from three categories of  action: five major actions by the Catalan autonomous 
institutions, five secessionist contentious actions by civil society actors, and five actions by the 
different actors of  the Spanish state. Of  course, this an abstraction from the vast number of  
contentious instances that took place over this period of  about two months (on selection criteria, 
see chapter 3). Some of  them can be read as representative for actions of  the same category. For 
instance, in addition to the intervention at the Department of  Economy on September, there were 
a couple of  smaller searches throughout the month. The Catalan Generalitat was also undertaking 
more than just five maneuvers in the period of  study. In similar fashion, I only focus on the five 
most important secessionist contentious performances. Table 6 on the next page provides an 
overview of  these actions. 
At the heart of  the episode was the referendum on October 1, because all other occurrences 
were tightly connected to it: the prior actions were either aimed at facilitating or preventing the 
referendum, while the subsequent actions were direct or indirect consequences of  it. But the 1-O 
was more than just a referendum. Rather, the 1-O was a complex array of  action in itself. Drawing 
partly on Letamendia (2018), who suggested that the 1-O must be understood as a combination 
of  vote, mobilization, and repression, I disaggregated it into three components: the institutional side 
of  the referendum (i.e. the administration by the Generalitat and the vote itself), the intervention 
to prevent the vote (by the Spanish state), and the efforts to “defend” the vote from interference 
(by the civil society actors of  the independence movement).  
In the remainder of  this section, I examine the actions performed by each actor category, 
starting with those carried out by the Catalan autonomous institutions, followed by Spanish state 
action, and finally, the contentious performances of  the secessionist civil society actors. I devote 
much more attention to the last category, because these performances represent the cases for the 




Table 6: Key actions in the 1-O episode of  contention in 2017. 
Date Contentious Action Action type 
June 9 Referendum Announcement Institutional Secessionist 
September 6 Law 19/2017 on the Referendum Institutional Secessionist 
September 7 
Ruling against Law 19/2017 by the Spanish 
Constitutional Court 
Spanish State 
September 11 Diada Demonstration Secessionist Contention 
September 20 
Operation Anubis by the Spanish Civil 
Guard and Police 
Spanish State 
September 20 Protests against Operation Anubis Secessionist Contention 
September 22 – October 2 Occupation University of  Barcelona Secessionist Contention 
September 29 – October 1 Defense of  Voting Stations Secessionist Contention 
October 1 Referendum on Independence Institutional Secessionist 
October 1 
Intervention in Voting Stations by National 
Police & Civil Guard 
Spanish State 
October 3 General Strike Secessionist Contention 
October 10 Suspended Declaration of  Independence Institutional Secessionist 
October 16 Imprisonment of  the “Jordis” Spanish State 
October 27 Declaration of  independence Institutional Secessionist 
October 27 Application of  article 155 Spanish State 
 
3.1 Pushing for Independence: Institutional Action by the Catalan Generalitat 
First, identifying starting points for any kind of  temporal sequence is always an arbitrary yet 
necessary endeavor to avoid infinite regress. In contrast to Kriesi, Hutter, and Bojar (2019), who 
chose government policy proposals as the starting point in their analysis of  contentious episodes, 
I used an action of  a challenger as the point of  departure. This choice was motivated by the focus 
on the 1-O referendum as an unusual attempt at unilateral secession in an established democracy. 




a referendum on October 1 of  the same year. While preparations for the vote were already 
underway, there was very little contentious activity over the summer of  2017.   
Second, only when the Catalan parliament reconvened after their summer recess, the 
confrontation between secessionists and host state became more intense. A crucial move was the 
adoption of  a legal framework that encompasses one law (“Law 19/2017 on the Referendum on 
Self-Determination”) and two decrees (139/2017 and 140/2017) by the parliament. The Law on 
the Referendum on Self-Determination was passed in a controversial parliamentary session on 
September 6, when the unionist parties (PP, Ciutadans, and PSC) left the plenary before the vote 
(Letamendia 2018). The main provisions of  the law included the formation and appointment of  
an Electoral Commission (Sindicatura Electoral de Catalunya) for the referendum, the question on 
the ballot (“Do you want Catalonia to be an independent state in the form of  a republic?”) and 
the response options (“Yes” or “No”), as well as the electoral roll (all persons with the right to 
vote in the elections to the Catalan parliament as well as Catalans abroad). The decree 139/2017 
represented the official call for the referendum, and the decree 140/2017 regulated all the 
administrative details. It delegated the power to carry out the Law on the Referendum to the 
Electoral Administration of  the Generalitat.  
Previous research pointed to the central role of  the independence movement in initiating and 
organizing the local referendums (Muñoz and Guinjoan 2013) and the 9-N referendum in 2014 
(Della Porta et al. 2017). The 1-O referendum was different, because it was organized by the 
Catalan Generalitat. In the case of  a positive outcome, Puigdemont pledged to declare 
independence. Thus, in order to maximize the legitimacy of  the referendum, it had to be organized 
top-down by state institutions. On paper, it reads like the Generalitat organized everything. While 
the legal framework was an important reflection of  the institutional provision, the de facto 
organization was different than laid down in the law.  
The central problem was that the capacity of  the autonomous institutions to organize a 
legitimate and valid vote on independence was threatened by repressive action by the Spanish state. 
Over the course of  the first half  of  2017, the Spanish government repeatedly stated to do 
everything to prevent a binding referendum. When Puigdemont officially announced the 
referendum in June, it was clear that a regular referendum would be difficult to organize as long as 
separatist leaders reclaimed its binding character and committed to declare independence in case 
of  a positive outcome. Hence, simply repeating the 2014 referendum was not an option. 
Consequently, many activities had to be clandestine from the beginning to minimize legal 




The central preparatory task was the purchase and distribution of  ballot boxes, which was realized 
through semi-clandestine networks instead of  official channels. This process is well documented 
in the book Operació Urnes (Operation Ballot Boxes) by the journalists Laia Vicens and Xavi Tedó 
(2018). In my own data base, interviewees frequently referred to the book and confirmed its 
content. 
In May 2017, before Puigdemont officially announced the referendum, the Catalan government 
published a document stating that it wanted to buy ballot boxes for “autonomous elections, 
referendums, and other types of  citizen participation.” Subsequently, the Civil Guard entered into 
firms interested in the procurement and the High Court of  Justice of  Catalonia opened an 
investigation against the Governance Department of  the Catalan government. Only a month after 
the procurement, the call was officially renounced. However, Puigdemont declared: “Don’t worry: 
On October 1, there will be ballot boxes” (cited in: Vicens & Tedó, 2018; all following translations 
from the book are mine). Puigdemont’s statement would prove true, because civil society actors 
had taken over the purchase of  the boxes.  
Already in March, Lluís, a life-long independentist, but always an activist in the background, 
had started a plan to purchase ballot boxes and distribute them secretly, which was called 
“Operation Ballot Boxes.” The goal was to circumvent the prohibition to buy the containers 
officially. It is unclear whether Lluís initiated Operation Ballot Boxes on his own or was asked by 
the Catalan government,29 but in any case, he had contacts with the government (Vicens and Tedó 
2018, 25). Thus, when Puigdemont tried to calm the debate after the failed procurement, he was 
most likely aware of  the semi-clandestine activities.  
The book and my interview data suggested that Operation Ballot Boxes was carried out mostly 
by private individuals with little government support through a pyramidal and semi-clandestine 
network. In several steps, these private individuals ordered 10.000 ballot boxes in China, had them 
shipped to the port of  Marseille, and brought them secretly to Catalonia by hundreds of  trips by 
car. Operation Ballot Boxes represented a complex and particular type of  collective action that 
was crucial for the preparation of  the referendum. The success of  the operation became a 
remarkable outcome given the constant threat of  Spanish state intervention. This was only possible 
because of  two elements of  the organizational process. First, the purchase and distribution was 
taken over by non-government actors. As mentioned before, there was no evidence in the data on 
whether this was a deliberative decision by the Catalan government or a private initiative. 
                                                 
29 The exact phrasing of the book is that Lluís “was chosen as the logistic coordinator of Operation Ballot Boxes“ 




Moreover, there was little evidence on how the operation was planned and designed in its 
beginning. In any case, the take-over by civil society actors allowed the operation to be carried out 
despite the paralysis of  Catalan institutions by state repression. Second, the operation was 
organized largely in clandestinity. In the book and in the interviews, organizers on all levels of  the 
operation told that they constantly feared that the ballot boxes could be intercepted by the Spanish 
police forces, leading them to take a series of  precautions. In particular, they generally did not 
share information with any outsiders. Also within the operation, communication was limited 
between the different levels: “You would only know the person from whom you would receive the 
boxes, but not from whom they had received them,” interviewee Eduard explained.  
The referendum – as an institutional and administrative mechanism – can be regarded as the 
third action of  the Generalitat in the contentious episode. As in regular elections and referendums, 
the Generalitat assigned a “responsable de la administració” (RA), a public servant who oversaw 
the voting procedure in each station. In addition, each voting station normally consisted of  two 
voting tables with a ballot box each – some smaller stations only had one table and box though. 
For each table, the Generalitat appointed a president and two members. However, in many cases 
the regular procedure was impeded by the intervention of  police and judicial action. During a raid 
in September, the Spanish police confiscated most of  the notices that were supposed to inform 
people of  their duty in the voting stations the day of  the referendum. Also, it seems likely that 
many people who were informed did not show up because of  fear of  penal consequences. This is 
why in many cases the independentist mayors, local parties, and associations were looking for 
volunteers to carry out these tasks instead. They approached public servants and trustful members 
of  their own ranks. Often, it was the RAs who received the ballot boxes from the local 
coordinators. The actions of  these officials on the day of  the referendum must be understood as 
institutional action and should be distinguished from the defense of  the voting stations, which I 
describe below.  
After the 1-O, the Catalan government was caught between a rock and a hard place: On the 
one hand, the positive vote in the referendum technically obliged the leadership to declare Catalan 
independence. In the following days, SMOs and media pundits put pressure on the Catalan 
government to execute the Law on the Referendum, which demanded the declaration of  
independence within 48 hours of  a Yes vote. On the other hand, the Spanish government made it 
clear that any further move towards independence would be followed by more repression against 
the leadership. Faced with this dilemma, on October 10, Puigdemont declared independence – just 
to suspend it within less than a minute. Finally, the Catalan parliament did celebrate a vote on 




process to apply article 155 of  the Spanish constitution. Thus, the declaration never had legal 
consequences, and Puigdemont and other politicians left Catalonia after the declaration of  
independence to avoid legal prosecution.  
3.2 Counter-secessionist Action by the Spanish State 
During summer 2017, there were only a couple instances of  state action against the referendum. 
Only after the approval of  Law on the Referendum on Self-Determination on September 6, 
Spanish state repression intensified. That very same day, the Civil Guard carried out a raid to search 
for ballots in the printing firm Indugraf  near Tarragona, and three days later in the newspaper El 
Vallenc, but in both cases they came up empty-handed (Vicens and Tedó 2018, 76–77).  
The first major action against the referendum occurred on September 7, when the Spanish 
government under Mariano Rajoy took the Law on the Referendum on Self-Determination to the 
Constitutional Court. The Court suspended the law immediately, while also explicitly warning the 
public servants of  the regional government and the 948 Catalan mayors that they would face 
personal juridical consequences if  they participated in the preparation of  the referendum. The 
suspension was followed by a series of  related actions, which I subsume in this category. For 
instance, 712 of  these mayors were cited by the attorney general on September 13 for alleged 
collaboration in the organization of  the plebiscite (Giménez and Gunzelmann 2019). At the same 
time, the Constitutional Court notified media outlets that they might face fines if  they published 
advertisements for the referendum. 
The second blow against the referendum preparations was Operation Anubis on September 20 
(20-S). The Spanish police had already carried out more raids at printing houses in different cities 
throughout Catalonia, for example seizing 45.000 envelopes from the firm Unipost in Terassa 
(Vicens and Tedó 2018, 79–81) some days before. But the 20-S represented the peak of  repressive 
action against the preparatory process of  the referendum. On that day, the Spanish National Police 
and the Civil Guard carried out 41 raids and 14 arrests in Catalan public institutions (Giménez and 
Gunzelmann 2019). Most notably, in the morning, the Civil Guard entered the Catalan 
Department of  Economy in Barcelona, confiscated documents, and detained Josep Maria Jové, 
one of  the most important civil servants in the department (Vicens and Tedó 2018, 84). Police 
forces also attempted to search the headquarters of  the CUP without a warrant, but were 
prevented from doing so by protesters who occupied the entrance of  the building. Furthermore, 
police confiscated another two million ballots in a small town in the Vallès. Finally, three cruise 
ships with about 5.400 riot police arrived in Catalonia. Two of  them docked in Barcelona, another 




Third, on the day of  the referendum, the three police corps present in Catalonia acted against the 
realization of  the referendum. The Mossos d’Esquadra closed around 140 voting stations 
(Guinjoan and Rodon 2017a), but had the order not to intervene if  there were more than 50 people 
present in the building. The largest and most violent part of  repressive actions was performed by 
the Spanish National Police (mostly in Barcelona) and the Civil Guard (in mid-size and small town), 
who managed to close about a hundred voting stations (Barceló 2018). Apart from places where 
prominent politicians were supposed to vote, the choice where to intervene appeared to have been 
quite random (Guinjoan and Rodon 2017b). Facing resistance from protesters in many places, the 
police used rubber bullets and batons to enter the voting stations, physically remove voters, and 
confiscate the ballot boxes (Della Porta, O’Connor, and Portos 2019).  
After the referendum, legal repression against the autonomous institutions and the 
independence movement intensified. On October 16, the leaders of  Òmnium Cultural and ANC, 
Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sànchez were charged with rebellion and sedition for calling the protest on 
September 20 and arrested. On October 27, the Spanish senate voted in favor of  applying article 
155 of  the Spanish constitution which supposed the temporary suspension of  Catalonia’s 
autonomy and snap regional elections. The application of  article 155 marked the end of  the 1-O 
contentious episode and a shift back to institutional politics, but not of  the overall cycle of  
contention. The next section turns to the contentious actions of  the independence movement 
during the 1-O episode.  
3.3 Secessionist Contentious Action 
September 11: The “Diada del Sí” 
The first large contentious performance in the 1-O episode of contention was the manifestation 
on September 11, the National Day of Catalonia. About a million people gathered in two of 
Barcelona’s largest avenues, Passeig de Gràcia and Carrer Aragó. The protest in the two 
intersecting streets formed an enormous plus sign, which stood for positivity, but also as a symbol 
for the “majority” of independentism in Catalonia. Thus, generally, the 2017 edition of the Diada 
was not any different from those staged in other years: a sea of flags, festive atmosphere, and 
participation from all sectors of the independence movement. In short, it was a massive, yet 
contained and strictly choreographed contentious performance. The only difference was that it 
was part of the larger Yes campaign by the ANC, demanding not only that the – at this point 




September 20: Protests against police actions 
In the data, there was evidence on three protest actions in response to the repressive action by the 
Spanish police and Civil Guard against the referendum preparation on September 20. The first 
one took place at the Catalan Department of Economy. In the morning, the Civil Guard entered 
the department to search for documents related to the institutional and administrative preparation 
of the 1-O referendum. In response, Òmnium Cultural and ANC called for a peaceful protest 
outside the building to “defend our institutions.” They improvised a concert and talks at a nearby 
square to entertain people during the protest. During the whole day, about 40.000 protesters 
impeded the exit of the police officers from the Department, who ultimately had to escape the 
building through a rear exit. At night, Jordi Sànchez and Jordi Cuixart climbed a car of the Civil 
Guard to calm down the protesters. 
The second action took place at the headquarters of the CUP. Police forces tried to search the 
headquarters without a warrant. The party called for a protest outside the building, which 
successfully prevented the police from entering. While these two instances are well documented, 
there was a series of smaller contentious actions. Interviewees reported a third instance. In 
Sabadell, for example, a high civil servant of the Catalan government was detained by the Civil 
Guard. There as well, people gathered outside the building, but in this case to prevent the police 
from exiting the detainee’s home.   
What these three instances had in common is the use of massive gatherings of people outside 
of buildings to obstruct police actions. As such, the 20-S represented a departure from the 
contained type of performance such as the Diada toward more disruptive forms of contentious 
action. Activist Pere described this shift as follows: 
Although there is no beating, it is the first day where people put their bodies to defend a 
political idea. It’s the first day they say “you’re not going to come out from the police 
operation. Because I’ve put my body.” There is no beating, but if there had been, the same 
thing would have passed [as on October 1]. It’s the change of mentality, no?  
He called this change in mentality the emergence of a “revolutionary conscious,” which drove 
people not just to demonstrate, but to employ disruptive tactics against police action and defend 
their autonomous institutions. The shift toward more disruptive action became even more evident 
on the day of the referendum itself, when activists mobilized to defend the voting stations against 




September 22 – October 2: Occupying the University of Barcelona 
Two days after Operation Anubis and the protest against it, the student platform Universitats per 
la República (UxR) called to occupy the historic building of the University of Barcelona in Plaça 
Universitat. UxR had been campaigning since summer to politicize the Catalan youth. Occupying 
the university was not instrumental for the platform itself or the referendum. Rather, the idea of 
the occupation was to maintain the level of mobilization until the referendum. In addition, the 
occupied campus served as a headquarter to launch demonstrations and host events but also to 
engage with local, Spanish, and international media. This was successful, as pictures from the 
occupation made it to the front page of the New York Times. Finally, it was also used to store 
material for the referendum, e.g. ballots, but also campaign material. UxR organized various 
activities every day of the occupation, for instance concerts with popular music groups such as 
Txarango, or a talk with Julian Assange via Skype. On September 28 and 29, 80.000 students 
participated in a strike and manifestation called by UxR. Interviewees reported that during the 
weekend of the referendum, there had been less participation at the occupation, as organizers had 
called most students to go home to their neighborhoods and villages and defend the voting stations 
– I describe this large-scale action in the next section. On October 2, the day after the referendum, 
the occupation ended. 
October 1: Defending the referendum – occupation and resistance 
What made the 1-O referendum so exceptional was the confrontation in the streets of  Catalonia. 
On the one hand, the Spanish government directly intervened, sending police forces to stop the 
referendum. On the other hand, civil society actors of  the independence movement made an 
enormous mobilization effort to guarantee that citizens could cast their vote. In this section, I 
describe the latter as a set of  contentious actions that have become known by the shorthand 
expression “defending the referendum.” There were 2.305 voting stations in total, but interviewees 
provided a global view on the defense. As a contentious performance, the defense of  the voting 
stations has three main components:  
 
 Occupation of  the voting station one or two days before the referendum (in most cases) 
 Gatherings inside and outside the voting stations (in all stations) 
 Nonviolent resistance to prevent the police from entering the voting station (only where 





First, in some instances (e.g. in Fastiada, Sabadell), town halls provided organizers the keys to the 
voting stations. Also, in other cases (Hospitalet de Llobregat, Sant Antoni), organizers were in 
contact with individuals who, worked at the place that would serve as voting station (e.g. schools 
or cultural centers) and had keys. Where keys were available, there often were no calls for 
occupation (Fastiada and also in some small towns) and people just gathered on the morning of  
the referendum instead. Similarly, the ANC did not call to occupy the referendums, but just to 
concentrate outside of  the buildings.  
Nevertheless, on Friday, September 29, people throughout Catalonia started occupying voting 
stations, many of  them public schools. Although my data did not provide a comprehensive 
overview of  the voting stations in Catalonia, my estimate is that a large majority of  voting stations 
were occupied - sometimes even when a key was available, and in many cases very consciously 
against the recommendation of  the ANC. Some schools were occupied only on Saturday. 
According to the law, schools can be open for the weekend if  extracurricular activities were 
organized, which was the case in most places.  
Second, in all the stations, occupied or not, organizers, activists, and ordinary voters gathered 
inside and outside of  the voting stations from 5am in the morning on October 1. In many places, 
turnout was massive with long lines forming already before the opening of  the voting stations at 
9am. The idea was to use nonviolent resistance to prevent the police from entering by forming 
human barricades to obstruct the entrances. In many cases, participants reported that, in addition 
to forming human walls, activists constructed material barricades to stop or slow down the police. 
In one voting station in Girona, activists formed a car cordon, which seemed to have been effective 
in deterring the police. In Tarragona, a van was used to block the road to the voting station. In 
one of  the Hospitalet voting stations, participants used trash cans to block access to the voting 
station. Others tried to barricade the entrance from within, even with chairs and tables of  the 
school, and banks.  
It was decisive that enough people were present in all the voting stations for two reasons. On 
the one hand, activists knew that Mossos d’Esquadra had orders not to intervene if  there were 
more than 50 people. On the other hand, the numbers were important for effective resistance 
against the Spanish National Police. Thus, people had to be distributed more or less evenly across 
voting stations. This required communication and coordination between the voting stations. In a 
few cases (Fastiada, Sabadell), there were deliberate efforts dedicated to this task. Organizers 
formed headquarters and had informants in each voting station to keep track of  the numbers of  
attendants. Organizers in the headquarters could then pass on instructions which voting station 




station to another. In other stations, information was exchanged through the networks and 
channels of  the involved associations. But this occurred more on an ad-hoc basis in many places. 
Ordinary participants realized that there was an imbalance between two or more voting stations 
and stayed at the least attended to help defending it. However, there was little evidence in the data 
on which of  these patterns was widespread and whether the coordination was effective or not. 
Third, in most of  the voting station mentioned in the data, there was actually no police 
intervention. Interviewees only mentioned clashes between police and protesters in six voting 
stations. In five of  them, organizers, activists, and ordinary voters defended the college using 
nonviolent resistance. Despite these efforts, police forces were in all cases able to enter the 
building. However, activists hid the ballot boxes and in none of  the described instances the police 
was able to confiscate them. In one case, the director of  the school unilaterally decided to open 
the doors for the police to avoid violent confrontations. After the police interventions, the hidden 
ballot boxes were brought back and the voting continued. Generally, most of  the clashes occurred 
in the morning and around noon, while the afternoon was relatively calm. It seems that in most 
cases, voting stations were open regularly until 8pm. However, there were a couple of  cases where 
a premature closing was at least discussed, for fear of  a police intervention. Interviewees reported 
on instance in which the voting stations were closed early.  
October 3: Shutting down the country 
Interviewees refer to the actions on October 3 (3-O) as “general strike,” but in fact it was an aturada 
de país, which translates as “country shutdown” and goes beyond the labor-related elements of  a 
strike. The 3-O was a threefold contentious performance: first, there was a massive strike in the 
work place. Second, large street demonstrations and marches took place. Third, activists blocked 
railways and highways throughout the country. These actions were performed in response to the 
police violence on the 1-O. The 3-O was the largest general strike in Catalonia since the end of  
the Franco dictatorship and involved participation from all sectors of  the independence movement 
and even beyond. The empirical data illustrates these contentious actions in five examples. 
First, in the Clot neighborhood of  Barcelona, activists cut the Avinguda Meridiana, which is 
one of  Barcelona’s largest avenues and passes just by the neighborhood. Then activists went 
picketing at the neighborhood’s Mercadona supermarket, which did not allow its workers any 
strike. Afterwards they went to protest at the station of  the National Police in the nearby Verneda 
neighborhood. For this action, they coordinated also with the CDR Verneda. The demonstration 




ten minutes. From there they marched to the railway Meridiana-Aragón to meet other CDRs and 
headed to Plaça Catalunya for the main picket line. 
Second, in Sabadell, activists marched from each neighborhood to meet in the North of  the 
city. Turnout was massive, and interviewees described the 3-O as the largest protest in Sabadell in 
a long time. 
Third, in Fastiada, activists met for a picket line at Mercadona and then blocked a highway near 
the town. They also called for a protest in the main square of  Fastiada at noon. However, as the 
action on the highway took longer, the organizers arrived late to the protest in the center. In the 
meantime, people had already started protesting by themselves, as Oriol explains: 
And when it was time to return to the center, we decided to send someone ahead to set 
up the thing already. It turns out that it got out of hand [...] like, a lot of people, all the 
center full of people and people were doing whatever- like they started to march by 
themselves. They started the demonstration and did the route they wanted. The trigger 
was only having said “demonstration at 12” and so people gathered at 12 and did the demo 
and went ahead to wherever they wanted. 
It appears that the protest almost went out of  control, as people were marching to the North of  
the city where the quarter of  the Civil Guard was located. However, as the organized arrived at 
the protest, they were able to redirect the march and avoid confrontation with the police forces. 
Fourth, in Barcelona during the day, a false rumor spread that UxR had called for a protest in 
Plaça Universitat. Suddenly, 150.000 people showed up in the square. They also called to occupy a 
square in the center of  Barcelona, but it failed because ANC and the political parties called 
everybody to go home after the strike.  
Fifth, people even mobilized in small towns and villages such as Montanya and Caldes. In small 
town Montanya, the 3-O was a large event with more than 3.000 people in the streets, which 
organizers describe as one of  the largest protests since the dictatorship. Activists cut a nearby 
highway. In Caldes, activists joined a protest in a nearby small town were the police had intervened 
to protest against violent repression. 
4 CONCLUSION 
When Carles Puigdemont announced his intention to hold a referendum in 2017, the relative 
equilibrium between challengers and the host state changed dramatically. In this chapter, I have 
traced how the strategy to pursue a unilateral referendum emerged and how this move intensified 
the conflict and led to an unprecedented period of  contention. 
The chapter shows that the October 1 referendum was not a neutral and purely institutional 




decisive step toward independence. In their work on the 9-N and the Scottish referendum on 
independence, Della Porta et al. (2017, 31) held that these referendums were “used as means to 
promote citizen mobilisation and involvement around territorial claims and, eventually, gain 
independence.” My empirical material supports this view. Interviewees highlighted that October 1 
did not represent an exogenous opportunity for the movement, but was actively created and used 
a tool. Although many movement actors framed it as a democratic process, the referendum was a 
fundamental instrument to advance secessionist aims at the same time. Hence, independently from 
the politics of  the campaign and the vote, holding a referendum in itself  can be understood as a 
contentious performance (Tilly 2008).  
Referendums are ideal tools to display public support for independence as they follow a logic 
of  numbers. Della Porta et al. (2017, 30; see also Qvortrup 2014b, 60) pointed out that  
“referendums are widely regarded as an adequate instrument – probably the most adequate – to 
give both internal and external legitimacy to independence claims (that is, towards both indigenous 
civil society and the international community).” Referendums, even when non-binding, are thus 
more than just “populist placebos” (Altman 2011). They are what are perfect Tilly (2004, 4) called 
“WUNC displays:” they demonstrate worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment.  
Despite these strategic benefits, the emergence of  the referendum strategy before the 1-O 
suggests that secessionist challengers do not employ referendums out of  purely rational 
calculations of  costs and benefits. Repertoires of  action are not a toolbox from which movement 
actors can simply pick and choose. Rather, movement strategies are the result of  debates among 
many actors in which frames, expectations, and norms play a crucial role. 
The chapter has also revealed that the 1-O referendum was the result of  a triple interaction 
between the Spanish state, the Catalan institutions, and secessionist civil society actors. Whereas 
the previous literature has either prioritized government interactions (Ferreira 2021; López and 
Sanjaume-Calvet 2020) or civil society actors (Della Porta et al. 2017), I have provided a full 
account of  these interactions. This has shown that secessionist collective action and strategy was 
a product of  institutional and movement action. The Catalan autonomous institutions called for 
the referendum and provided its administrative and legal framework, whereas the main SMOs 
Òmnium Cultural and ANC campaigned and mobilized for the referendum. These actors have 
cooperated to coordinate these two strands of  secessionist action.  
However, the 1-O also sparked a shift from institutional to contentious action. The Generalitat 
in particular was paralyzed by Spanish repression after the 20-S. In response, emergent groups 
took over the initiative and organized the defense of  the referendum and the general strike on 




performances of  the independence movement in this episode over time, it becomes clear that 
there was a repertoire shift from contained to disruptive action without escalating into violence 
(Della Porta, O’Connor, and Portos 2019). Furthermore, there was a change from the massive 
street performance of  the Diada to the mobilizations on September 20 and October 1, which 
directly confronted police action against the referendum, and then to the general strike on October 
3. 
This transition from institutional to contentious action underlines the contentious character of  
the 1-O referendum. Its announcement triggered a rapid succession of  interactions between 
secessionist challengers and the host state. The push for a binding referendum escalated the 
secessionist conflict and supposed a transition from the normal times described in the previous 
chapter to the intense 1-O episode of  contention. This transition from normal times of  
secessionist conflict to the phase of  intense contention puts forward the central research question 
of  this dissertation: How did the 1-O contentious episode transform protest organizing? The next 
chapter approaches this question by showing how the five different contentious performances 
were organized by secessionist civil society actors. 
Finally, the 1-O episode of  contention did not come to an end on October 3. The collective 
actors of  the independence movement continued to mobilize their followers. On October 10, 
thousands of  secessionist activists gathered in the streets expecting to celebrate an independent 
Catalan republic, but were massively disappointed after Puigdemont’s suspended the declaration 
of  independence. A week later, they took the streets again to protest the arrest of  Jordi Cuixart 
and Jordi Sànchez the day before. Only after the application of  article 155 on October 27, the level 
of  mobilization decreased. Since article 155 supposed the dissolution of  the Catalan parliament 
and anticipated regional elections, the focus of  the secessionist conflict returned to the institutional 
arena. Faced with the threat of  losing their majority in the regional chamber, pro-independence 
parties shifted their attention to their campaigns. Although unionist Ciutadans obtained the most 
votes in the elections on December 21 (called 21-D), Junts per Catalunya, ERC, and the CUP were 
able to hold on to their majority in the parliament. Article 155 and the election campaign made it 









ORGANIZING SECESSIONIST PROTEST IN INTENSE TIMES 
 
 
Protests have become so familiar that they seem an everyday feature of  contemporary politics. The 
same could be said about secessionist contention in Catalonia. Demands for independence have 
become a central characteristic of  Catalan politics. Between 2012 and 2017, collective actors such 
as ANC and Òmnium Cultural, student associations, left-wing organizations, and local grassroots 
groups staged a great number of  contentious performances. Not only protests but also 
organizational structures, processes, and practices of  the movement became normalized over this 
period of  time. However, neither protest nor its organization remains stable over time. Scholars 
have shown that protest comes and goes in waves, tides, or cycles (Beissinger 1996, 2002; 
Koopmans 2004; Tarrow 1989, 2011). The organizational dimension of  social movements 
sometimes undergoes profound transformations, too.  
 In 2017 Catalan secessionists challenged the Spanish state by calling for a unilateral referendum 
on independence. The announcement of  the referendum triggered a dense sequence of  
interactions between civil society actors, the regional institutions, and the Spanish government. 
Secessionist action became more contentious and disruptive. I have called this condensed series 
of  occurrences between September 6 and October 27 the 1-O episode of  contention. This contentious 
episode represented a shift from normal to intense times of  the Catalan secessionist conflict. The 
intensification of  the conflict poses a fundamental question: how did activists organize secessionist 
contention in the 1-O episode of  contention?  
Existing research on organization in social movements tells us very little about this question, 
because it has not been particularly sensitive to the cyclical dynamics of  contentious politics. 
Hence, there are no clear theoretical and empirical expectations with regards to this question. Still, 
in chapter 2, I have theorized three mechanisms that may shape protest organizing in intense times 
of  contention. First, activists are more likely to face actions from their opponents, because the 
level of  repression normally increases during intense times (Tarrow 2011). Thus, organizers must 
include opponent actions into their plans and preparations. Second, intense times often involve 




(Wagner-Pacifici and Ruggero 2018). Third, intense times suppose dense sequences of  
occurrences. Activists must often act quickly and have less time to organize collective action (Della 
Porta 2018). These three mechanisms suggest that protest organizing becomes much more difficult 
in intense times than in normal times. However, their precise impact is hard to discern on a 
theoretical level.  
The independence movement repeatedly managed to mobilize massively to defend the 
referendum and the autonomous institutions, and to push its own representatives to take action 
toward secession. From the stream of  continuous contentious activity, I have selected five cases 
of  protest action: the Diada on September 11, the protest on September 20, the occupation of  the 
University of  Barcelona, the defense of  the voting stations on the weekend of  the referendum, 
and the general strike on October 3.  I have already described these protest actions in the previous 
chapter. This chapter turns to the “backstage” of  these protests and explores how they were 
organized. The next sections provide analytical narratives of  their organizing processes. 
1 FIVE CASES OF PROTEST ORGANIZING IN THE 1-O EPISODE OF CONTENTION 
1.1 Organizing the Diada  
The first major protest in the 1-O episode was the massive street demonstration on the National 
Day of  Catalonia, called La Diada, on September 11. As I have described in chapter 5, the Diada 
had been organized by the ANC since 2012 and turned out massive numbers of  protesters each 
year. In the interviews, ANC organizers pointed out the enormous amount of  time and 
preparatory work that went into the Diada each year.  
The organizing process of  the 2017 Diada was not substantially different from those during 
what I have called “normal” times of  the Catalan secessionist conflict. In fact, the organizing 
process started before the start of  the 1-O episode. Organizers reported that the ANC dedicated 
almost half  a year to the preparation of  the Diada. Just like in normal times, the Diada was 
meticulously planned and prepared in a long and complex process. The detailed plan for the protest 
required a variety of  preparatory tasks. For instance, every local chapter of  the ANC was 
responsible to prepare a stretch of  the street where the demonstration happened. ANC Organizer 
Carme described the details of  these preparations as follows. 
You have to understand that the hardest work of the summer is to organize the 
demonstration. No? So in this stretch [of the street] you have to organize a team of 
volunteers, the have to go see “their” stretch. We speak with all the businesses in that 
stretch, we let them know there will be a demonstration, that they have drinks that they- 
whether they let us use the bathrooms- we mark on a map if there are pharmacies, water 




potentially dangerous. Then we secure them off. Oh, I don’t know, we decorate our 
stretch. Every local chapter is in charge to decorate their stretch. Then there is the design 
of the protest. The shirt is provided by the national ANC, but for every stretch there is a 
local chapter in charge. Normally that is a chapter from Barcelona. And they host a chapter 
from outside Barcelona. A district from the Maresme or whatever. And then we do it 
together and the work we have is to sell t-shirts and that is a lot of work, selling t-shirts. 
This quote shows the level of  detail ANC organizers dedicated to the Diada protest. This level of  
detail required an enormous amount of  preparatory work, especially because of  the massive scale 
of  the protest. As in previous years, organizers expected a turnout of  more than a million 
protesters on two of  Barcelona’s largest streets: Passeig de Gràcia and Carrer Aragó. 
The complexity of  these preparations was organized in a streamlined process. Five features of  
the organizing process stand out. First, the Diada was planned and prepared primarily by the ANC 
as a single SMO, although it was endorsed and supported by many other organizations such as 
Òmnium Cultural. Thus, there was less interorganizational work necessary and no negotiations 
about the place, slogan, and timing of  the demonstration. The organization also provided for both 
material and human resources that were necessary to achieve the level of  detail. Second, the 
decisions in the process were controlled top-down by the leadership of  the organization. There 
was a clear division of  labor between the national leadership and the local chapters. The centralized 
decision making and division of  labor made it easier to allocate the preparatory tasks. Third, ANC 
organizers benefited from already having organized the Diada for several years in a row. 
Interviewee Carme pointed out that over the years, they had accumulated a lot of  experience and 
were “professionals” now. She underlined that this routinization made the preparatory process a 
lot easier. Fourth, while the Diada was one of  the largest protests in Europe, it was also a contained 
performance. It did not involve any confrontation with authorities, police, or other opponents. 
Fifth, and finally: the ANC invested a lot of  time into preparing the Diada – which of  course made 
the organizing process a lot smoother. 
Although the Diada was the first major protest that occurred after the secessionist conflict 
began to intensify, it had to be understood as a continuation of  previous normal modes of  protest 
organizing. The detailed and meticulous preparations resembled closely the organizing processes 
before the onset of  the 1-O episode. As such, the Diada came close to the model proposed by 
Rucht (2017), but the difference was that the Diada required almost no interorganizational effort. 
Rather it represents an exemplary case of  organizing inside a single organization. As such, the 
organizing process seemed typical for many of  the contained and routine protests of  a movement 




1.2 Organizing the 20-S  
The protests on September 20 were very different than the Diada demonstration just a couple days 
before. On the morning of  the 20-S, the leaderships of  Òmnium Cultural and ANC received news 
that the Civil Guard had entered the Catalan Department of  Economy to search for documents 
related to the referendum on October 1. The leaders quickly decided to call for a protest outside 
the Department building. To illustrate this condensed preparatory process, I quote at length a 
passage from the interview with Beatriu, who was one of  the members of  Òmnium Cultural’s 
board of  directors at the time. She described how the decision was taken by the organization’s 
executive committee, which consisted of  the president, the three vice presidents, the treasurer, and 
the secretary.  
R: Well look, on the morning of the 20-S. Hmm, we knew that the Civil Guard was 
entering the Department of Economy. Somebody heard it on the radio or a party member 
told someone. And so we discussed it on Telegram like “look this is happening, what we 
do?” – “do we call for a demonstration?” and so on. Then we sent a WhatsApp message, 
because we already had this channel in place – “Call for Democracy” – Over “Call for 
Democracy” we called people to the streets and we send it the same morning over 
Telegram as well. Thus, the responsible person send this over WhatsApp to our followers.  
I: And who on the Board of Directors decided this? How did you decide where and when?  
R: That’s not easy [to answer], I suppose this should have been an issue for the executive 
committee, I don’t remember anymore, but everyday decisions – o rather for the 
functioning of the entity and short-term things, that’s for the executive committee. So 
when there is something, some relevant issue, we say “Okay, fine, but we have to 
communicate this to the Board” and then we pass the word to their [messenger] group so 
that everybody is up to date. Surely it must have gone this way: In the executive committee 
we decide to call the people to the Department [of Economy] for what our president is on 
trial. And so I believe we decided to tell the board of directors “look in the next moments, 
we are going to send a WhatsApp message to call people to protest. Spread the word!” So 
informing the Board, but the decision is from the Executive or rather it’s the order it 
executes, taking the most frequent decisions.  
This quote from the interview provided an account of  how Òmnium Cultural made the decision 
to call for a protest in response to the police intervention in the Catalan Department of  Economy. 
Òmnium Cultural called the protest jointly with the ANC. In the data, there was a very similar 
passage in the interview with ANC organizer Judit, who stated that it was “an emergency” and 
that they had to “react quickly.” Beatriu and Judit thus described an organizing process that was 
very different from the one of  the Diada. There were three properties of  the process that stood 
out in the analysis. First, and as stated above, the organizing process was extremely condensed. 




discussion and a call for protest on the very same day of  the police intervention. This finding is 
not surprising, because the protests were called as a reaction to Operation Anubis. Second, the 
preparation of  the 20-S protest was organized in top-down fashion, even more so than the Diada. 
As the quote above showed, in Òmnium Cultural, the decision was made only by the Executive 
Committee, which is the smallest circle of  the organization’s leadership. Third, messenger 
applications played a central role in the process. The organizers did not even bother to meet in 
person, but made the decision through a Telegram channel. Then, the call was spread rapidly 
through messenger channels. Turnout was massive with 30.000 protesters showing up at the 
demonstration called by Òmnium Cultural and ANC and endorsed by many smaller organizations. 
At the same time, there were many small protests throughout Catalonia, for instance in Sabadell 
against the detention of  a high-level civil servant. Interviewees witnessing these protests described 
them as quick reactions to the police interventions. 
1.3 Organizing the Occupation of the University 
Two days after the 20-S, students occupied the historic building of  the University of  Barcelona. 
The occupation lasted until October 2 and was organized by the platform Universitats per la 
República (UxR). The idea of  UxR was first put on the table by some former members of  the 
student organization Sindicat d’Estudiants dels Països Catalans (SEPC) in April 2017 and was 
formed as an interorganizational youth platform. It included representatives from the SEPC, 
ERC’s youth organization Joventuts d’Esquerra Republicana (JERC), the Assemblea de Joves per 
la Unitat Popular (AJUP), and the Joventut Nacionalista de Catalunya (JNC), the youth wing of  
the PDeCAT. Later also a representative from Arran joined. 
Already at the beginning of  September, organizers started calling for open assemblies to 
mobilize people for the idea of  UxR. In mid-September they staged a couple more formal events 
to present UxR to the media. On September 21, there organized a big event at the Autonomous 
University of  Barcelona, which is another university in Barcelona. The organizers decided from 
one day to the next, in light of  the 20-S, to use that event as an occasion to call for the occupation 
of  the historical building of  the University of  Barcelona in Plaça Universitat. Interviewee Ester 
described this process as follows. 
The rhythm of things was- they’ll have told you already and I don’t want to be repetitive, 
but it was that almost from one day to the other we thought that tomorrow we would set 
up an occupation. So- but this event at the Autonomous University was planned before. 
But as things became heated, we decided we would use the event to, hmm, use it as an 
amplifier to call for the occupation the next morning, which was a Friday. [So at the event 
at the Autonomous University] we called the masses to occupy the historic building of the 




The day after the event at the Autonomous University, about 3000 students gathered to occupy 
the historic building of  the University of  Barcelona without consent of  the university’s 
administration. One of  the first tasks for the organizers was to negotiate with the chancellor – 
primarily about the spaces which they were tolerated to occupy. The occupation required a lot of  
mundane organizational work, Ester explained. 
So we were taking very well-organized turns for security, like “from this hour on, no one 
can enter,” putting measures that no one could enter. Then, all sorts of things, cleaning 
shifts, and then- because people outside really liked what we were doing, shop owners 
from the neighborhood were bringing us food and we had like a- I don’t know what this 
is called in Spanish  
I: Say it in Catalan. 
R: Well an inventari- an inventory. A list with the food that we had. It was all very organized.  
Cleaning shifts, guard duties, and food distribution are not the only things that needed to be 
managed; activists also coordinated the production of  political material such as placards, putting 
up an information stand outside the university, reaching out to other actors of  the independence 
movement, etc. This shows that the occupation, because of  its duration, required a more 
continuous organizing process that was interwoven with the contentious action itself. In contrast, 
time to prepare the occupation was rather short, as it was called from one day to another. Apart 
from the call itself  and the negotiation with the chancellor, the organizers did not mention any 
specific steps or phases, but described the organizing as a permanent managing of  the occupation.  
One explanation for this form of  description might be that the single phases in the process and 
their sequence were routine to the organizers. In fact, it was not the first time that they occupied 
the university, as organizer Pere explained when I asked about the process in the interview. 
I: So the occupation in this moment- at the university, how did you organize it?   
R: Well, I have occupied the university several times already. Probably three times already 
and this was the fourth time. But I’ll tell you this one and the other three don’t have 
anything to do with each other. Just like any other youth protest that we did before and 
we did after.   
Pere’s response described the organizing of  the occupation as routine, as not particularly worth 
elaborating about. Nevertheless, the statement also highlighted that the 2017 occupation was 
different from all previous occupations in normal times. The mobilization achieved a much larger 




that the organizing process was exceptional. Normally, student activists organized occupations 
through deliberation in open assemblies, as I have described in chapter 5. In contrast, the quick 
preparation as well as the continuous management of  the occupation was controlled by the small 
leadership group of  UxR. Although there were frequent open assemblies in the occupation, the 
organizers hold that no substantial decisions were made. Moreover, the leadership had full control 
over material resources (such as money, food, campaign material), which they received from ANC 
and Òmnium Cultural. Thus, the organizing of  the occupation developed mainly as a top-down 
process steered by a small group of  student organizers. This was very different from previous 
modes of  organizing and was justified by the organizers with the prevalence of  strategy (see 
chapter 10) and the fear of  repression (see chapter 11). 
1.4 Organizing the Defense of the Voting Stations 
The defense of  the voting stations was by far the most complex contentious action among the 
twelve cases that were studied for this dissertation. First of  all, what has been called the defense 
of  the voting stations actually was not a single protest action, but consisted of  three elements: 
occupations of  the voting stations, public gatherings to obstruct access to them, and non-violent 
resistance in those places where the police did intervene. I have mapped these actions in the 
previous chapter.  
Second, the defense of  the voting stations was geographically complex: The referendum was 
supposed to be held in 2305 voting stations. Sometimes there was coordination between several 
voting stations of  an area or neighborhood, but organizing processes for entire cities such as in 
Sabadell or Fastiada remain the exception. Normally, each voting station organized its own defense. 
Hence, there actually was no single defense of  the voting stations. For the analysis, this presented 
the problem of  great geographical variation with regards to the preparatory activities. Each voting 
station could potentially organize in a different way. Nevertheless, I encountered a point of  
satisfaction quite early in the data gathering process. Despite selecting interviewees from a variety 
of  organizational and geographical backgrounds, their descriptions of  the local organizing 
processes were all fairly similar. Some minor differences aside, the preparation and planning of  the 
defense of  the voting station looked quite similar in most places. Hence, when I refer to the defense 
of  the voting stations in the singular, I mean an abstract account of  the shared features of  many 
single processes. 
The third feature that made the case so complex was the fact that it was not organized by a 
single pre-existing collective actor. The referendum and its administration were institutionally 




the defense was not in the Catalan government’s interest, because any casualties could have been 
blamed on the Catalan authorities. Furthermore, the two large SMOs ANC and Òmnium Cultural 
were instrumental in the campaign for the referendum and previous contentious action, but they 
had no significant impact on the defense of  the referendum. On the contrary, the ANC merely 
suggested to gather outside the voting stations with ballot in hand, but neither to occupy the voting 
stations nor to interfere with the police intervention. But, then how was it organized? 
The 2.305 voting stations were the focal points of  the organizing processes. Moving to the local 
level represents a “downward scale shift” (Della Porta, O’Connor, and Portos 2019; see also 
McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 2011) with respect to previous organizing processes, 
which were located mainly at the regional level. The local level served as a space of  encounter for 
organizers from existing parties and organizations but also allowed to accommodate non-partisan 
neighbors and participants without any previous political experience. Interviewees describe the 
series of  encounters as “open spaces,” “unitary spaces,” or “neutral spaces” not affiliated with any 
collective actor. Some of  these emergent groups started meeting already a year before the 
referendum, but they limited themselves to campaigning for the referendum and to mobilizing 
citizens to vote. As interviewees reported, the idea to defend the voting stations only came up later. 
Before summer 2017, a proposal to form platforms for the referendum circulated in the CUP. 
However, the idea that it might be necessary to occupy voting stations, obstruct access to them, 
and resist the police intervention only appeared in mid-September and in particular after the 20-S. 
This was when many of  the existing campaign platforms adopted the name Committee for the Defense 
of  the Referendum (CDR) and new ones emerged specifically with the goal to defend the voting 
stations. Others did not adopt the name at all, for example Girona Vota.  
The primary organizational task was to keep the voting stations, which in most cases were 
public schools, open for the weekend. Of  course the easiest way to achieve this was to obtain the 
keys, which was why organizers tried to cooperate with the principalships of  many schools, but it 
appears that many were reluctant to hand over the keys because of  potential legal consequences. 
In many cases, the CDRs and other emergent platforms found that parent organizations, the 
AMPAs (Associació de Mares i Pares d’Alumnes), had already organized to occupy the voting 
stations. The AMPAs were arguably the pre-existing actors which had most influence on the 
organizing process. Some of  them acted on their own, others followed an initiative called Open 
Schools (Escoles Obertes), which was launched a couple of  days earlier, as organizer Lluís from 
an AMPA in Gavà explained: 




R: Totally improvised. Like, without any type of preparation, simply when- when the Open 
Schools proposal came out, which I think was on Thursday, well, we decided in the AMPA 
“what should we do, do we open, do we not open? Do we organize something or not?” 
And that was it, it was that simple.  
The AMPAs used a loophole in the law stating that public schools could not be closed for the 
weekend if  extracurricular activities for children took place. Thus, many AMPAs organized 
“marathons” for playing cards, ping-pong, and other activities on Saturday, September 30, which 
was the day before the referendum. For instance, Lluís and the Gavà AMPA organized to play 
parchís, a popular board game, calling the activity “Parchís for Democracy.” Lluís described the 
organizing process as a quick reaction to the Open Schools proposal, as evidenced by the following 
extract from the interview.  
I: Do you remember the discussion in the AMPA? How did you decide this?  
R: Four messages. Like, there was not a lot- there wasn’t even time. There wasn’t even 
time, it was Thursday already. And it was organized very super remotely and super fast, 
because no- everything was done in a hurry, we just said “we do it or we don’t do it” and 
then we were talking about it a little bit. Four telephone calls later, we were like “look, ok, 
we have to do it” – “Ok, we're gonna do it” – “That’s it, we’re doing it.”  
Lluís and his fellow organizers did not have a long discussion and did not even meet in person. 
Over phone and messenger, they decided to rapidly organize an activity for children on the 
weekend. Now it cannot be inferred from the data that this process was typical for all AMPAs. 
Possibly some of  them took more time to discuss the potential risks and opportunities involved 
in organizing the activities. But given the little time left until the weekend, it seems likely that Lluís 
descriptions applied to most processes. In any case, interviewees reported the AMPAs were 
decisive in keeping the voting stations open for the weekend.  
Despite the short time available for the preparatory process, the above account shows that the 
defense of  the voting stations was in large a product of  meticulous organizing. Nevertheless, there 
was some evidence about contentious actions during the 1-O that were not part of  the plan. Here, 
I briefly discuss five actions that in some of  the voting stations occurred in an ad-hoc fashion: the 
composition of  organizing groups, the hiding of  ballot boxes, the resistance to the police and the 
construction of  barricades, the redistribution of  voters, and the closing of  voting stations.  
First, some interviewees stressed that the informal groups managing the voting process as well 
as the defense of  the voting stations on the day of  the referendum were formed spontaneously. 




organizations, party representatives, and other volunteers. Often, these people did not have any 
contact before, as organizer Berta explained.  
We were two RAs. Then for each ballot box there were- I don’t remember if they were 
three or four voting officials. And then there were volunteers organizing the people, I 
don’t know, maybe there were about 15. 
I: And how was this group formed? 
R: Hmm we didn’t know each other, or rather we did know each other, when we saw each 
other some of us recognized each other. Because Girona is about a 100,000 inhabitants, 
very small, but hmm we didn’t know we would be there. Like, I only knew one of the 
voting officials and I knew who would open the school, which wasn’t necessary because 
it was occupied, but the rest [of the people], we didn’t know each other. 
This type of  answer was more frequent in responses to the question how activists coordinated on 
the day of  the referendum. It appears that in many voting stations, organizers did not have any 
connection and worked together spontaneously. 
Second, some interviewees reported that activists spontaneously decided to hide the ballot 
boxes when the police arrived that the voting station (for instance in Girona). In most stations, 
however, it appears that there was a previous plan for this. Organizers had checked the building 
for good spots to hide the boxes or arranged for escape plans.  
Third, in those places where the police forces intervened, the resistance was sometimes 
spontaneously managed. In Sabadell for example, activists drove the police out of  the voting 
station after they had stormed it. In other cases, activists spontaneously constructed barricades 
depending on what was available to them in that moment. For instance, in a voting station in 
L’Hospitalet de Llobregat, the use of  containers to build a barricade was a spontaneous idea by 
organizer Enric. He described giving instructions to the participants about where to put them and 
what to do in case the police would arrive.  
I: When the police arrived, how did people coordinate the action? How did you decide 
what to do?  
R: Right there on the spot. In Situ. What you do if have a bit of spirit- people put 
themselves to lead or direct something  
In another voting station in the outskirts of  Girona, for example, ideas for actions such as 
defending the voting station with a vehicle cordon arose in a group chat in a messenger application. 




Tarragona, it appears that some of  the actions (gathering, barricades, monitoring) were decided 
on the spot, but there were also organizers giving instructions.  
Fourth, the allocation of  voters to the stations was also spontaneous. There needed to be a 
minimum amount of  people in every station to be able to defend them. The redistribution of  
voters among voting stations occurred to some extent instantaneously. In part, because voters had 
some room for self-allocation. For example, interviewee Quim told that when he and his family 
realized that there were less people at a nearby voting station, they went there to vote and 
subsequently stayed to defend the station. Interviewees Sergi and Dolors also reported that in 
some stations in Girona the redistribution was not planned ahead, but was managed by organizers 
spontaneously.  
Fifth, in Fastiada the closing of  the voting stations was a unilateral and spontaneous decision 
by organizer Pasqual, who had received information that police vans were parked a few kilometers 
outside the city. Thus, Pasqual gave instruction to each voting station to look for a place to hide 
the ballot boxes. Then, as tension seemed to be rising, Pasqual decided to close the voting stations 
at 6 pm and called all participants to gather at the Ateneu, which was an important cultural center 
in the town. Even there, they expected the police to arrive and had all people leave the Ateneu, 
who then gathered in the main streets in the center of  Fastiada. This was also not only a decision 
to simply close the voting stations but also against resistance and nonviolent action against the 
police.  
The illustrated five pieces of  evidence of  spontaneous actions in the data suggested that 
spontaneity was limited to isolated instances in a couple voting stations. No overall spontaneous 
pattern emerged from the data. In contrast, as the previous analysis of  the preparatory process 
has shown, most of  the actions were the result of  planned and deliberate organizing. I will discuss 
the relationship between spontaneous and planned action in the final section of  this chapter. 
1.5 Organizing the 3-O 
On the day after Operation Anubis, the trade unions CSC-Intersindical, Confederació General del 
Treball (CGT), and Coordinadora Obrera Sindical called for a general strike after the Spanish 
police forces had carried out Operation Anubis in several Catalan government institutions. Thus, 
there were some preparatory activities before the 1-O. In Sabadell, for instance, the first meeting 
of  the CDR on September 26 was also a meeting for the strike committee for the 3-O, where also 
the Confederació Nacional del Treball and CGT trade unions were present. 
However, the 1-O referendum completely changed the scenario. The night of  October 1, the 




which comprised ANC, Òmnium Cultural, the Catalan sections of  the largest Spanish trade 
Unions Confederación Sindical de Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) and Unión General de 
Trabajadores (UGT), as well as the employers’ associations Petita i Mitjana Empresa de Catalunya 
and Cecot called for an aturada de país, which translates as “country shutdown” – the goal was to 
completely paralyze the Catalan economy. Hence, the labor-related elements of  the 3-O were 
organized primarily at the regional level and resulted from a coordinated effort between pro-
independence organizations, trade unions, and employers. 
In contrast to strike action, most of  the protest actions and disruptions were prepared at the 
local level by the emergent CDRs in response to the police violence on the day of  the referendum. 
In many neighborhoods, towns, and villages, activists who had defended the voting stations on 
October 1 met the day after to reflect on the referendum and to discuss possible reactions. 
Organizers used the WhatsApp and Telegram channels that were already in place for the defense 
of  the voting stations to call for open neighborhood assemblies or prepare contentious actions 
directly through these channels.  
For instance, already the night of  the referendum, CDR organizers in Barcelona’s Clot 
neighborhood called for an open assembly of  all the neighbors on October 2 as a sort of  “strike 
committee.” The next day, there were 200 people in the square to prepare the strike on October 3. 
Participants had a lot of  work-related questions (workers’ rights to strike, the provision of  minimal 
public services), but the discussion quickly shifted towards ideas for protest actions in the 
neighborhood, as organizer Carles explains: 
And then there were other people who said “Ok, we’re going to go on strike, we have to 
paralyze everything, but what are the goals, where are we going, what are we going to do?” 
They planned three actions: a picketing line at a local Mercadona supermarket, a silent sit-in at a 
police station, and a march to the main protest in the center of  Barcelona.  
In Sabadell, too, there was an open assembly on October 2. Organizer Joana told that there was 
a lot of  indignation among participants about the violent repression of  the previous day, but they 
also discussed the strike action in the neighborhood on the following day. They talked about the 
concrete actions, the route of  the march and making banners: 
Well in that assembly, we didn’t do much more than saying “Ok, we start from here and 
we go down this road and that one and-“ well, we informed the CDR coordinators in 
Sabadell about the route in order not to run into other neighborhoods .We focused on a 




In the interview, Joana stressed two things about the 3-O preparations. On the one hand, she 
described it as relatively easy to organize, because people were motivated to participate. On the 
other hand, the strike preparations that were made previous to the 1-O had become obsolete and 
turned into organizing a protest: 
Hmm there was not a lot to prepare for the strike. Because- everybody was willing to go 
on strike. I think it was one of the strikes that required the least preparation because- we 
talked about it a bit on the 26th, but we forgot about it and the strike organized itself. 
Because people saw it was a strike against repression. [...] it was very easy to organize 
because it wasn't the organization of a strike. Properly speaking, it was the organization of 
an enormous protest. 
This shows that the assemblies on October 2 were an important moment for activists to gather 
and reflect upon what happened the day before and how they would respond. Although Joana 
pointed out the ease of  the preparations, they also needed to take place in an extremely short time 
frame. Another example in the data came from CDR organizer Josep, who described that 
participants in small town Caldes were angry and wanted to protest, to cut highways, to do slow 
marches, to strike and halt the country. Yet, they only had very little time available: 
but of course, coordinate that from one day to another, well- we didn’t have anything 
prepared and so we said “on October 2 we’re not doing anything, but on October 3 yes, 
we we’ll do whatever we can do to mobilize the country,” but of course, it was a 
spontaneous thing.  
Through WhatsApp and Telegram the organizers in Caldes received information from other towns 
were the police had intervened. Finally, in the assembly they decided to go to another small town 
to support the protest against police violence there. 
Not all platforms and CDRs called for open assemblies though. In Fastiada for instance, only 
organizations and parties had a meeting on October 2 to reflect on what happened the day before 
and what needed to be done. There was the idea to strike and paralyze the country on October 3. 
The concrete plan they had was to make a picket line at the town’s Mercadona supermarket and 
then cut the highway near the town. The local PDeCAT did not even participate in the meeting, 
and Òmnium Cultural, ANC, and the local Esquerra Republicana group also did not support the 
action because of  fear of  repression. ANC and Òmnium just called for a protest in the afternoon. 
Esquerra Republicana in the end did mobilize some people over WhatsApp, but the main 
promoters in Fastiada were the CUP through the CDR. Subsequently, the CDR was more a label 




Some of  the actions described in the previous chapter were the result of  decisions made on the 
very day of  the 3-O. As people mobilized massively, some of  the protest developed their own 
dynamic. In Fastiada, for example, organizers had called a protest at noon, but arrived late because 
they were still blocking a nearby highway in the morning. In the meantime, participants had already 
started marching. Similarly, the UxR organizers were caught by surprise by the protest in Plaça 
Universitat after a rumor had spread that UxR had called for the protest. Organizers Ester told 
that they “didn’t have anything to put at the head of  the march,” so they improvised and took one 
of  Òmnium Cultural’s “Democracy” banners. Then they decided spontaneously to march to the 
Catalan parliament. In the afternoon of  October 3, the UxR organizers also met with the 
leadership of  Òmnium Cultural who suggested them to put up an occupation on the same day. 
ERC’s youth organization JERC were undecided about the action, which delayed the decision-
making process until later at night. Although they had resources at hand, the occupation never 
really took off, which interviewees blamed on the timing.  
All things considered, the 3-O was originally called as a strike in response to the 20-S, but took 
on another meaning after the referendum. Thus, many of  the preparations had taken place in a 
relatively short time frame. While the strike was primarily called by actors at the regional level, 
much of  the protests and disruptive actions were organized at the local level. Open assemblies on 
October 2 served as the primary setting to prepare contentious actions. These assemblies were 
called by the emerging platforms that had been instrumental in the defense of  the voting stations. 
Interviewees reported that participants showed enhanced readiness to protest, which made the 
preparations easier, but also led to some spontaneous actions during the 3-O.  
Contentious action did not stop after the 3-O of  course – activist continuously organized small 
and large protests to challenge the Spanish state and to put pressure on their own representatives 
to declare independence. I have focused here on the organizing processes of  those protests that 
were highlighted as most important by interviewees. This section has provided a thick yet 
condensed description of  these five processes. The remainder of  the chapter discusses the 
properties of  these processes more in detail, but I first turn to the relationship between 
spontaneous and organized protest in the 1-O episode of  contention.  
2 SPONTANEOUS AND ORGANIZED ACTION IN INTENSE TIMES 
Intense times of  contention are sometimes characterized as chaotic. Early research in social 
movement studies saw contentious action as the product of  spontaneous dynamics instead of  
previous planning and preparation (Blumer 1951). This view has long been challenged in social 




such as Charles Tilly (1978, 1986, 1995), John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1973, 1977) criticized 
the view of  social movements as spontaneous and highlighted organized and rational action 
instead.  
The analysis of  the 1-O episode of  contention mostly supports this view. The description of  
the five cases in this chapter has revealed the amount of  organizational work that organizers in the 
independence movement put into the preparation of  protest. Even as secessionist conflict 
intensified, organizers dedicated much time and effort to plan contentious action that would 
fundamentally challenge the Spanish state.  
This does not mean that everything went as planned during the 1-O episode. Despite the often 
painstaking preparations, practically all cases other than the Diada exhibit some degree of  
spontaneity, that is actions “which were not planned, intended, prearranged, or organized in 
advance of  their occurrence” (Snow and Moss 2014, 1123). I have described many of  such 
instances above: for example, the protest that was not planned by the UxR organizers, or the 
demonstration that went ahead without the CDR in Fastiada on October 3. In particular for the 
defense of  the voting stations, the data offered rich descriptions of  spontaneity, for example Xavi’s 
story of  resistance to the police intervention in Sabadell. 
The police managed to enter [the voting station], they closed the door, and I don’t know 
how, but they [activists] managed to hide the ballot boxes [before], I don’t know how they 
did it, if they threw them out of the window and fetched them later. And the police didn’t 
know what to do “we haven’t found the ballot boxes, we’re staying here”. Then, there 
started to generate- the people, let’s say, started to react. Like, at first, there is the typical 
dynamic, they get kicked out and people start saying “damn, fuck it” and people get angry, 
things starting to heat. So they formed a sort of human wall, which advanced and advanced 
and advanced, and in the end, they throw the police out. The images are quite spectacular, 
if you search for them, you it’s gonna blow your mind. 
The CDR in Sabadell had put a lot planning into the defense of  the voting stations, but the passage 
shows how a protest can still “get out of  hand:” during performances, situational dynamics 
sometimes produce spontaneous lines of  action. This suggests that the 1-O episode was a product 
of  both organized and spontaneous collective action. However, none of  the five contentious 
performances analyzed here occurred in a purely spontaneous manner – there was always some 
degree of  prior preparation.  
At the same time, the findings suggest that the distinction between spontaneity and organizing 
is not always clear-cut. First, in some of  the cases, there is a very fine line between spontaneous 
action and quick preparation. This can be illustrated with examples from the data. In the section 
on the role of  the AMPAs, I have quoted organizer Lluís describing the occupation of  the school 




a spontaneous action. At the same time, however, he did mention preparatory activities: making 
telephone calls, discussing the slogan, creating a Twitter account. He said it was “organized very 
remotely and super fast.” How to make sense of  this apparent contradiction? Polletta (1998, 2006) 
argued that activists often qualify protests as spontaneous to describe them as bottom-up popular 
initiatives. In her work on social movements in the US, she found that “spontaneity denoted 
independence from adult leadership, urgency, local initiative, and action by moral imperative rather 
than bureaucratic planning” (Polletta 1998, 138). The use of  spontaneity as a strategic framing was 
certainly at play in many of  the descriptions by Catalan activists. However, the data suggested that 
there was a different pattern. Interviewees often described short organizing processes as 
spontaneous or improvised. Thus, organizers simply had an understanding that is different from 
the narrow concept developed in the first section of  this chapter. What interviewees described as 
spontaneous might be, analytically speaking, a case of  quick organizing.  
The primary example of  this subclass of  processes is the 20-S: within a couple of  hours after 
the police intervention in the Department of  Economy, Òmnium Cultural and ANC staged a 
protest responding to the action. From an analytical point of  view, it does not qualify as 
spontaneous, because it was decided prior to the action. This narrow understanding of  spontaneity 
might be conceptually sound, but it raises other theoretical issues. It renders spontaneity an 
extremely rare type of  phenomenon in which decision and action are temporally coincident. Thus, 
it depends very much on the temporal boundaries of  decision and action (cf. Wagner-Pacifici 
2010).  
Second, in some cases the preparation of  a contentious action can be shorter than the duration 
of  the contentious action itself. Take the occupation of  the university for example. As I have 
described above, UxR decided from one day to the other to call for the occupation during a protest 
at the Autonomous University of  Barcelona. Yet, the occupation itself  lasted ten days. Rather than 
a long preparatory process, an occupation requires continuous management: organizers meet and 
meet again, make decisions, react to events, and plan how to continue to performance. Analyzing 
such a type of  action in terms of  spontaneity and organizing is extremely difficult and would 
require dividing the occupation in its different components. Again, understanding spontaneity and 
organizing depends very much on the temporal boundaries of  contentious action and preparatory 





3 UNDERSTANDING PROTEST ORGANIZING IN INTENSE TIMES 
When comparing the five organizational processes described above, one can immediately discern 
a stark contrast between the preparations of  the Diada and the other four contentious 
performances. ANC organizers had started organizing the Diada before the onset of  the 1-O 
episode. It was prepared in a long process in a single organization, in which organizers meticulously 
planned the contentious performance in all its details. The suspension of  the referendum by the 
Spanish Constitutional Court a few days earlier did not change any of  that plan. The 2017 Diada 
was thus organized very much like in previous years. It represented a continuation of  normal 
organizing into the 1-O episode of  contention.  
In contrast, the other four protests that followed after the Diada were organized very differently 
from those organizing processes in normal times. There were also significant differences between 
the four cases. However, the comparative analysis revealed that protest organizing in those four 
cases exhibited a specific pattern, which I simply call organizing in intense times. In this section, I 
discuss this mode of  protest organizing. 
A first feature that distinguished the four organizing processes from modes of  protest 
organizing was their length. While it took the ANC about half  a year to prepare the Diada, the 
other cases were organized within a couple of  weeks, days, or hours. In the conceptual chapter, I 
have theorized the role of  time pressure and opponent action in intense times. The interview data 
partly confirmed these mechanisms. For example, when the Spanish Civil Guard entered the 
Department of  Economy, there was simply no time for long and detailed preparations. ANC and 
Òmnium Cultural needed to react as quickly as possible. Another example is UxR’s call to occupy 
the University of  Barcelona, which was also related to the 20-S and took advantage of  a protest 
event the day after. Even when protest was not organized in reaction to a specific occurrence, 
activists invested very little time in the preparations. Interviewees suggested this was because they 
wanted to take advantage of  already scheduled events such as the referendum itself  or the general 
strike on October 3 and because they wanted to maintain the level of  mobilization and keep 
participants engaged. But interviewees also suggested that there was no real need for longer 
preparations, because the overall strategy was clear.  
3.1 Organizing beyond Organizations  
In the conceptual framework, I have suggested that it is important to distinguish between 
organizations as entities and organizing as process, using the latter as the unit of  analysis to 
understand how activists plan and prepare contentious action. In this perspective, protest 




Focusing on the role of  organizational structures in the five organizing processes again reveals 
some important differences between the Diada and the other four cases. The Diada was almost 
exclusively organized by the ANC, which mobilized material resources and a large number of  
organizers. The ANC put a large part of  its time and effort into organizing the Diada. The 
organization also provided established routines and procedures, since it had prepared the Diada 
several times before. Thus, in the Diada case there is a close connection between organizing and 
organization. In all the other cases, protest organizing process took place beyond organizational 
boundaries.  
First, much of  the organizing processes in the 1-O episode took place between organizations 
rather than within their boundaries. This took different forms. First, in some instances, the existing 
organizations merely cooperated. The decision to call for the main protest against Operation 
Anubis on September 20 was taken by ANC and Òmnium Cultural separately, but followed by a 
coordination between the leaderships of  the two organizations. Second, organizations joined 
forces and created an interorganizational platform. This new organizational structure sometimes 
served as a basis for organizing several performances, for example UxR. Platforms were also 
purposefully designed for single contentious performances, as was the case of  the up-scaled CDR 
in Sabadell or the nameless platform in Fastiada. Often, however, interorganizational platforms, 
e.g. the Table for Democracy, served as a more permanent space of  encounter and only 
occasionally for the preparation of  contentious performances. These two types of  processes, 
cooperation and platform building, were essential for organizing contentious actions in a multi-
organizational social movement field. 
Second, activists also organized contentious action outside of  the limits of  established 
organizational structures. The prime example is the case of  the defense of  the voting stations on 
October 1. While most organizers were members of  pre-existing organizations and political 
parties, the role of  these organizations in the preparation was limited – except for the local AMPAs, 
which organized many of  the occupations of  the voting stations. Neither of  the large SMOs, ANC 
and Òmnium Cultural, organized the defense of  the voting stations. As mentioned before, the 
ANC only mobilized for people to gather outside the voting stations, but not to occupy them or 
to resist the police intervention. Organizers and activists gathered in meetings and assemblies in 
neighborhoods and villages throughout Catalonia, creating spaces of  encounter that were outside 
the boundaries of  existing organizations and parties. With the support of  messenger applications 
and Twitter, organizers managed to coordinate the required tasks for the occupation and defense 




Previous research has suggested that these forms of  organizing are more prone to spontaneity. 
Snow and Moss (2014, 1128) suggested that “nonhierarchical movements value and often rely on 
impromptu contributions by participants,” and therefore “are more likely to produce unplanned 
actions and dynamics.” The analysis presented here somewhat supports Snow and Moss’s 
assertion, because the defense of  the voting stations, which had the lowest implication of  
hierarchical SMOs, also involved the highest degree of  spontaneous action. There was no formal 
organization controlling the action through rules, procedures, and sanctions. However, as pointed 
out before, spontaneous actions were limited to singular clashes with police in some voting 
stations. This makes the defense of  the voting stations a curious case of  collective action: How 
was it possible to prepare the defense outside the boundaries of  established organizations? I have 
already pointed out some of  the features of  the organizing process here, but I devote more 
attention to this puzzle in the next chapter. 
The comparison between the Diada and the other cases suggests that protest organizing 
transcends organizational boundaries in intense times. One might conclude that organizations 
prepare protests “on their own” in normal times, whereas activists are more likely to work together 
across organizational boundaries in intense times – even outside formal organizations. However, 
this inference appears to be overdrawn in a broader perspective. Of  course SMOs also collaborate 
and form platforms in normal times. Vice-versa, some organizations might keep preparations 
within their boundaries in intense times, too.  
3.2 From Deliberation to Directing 
The 1-O episode of  contention not only impacted the structural and process levels of  the 
organizational dimension of  the movement, but also the organizational practices within these 
structures and processes. As I have described in chapter 5, deliberation was an important practice 
for many collective actors in the independence movement in normal times. Groups in the 
independentist Left and the ANC employed deliberative assemblies for communication and 
decision making. This changed fundamentally in the 1-O episode of  contention. The data 
suggested that instead of  deliberation, organizers employed directing much more frequently. This 
was most visible in two examples: the ANC and the student platform UxR. 
First, in the months before the 1-O referendum, some organizational practices at the national 
level of  the ANC changed. During this time, the ANC was part of  the Estat Major, which was a 
committee in which the Catalan president and vice president, the leaders of  the three pro-
independence parties, as well as the presidents of  Òmnium Cultural, and the AMI participated. 




not reveal very much about what was discussed or decided in the Estat Major, but it became clear 
that it had an important coordinating role between the Catalan government, the independentist 
parties, and the major civil society associations. The ANC’s National Secretariat had delegated the 
power to negotiate this line to its president Jordi Sànchez. This meant a departure from usual 
practice within the organization. Organizer Emma, who was part of  the leadership at that time, 
described this as follows:  
In some way, the ANC is assemblarian, but in the last year, well it stopped being it in the 
sense that decision had to be made quickly. And, moreover, in small committees. Imagine 
we explain October 1 to 77 people [of the national secretariat], who then explain it to 77 
more, then it’s inevitable that the issue comes to light […] So we understand that in this 
moment the decisions had to be differently, not in an assemblarian way. 
This quote highlights that the ANC in normal times worked in an assemblarian way – it is called 
Assemblea Nacional Catalana after all. In chapter 5, I have already explained that interviewees used 
the term assemblarian not just to describe the narrow practice of  assemblies, but that it also carries 
connotations of  deliberative and participatory democracy. I have called this combination deliberative 
assemblies.  
The piece of  data also shows that the ANC deviated substantially from its normal practices and 
“stopped being” assemblarian in the time around the 1-O referendum. Instead, decisions were 
taken by the smallest circle of  leaders. This suggests that there was a shift in the relationships of  
organizational practices: from a texture that involved a close connection between deliberation and 
assemblies to more directing and closed meetings. Of  course, this change did not come without 
tension, as Emma went on to explain: 
This produced conflicts, because you don’t do it in the assemblarian way and suddenly a 
lot of information is not passed on and you don’t really know what you’re doing. At least 
I felt a bit useless during this time. Like, ok, I’m wasting my Saturday morning, because 
they just say to me that they can’t tell me anything. 
Emma stressed again that, decisions were not taken in deliberative assemblies during this time, but 
primarily by the leadership of  the ANC. The two quotes also reveal the lack of  transparency in 
this unusual mode of  organizing. Even the members of  the National Secretariat did not receive 
full information about what the leadership was discussing with the political parties and the Catalan 
government in the Estat Major. This shattered the trust in the political parties but also in the ANC 
leadership. Enric, who also was a member of  the national secretariat at the time, asked a rhetorical 




How do I tell people to have trust in [the political parties]? The people won’t have trust. 
In the moment I tell them this, they will stop trusting me. 
The less transparent and less assemblarian mode of  organizing caught many mid-level organizers 
between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, the ANC leadership was asking them for 
confidence, and on the other hand, their constituencies were holding them accountable. 
These findings suggest that in the time before the 1-O referendum, there was a transformation 
in the texture of  organizational practices in the ANC. In normal times, the ANC combined 
deliberation and open assemblies, but during this period of  time, there was a larger emphasis on 
directing and closed meetings. This created a lack of  transparency within the organization and was 
met with conflict. The quotes from both Enric and Emma were prompted by the question “how 
has the 1-O changed the ANC?” implying that the interviewees understood them as major changes 
and not just some side development. At the same time, this highlights the importance of  these 
shifts in the organizational practice for the interviewees. 
The second example for the shift from deliberation to directing is the organizing process of  
the occupation of  the University of  Barcelona. The occupation was organized by the student 
platform UxR, which was the idea of  some experienced young activists who had been organizers 
in the student union SEPC and the left-wing youth organization Arran. This group of  unaffiliated 
organizers brought together the leaderships of  the SEPC and the JERC, the youth wing of  ERC. 
The platform also included representatives from Arran, the AJUP, and the JNC, the youth wing 
of  the PDeCAT.  
During the occupation of  the University, the platform called for open assemblies. However, as 
interviews with the former leadership of  the platform shows, there was no deliberation in these 
assemblies. Organizer Ester, for example, states that the assemblies were “super prepared.” While 
the leadership kept in the background, rank-and-file members of  the SEPC and the JERC “knew 
what they had to say.” In this way, the outcome “was always as it had to be.” According to organizer 
Pere, there was no decision making in these assemblies:  
There was a little bit of debate, but we cut it quite a bit. Without being rude. You have to 
know how to cut a debate delicately or to table it for the next day […] if one member 
would be like “no, because,” then we would cut them “shut up, because we’re acting in 
the interest of the country, this needs to work well.” Like this you silence internal dissent. 
The organizers would make concessions to some extent, but if  a controversial issue came up, they 
would have the debate silenced immediately. Hence, deliberative practices were basically absent 
from the open assemblies in the preparation and managing of  the occupation of  the University 




chapter 8), but there was a crucial difference: the UxR organizers actively suppressed deliberative 
practices, whereas there was no evidence for that in defense of  the voting stations. 
Instead of  open assemblies, the interview data showed that the leadership group of  UxR had 
a strong role in the organizing process. Ester described that it was the leadership group of  the 
platform who took the decisions: 
In the end we decided what kind of activities we would do, which ones not, and so on. 
We were quite few, 10 or 12. Among them there some which represent the SEPC and the 
JERC most of all, but the others we were independents who didn’t represent anybody in 
reality.  
The important decisions were taken within the leadership group, who directed the occupation with 
the help of  activists from the member organizations of  the platform. Moreover, the leadership 
controlled all the necessary resources, from campaign material such as flyers, posters, and paint to 
food and money. All in all, Pere admitted that the “occupation […] was remotely controlled top-
down. It’s true. I’m sorry, but it’s true.” When activists tried to hold open assemblies, the leadership 
tried to manipulate debates in order to maintain control over the occupation. Ester even claimed 
that this “false democracy” was key to the success of  the occupation.  
UxR was a new platform that emerged in the months before the 1-O referendum. Hence, it is 
difficult to speak of  organizational change in this case. Nevertheless, from the interviews with Pere 
and Ester, it became clear that the top-down mode of  organizing, which limited decision-making 
to the leadership group and placed emphasis on directing, was not usual practice. Most of  the 
organizers of  UxR came from organizations of  the independentist Left, such as SEPC and Arran, 
which championed deliberative practices. 
Deliberation had been an important organizational practice in the independence movement in 
normal times. Organizations in the independentist Left had relied on open deliberative assemblies. 
The ANC had combined deliberative assemblies with deliberations in their leadership group. This 
changed dramatically in intense times. These two examples show that deliberation as a practice 
became less important during the 1-O episode of  contention. Instead of  deliberation, organizers 
in the ANC and UxR made decisions in small circles and relied much more on directing in protest 
organizing processes.  
3.3 Four Mechanisms in Intense Times 
The time around the 1-O referendum represented a highly contentious episode. It was a period of  
constant mobilization and confrontation between the independence movement and the actors of  




from previous normal times of  conflict. Organizing processes were much shorter, took place 
between or outside organizations, and involved more directing than deliberation. 
In the conceptual chapter of  this dissertation I have theorized three mechanisms that may 
impact protest organizing in intense times: opponent action, uncertainty, and time pressure. These 
three mechanisms were recognizable in the empirical material. First, interviewees stressed the role 
of  opponent action in intense times. In September 2017, Spanish state actors intensified repressive 
action against Catalan government to prevent the referendum (see chapter 6). Opponents acted 
more often and more directly against civil society actors too. Intense times thus created a need to 
organize protest in response to these actions. Second, opponent action created uncertainty. In the 
weeks before the 1-O, the Catalan autonomous institutions were paralyzed and it was unclear 
whether they had the capacity to organize the referendum. In a similar vein, ANC and Òmnium 
Cultural seemed stuck in their repertoires and practices from normal times. This created a climate 
of  uncertainty to which organizers responded and started to take the defense of  the voting stations 
in their own hands – outside the boundaries of  the established organizations. Opponent action 
and uncertainty also led to more directing in these processes. Organizers feared repression, which 
is why they often shared crucial information only within small leadership circles. Directives to 
larger masses were limited to essential information and decisions. Third, interviewees highlighted 
the necessity for quick organizing under time pressure. In the piece of  data quoted above, Emma 
stressed that “decisions had to be made quickly.” The prime example was the protest on September 
20, which was organized by the leaderships of  ANC and Òmnium Cultural only within a couple 
of  hours. In the intense 1-O episode, there was simply no time for deliberation with large 
assemblies. Instead, organizers made decisions in small groups and communicated them to other 
activists through directing. 
Finally, the data suggested there was a fourth mechanisms, which was not theorized beforehand. 
The features of  protest organizing in intense times described here – shorter processes outside and 
between organizations with less deliberation and more directing – can all be linked to the existence 
of  a common goal among activists. In September 2017, the diverse actors of  the independence 
movement were united by a single aim: to realize the referendum on independence on October 1. 
On the one hand, interviewees suggested that there often was no need for deliberation and extended 
organizing processes, because the goal was clear to everybody.  On the other hand, some 
interviewees described how the shared goal was used to silence dissenting voices within the 





because there was a very clear common goal, which is October 1. When you have a 
common goals, you can tell people – in the short run – “put your social demands on hold, 
your left-wing, your right-wing demands, your vegan demands, your feminist demands, 
put it on hold, because there is a common benefit in the short term.” 
This suggests that vertical forms of  organizing – for instance the unusual combination of  public 
assemblies with directing – were more easily accepted by activists, because there was a common 
goal. The goal “defending the referendum” was clear and tangible in the near future. Movement 
strategy as a mechanism also carried a normative component. It becomes clear from the quotes I 
have shown here that organizers put them forward as justifications for less deliberative and 
participatory practices of  organizing. As such, they should be put in a narrative perspective and 
handled with care. Interviewees also highlighted the limits of  directed organizing. Organizer Pere 
stated that “of  you course you cannot do this indefinitely […] It can only be a short period of  
time and for a real, tangible goal, you know?”  
In short, the specific texture of  organizational practices can be related to four mechanisms that 
were at play during the intense 1-O episode: opponent action, uncertainty, time pressure, and 
strategy. These mechanisms led to more directing and less deliberation in the organizing processes. 
4 CONCLUSION 
On September 7, the Spanish Constitutional Court suspended the Law 19/2017 on the 
Referendum on Self-Determination, which had been approved only the day before by the Catalan 
parliament. This ruling put the 1-O referendum and its preparation in jeopardy. It created a climate 
of  uncertainty in the independence movement and provided the legal basis for the repression 
against civil society actors, who increasingly needed to act under time pressure. But the referendum 
also represented a shared goal around which the movement could rally. In the previous sections, I 
have shown how these four mechanisms impacted the ways in which movement actors organized 
secessionist protest in the 1-O episode of  contention. 
However, the first protest was not any different from normal times of  secessionist conflict. 
The ANC organized the Diada in a meticulous and elongated preparatory process. The Diada 
organizing process suggested that there was some resilience, some inertia of  the major SMOs. 
Intense times do not change everything. 
After the Diada, however, protest organizing changed substantively. When the Spanish Civil 
Guard searched the Catalan Department of  Economy for documents related to the referendum 
on September 20, Òmnium Cultural and ANC quickly called for protesters to gather outside the 
building to obstruct the officers’ exit. This was organized by the organizations’ leadership without 




point because it was the first of  a series of  more disruptive actions. It appeared that the two large 
associations could draw on their organizational capacity and mobilize and did not necessarily need 
long preparations. 
This impression did not hold up for the 1-O referendum itself. ANC and Òmnium Cultural 
seemed paralyzed and refused to call for disruptive actions to prevent the Spanish police from 
intervening in the vote. In response to this void, activists from different backgrounds gathered at 
the local level to create the CDRs: using a combination of  open assemblies and instant messenger 
applications, organizers directed the occupation of  voting stations. The interviewed organizers felt 
that the Generalitat had lost control of  the referendum and that they needed to take care of  it 
themselves. Around the same time, the student platform UxR occupied the historic building of  
the University of  Barcelona. The occupation was also organized through directed open assemblies. 
The CDRs mobilized thousands of  voters to prevent the Spanish police from entering the 
voting stations to confiscate ballot boxes. These efforts were successful in most voting stations 
and the referendum could go ahead. However, on numerous occasions the police tried to force 
their way through the masses gathered outside the voting stations, leaving almost one thousand 
people injured. Two days after the referendum, protesters used the occasion of  the general strike 
to turn out massively in the street to condemn police violence. Many public services and private 
firms remained closed for the day. In short, protest became much more disruptive after the Diada, 
while its organizing was shorter, less deliberative, and more directed. 
In addition, the five contentious performances analyzed here were organized by a variety of  
collective actors with different organizational forms. In most cases, these actors collaborated in 
some way or the other. This shows that organizations represented an important factor in the 1-O 
episode. Nevertheless, the defense of  the voting stations was prepared and planned largely outside 
the boundaries of  existing SMOs. This suggests that organizational structures can be an important 
basis for organized contentious action – but they are not a necessary condition. I tackle this 
problem in the next chapter on organizing outside formal organization. 
The chapter shows that protest organizing in intense times differs very much from normal 
times. Interviewee Ester suggested that the organizing in UxR was “not a moment of  […] classic 
functioning.” The quote illustrates perfectly that organizational process and practices in the 1-O 
episode were a departure from the usual mode of  organizing in the independence movement. 
Most existing approaches to organizational change in contentious politics highlight long-term 
trends such as technological change, oligarchization, radicalization, or moderation of  movements. 
In contrast, this chapter has revealed how volatile protest organizing can be. When interactions 




transform substantively within a couple of  weeks. The 1-O referendum as the central event 
functioned as a catalyzer for this development.  
Finally, Ester also pointed at the limits of  directed and quick organizing. She said in the 
interview that it “worked well, but it has a lot of  limitations. It works well only [when applied] 
moderately in the long run.” It is far from certain whether all the changes I have described in this 
chapter were reversed after the 1-O episode of  contention. The fourth part of  this dissertation 







ORGANIZING PROTEST OUTSIDE ORGANIZATIONS. THE 
DEFENSE OF THE VOTING STATIONS 
 
 
In spite of  the long-standing interest of  movement scholars in the organizational dimension of  
social movements, their focus has largely remained on organizational entities and, in particular, 
formal SMOs (Clemens & Minkoff, 2004; Kriesi, 1996; McAdam & Scott, 2005; McCarthy & Zald, 
1973, 1977; Minkoff  & McCarthy, 2005). As Dieter Rucht (2017, 1679) has recently pointed out, 
“few empirical studies were undertaken to demonstrate the actual requirements and processes of  
organizing protest.” In my view, this blind spot has led to an equation of  “organized protest” with 
“protest organized by an organization.” But as I have argued in the conceptual part of  this 
dissertation, the process of  protest organizing must be distinguished from SMOs as organizational 
entities. There are cases in which the process of  protest organizing does not take place within 
organizations. Empirical research has found that a large part of  organizing takes place at the meso 
level between organizations (Della Porta and Rucht 2015; Diani 2015; Gerhards and Rucht 1992; 
Haug 2013; Haug, Haeringer, and Mosca 2009). Organization theorists have even suggested that 
organizing may take place outside of  formal organizations (Ahrne and Brunsson 2011, 2019b; 
Ahrne, Brunsson, and Seidl 2016).  
This chapter takes up the latter idea by studying a case of  protest organizing outside formal 
organizations: the defense of  the voting stations during the Catalan referendum on independence 
on October 1, 2017. Neither of  the two major SMOs, the ANC and Òmnium Cultural, played any 
role in the preparations of  the protest. In fact, the empirical evidence shows that the ANC 
hindered the mobilization by calling followers exclusively to gather outside the voting stations and 
not to occupy and defend them against police intervention. The formal organizations were, using 
Czarniawska’s (2013) phrase, “obstacles to organizing.” How was it possible to organize the 
defense of  the voting stations without the support of  the existing SMOs? 
This chapter explores the curious case of  the defense of  the voting station as a case of  




cited in: Whittington 2003) called the “internal life of  processes.” I show that decision-making and 
communication practices were instrumental in the organizing process of  the protest. Activists 
combined public assemblies, messenger applications, and what I call directing to prepare and plan 
contentious action. Outside the boundaries of  formal organizations, the skills and experiences of  
activists played a crucial role in organizing mass protest. Before developing this argument in detail, 
I elaborate on the puzzle of  organizing outside organizations in the next section. 
1 THE PUZZLE: WHEN ORGANIZATIONS ARE OBSTACLES TO ORGANIZING 
Since the 1970s, social movement studies have been emphasized the importance of  organizational 
structures as a basis for contentious action. In contrast to earlier collective behavior approaches, 
scholars pointed out the role of  social movement infrastructures, most importantly organizations 
and their resources (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977). SMOs fulfill a series of  important functions 
for social movements: they recruit participants, raise funds and other resources, and create 
solidarity and identity (Della Porta and Diani 2006, 137). Scholars suggested represent crucial, if  
not necessary, preconditions for contentious action (Klandermans, Kriesi, and Tarrow 1989; 
McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1986). Tilly (1995, 32) argued that “whatever stress ordinary people 
may have endured, the critical difference between action and inaction was the extent to which they 
had become involved in organized movements.” Social movements – as a category of  action, not 
as an actor – were regarded as inherently organized, and that meant: based on organizations (Snow, 
Soule, and Kriesi 2004a, 10; Tilly 2004, 3; Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 11). 
The role of  the two large formal SMOs (the ANC and Òmnium Cultural) was rather limited in 
the case of  the defense of  the voting stations on the October 1, 2017. While the two SMOs had 
been the main drivers of  mobilization for much of  the secessionist cycle of  contention, they were 
not directly involved in what arguably represents the peak of  contention. In fact, the data show 
that the ANC hindered the mobilization by calling followers exclusively to gather outside the voting 
stations and not to occupy and defend them against police intervention. Only when the 
occupations were already under way the ANC did change its stance. Organizer Carme, a member 
of  the ANC leadership looked back on this decision in the interview. When the plans for the 
referendum were announced, the ANC was part of  the Estat Major, a coordinating committee 
composed of  the Catalan president and vice president, the leaders of  the three pro-independence 
parties, as well as the presidents of  ANC, Òmnium Cultural, and the Associació de Municipis per 
la Independència (the organization of  pro-independence mayors). These different actors 
negotiated a common strategy for the referendum, as Carme describes. 




R: Of course, that’s why. [The Secretariat] had to delegate to him. And well, looking back 
everything is easy, no? But in this moment, maybe some decisions should have been taken 
another way. So that role of the ANC the day before the vote would have been a bit, hmm, 
stronger. Which had been a bit, deluded, because we only called to gather outside. 
Basically, we didn’t know well whether it would be possible to do [the referendum]. Well, 
now it’s very easy to say, but those were difficult moments and a decision had to be made. 
And I think, as ANC, we didn’t make a good choice convening people only outside the 
voting station with the ballot in hand. 
The passage displays a high level of  self-critique, essentially saying that, in retrospective, the 
decision was a mistake. She also makes clear that the ANC’s position was influenced by its 
participation in the Estat Major. 
R: What happened is that – since the ANC also participated in the Estat Major, this also 
conditioned our stance on October 1, which perhaps followed the line agreed between 
everybody. 
The ANC’s decision not to call for the occupation and defense of  the voting stations was 
fundamentally shaped by the common line of  action that had been agreed upon by the regional 
government, the parties, and the civil society associations. For the ANC, this process also meant a 
departure from its decentralized decision making, as the leadership had delegated all negotiating 
power to its president, Carme explains. The inaction of  the ANC had also been noted – and often 
criticized – by other collective actors. Organizer Joana, for example, describes the situation as 
follows: 
The independence movement paid attention to two major organizations, which are 
Òmnium and ANC, because of their successful mobilizations. But they have a handicap, 
which is that there is not a real political participation of the people who go to these 
manifestations. They have massive turnout, but they do not imply more than standing still 
in a place for some hours. And these organizations, at the moment of organizing the 
referendum, together with the government, who had to do it – they can’t do it. For legal 
reasons, basically because their organizations are constantly under attack.  
The two major organizations, ANC and Òmnium Cultural, had pushed the secessionist cycle of  
contention mainly through contained performances such as the yearly Diada manifestation. Yet, 
in the crucial moment of  the referendum, they were paralyzed. As Joana’s comment suggests, it 
was for fear of  legal repression that ANC and Òmnium Cultural did not call for the occupation 
of  the voting stations. Moreover, both the two organizations’ close links with the regional 
institutions might have discouraged them from initiating more disruptive actions.  
Despite the inaction of  the two major pro-independence SMOs, disruptive action did occur on 




intervention were no ad-hoc actions either. Although some spontaneous lines of  contentious 
action unfolded on the day of  the referendum, there is much more evidence in the data this is of  
actions that were planned and prepared ahead of  time. This presents a puzzle for social movement 
research: If  the defense of  the voting stations was neither spontaneous, nor initiated by SMOs, 
then how was it organized?  
Existing research has suggested that SMOs as formal and complex organizations are not the 
only organizational form that can serve as a basis for contentious action. McCarthy (1996), for 
example, develops a typology of  both formal and informal, of  movement and non-movement 
structures, ranging from friendship networks, to churches and unions, to affinity groups, to SMOs 
and protest committees. These are all mobilizing structures, i.e. “those agreed upon ways of  engaging 
in collective action which include particular ‘tactical repertoires,’ particular ‘social movement 
organizational’ forms, and ‘modular social movement repertoires,” but also “the range of  everyday 
life micromobilization structural social locations that are not aimed primarily at movement 
mobilization, but where mobilization may be generated” (McCarthy 1996, 141). In general, there 
has been agreement that some kind of  social movement structure is crucial for contentious action, 
as John McCarthy (1996, 141) points out: “Scholars of  social movements have come to a quite 
broad consensus about the importance of  mobilizing structures for understanding the trajectory 
of  particular social movements and broader social movement cycles.”30   
Two kinds of  mobilizing structures can be identified in the organizing process of  the defense of  
the voting stations. First, I have already described the role of  the AMPAs in promoting and 
planning the occupation of  those voting stations that were public schools. They used a loophole 
in the law, which allowed to maintain public schools open for the weekend if  extracurricular 
activities for the pupils are held. Although the AMPAs generally do not have any links with the 
independence movement and are largely apolitical associations, they constituted an important link 
between the public schools as an institutional space and the voluntary mobilizations in the 
neighborhoods.  
Second, while political parties and SMOs (including ANC and Òmnium Cultural) did not play 
any role in the organizing of  the defense, the networks between their members at the 
neighborhood, small town, and village level represented an important structural basis for the 
preparatory process. In many cases, they came together with militants from the pro-independence 
                                                 
30 In the same volume, Rucht (1996, 185) states that "few social movement scholars doubt that movement 




parties to campaign for the referendum months before the defense of  the voting stations was 
organized. Quite often, this process started with a meeting, as organizer Carles explains: 
R: One year before the 1-O, people from the Neighborhood Association, from other 
organizations, from the parties, mostly Esquerra and CUP, because Convergència, for 
participation is a bit weak- a bit weak with people- and so we did a meeting between some 
of us.  
I: When? When was that? 
R: One year before the 1-O. It wasn't about the defense of the referendum that day, but- 
we have to inform the people, the neighbors about the referendum, that it's not about 
being in favor or against independence, but that it's a matter of voting, of participation, 
and so on, of democracy. Not the defense, more about the participatory process. And 
that's what we did.  
From these kinds of  meetings between local militants of  pro-independence parties and members 
of  organizations emerged a network that served as an important basis for the defense of  the voting 
stations. These local networks represent the “embryo” (Interview Gabriel) of  the open spaces and 
encounters appearing in the weeks before the referendum, often under the label CDR. It cannot 
be neglected that these networks represent an important movement infrastructure, but they are 
insufficient to explain the defense of  the voting stations. 
This is a threefold argument. First, the network structures must be distinguished from the 
CDRs, which represent a different phenomenon. Reducing the CDRs to the networks between 
activists would miss their distinct character as non-partisan public space. Second, there is no doubt 
that the CDRs were the most important element in the organizing process. Interviewees stress that 
without the CDRs, the referendum would not have happened. Third, it would be misguided to 
describe the CDRs before the referendum as an organizational structure, even just as an “emergent 
structure” (Killian 1984). If  the term mobilizing structure signifies “a pattern of  more or less stable 
relationships within and between elements of  a larger entity” ), with “some degree of  regularity 
and therefore predictability” (Rucht, 2013, p. 170) , then the CDRs before the referendum hardly 
qualify as structures at all. Interviewees describe the CDRs at this point in time as a space rather 
than as a collective actor. The relationships among activists had not stabilized yet and would change 
dramatically with the upcoming events. They were still in a process of  “organizational becoming” 
(Tsoukas and Chia 2002).   
In sum, the role of  movement infrastructures for the defense of  the voting stations was rather 
limited. Neither the two large SMOs, nor the pre-existing activist networks account for the 




outside organizations. My central claim in this chapter is that communication and decision-making 
practices were instrumental in this particular organizing process. The next section present this 
argument. 
2 ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICES IN THE DEFENSE OF THE VOTING STATIONS 
The key factor in the organizing process was the emergence of  open initiatives for the defense of  
the referendum at the local level. On the one hand, the CDRs involved experienced organizers 
from different organizational backgrounds: members of  the large associations ANC and Òmnium 
Cultural; militants from the local branches of  the independentist parties PDeCAT, ERC, and CUP; 
members from youth organizations (e.g., Arran and JERC); and activists from student groups (e.g., 
SEPC and UxR). On the other hand, the CDRs were not an interorganizational setting, but a 
neutral space that also included activists from other social movements that defended the right to 
decide (e.g., militants from Barcelona En Comù or the Plataforma de Afectadas por la Hipoteca), 
neighborhood associations, as well as many participants without any affiliation or prior activist 
experience.  
The next sections turn to the specific practices in the CDRs in the few days before the 
referendum of  October 1. The next section builds directly on the abstract model of  organizational 
practices, which I have presented in chapter 5. In that chapter, I have outlined generalized accounts 
of  four organizational practices that emerged from the data. On the one side, deliberation and 
directing as decision-making practices, and on the other side, public assemblies and messenger 
applications as communication practices. In the next section, I examine how experienced 
organizers used combinations of  these practices in the defense of  the voting stations. I argue that 
three of  the four practices were key in the organizing process: public assemblies, instant messenger 
applications, and directing. First, however, I present the most notable finding about the organizing 
process: the absence of  deliberation.  
2.1 Consensus without Deliberation 
The first remarkable observation about the defense of  the voting stations is the almost complete 
absence of  conflict among activists during the preparations. Practically all interviewees answered 
in the negative when I asked them about tensions and debates in the days before the referendum. 
Consider the answer of  CDR organizer Xavi for example: 
R: No. No, in fact, no. In the beginning, or rather before October 1, and the organization 
of October 1, conflict was practically absent. There was really a unity of action, which I 




[conflict]. But the truth is there was very little dispute, very little debate, and the idea what 
had to be done and how was quite clear. 
Xavi stated very clearly that there was basically no debate or conflict in the organizing in the CDR 
in Sabadell before October 1. Instead, there was what he called “unity of  action,” and what Joana, 
another organizer from the CDR in Sabadell, dubbed “general consensus:” a common willingness 
to go ahead and prepare the defense of  the voting stations. This pattern was not unique to Sabadell, 
but it was clearly visible throughout the interview data. The only contrary evidence came from 
small town Fastiada, where conflicts between organizers from different parties and organizations 
persisted during the preparatory process (Interviews Oriol, Pasqual). But overall, conflict was 
absent, as expert Roger summed up: “In this moment, the debate was zero, because we all agreed. 
We all agreed. For the strategy for October 1, there was no dissidence, no dissent, no discrepancies, 
and no divergences.”  
The same applied not only to the preparations, but also to the actions during actual defense of  
the voting stations; there was no evidence of  disagreements among activists and voters. During 
the tense day of  the referendum, the unity described above did not fall apart under the pressure 
of  police interventions. For example, when I asked organizer Carles whether there was any 
moment of  conflict during the defense, he responded: “None. No, everybody knew what had to 
be done. We already knew for a couple of  months that this would come.” Virtually all interviewees 
answered the question about conflict during the defense in the negative. In most cases, there was 
not even a discussion about what to do.  
The lack of  conflict is particularly surprising given that both during the preparations for the 
defense and on the day of  the referendum itself, activists from very different backgrounds came 
together. As Joana pointed out, “there were none of  the previous squabbles among these 
organizations, which do not share their forms of  seeing politics. In this moment, there was no 
conflict between them.”  
Interviewees had their own explanations as to why this remarkable unity emerged during this 
short period of  time. Organizer Enric, from the ANC, attributed this to the level of  trust among 
activists, Xavi pointed out that the goal of  the organizing was very clear, and Joana and Judit 
suggested that the conflict with the Spanish state created internal unity in the movement. I am not 
so much interested in the reasons why there was no conflict, but what it tells us about 
organizational practices. 
Simply focusing on consensus, one could rush to conclude that the preparations were ordered 
by deliberative practice. Deliberation refers to the practice of  overcoming disagreement through 




Mansbridge et al. 2012; Thompson 2008). Previous research revealed the role of  deliberation in 
many progressive social movements, such as the global justice movement (Della Porta 2009a; Della 
Porta and Rucht 2015), the Spanish indignados (Della Porta 2015; Flesher Fominaya 2014; Nez 
2012), and the French nuit debout protests (Felicetti and Della Porta 2018). 
However, the interview data showed that the opposite was the case in the defense of  the voting 
stations: consensus was not the result of  activists overcoming disagreements through debate. Joana 
described an open assemblies that was called by the organizers in Sabadell a couple of  days before 
the referendum: 
R: There were 300 people. I don’t think anybody expected so many people in every 
neighborhood. In another area, and in the center of Sabadell, there were maybe almost 
2000. Of course, it’s quite difficult. Yes, we had a microphone, and we plugged it in at the 
civic center which was right there. And we explained what had happened at the assembly 
before, how it was formed, that we were coordinators, but there could be more 
coordinator, that it was an assembly and we would decide about the proposal to occupy 
the schools from Friday on if possible, if not on Saturday. And of course, there were 
questions, but basically, we were asking these 300 people, “well, how many of you agree 
to occupy?” And it was the great majority […] 
I: So it was more of an informative assembly? 
R: Yeah, it was- 
I: You didn’t make the decision with 300 people? 
R: No, no, big decisions were not taken, most of all, because there was a proposal already 
and that proposal was accepted. 
In the case of  the CDR Sabadell, the organizers used the public assembly for two things. First, to 
recruit other activists as organizers (or coordinators as Joana called it) and second, to bring forth 
a proposal to occupy the voting stations. There was little debate about the proposal; the organizers 
were merely seeking the consent of  other activists. Although much of  the organizing was done in 
public assemblies, activists did not deliberate, as organizer Xavi underlined: 
Because in the end it’s what I told you, since the objective was very concrete, very specific, 
the assemblies weren’t deliberative spaces, or like, there was no deliberative element, but 
rather an element almost as of a transmission belt.  
The extract from the interview shows that deliberation was completely absent from the 
preparatory process. This was a common pattern in the descriptions of  the assemblies before the 




the absence of  debate and disagreement. Normally, the practices of  public assemblies and 
deliberation are closely connected in social movements, but in the case of  the defense of  the voting 
stations, they were not. This shows that the consensus described by the interviewees was not the 
result of  deliberation. Instead, I suggest it is the expression of  another practice, which played a 
greater role than deliberation in the defense of  the voting stations: directing. 
2.2 Combining Directing, Assemblies, and Messengers 
Conflict was largely absent during the process of  preparing the defense of  the voting stations. 
This does not mean, however, that the contentious performance was a self-fulfilling prophecy; the 
organizing still had to be accomplished. From the analysis of  the empirical material, it became 
clear that the practice of  what I call directing was instrumental in coordinating the preparatory 
activities.  
First of  all, directing naturally is a relational practice, because it cannot be performed by 
individuals in isolation. It establishes a relationship between those who direct – which I will call 
directors – and those who are directed. Second, directing other people means to exercise power. 
However, it refers to a relationship where those directing other activists do not have coercive 
means to actually impose their will on them. Interviewees sometimes speak of  “giving orders,” but 
these orders require the compliance of  other participants, rather than disobedience. This is why I 
prefer the label directing over the more coercive-sounding ordering. Third, while directing does not 
involve coercion, it does not mean that directing cannot rest on some sort of  formalized authority. 
Social movements delegate authority to steering groups and other forms of  “organized power” 
(Ahrne and Brunsson 2011), which often direct other participants. However, the two should not 
be equated. Activists who hold formal authority in social movements might still seek deliberation 
with other participants. Conversely, even activists who do not occupy a formal role might direct 
others at times. Fourth, the narrow practice of  directing is more closely related to the notion of  
leadership – but it should also be distinguished from it. Indeed, one could rush to conceptualize 
the relationship of  directors and directed as leaders and followers. However, the concept of  
leadership is broader than the narrow practice of  directing. Ganz (2010, 527) defines leadership as 
“accepting responsibility to create conditions that enable others to achieve shared purpose in the 
face of  uncertainty.” But leaders do much more than direct other people. For instance, Ganz and 
McKenna (2017) describe five types of  leadership practices: relationship building, narrative, 
strategy, structure, and action. All these practices may involve directing – but directing is not 




In the defense of  the voting stations, there was evidence of  three instances of  directing: first, 
organizers combined directing with public assemblies, and second, they combined directing with 
the use of  instant messenger applications. Third, directing was also prominent during the actual 
defense of  the voting stations. 
First, activists held open assemblies in villages, small towns, and the neighborhoods of  larger 
cities throughout Catalonia in September 2017 with the intention of  preparing the defense of  the 
voting stations. In the literature, an assembly is described as a large meeting that allows for some 
“side involvement” (Goffman in Haug 2013: 710). A meeting is defined as a temporary gathering 
of  at least three people in which communication is oriented to some common business (Boden 
1994, 90–99; Haug 2010, 80, 2013, 709; Schwartzman 1989, 7). Openness was crucial to the public 
assemblies in the organizing process. At least theoretically, people from the outside were able to 
join and participate in the assembly.  
As shown in the previous section, there was not a lot of  deliberation in these public assemblies. 
Nevertheless, they played a crucial role as “transmission belts,” as interviewee Xavi calls them, in 
the organizing process. The analysis of  the empirical data showed that organizers used these public 
assemblies to give directions to other participants. This is why CDR organizer Carles called them 
“directed assemblies” (asambleas dirgistas): 
So I took the microphone and said “Listen people, come here, we need to do this” and I 
don’t know what. There was an idea already. It was a very directed assembly. It was not 
participatory, because there were many people who had no experience in the topic and, 
moreover, they were quite nervous. Let’s be honest, we were all feeling pretty bad, but we 
have a bit more activist experience and we have lived through something like that already, 
no? So it was a bit directed, saying “OK, between 8 and 10 on Friday we have to be here.” 
Those who knew when the ballot boxes would come, we did not share that information, 
but we said “OK, calm down, we know the ballot boxes will come and we know the person 
who has them.” 
This passage from the interview with Carles illustrates how the practice of  directing was performed 
in these open assemblies. Carles and the other organizers were giving instructions to other 
participants about what to do at what time. Thereby, the directed assemblies ordered the 
preparatory activities. The directed assemblies represented a peculiar texture of  organizational 
practice. They maintained the core practice of  public assemblies (multiparty talk, facilitation, and 
openness) and were combined with organizers giving instructions to other activists. These 
assemblies were crucial in the preparatory process, because they provided a space for encounter at 
the local level. Their public and open character allowed activists from different backgrounds to 




kind of  organizational setting was of  great importance, because the organizing process occurred 
outside of  organizations.  
Second, organizers did not only direct through public assemblies, but also through instant 
messenger applications. Messenger applications were used primarily through mobile phones, which 
have become a key technology for protesters because of  their versatility, allowing for 
communication with other activists, authorities, and the wider public (Neumayer and Stald 2014).  
In the days before the referendum, organizers were passing instructions through group chats to 
organize the preparations of  the defense of  the voting stations. Telegram was particularly useful 
for organizers because it offered this kind of  communication. Organizer Enric describes how 
organizers practiced directing through Telegram. 
R: How were these groups born? And who was putting content on Telegram?  
I: Look, this is very easy. Today, with this tool that I have here, which is a mobile phone, 
if you have a little bit of organization, and you know a little bit of marketing and how to 
manage this, it’s very easy to create a nucleus who gives certain orders, let’s say at the head 
of all of this. And from there, it branches out, it’s like pyramid. It branches out and people 
organize. Everybody knew they had certain freedom, but that some norms needed to be 
followed. Not because they were written somewhere, but purely because of common 
sense. Of course, there were coming prepared things. The topic of how to treat the 
Mossos, not to confront the National Police nor the Civil Guard, to always maintain a 
peaceful tone. And you notice, that practically, that was the norm in all the videos you can 
see. 
Organizers combined the use of  instant messenger applications with the practice of  directing to 
give instructions about preparatory activities prior to the referendum. The transcript also shows 
how they could diffuse norms about how to behave during the defense of  the referendum through 
the combination of  these two practices. The use of  instant messengers had the advantage that it 
could reach a great number of  activists in a short time. In some cases, this was combined with the 
practice of  directed assemblies, but in others, directions were given exclusively through IMAs, as 
Gabriel described. In the Barcelona neighborhood, where he participated, “before [the 1-O], there 
were no assemblies, it was all through WhatsApp.”  
Third, directing also played a role in the voting stations itself. Organizers tried to control the 
protest action by giving instructions to the activists and voters who were gathering in and around 
the voting stations. Activist Quim, who became a CDR organizer only after the referendum, told 
that “those who were in charge of  the voting stations did give some orders, because from the roof  
they said ‘be careful to get together,’ ‘now relax,’ ‘please everybody in a single line,’ ‘if  we shout, 




Another example comes from a voting station in L’Hospitalet de Llobregat, where organizer Enric 
had the idea to use trash cans to block the road access to the building where the voting station was 
located. In the interview, Enric reported that he directed to the other participants that they “pull 
them out from where they were and that they put them basically at the extremes of  the street.” 
Even if  this would not have stopped the police, it would have at least slowed them down. Enric 
was giving directions: “If  they come to take the trash cans, the people who are in line come and 
put yourselves behind the trash cans and the others stay on the sides.” In the end, this would not 
even be necessary, because the police only passed the voting stations but did not intervene. These 
two pieces of  data illustrate that directing was not only relevant in combination with public 
assemblies and instant messaging in the preparations, but also continued during the defense of  the 
voting stations. 
2.3 Organizational Practices beyond Organizations 
The analysis of  the empirical material revealed that organizers employed a combination of  
directing, public assemblies, and instant messaging applications for the preparation of  the defense 
of  the voting stations, while deliberative practices were practically absent in the process. Directing, 
public assemblies, and instant messaging formed what Gherardi (2006, 2012) called a texture of  
practices. In the absence of  formal organizations, this texture of  practice acquired organizational 
qualities. The practices structured collective action in two ways: through communication and 
decision making. 
First, both public assemblies and instant messengers established communication flows that are 
usually found within formal organizations. As mentioned before, public assemblies essentially 
provided a space of  encounter at the local level, which allowed activists from different 
backgrounds to come together in the squares and streets of  neighborhoods and villages. Instant 
messaging applications had a similar role at the digital level, creating communication channels 
between organizers and activists. Often the digital and face-to-face levels were interlocked. In many 
voting stations, activists used both practices at the same time to facilitate communication.  
Second, the practice of  directing reduced uncertainty about the protest event. Whenever 
organizers gave instructions to other activists, they were taking a collective decision. For instance, 
when Enric told other activists where to put trash cans to prevent the police from accessing the 
voting stations, he excluded other courses of  action and thereby organized preparatory activities. 
This depended on the compliance of  other activists. Nevertheless, directing represented a form 
of  (temporary) centralized decision making. Key decisions in the process were taken by local 




boundaries of  established formal organizations, directing became particularly relevant, because the 
activities of  activists were not guided by any previous collective decisions. 
The three practices ordered the preparatory activities for the defense of  the voting stations. 
Activists made use of  public assemblies, messenger applications, and directing. Thereby, they 
integrated the decision-making and communication dimensions of  these practices. Through the 
combination of  these practices, organizers were able to plan and prepare the defense of  the voting 
stations outside the established SMOs. 
But practices not only structure collective action, but they are structured themselves, too. Practices 
are not random bundles of  activity, but their components exhibit some kind of  pattern (Reckwitz 
2002; Schatzki 2001b). Ann Swidler (2001, 88) pointed out that practices “are structures in just 
this sense, simultaneously material and enacted, but also patterned and meaningful, both because 
they enact schemas and because they may be read for the transposable schemas they contain.” 
Public assemblies, messenger applications, and directing all exhibit some regularity and 
repetitiveness, which provides practitioners meaningful cues for action. 
Organizational practices were thus key in organizing outside formal organizations. However, 
this was not easily accomplished. Decision-making and communication practices could not simply 
be extracted from SMOs and applied in unstructured settings. Directing, messenger applications, 
and public assemblies could be used, because organizers and activists had the necessary experience 
and skill to practice them without the support of  a formal organizational structure. 
2.4 Practical Knowledge and Experience 
Organizational practices are not a toolbox that is readily available to activists, from which they can 
simply pick and choose. Organizational practices require knowledge and skill. Organizers must 
have acquired these skills through learning and experience – they must become practitioners. The 
case of  the defense of  the voting stations was no exception, which became clear from the pieces 
of  data cited in previous sections. Organizer Enric, for example said that giving directions through 
messenger applications was possible “if  you have a little bit of  organization, and you know a little 
bit of  marketing and how to manage this.” This highlights that it was not enough to simply send 
out text messages over Telegram telling people what to do. It required knowledge how to do it. 
Another example came from Carles’ description of  the directed assemblies in the CDR prior to 
the referendum. He admitted that all the participants, including him, were quite nervous, but at the 
same time he also stressed that they had “a bit more activist experience and we have lived through 
something like that already.” With this experience, the organizers were able to direct the assembly 




Further evidence for the role of  experience and practical skill came from the interviews with the 
organizers of  the CDR Sabadell. Joana said that organizing process was not initiated by “three 
neighbors who say “let’s do this,” but by activists “with previous political participation.” These 
organizers had experience in other social movements and civil society organizations, for example 
in the Plataforma de Afectadas por la Hipoteca. Organizer Xavi, who had been involved in 
different movements before explains the role of  experience as follows. 
We had experience to stage assemblies with 300 people every Wednesday. So you prepare 
a microphone, an agenda in 30 seconds, pa-pa-pa, turns of talk, and I don’t know what 
else. This is an important school of activism as well. 
Previous experience in social movements provided Catalan activists with the necessary practical 
skills to hold public assemblies, use messenger applications, and give directions to other activists. 
This represented a common thread in many interviews. Organizers emphasized the role of  
practical knowledge and previous experiences. Because they had practiced these organizational skills, 
they could use them outside of  organizational entities.  
 This shows that the independence movement had experienced and skillful organizers who 
knew how to organize collective action. But skillful organizers alone were not sufficient for 
successful organizing. It also required that a critical mass of  ordinary participants could be involved 
in the organizational process. The basic condition was that organizational practices had to be 
recognizable beyond the small circles of  core activists. Participants had an idea what it meant to 
hold assemblies or to use instant messengers. Moreover, they also possessed some basic skills and 
knowledge to do these things. Otherwise, communication in messengers and assemblies would 
have just produced chaos, and nobody would have followed the directions of  organizers. 
3 CONCLUSION 
In the last days of  September 2017, it seemed highly doubtful whether the referendum on October 
1 could go ahead as planned, as the Catalan government came under political and legal pressure 
from the Spanish state. One of  the largest civil society associations, the ANC, merely called to 
gather outside the voting stations to protest with ballot in hand in case the police would impede 
the voting procedure.  
In this chapter, I have addressed an important empirical puzzle for social movement scholars. 
I have described how the independence movement successfully planned and prepared the defense 
of  the voting stations despite the inaction of  its two largest SMOs. The most surprising finding 
was that deliberation was largely absent in the organizing process. Instead of  deliberation, 




messenger applications, and directing. The “texture” (Gherardi 2006, 2012) of  these practices 
enabled communication and decision making among activists.  
They key finding of  this chapter is that communication and decision-making practices structure 
collective action – even when formal organizations as infrastructures are practically absent. Public 
assemblies, messenger applications, and directing, also work outside the boundaries of  formal 
organizations. Communication and decision-making practices acquire organizational qualities, 
because practitioners employ them to reduce uncertainty about the protest event by elaborating 
plans for collective action. Precisely because practices represent relatively regular and stable ways 
of  action, they work even outside the boundaries of  established organizations.  
However, this requires practical skill and knowledge from both organizers and activists. Put 
simply, activists must know how to organize contentious action. Skill and knowledge are not readily 
available to them, but must be acquired through learning and experience. If  organizers know how 
to use the practices at their hands properly, the structural components of  organization might 
become irrelevant.  
The findings have important implications for scholarship in social movement studies. Previous 
research stressed the importance of  organizational structures, in particular SMOs, as a basis for 
contentious action. The role of  the ANC in the defense of  the voting stations suggests that the 
importance of  formal organizations might not only be overstated – formal organizations may even 
hinder contentious action. The findings further suggest that the key to organized protest action 
may lie not so much in structures, but in the practical skill and experience of  activists and 
organizers. The relevance of  communication and decision-making practices demonstrates the 
limits of  structural accounts of  organization in social movements. This means that social 
movement scholars should pay more attention to practices. 
The chapter also contributes to the literature on organizing beyond organizations (Ahrne and 
Brunsson 2011, 2019b; Ahrne, Brunsson, and Seidl 2016) by exploring a case of  contentious 
action. Social movements represent a particularly relevant field for the study of  organizational 
dynamics beyond organizational structures, because of  their comparatively low level of  
formalization. But the findings of  the chapter might also apply to other forms of  collective action. 
Decision-making and communication practices may be decisive in any kind of  informal setting.  
These implication seem particularly important given that both social movement researchers and 
organizational scholars have lamented the declining role of  organization in contentious action and 
also in society more in general (Ahrne and Brunsson 2011; King 2017; Soule 2013). Understanding 
organization not only as formal structures but also as practices and processes may highlight the 


























CONTINUITY, INNOVATION, AND TRANSFORMATION. 
ORGANIZING PROTEST AFTER THE 1-O REFERENDUM 
 
 
October 27, 2017 was an important date in the course of  the territorial conflict in Catalonia. On 
that day, secessionists and counter-secessionists both made another push towards their goals. First, 
the Catalan parliament voted in favor of  declaring independence. The three pro-independence 
parties approved the motion, the “Comuns” abstained, and PSC, PP, and Ciutadans boycotted the 
parliamentary session. More than two weeks after Puigdemont’s suspended declaration, one could 
get the impression that secessionists finally had achieved their goal. But it turned out quite 
different, as organizer Antoni, who was present as an observer at the parliamentary session, told 
in the interview. 
When I left the parliament and I saw that the building of the parliament still had both the 
Catalan flag and the Spanish flag, I said “we haven’t declared independence, we haven’t 
declared anything. This doesn’t have any effect.” 
In hindsight, Antoni’s reading of  the symbolic value of  the two flags on the building was spot on. 
When the parliament declared independence, it had already become apparent that the Spanish state 
would take even more severe measures of  counter-secession. The second important occurrence 
of  October 27 was the Spanish senate’s vote to apply article 155 of  the Spanish constitution. 
Article 155 suspended Catalan autonomy, discharged the Catalan government, and put the region 
under direct administration of  the Spanish government. Activating the article also dissolved the 
Catalan parliament and called for anticipated elections in the region. The Catalan government did 
not actively resist these measures or take any effective steps to implement the declaration of  
independence.  
The two occurrences on October 27 were an important moment in the cycle of  contention, 
because the limits of  the Catalan secessionists’ quest for independence became apparent and the 




27 marked the end of  what I consider the 1-O episode of  contention and the beginning of  the 
contraction of  the cycle of  contention.  
In previous chapters, I have shown that protest organizing during the 1-O episode of  
contention was fundamentally different from previous normal times of  secessionist conflict. In 
this intense time, the preparatory processes of  actions such as the protest on September 20 or the 
defense of  the voting stations were notably shorter and took place mostly between and outside 
organizations. There was less time for deliberation, and activists were more willing to accept the 
directions of  leaders. In this part of  the dissertation, I address a simple, but compelling question: 
What happened to the Catalan independence movement after the 1-O episode of  contention? 
And, more precisely, how did the ways in which activists organize protest change after the episode? 
Theory suggests two potential answers to this questions. 
First, some institutionalist scholars have suggested that critical junctures, such as the 1-O 
episode of  contention, do not necessarily lead to transformations. Critical junctures represent 
moments of  greater possibility for change, but it is not inevitable. Instead, “re-equilibration” 
(Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 352) can also take place afterwards. Following this idea means that 
the various patterns of  organizing during the intense period of  contention were exceptional, and 
once this phase was over, activists went back to previous modes of  normal organizing.   
Second, as outlined in chapter 2, historical-comparative sociologists proposed the notion of  
transformative events (McAdam and Sewell 2001; Sewell 1996a; Wagner-Pacifici 2010), arguing 
that brief  periods of  time can have durable consequences. Times of  upheaval can lead to what 
Della Porta (2018) called “sedimentations”: radical changes during these intense times stabilize and 
become long-term outcomes. This suggests that the organizational practices and processes that 
emerged during the 1-O period were there to stay. In this perspective, the 1-O episode of  
contention represented not just an exceptional period of  time for organizers, but one that 
transformed protest organizing in the long run. 
The analysis of  empirical data showed that neither of  these hypotheses fully fits the case of  the 
Catalan independence movement. Still, the evolution of  protest organizing was somewhat closer 
to the second line of  reasoning. In essence, I argue that the 1-O referendum had transformative 
effects on protest organizing beyond the very episode of  contention. However, these 
transformations were not just continuities of  how activists organized protest during intense the 1-
O episode of  contention. Rather, protest organizing was further transformed after October 27. The 
1-O referendum was eventful, because it caused a series of  mechanisms that led to the contraction 
of  the cycle of  contention. These mechanisms are well known in social movement studies: 




institutionalization and radicalization (Tarrow 2011, 190). In this phase, the size and number of  
protests decreases as demobilization begins to affect the movement (Koopmans 2004; Tarrow 
2011). The analysis of  the empirical data showed that these familiar mechanisms were also at play 
after 1-O episode of  contention. Disagreements over movement strategy led to more deliberation 
and less organizing between organizations (chapter 10). As I show in chapter 11, repression, and 
counter-secessionist surveillance in particular, had an impact on how activists in the independence 
movement organized protests after the 1-O referendum. These transformations led to 
organizational practices and processes that were substantively different from organizing before 
and during the 1-O episode of  contention. 
These findings underline the role of  events – such as the 1-O referendum – for the course of  
collective action over time. However, it would be misguided to conceive of  events as an 
experimental “treatment,” as a force that is independent from other variables (Sewell 1996b). Anna 
Grzymala-Busse has warned that “time is not simply an independent and self-evident causal force” 
(2011, 1273 emphasis added). Rather, events acquire transformative power only when they are 
interpreted as such by political actors (Basta 2018; Wagner-Pacifici 2010). In other words, what 
matters is how activists make sense of  events and how they turn this sense into collective action 
(Weick 1995; Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2005). Following this idea, I take an interpretative 
approach to organizational change, focusing on activist sensemaking and strategizing as the links 
that underpin the mechanisms between events and organizing. I demonstrate how these 
mechanisms work empirically in chapters 10 and 11.  
Before I turn to the effects of  repression and strategy on organizing more in detail, I use this 
chapter to examine the contentious actions after the 1-O episode of  contention and their 
organizing processes. More precisely, I focus on four cases of  collective action: one campaign by 
each of  Òmnium Cultural and ANC, and two protests by the CDRs. The empirical analysis of  the 
post 1-O period also showed that not everything changed. In the second half  of  this chapter, I 
demonstrate that there were some important continuities throughout the whole period that was 
studied. I also show that some innovations during the 1-O episode of  contention turned into long-
term legacies. Finally, I briefly introduce the four transformative mechanisms that were at play 
after the 1-O episode of  contention. 
1 ORGANIZING PROTEST AFTER THE 1-O EPISODE OF CONTENTION 
Cycles of  contention “usually end with rapid demobilization of  most actors, especially those who 
have challenged and lost” (Tilly 2008, 154). On October 27, the political opportunities for the 




independence and the application of  article 155. Catalan independence seemed as unlikely as two 
months before. Catalan secessionist, however, did not give up after October 27, in spite of  the 
increasingly dim prospects of  achieving their goal. The end of  what I consider the 1-O episode 
of  contention did not suppose a halt of  protest action. The secessionist cycle of  contention 
continued to unfold well beyond that date (Della Porta, Gunzelmann, and Portos 2021; Della 
Porta, O’Connor, and Portos 2019).31 
In the following sections, I describe the trajectory of  secessionist contention from the end of  
the 1-O episode until October 2019. From the continuous stream of  contentious interaction, I 
have selected four cases of  organizational processes: the Llibertat Presos Polítics (“Freedom 
Political Prisoners”) campaign by Òmnium Cultural, the Primàries (“Primaries”) campaign by the 
ANC, the 8-N general strike, and the March 2018 protests after the arrest of  Carles Puigdemont 
and other pro-independence politicians. 
1.1 Campaigning after the 1-O Referendum 
After the arrest of  their leaders Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sànchez on October 16, Òmnium Cultural 
and the ANC both shifted their strategic efforts towards anti-repression (see chapter 10). This 
included traditional and online media work, advertising and leafleting, and public events, but also 
legal and material support for their leaders and later for the imprisoned members of  the Catalan 
government. These actions were part of  the campaign work of  the two organizations.  
The day after the imprisonment of  Cuixart and Sànchez “was when we decided to do a 
campaign; we as Òmnium Cultural created the brand Llibertat Presos Polítics” (Beatriu). The 
following piece of  data from the interview with Òmnium Cultural organizer Isabel shows how 
Llibertat Presos Polítics relates to previous campaigns. 
October 16 is the day when they lock up Jordi Sànchez and Jordi Cuixart. Here begins a 
campaign, which is Llibertat Presos Polítics, which coexists with the other campaigns, 
which are basically Crida per la Democràcia and PNR (Pacte Nacional pel Referèndum). 
Llibertat Presos Polítics went along the lines of framing the story, of concretizing a bit the 
Democracy campaign. Concretizing it as a specific case. 
In Isabel’s view, the campaign Llibertat Presos Polítics was tightly connected to those developed 
before the referendum. Although the campaign represented a shift in the organization’s strategy 
                                                 
31 The precise trajectory of the secessionist cycle of contention remains to be determined empirically through 




(see chapter 10), she portrayed it primarily as a continuation of  the previous Democracy campaign. 
Moreover, when asked about how the organizational work changed, she stated that: 
Well, in fact, they coexisted, I don’t know how to say it. They coexisted, but Llibertat 
Presos Polítics was much more a story of demonstrations, because the image had a lot of 
success and you saw all the campaigns where people wore badges and banners of our 
image. This is part of the amplifier that Òmnium Cultural has. It’s a matter of being quick, 
of getting it right and if you do it well and fast then people make it their own. 
Isabel stressed the imagery of  the campaign, which became an integral part of  the movement’s 
visual language. She did not elaborate about potential differences and changes to previous 
campaigns, but emphasized their coexistence. This suggested that there was a lot of  continuity in 
the organizational work after the referendum and after the detention of  Jordi Cuixart. 
Nevertheless, the same interview with Isabel also displayed some differences in the 
organizational processes of  the different campaigns. The following passage from the interview 
referred to the beginnings of  Llibertat Presos Polítics: 
I: Do you remember the beginning of the campaign [Llibertat Presos Polítics]. Did it start 
right on October 16?  
R: Well, on the 16th, we called for a demonstration for the next day. In fact, here [at 
Òmnium Cultural] we don’t usually call for demonstrations that shortly. Only for very 
concrete things. And here the big demonstration that we called one day for the next 
overflows as well. This determines how the entity [Òmnium Cultural] works now. The fact 
of having the president in prison changes everything. This might be different for other 
[entities], because Jordi Cuixart still is our president. 
The campaign started abruptly with a call to protest for the day after Sànchez and Cuixart’s arrest. 
As Isabel told, this was different from previous campaigns. Actually, the campaign start was more 
similar to the quickly called protest on September 20 (see chapter 7). The quote from the interview 
with Isabel showed a further difference between organizing the Llibertat Presos Polítics campaign 
and previous campaigns. Namely, the occurrence that led to the campaign – the imprisonment of  
leader Jordi Cuixart – also had a profound impact on the organizational process of  the campaign. 
After the imprisonment, decision making and communication within the leadership group became 
much more difficult (see chapter 11). In spite of  these difficulties, the campaign was successful in 
the eyes of  the organizers, as Isabel’s statement above shows. As Cuixart remained in prison, the 
Llibertat Presos Polítics campaign unfolded way beyond the 1-O episode, and was further 
developed into other campaigns, in particular Demà pots ser tu (Tomorrow it could be you), which 




the trial against the prisoners came closer, Òmnium Cultural launched its campaign Judici a la 
Democràcia (Trial against Democracy), which soon became its main focus. 
The ANC shifted its strategic focus toward anti-repressive action, too. This included periodical 
press releases and social media posts about the duration of  Sànchez and Cuixart’s imprisonment 
(e.g. “seven months without you – seven months of  prison – Jordi Sànchez and Jordi Cuixart”), 
and weekly vigils in front of  the town halls of  villages and cities of  the region.  
In the interviews with ANC organizers, one campaign stood out as important for the 
organization: the Primaries campaign. However, this campaign was not aimed at anti-repressive 
action. Interviewees reported that the idea for the Primaries originated in a group within the 
leadership around the newly elected president of  the organization, Elisenda Paluzie. Exactly nine 
months after the 1-O, the ANC’s leadership published the following statement:  
With the goal of achieving the maximum numbers of pro-independence mayors, of 
guaranteeing unity of action and to make the Catalan Republic effective, the National 
Leadership of the ANC proposes to initiate and promote a process of primaries to select 
political representatives.  
These primaries must form a unitary republican list for municipalities with more the 25,000 
inhabitants and guarantee the election of an independentist mayor. 
This list will be open to candidates from civil society and parties. The ANC considers this 
list to favor unity of action, does not divide and promotes the republican value of 
participation and access to municipal politics, which is indispensable in an exceptional 
moment.  
(ANC Press release 01/07/2018) 
The ANC leadership proposed holding primary elections and creating a unitary pro-independence 
list at the upcoming municipal elections in Catalonia. About a month later, the members of  the 
organization ratified the leadership’s proposal, carrying 87.8 percent of  votes (ANC Press release 
06/08/2018).  
The interview data revealed that the organizational process of  the Primaries campaign was not 
different from the campaigns that had taken place before the 1-O referendum, such as the Ara és 
l’hora campaign. The campaign was meticulously prepared in a couple of  months by volunteers 
and professional staff. However, the Primaries campaign did represent a transformation in the 
ANC’s strategy and repertoire of  action. Whereas previous campaigns were aimed at exercising 
pressure on the host state and the independence movement’s elected representatives, the Primaries 
campaign sought competition with the established parties in their arena. The ANC continued to 




of  the organization’s repertoire into institutional politics. This strategic change came about with 
the leadership election in March 2018 after which Elisenda Paluzie took charge of  the organization.  
In August 2018 the ANC started to promote the campaign. Thousands of  Catalan citizens 
registered to vote in the ANC’s primaries. In Catalonia’s most important municipality, Barcelona, 
over 10.000 people participated in the primary. The academic and journalist Jordi Graupera won 
the primary with a large majority, making him candidate for city’s municipal election in May 2019. 
In spite of  the broad participation in the process and the support of  the ANC’s campaign, the 
candidacy of  Graupera in Barcelona and the Primaries campaign as a whole had only limited 
success. The established pro-independence parties, PDeCAT, ERC, and CUP declined the ANC’s 
invitation to join the unitary list, and ran their own candidates in most municipalities. Graupera’s 
pro-independence platform Barcelona és capital (Barcelona is capital) only achieved 3.74 percent 
of  the vote in the elections and did not overcome the 5 percent threshold to enter the city council. 
Moreover, the Primaries campaign and Graupera were criticized within the movement. Critics 
argued that the campaign took away important votes from the established pro-independence 
parties, which, in the end, were unable to achieve a majority of  seats in the election. Ultimately, 
incumbent mayor Ada Colau of  Barcelona en Comù was reelected with the support of  the PSC 
and Ciutadans.  
Of  course these two campaigns were not the only ones that were organized by ANC and 
Òmnium Cultural after the 1-O episode. I have selected them, because organizers and experts 
highlighted them as important and mentioned them more frequently than others in the semi-
structured interviews. Other examples of  ANC campaigns were Consum Estrategic (Strategic 
Consumption), which promoted buying Catalan products and supporting Catalan firms, and 
#makeamove, which was aimed at raising awareness about the secessionist conflict in the 
international community. On the one hand, these campaigns, as well as the described Primaries 
campaign represented a diversification of  the ANC’s strategy after the 1-O episode. On the other 
hand, the organization’s tactics remained largely the same. It was still focused on stands on the 
streets, media work, public talks, leafleting and advertising, as well as contained protests. The 
actions of  Òmnium Cultural were not limited to the Llibertat Presos Polítics campaign either. As 
described above, Llibertat Presos Polítics was developed further into the Demà pots ser tu 
campaign; later, the Judici a la Democràcia campaign was launched for the trial against the Catalan 
prisoners. Interviewees reported that the action repertoire employed in these Òmnium Cultural 
campaigns was basically the same as before the referendum.  
At the process level, the two campaigns were mostly the result of  planned and ordered actions, 




campaigns were developed and organized within each organization. Both organizing processes 
relied on the leadership and professional staff  of  the respective organization, although this was 
more important in Òmnium Cultural. The ANC, in contrast, relied more on its volunteers in local 
chapters throughout the region. These features point to continuities in the ways in which the large 
organizations organized contentious action.  
Nevertheless, the detention of  the Jordis on October 16 was a shock for both organizations 
and had an impact on how they organized campaigns of  contentious action after the 1-O episode. 
The consequences of  the event for the two campaigns were different, however. Òmnium Cultural 
decided to continue with Jordi Cuixart as president, which made internal communication and 
decision making in the organizing process much more difficult. In contrast, Jordi Sànchez resigned 
as president of  the ANC a month after his imprisonment in order to run for Puigdemont’s JxCat 
list in the elections of  December 21. While it is unclear if  Sànchez’s decision to leave the ANC 
was related to his imprisonment, the data suggested that the election of  a new leadership in March 
2018 brought about an expansion of  the repertoire of  action and a shift in strategy.  
1.2 November 8: Disruption and Strike 
On November 2, the Generalitat’s vice president, Oriol Junqueras, and seven other members of  
the Catalan government were arrested. The day after, the trade union CSC-Intersindical called for 
a general strike on November 8 (called 8-N). The general strike was framed as a protest against the 
“impoverishment of  the working class” and against a national law adopted in October that would 
facilitated the relocation of  Catalan businesses to the rest of  Spain. SMOs such as Òmnium 
Cultural and ANC joined the mobilization, but in contrast to the 3-O, neither the large trade unions 
CCOO, UGT, and CGT, nor the employers’ associations supported the call. Thus, the CSC-
Intersindical was the only trade union to call for the general strike, which made them more known 
to the public according to organizer Montserrat.  
On November 8, thousands of  protesters took the streets again. As a contentious performance, 
the 8-N was very similar to the 3-O in that it was a combination of  a strike, a series of  
demonstrations, and disruptive actions such as highway and railway blocks. However, the 8-N was 
much smaller in scale, as very few workers participated in strike action. Only in public schools and 
universities, participation reached about 31.5 percent, as estimated by government sources.  
Nevertheless, there was some significant participation in a number of  demonstrations 
throughout the region. At noon, various organizations called for a protest in front of  the seat of  
the Generalitat in Barcelona and its delegations in other towns. At 6 pm, protesters also gathered 




changed their name to Committees for the Defense of  the Republic in the meantime. The 8-N 
was the public presentation of  the CDRs as an independent collective actor, and from this moment 
on they were much more visible in the media. It also represented a turning point in their 
relationship with the institutions, as Joana explained:  
Until this moment, the CDR fulfilled a function that the government could not take on. 
But when on October 27 the Republic is not actually declared and the exile begins, all 
these things start to change and there is a disconnect between CDR and public institutions. 
The CDRs take their way towards the Republic and the institutions don't. 
The CDRs mainly called for disruptive actions. Protesters occupied more than 60 roads 
throughout Catalonia and cut the high speed railway in Girona. The 8-N thus represented a turn 
towards mobilization for disruptive action (see also Della Porta, O’Connor, and Portos 2019, 8). 
These actions were prepared by the CDRs in the week prior to the 8-N. In comparison to the 3-
O, this gave the organizers a bit more time to plan the concrete actions and also to coordinate with 
other CDRs. Again, the primary setting for the preparation were open neighborhood assemblies. 
Some interviewees reported that the attendance at these assemblies rose before the general strike. 
In Fastiada, for instance, there were about 100 people at the open assembly to prepare the protest. 
However, interviewees also reported that there was a lot of  secrecy in these meetings about the 
preparation of  the 8-N. Activist Quim described this as follows: 
We talked about how to do it, at what time we would meet and everything in a language- 
hmm, always encrypted. You never speak about highways. You use, well, euphemisms or- 
the word “excursion” is typical. “We’ll do an excursion, we’ll do a very slow excursion and 
then we go for breakfast” and everybody knows what it means. 
The CDRs’ increasing focus on disruptive actions was accompanied by secretism and counter-
surveillant protest organizing (I discuss this more in detail in chapter 11). The CSC-Intersindical 
did not participate in the preparation of  disruptive actions. As organizer Montserrat stressed, the 
role of  the union was the strike in the workplace, not blocking highways and railroads. However, 
it also became clear that the union was not opposed to the disruptions. Thus, the various actions 
of  the 8-N were prepared by different collective actors (CSC-Intersindical, the CDRs, and ANC 
and Òmnium Cultural).  
1.3 March 2018 Protests 
Demobilization affected the CDRs after the 1-O episode, and even more after the 8-N general 
strike. But there were occasional peaks of  protest participation, for example in March 2018. On 




warrant. Llarena also ordered the arrest of  Jordi Turull, Carme Forcadell, Raül Romeva, Josep Rull 
and Dolors Bassa, who had already been detained on November 2, 2017 and released on bail on 
December 4. On March 25, Puigdemont was arrested by German police while traveling back from 
Finland to his residence in Belgium.  
In response to the arrests, the CDRs mobilized for protests throughout the region. Similar to 
the 8-N, the March protests included highway and railway occupations. These disruptive actions 
were carried out by local CDRs. The following piece of  data from the interview with CDR 
organizer Quim illustrated some of  these protest actions in Tarragona: 
They detained Puigdemont on March 25, on the 23rd the ministers enter prison again. 
Dolors Bassa and the others. That day they we called everybody to Plaça Imperial Tàrraco. 
There, we from the CDR took the reins. 
Although the activists were not enough to fully occupy the traffic circle at Plaça Imperial Tàrraco, 
they managed to block the traffic at its entrances. Then, the CDR Tarragona called to meet at the 
central government’s subdelegation. There, they held an open assembly and decided to block the 
AP-7 highway, which passes near Tarragona. About 200 activists blocked the highway, but were 
charged by police. There was also an innovation in the repertoire, as Quim reported in the 
interview: 
The organization of the CDRs went quite well, because we were able to open very quickly 
the toll gates in all of Catalonia on the days 23, 24, 25, 25. Then we rested for two days 
and opened the toll gates again. This was interesting, because opening the tolls was protest 
the other way round. Instead of blocking the highway to annoy people, we said let’s annoy 
the government by opening the gates. So people see that we do not disturb them […] But 
when Puigdemont was detained in Germany, we were not just 200 people. We were 4000 
people and cut three lanes on different highways. 
This piece of  data showed not only the innovation in the repertoire, but also the success of  the 
mobilization. Although the arrests of  Puigdemont and other politicians occurred in a phase of  
demobilization, the data suggested that the events led to a spike in turnout. According to organizer 
Quim, “people were very nervous, […] but there was motivation to mobilize.”  
Although the CDRs were quick to react, it was not a spontaneous protest. Given that the five 
ex-ministers of  the Catalan government had been imprisoned before, and Puigdemont was 
searched with a warrant, it was not unlikely that they would be arrested again. This was why 
organizers perceived the situation in March 2018 as different to previous arrests. From the 




This was decided in the assembly. We knew [the arrests] would happen, because the 
judicialization would come. So there was a protocol that was approved by all the CDRs. 
And we knew what to do when the arrests would happen. Today we call for a protest. 
You, you, and you. Call for protest at 8pm in Sant Jaume Square, and so on. 
This plan was approved by the CDR Catalunya, the national assembly of  CDRs. As Carles 
reported, almost all local CDRs followed the directive from the national level. 
It was quite consensual. There should be a protest in the squares in each village or city. 
People should prepare giant hand cuffs in order to say that the imprisonment is unjust. 
People prepared some shows. It was very planned. 
These pieces of  data suggested that the CDRs were prepared and could respond quickly with 
coordinated protest actions throughout the region. The phrase “it was very planned” shows that 
the March protests were not a case of  spontaneous action. Moreover, Carles also highlighted in 
the interview that the ANC was pursuing a different tactic in the protest, calling for a centralized, 
symbolic protest with yellow ribbons. The stance of  the CDRs was that this was not disruptive 
enough. 
We said “shit, of course we have to protest,” because Puigdemont was arrested. But you 
can’t go to the German Consulate. So our job was to say “no.” This was the day when the 
first riots happened. 
In the end, the ANC joined the CDRs’ call for protest, but there was some confusion about where 
to march. In the end, the protest was headed to Spanish government’s delegation, where 
confrontations between protesters and riot police occurred. While the protests were well organized 
overall, some activists said that the confrontation with the police at the Spanish government’s 
delegation and in other places was not. This became clear in the following piece of  data from the 
interview with CDR activist Gabriel. 
[The mobilization after the 1-O] went down a bit, not disappearing, but with dilemmas 
such as the action when they detained Puigdemont. As I told you, there was a call to 
occupy the central government’s delegation, but without any kind of plan. Without 
anything, and it turns out to be a failure. Because we did not do anything, we only received 
blows by the police. 
The lack of  plan referred to the confrontation with the police, not to the overall protest. In 
Gabriel's view the CDR actions in Girona and Lleida were successful, but in Barcelona they were 
not. This was not surprising, because according to the interview data the March protests were the 
first time there were clashes between protesters and police since the 1-O. The protest became a 




tactics emerged and a change of  repertoire: “I think on this day there is a substantial change and 
it becomes understood that direct confrontation pauses.”  
Interviewees reported that demobilization continued to affect the CDRs after the March 
protests. What had started as large, open assemblies after the 1-O transformed over time into small 
groups with a stable but informal membership. The rest of  activists remained latent and only 
participated in reaction to repressive events. The arrest of  Puigdemont, for example was perceived 
as a “direct attack,” as CDR organizer Miquel called it, and people mobilized briefly again. Or, as 
organizer Quims put it: “in the end, if  there is no trigger, if  there is no reason, people do not 
mobilize.” Thus, in the long run, exhaustion, repression, and the lack of  movement strategy took 
their toll on the CDRs.  
1.4 Summary 
When the Spanish senate suspended Catalan autonomy and dissolved the Catalan parliament by 
applying article 155 of  the Spanish constitution on October 27, secessionists’ hopes that the 1-O 
referendum would lead to independence were crashed. Subsequently, the cycle of  contention 
began to contract and demobilization set on. As I have shown here, this did not mean that 
secessionist contentious actions were suspended completely after the 1-O episode.  
ANC and Òmnium Cultural organized their secessionist actions mostly in well-structured, 
planned campaigns. The respective campaigns Llibertat Presos Polítics and Primaries illustrate this 
form of  organizing process. Both associations relied heavily on the work of  professional staff  in 
these campaigns, and the ANC also involved volunteers on the ground to a large extent. While the 
Llibertat Presos Polítics was a quick reaction to the arrest of  Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sànchez on 
October 16, the Primaries campaign was a result of  a longer deliberative process in the ANC after 
the election of  a new leadership. In the campaigns, organizers and activists employed mostly 
contained forms of  action, such as orderly street protests, vigils, leafleting, and advertising. Overall, 
both the repertoire of  contention and the organizing processes were quite similar to the cases 
before the 1-O episode of  contention. However, the temporal comparison also revealed some 
crucial differences in organizing. The arrest of  their leaders had a transformative impact on the 
Llibertat Presos Polítics campaign in particular, because working with Cuixart in prison made 
internal communication in the organizing of  the campaign more difficult.  
The CDRs were born as open assemblies in neighborhoods and villages to occupy voting 
stations and organize resistance against the police interventions on October 1. After the 
referendum, they did not disappear though. They changed their names to Committees for the 




label, they came to be known to a wider public for their disruptive actions during the general strike 
on November 8, which had been called in reaction to the application of  article 155 and the arrests 
of  independentist politicians. Thus, the 8-N was not a spontaneous reaction, but activists had some 
time to prepare the occupation and blocking of  highways and railways. Although there was some 
coordination at the regional level, most of  the actions were planned by local CDRs, which at that 
point still functioned as open assemblies rather than proper organizational entities. This started to 
change after the general strike, when the assemblies were affected by demobilization, and the core 
groups of  attendants gradually became stable groups without formal membership. In contrast to 
the 8-N, the March protest followed immediately after the detentions of  four former ministers, 
and intensified when Puigdemont was arrested in Germany. Yet, these contentious actions were 
not spontaneous reactions either, because the CDRs had anticipated the repressive events. 
Different scenarios for action were developed at the regional level of  the CDRs, but most of  the 
disruptive action were planned and prepared at the local level. The protests were even more 
disruptive than the 8-N, and clashes between police and activists happened at the Spanish 
government’s delegation in Barcelona, as well as on several highways.  
In sum, there were notable instances of  disruptive action by the CDRs after the 1-O episode. 
In contrast, Òmnium Cultural and ANC continued their contained repertoire of  action, which was 
characteristic for them before the referendum. Della Porta, O’Connor, and Portos (2019, 7) 
summarized the overall trajectory of  the secessionist cycle of  contentions as follows. 
The cycle brought about a considerable degree of radicalization and polarization of claims, 
frames and justifications for independence (and anti-secessionism), but a very limited 
amount of actual violent forms of action deployed by the challengers (at least until late 
2018), which mainly came in the form of intermittent clashes with police.  
This changed only in October 2019, when the prison sentences for nine pro-independence leaders 
sparked a series of  protests that were more disruptive and violent than the 8-N and March 2018 
protests. For several weeks, activists burned trash cans, constructed barricades blocked highways, 
railways and Barcelona’s airport, and engaged in clashes with local and national police (Della Porta, 
Gunzelmann, and Portos 2021, 139). 
2 THE OLD AND THE NEW – ORGANIZATIONAL CONTINUITY AND INNOVATION 
2.1 Organizational Continuity and Re-equilibration 
When studying political phenomena over time, transformations often catch the eye more easily 




of  sudden social changes, such as large-scale insurgencies and revolutions. However, scholars from 
a range of  disciplines stressed the need to study both change and stability (e.g. Capano 2009; G. 
Hernes 1976; Mahoney 2002; Poole et al. 2000; Van de Ven and Poole 2005). In the same spirit, 
researchers in social movement studies highlighted the role of  organizational structures for social 
movement continuity, especially to survive in times of  low mobilization (Staggenborg 1988; V. 
Taylor 1989). Della Porta and Diani (2006, 138) summarized these findings as follows:  
For people committed to a certain cause, organizations are an important source of 
continuity, not only in terms of identity, but also in terms of action. At times of collective 
effervescence, when enthusiasm is high and the will to participate is strong, it is easier to 
mobilize people and resources even informally as individuals. But when opportunities for 
action are more modest and it gets more difficult to attract people spontaneously “to the 
streets,” then organizations can secure continuity to collective action precisely because of 
their tendency to selfperpetuation. 
Whereas the role of  organizational structures in times of  latency is well documented, less is known 
about organizational continuity in turbulent times. Also, the existing work has focused primarily 
on organizational entities and less on practices and processes. Although this dissertation is more 
concerned with transformative events and organizational change, it is important to acknowledge 
stability as well. After all, even the most radical ruptures do not overhaul everything. The problem 
for my empirical research was that continuities were often less visible in the data, especially because 
semi-structured interviews were the main data source. Interviewees often treated stability as 
inherently uninteresting and were keener to talk about changes. Consequently, the evidence on 
organizational continuity was rather sparse. Nevertheless, some organizational continuities 
emerged from the data. Given their rarity in the data it is particularly important to take them 
seriously and not dismiss them as marginal.  
Between 2012 and 2017, the secessionist conflict in Catalonia was characterized by routine 
interactions between challengers and authorities. I have called this phase the normal times of  
secessionist conflict (chapter 4). In this period, the two large SMOs, ANC and Òmnium Cultural 
dominated the organizational field of  the movement and managed to turn out massive numbers 
of  protesters for their street manifestations. This repertoire of  contention was characterized by 
contained action. Protests were primarily organized within these organizations in long and detailed 
preparatory processes, which involved the support of  professional staff  and volunteers.  
These normal modes of  organizing protest underwent dramatic transformations during and 
after the 1-O episode of  contention. This does not mean, however, that protest organizing was 




the organizational practices in the movement more in general showed that there were some 
important continuities throughout the 1-O episode of  contention and beyond.  
At the process level of  analysis, the description of  the cases showed that long and detailed 
organizing processes within the boundaries of  single organizations continued to be relevant for 
contentious action in the independence movement. The primaries campaign, for example was 
developed by the ANC in a deliberative process and meticulously prepared by its professional staff. 
Although Òmnium Cultural’s Llibertat Presos Polítics campaign was quickly called for after the 
detention of  Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sànchez, it was continuously developed and most of  its 
actions were the product of  professional planning and preparation. This process resulted in the 
subsequent campaign Demà pot ser tu.  
In the interviews, some organizers, even from Òmnium Cultural and ANC themselves, 
criticized the two large SMOs for their inaction before the occupation and defense of  the voting 
stations. The inability to adapt their repertoire of  action and to include more disruptive means was 
seen by many as a sign of  organizational inertia. This was only part of  the picture. Some 
interviewees pointed out the positive effect of  the inertia of  the two SMOs. They described how 
inertia provided organizational stability in periods of  intense conflict. This is best illustrated by the 
following piece of  data from the interview with Òmnium Cultural organizer Beatriu: 
Luckily, [Òmnium Cultural] is a large ship that has some inertia, a dynamic, it moves by 
itself. Even if the Executive disappeared one day, Òmnium Cultural would keep working. 
Although without political course, but an organization that manages 130.000 members 
would keep functioning. 
The statement shows that the size and structure of  Òmnium Cultural provided some resilience 
against the repressive actions by the state, and allowed the organization to continue campaigning 
despite the imprisonment of  its president. In this situation, organizational inertia became 
important, as Òmnium Cultural interviewee Antoni put it: 
This is our work, the work we have done. Naturally support, give all our support to the 
president of Òmnium Cultural who is in jail. To continue working is resisting the current 
situation, which we do not know how it will end. 
The inertia of  Òmnium Cultural and ANC, which had limited their repertoire of  action before the 
1-O, became an asset for the organizations as they were hit by repressive action. Their organizers 
saw continuity as anti-repression. 
At the level of  practices, there were some important continuities as well. Generally, practices 




(Reckwitz 2002, 255). Practices inhibit a certain regularity over time, which distinguishes them 
from singular actions. Although they are not rigid constructs, they certainly possess an inertia 
similar to that of  organizational entities. This became apparent in the empirical analysis of  the 
period of  time after the 1-O episode of  contention. 
The stability of  practices is best illustrated by the example of  public assemblies. In chapter 8, I 
have described how in the process of  organizing the defense of  the voting stations, but also in the 
ANC and in UxR, activists combined assemblies and the practice of  directing in an unusual way. 
This does not mean that the practice of  assembly itself  changed. There was some evidence in the 
data that the core features of  assemblies – face-to face and multi-party talk, open access, facilitation 
– remained stable throughout the 1-O period and in the phase of  demobilization that followed. 
Consider the following quote from the interview with SEPC organizer Irene. 
I: And how do you manage the assemblies? Has that changed? 
R: No, no. 
I: I don’t know, did you have to include more people? 
R: No, no. I’m sorry. 
Irene was apologetic that she could not report any changes. This illustrates the difficulty of  getting 
interviewees to talk about continuities. The statement also suggests that assemblies as such did not 
necessarily change. This became even more apparent in the following passage from the interview 
with CDR Sabadell organizer Joana. As shown in chapter 8, the CDR Sabadell was a prime example 
of  directed assemblies, in which deliberation was practically absent. However, Joana reported that 
the practice of  assembly in itself  did not change. 
[Decision making] still happens in the assembly. Assemblies are participatory, they are 
facilitated by someone. If somebody asks a question in the assembly, the facilitator picks 
up that question. We’re not going to deny that, either right? 
Even in directed assemblies, activists upheld multi-party talk and facilitation as core features of  
assemblies as a communicative practice. What did change was the openness of  assemblies. Many 
CDRs closed off  their assemblies to strangers or removed decision making from open spaces, as 
I describe in chapter 11. However, this was not a uniform transformation; some local groups 
decided to maintain their assemblies open. 
There was not enough evidence in the data to make a comprehensive assessment of  continuities 




assemblies suggests that practices themselves did not change so easily, even during eventful periods 
of  time. However, as shown in chapter 8, some practices became more or less important in protest 
organizing. Also, activists combined them differently, depending on the context of  the organizing 
process. In other words, what changed was the texture of  practice (Gherardi 2012). 
2.2 Organizational Innovation and Sedimentation 
Periods of  intense contention are productive times. When mobilization increases and resources 
become available, new spaces for collective action open up and activists get creative. Innovation 
of  contentious action is a central mechanism as the cycle reaches its peak (Tarrow 2011). 
Transformative events may play a crucial role in a series of  innovative processes. as Della Porta 
(2008, 29–30) argued:  
During cycles of protest, some contingent events tend to affect the given structures by 
fueling mechanisms of social change: organizational networks develop; frames are bridged; 
personal links foster reciprocal trust. In this sense, protest events - especially, some of 
them - constitute processes during which collective experiences develop in the interactions 
of different individual and collective actors, that with different roles and aims take part in 
it. 
Della Porta suggested that contentious actions produce new frames for action, as well as 
relationships of  trust and collaboration among individual and collective social movement actors. 
In other words, transformative events can trigger a series of  cognitive, relational, and emotional 
mechanisms that lead to new practices, relationships, or structures in social movements.  
Two organizational innovations were initiated in the 1-O episode of  contention: open 
assemblies and IMAs. After the referendum was suspended by the Spanish Constitutional Court 
at the beginning of  September, organizers faced an uncertain and increasingly repressive situation. 
When ANC and Òmnium Cultural remained paralyzed in the wake of  the referendum, local 
organizers needed to find quick solutions to ensure that the referendum could go ahead. Open 
assemblies and the use of  IMAs were instrumental in the planning and preparation of  the defense 
of  the voting stations. Of  course neither of  these practices was invented for this purpose. 
Interviewees reported that IMAs were used for internal and external communication in campaigns 
and protests already before the 1-O. Open assemblies already had a long-standing tradition in 
Catalan and Spanish alternative and autonomous movements (Flesher Fominaya 2014).  
However, the 1-O episode of  contention was innovative in that it led to a widespread diffusion 
of  assembly and messenger practices. The two practices were crucial for the organizing of  the 
defense of  the voting stations, because they functioned as communication channels outside the 




the preparation of  the defense of  the voting stations outside of  the established SMOs, organizers 
reached a greater number of  participants, especially those who were unlikely to get involved in an 
existing organization. Interviewees reported that these new participants learned in the emergent 
CDRs how assemblies and messengers worked as activist practices.  
After the 1-O referendum, activists in the CDRs but also in other collective actors continued 
to organize through the same open assemblies and messenger channels. Thereby, the two 
innovative practices became permanent elements of  the movement’s organizational repertoire. In 
the following, I describe these two processes more in detail. 
First, IMAs such as WhatsApp, Telegram, and Signal were instrumental for internal and external 
communication in organizing protest in the 1-O episode. Organizers created messenger channels 
to give instructions to activists and other organizers in the preparation of. Many organizers 
continued to use these messenger channels after the referendum. For example, the 
interorganizational platform in Fastiada still used its Telegram channel Mou’te but changed its 
name to CDR, as interviewee Oriol described: 
Thus we went from Mou’te, in which there were also those from Convergència, to the 
CDR. Those from Convergència had left the group, and once all the other actors said they 
wanted to be in the CDR, we said “look, we will change the name of the channel and call 
it CDR,” because we already had all the people in there. And when those from 
Convergència saw this, they said at a meeting “I just saw you changed the name, what is 
this?” And I said, “well, look, we were all in this coordination space, which you left, so we 
decided to do this.” He didn’t say anything. Mou’te was ok, but now it was Committee for 
the Defense [of the Republic] for strikes, and blockades, and so on. They didn’t like that. 
Well, and from that moment we worked as CDR.  
The organizers who had prepared the defense of  the voting stations in Fastiada continued to use 
the same Telegram channel after the referendum. This was important, because it allowed them to 
build on an established communication channel to reach out to other activists. Fastiada was by far 
not the only local case to do so. Organizers in the Clot neighborhood in Barcelona changed the 
name of  the channel from Clot deceideix (“Clot decides”) to Committee for the Defense of  the 
Republic, too. In this fashion, many messenger channels and groups were set up for the post-
referendum CDRs.  
The student platform UxR also made heavily use of  messenger practices to prepare and manage 
the occupation of  the University of  Barcelona. The messenger channels that were set up for this 





And then [UxR] has a larger, relatively stable group of people with already established 
communication channels, such as WhatsApp, and so on. This makes it much easier for 
them to clarify things, for example when there are demonstrations or social things. Now 
when UxR proposes a demonstration - where in fact the SEPC has a lot to say – UxR can 
call large assemblies again. They have a consolidated group of maybe more than 60 people 
that mobilize themselves regularly.  
This piece of  data illustrates the importance of  the newly created messenger channels for 
organizing protest also after the 1-O episode. The use of  messengers allowed organizers to reach 
a group of  regular activists in the preparatory process.  
Second, open assemblies were an integral part of  the organizing of  the defense of  the voting 
stations. Just like the messenger channels, some of  these open encounters were called Committees 
for the Defense of  the Referendum, some were called differently, and some did not carry any 
name. In any case, these local assemblies continued after the referendum, too. The following quote 
from the interview with Jordi describes the initial period of  time after the referendum: 
Well, on October 2, people were outraged and wanted to do protest actions, block 
highways, and I joined the people in the village, with the CDR […] We started with 
meetings, assemblies to see what we could do, what we could not do, which actions to 
take basically. Of course, we wanted to do marches, we wanted to shut down the country. 
In the assemblies on October 2, activists voiced their outrage over the violent actions of  the 
Spanish police forces the previous day. These assemblies were instrumental in the preparations of  
the general strike on the following day but they were no single occurrences. They kicked off  a 
series of  local activist assemblies after the referendum. Just as the assemblies in preparation for 
the defense of  the voting stations, these encounters took place in the streets and squares every 
week or every other week. Thus, the assemblies acquired a steady rhythm. They went beyond their 
initial purpose to defend the voting stations and turned into a permanent encounter.  
 These two practices, assemblies and messenger applications, did not disappear after the defense 
of  the voting stations. They continued to be used by activists as communication channels and 
spaces of  encounter in the aftermath of  the referendum. Thereby, these practices were repeated 
and structured over time. This routinization of  communicative practices gave rise to the CDRs as 
a concrete collective actor within the independence movement. In other words, the CDRs evolved 
from an open space of  encounter that was closely linked to a short-term goal (the defense of  the 
voting station) to a more permanent organizational form. This process of  stabilization, or 
“sedimentation” as Della Porta (2018) called it, was reinforced by three parallel developments of  




First, the CDRs were affected by demobilization. Interviewees reported that participation numbers 
in the assemblies dropped after October 27 and even more after the December 21 elections. The 
following quote from the interview with CDR organizer Ruben illustrates this process:   
I: I was going to ask you, did participation in your CDR drop?   
R: Yes, well, it has dropped, but there is a core of people that always attends. Thus, now 
there are “the 12 from the CDR,” who are those that always go to the assembly and are 
now a group of friends. Now these people meet to put up posters, prepare I-don’t-know-
what, go to protests. They are those who continue and they form a loyal group. 
I: Since when? 
R: Well, I remember that the CDR maintained good numbers until the end of the year 
[2017], but since the beginning of 2018, it was more reduced. I think once the summer 
was over, this core was all that was left. 
Although the CDRs became regular assemblies after the 1-O referendum, they suffered from 
demobilization. Instead of  serving as a space of  encounter with fluid attendance, many of  them 
evolved into groups with a more or less stable but informal membership, as Ruben described. This 
process created close bonds among the remaining members and sometimes even friendship.  
Second, the CDRs stabilized not only through mere repetition of  messenger and assembly 
practices but also through deliberate efforts to structure themselves as a collective actor. 
Approximately a week after the 3-O, the CDR Sabadell proposed to enhance coordination between 
the local CDRs. The following quote from the interview with CDR Clot organizer Carles describes 
this proposal: 
Afterwards there was the great idea of the CDR Sabadell to say “listen, we cannot manage 
our actions everybody in our neighborhoods. Of course, in your neighborhood you have 
power, but a common response of 200, 300 CDRs at the same time, that’s not the same 
thing, that’s much more interesting.” So, the CDR Sabadell proposed to hold a meeting. 
The first assembly of CDRs, which was in Sabadell after October 1, I think around 
October 10 or 11 […] We were 250 CDRs or more. Two people representing each CDR 
as a block […] and then the second, assembly, I don’t remember where it was, Manresa, 
Igualada, I don’t know. At this one, there were also people from the farmer’s union, from 
Òmnium Cultural, because they saw that this was enormous. 250 CDRs from all over the 
region, trying to organize themselves. This was very powerful. 
These first two encounters enhanced coordination between the local CDRs. They created a multi-
level structure of  local, intermediate, and regional levels, where rotating representatives from the 
local CDRs participated. Organizers set up a Telegram channel and a Twitter account called CDR 




relationships among the different levels remained largely informal and the local CDRs maintained 
their autonomy. The CDR Catalunya was not able to force the local groups to participate in 
collective actions. Still, establishing the CDR Catalunya represented an important step towards 
coordination. This allowed organizing simultaneous actions throughout the region at the 8-N and 
the March protests.  
Third, the establishment of  the CDR Catalunya was coincidental with the name change of  the 
CDRs. At the encounter at the regional level, it was proposed to change the name of  the 
Committees for the Defense of  the Referendum to Committees for the Defense of  the Republic. This 
proposal was accepted and brought back to the local level by the representatives. After some 
intense debates, almost all CDRs adopted the new name. This change was not merely about labels. 
As I show in chapter 10, the debates around the name were also a way of  making sense of  what 
had happened during the 1-O and carried fundamental implications for the strategy of  the 
independence movement. The point I would like to make here is quite simply that putting a 
uniform name for all local groups represented the establishment of  a group identity. This identity 
was closely related to the readings of  the referendum as a legitimation for independence, and the 
unilateral strategy that followed from it. Most importantly, it represented an important element in 
the consolidation of  the CDRs as a proper collective actors as after the 1-O referendum.  
The emergence of  the CDRs as new collective actors was ultimately a result of  the 
mobilizations around the 1-O referendum. This is a quite common process in social movement, 
as Tarrow  (2011, 122–23) pointed out:  
Organizations emerge out of episodes of contention through interaction with authorities, 
allies, and third parties. [They] begin as local networks, spread through the diffusion of 
contention, and ultimately either disappear or scale upward to regional and national levels.  
The CDRs largely fitted this process: they were born out of  the need to organize the defense of  
the voting stations and the confrontation with Spanish police during the referendum. Before the 
1-O, they were merely open spaces of  encounter that rapidly spread all over Catalonia. After the 
referendum, they stabilized to a certain degree and initiated coordination at the regional level. 
However, the upscaling remained fairly limited, as local CDRs kept their autonomy. Moreover, they 
did not evolve into a formal organization and remained loosely structured. Or, as interviewee 
Miquel put it: “We’re not talking about an organization. You cannot even call it structure.” This 
situated the CDRs along the lines of  other flexible and loosely structured forms of  organization 
that have emerged over the last decade, rather than in the realm of  classic formal organization. 
Independently of  their character, the CDRs represented the most important organizational legacy 




the 1-O episode of  contention, the Catalan pro-independence civil society and its contentious 
repertoire was dominated by ANC and Òmnium Cultural. The emergence of  the CDRs as a 
loosely structured actor can be seen as a response to the inability of  the two large established 
SMOs to adapt to the strategic context of  the 1-O episode and call for disruptive action. This 
organizational diversification of  the independence movement reflects the pattern of  
environmental movement, in which many new grassroots groups emerged in the 1990s after the 
institutionalization and professionalization of  the existing organizations (Diani and Donati 1999; 
Rootes 1999).  
In this section, I have described the routinization of  assembly and messenger practices, which 
led to the consolidation of  the CDRs as collective actors. This stabilization did not mean that the 
CDRs were unaffected by the contraction of  the cycle of  contention that followed the 1-O 
episode. In fact, the data suggested that several mechanisms of  contraction had a transformative 
impact on communication and decision-making practices in the CDRs and other collective actors 
of  the independence movement. I introduce these mechanisms in the next section, and discuss 
them more in detail in chapters 10 and 11. 
3 GIVING UP AND GIVING IN – EXHAUSTION AND FACILITATION 
The declaration of  independence by the Catalan parliament on October 27 did not have any 
practical effects. But as I have suggested at the outset of  this chapter, it represented, together with 
the simultaneous application of  article 155, a symbolic and strategic end point to the 1-O episode 
of  contention. What followed was, apart from the four cases of  contentious action described 
above, a phase of  demobilization in which protests were reduced to mainly local actions with very 
limited numbers of  participants. The contraction of  the secessionist cycle of  contention had a 
series of  effects on protest organizing. The analysis of  the empirical data suggested that four 
mechanisms – two external and two internal to the movement – were driving the transformation 
of  organizing after the 1-O period of  time: exhaustion, movement strategy, repression, and 
institutionalization. 
First, the major internal driver of  organizational change was activist exhaustion. October 27 
was a great disappointment for pro-independence activists, as UxR organizer Pere reported in the 
interview:  
Since [October 27], more or less, we did some estimations, and we said “well, this is lost.” 
It took us a lot to see it, me too actually, because I am very positive, but I said- well, we 
did an ideological reflection between all the organizers from the organizations, and we said 




This impression of  defeat was shared by many interviewees, for example by Antoni whose 
disappointment at the sight of  the Spanish flag on the Generalitat’s building I have quoted at the 
outset of  this chapter.  
The movement’s failure to achieve independence cannot alone explain the following phase of  
demobilization, because “history is full of  examples of  movements that kept on fighting in the 
face of  defeat, and of  victories that served only to open up new horizons” (Koopmans 2004, 37). 
Still, the activists’ interpretations of  October 27 should not be understood as purely sentimental 
thoughts that did not have any consequences. The interview data suggested that increasing 
frustrations of  pro-independence activists over the failed outcome of  the referendum were an 
important driver of  the process of  demobilization that followed in the period after the 1-O episode 
of  contention. Although contentious episodes “are exhilarating at first, [...] they involve risk, 
personal costs, and, eventually, weariness and disillusionment” (Tarrow 2011, 206). The wear and 
tear that intense times such as the 1-O episode put on activists also became apparent in the 
interview data. Exhaustion is best illustrated by the following passage from an interview with UxR 
organizer Ester: 
We could not maintain this rhythm. During one month we had put our lives on hold. I 
was working half days, was missing I don’t know how many days, did not go to my 
internships. It was not sustainable in the medium term. So everybody went back to their 
things. 
The “rhythm” that Ester referred to was the density of  protests, repression, institutional actions, 
but also organizational activities during the 1-O episode. Internal tensions, for example among 
student organizations rose after the end of  the occupation of  the University of  Barcelona. After 
October 27, participation and dedication dropped in the student platform, and after the 21-D 
elections the UxR organizers decided to suspend the platform’s activities until a more opportune 
moment. Exhaustion had a series of  consequences for protest organizing after the 1-O: both 
organizers and activists had less time and energy to sustain mobilization over a long period of  
time, especially when protest action became more disruptive and was met with repressive action 
by the Spanish state. Individual and collective actors had less resources at hand to cover the rising 
cost of  contentious action.  
The second internal mechanism that played a major role in the transformation of  organizing 
after the 1-O episode was the disagreement among activists over the independence movement’s 
strategy. The contentious character of  the 1-O referendum sparked debates within the various 
collective actors of  the movement about how to make sense of  the event and its contested 




as well as to less organizing between organizations. I describe these findings more in detail in 
chapter 10. 
With regards to external factors, facilitation and institutionalization have been identified as 
important drivers of  contraction by previous social movement research (Tarrow 2011). In the 
aftermath of  the 1-O referendum, these mechanisms played only a minor role, however. Della 
Porta , O’Connor, and Portos (2019, 7) noted that the closure of  opportunities at the national level 
was an important reason for the emergence of  the secessionist cycle of  contention in the first 
place:  
With the conservative Partido Popolar [sic!] (PP) winning national elections in 2011, opportunities 
for a negotiated enhanced autonomy (not necessarily full independence) for Catalonia closed down 
at national level. 
The PP government under Mariano Rajoy continued this uncompromising stance throughout the 
1-O episode of  contention and afterwards. Facilitation on part of  the authorities was virtually 
inexistent, even as socialist Pedro Sánchez won a vote of  no-confidence in June 2018. Della Porta, 
O’Connor, and Portos (2019) argued that there were some openings of  political opportunities at 
the local level in the period around the referendum, which ultimately led to the downward scale 
shift represented by the defense of  the voting stations. After the 1-O episode of  contention, the 
elections on December 21 represented an (unwanted) opportunity at the regional level. At that 
moment, the independence movement could simply not afford to lose its majority in the Catalan 
parliament, but it was also an occasion to expand that majority. The electoral campaign brought 
the secessionist conflict back into the institutional arena. The 21-D elections also affected the 
organizational dimensions of  the independence movement. Several organizers reported in the 
interviews that they were actively recruited by political parties to run in the elections. The most 
prominent case – who did not feature among the interviewees – was the ANC’s Jordi Sànchez, 
who ran as number two of  the Junts per Catalunya list. While this opened opportunities for 
individual careers, it also supposed a drainage of  experienced organizers from all collective actors 
with the exception of  the CDRs. Another instance of  institutionalization was by the ANC’s 
decision to promote its Primaries campaign for the 2019 municipal elections. Since none of  the 
established pro-independence parties joined the initiative, it effectively meant running a platform 
whose main support was the ANC itself. Thus, the campaign can be considered a strategic shift 
of  the organization from contentious to institutional action.  
Still, the overall the effect of  institutionalization on protest organizing was marginal. The other 
external factor, repression, played a much larger role. The Spanish state already increased 




and the police intervention on the day of  the referendum itself  (see chapter 6). Repression 
intensified further in the aftermath of  the referendum with the arrests of  Jordi Cuixart and Jordi 
Sànchez on October 16, and of  vice president Oriol Junqueras and other politicians on November 
2. Activists and organizers suffered from legal and physical repression, too, which in turn had 
consequences for protest organizing. In chapter 11, I discuss these effects and the role of  counter-
secessionist surveillance more in detail. 
4 CONCLUSION 
Without doubt, the days around October 1 were the peak of  the secessionist cycle of  contention, 
but protests continued in the aftermath of  the referendum. In this chapter, I have described four 
cases of  contentious action in the time after the 1-O episode of  contention: the Llibertat Presos 
Polítics campaign by Òmnium Cultural, the Primaries campaign by the ANC, as well as the 8-N 
general strike and March 2019 protest, during both of  which the CDRs were the main protagonists. 
These cases were organized differently than the previous cases in both normal and intense times. 
Although there were some important continuities of  normal organizing, as well as consolidating 
legacies of  the 1-O episode, protest organizing was shaped fundamentally by the mechanisms of  
contraction that followed the referendum. Exhaustion drove the shortening of  time, resources, 
and protest participants for the organizing processes, whereas institutionalization led to a drainage 
of  experienced organizers and leaders. As the level of  repression by the Spanish state increased, 
and the movement’s strategy was divided after the 1-O, organizers had a much harder time to 
prepare and plan effective collective action.  
The findings echo the work of  Davenport (2014), who argued that both internal 
(factionalization) and external (repression) factors lead to the decline, and ultimately destruction 
of  SMOs. Most importantly, he claimed that it is the interaction of  these factors that is most 
damaging to social movements. The analysis of  the empirical material suggests that there was a 
similar effect on protest organizing in the Catalan case – not just by integrating internal and 
external mechanisms, but also within that same category: exhaustion and disagreements over 
strategy enhanced each other, and limited institutionalization and opportunities made it hard to 
sustain repression. 
These mechanisms are quite familiar to social movement scholars. This suggests that the 
organizational development of  the Catalan independence movement was not significantly different 
from those of  other movements. Just like many movements before them, the Catalan activists 
faced a variety of  repressive forces by the state and were unable to maintain the rhythm of  




of  the case. First, as Della Porta, O’Connor, and Portos (2019) already noted, there was surprisingly 
little radicalization of  the movement despite increasing levels of  repression. As I have shown in 
this chapter, protest action turned more disruptive but seldom violent. Second, there were little 
institutional openings for the movement. In the aftermath of  the 1-O episode, the Spanish state 
responded primarily with repression and not with facilitation. The only opening were the 21-D 
elections, which were approached in a rather defensive manner by the movement. However, the 
lack of  facilitation and institutionalization after the 1-O must be seen in context: the independence 
movement had already been quite institutionalized at the regional level. After all, the three pro-
independence parties had enjoyed a majority in the parliament since 2015 and formed governments 
since then. This fact points to another characteristic of  the case: The post-1-O development was 
also driven by interactions between pro-independence civil society and its representatives. This 
became most visible when political parties turned their attention to the 21-D. It also played a 
crucial in strategic debates after the referendum, as I show in chapter 11. All these elements did 
not just impact protest behavior but also protest organizing.  
Most importantly, the analysis shows that the 1-O referendum represents a transformative event 
for protest organizing, not just because of  its effects during the 1-O episode, but also because of  
the consequences it had in the time afterwards. The referendum triggered four contractive 
mechanisms that not only led to demobilization of  the movement, but fundamentally changed the 
ways in which activists organized protests in Catalonia. These mechanisms contributed to the 
restabilization of  the secessionist conflict, but they did not bring back normal organizing from 
before the 1-O episode. Neither were the legacies of  the organizing during the episode of  
contention fully continuous afterwards. Instead, the four mechanisms had their very own impact 
on protest organizing, leading to further transformations after the end of  the 1-O episode. In the 









MAKING SENSE OF THE REFERENDUM: STRATEGIZING AND 
ORGANIZING AFTER THE 1-O 
 
 
Transformative events are outstanding occurrences that have an impact on politics beyond their 
own duration. William H. Sewell (1996a, 861) in his seminal article stressed that what makes 
transformative events remarkable is their symbolic dimension. It is the images and stories that are 
resonant and set them apart within the continuous flow of  time. However, events are not self-
evident facts, as a series of  scholars has pointed out  (Abrams 1993, 193; Basta 2018; Wagner-
Pacifici 2010). There is no objective measure what counts as an event and what does not, how 
common or rare they are, what their duration is, or whether two of  them fall into the same 
category. All these things are not inherent to occurrences. Rather, they are subject to social 
construction, or, as Basta (2018, 5) put it: 
Occurrences do not become events as a matter of course, even if and when they do 
transform institutions or social structures. Their meaning must be actively created in order 
for them to become broadly apparent political facts.  
The meaning of  an event is not objectively given, but the result of  a process of  social construction. 
This shifts the analytical focus to the question how an occurrence becomes interpreted as an event 
in the first place (Wagner-Pacifici 2010, 1358; Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2005, 410). Basta 
(2018, 2020) showed that political actors sometimes anticipate scheduled happenings, such as 
elections, referendums, or court decisions, and attempt to prospectively frame them in their favor. 
However, most events are created as such only after they take place. 
Organizational scholars have described this process of  event creation as sensemaking (Maitlis 
2005; Maitlis and Christianson 2014; Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 2005). The concept of  
sensemaking rose to prominence in particular through the seminal work of  Karl Weick (1995), 
who developed a theoretical framework for its analysis drawing on previous studies (Feldman 1989; 
Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991; Louis 1980; Sackmann 1992). He viewed sensemaking as the process 




them (Weick 1995, 5). When actors are faced with occurrences that do not meet their previous 
expectations, they try to retrospectively rationalize these occurrences and integrate them into a 
plausible narrative  (1995, 17; see also Czarniawska 1998, 5). It represents an ongoing collective 
attempt to create reality.32  
Sensemaking is more than just interpretation, because it involves the active creation of  the 
problem that actors try to understand. The difference between the two is that “sensemaking is 
about the ways people generate what they interpret” (p. 14). This is why the concept is essential 
for the empirical analyses that are the subject of  this chapter. It describes the processes through 
which social actors construct events, or as Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld (2005, 210) put it: 
Organizational sensemaking is first and foremost about the question: How does 
something come to be an event for organizational members? Second, sensemaking is 
about the question: What does an event mean? In the context of everyday life, when people 
confront something unintelligible and ask “what’s the story here?” their question has the 
force of bringing an event into existence. 
The concept of  sensemaking is extremely valuable for the study of  events in the line of  Sewell 
and others, precisely because it does not assume that events are “out there” to be discovered. 
Instead, it highlights how people do not just interpret and frame events, but how they actively 
create them. Hence, the concept of  sensemaking can be employed to investigate how political 
actors construct transformative events. 
Sensemaking is an everyday activity that is far from being without consequences. Weick and 
other scholars emphasized the role of  sensemaking for organizational processes and practices. 
Sensemaking has often been linked to processes of  change in organizational settings. Making sense 
of  unexpected events can prompt organizational learning (Christianson et al. 2009; Haas 2006), 
creativity (Drazin, Glynn, and Kazanjian 1999), innovation (Jay 2013), or lead collective actors to 
shift their strategy (Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991). But change is not the only outcome of  
sensemaking. In an early contribution, Feldman (1989, 20) pointed out that sensemaking does not 
always lead to action. Sometimes, sensemaking even fails completely. In his article on the Mann 
Gulch disaster, Weick (1993), showed how firefighters ignored cues on the severity of  the fire 
when they countered it, sticking to their prior expectations, and ultimately died. Luckily, the failure 
to make sense does not always have fatal consequences, but the example shows that sensemaking 
represents a crucial foundation for collective action. Most importantly, Weick (1993) demonstrated 
                                                 
32 Of course, the academic debate around the concept is much more complex than presented here. For an 




that unexpected occurrences do not always lead to change. In order to become transformational, 
social actors must make sense of  them as such and adapt their actions accordingly. Thus, 
sensemaking as the process of  meaningful event construction is a necessary precondition for the 
causal consequences of  an occurrence. Sensemaking does not always unfold as a uniform process 
across individual and collective actors. In the next section, I describe how the October 1 
referendum produced a crisis of  sensemaking, and how the various actors of  the independence 
movement constructed the 1-O as an event in different ways. 
1 “THE DAY THAT LASTED YEARS”. OCTOBER 1 AS AN EVENT 
To anyone who follows Spanish and Catalan politics, there can be very little doubt that October 1, 
2017 represents a remarkable date in Catalonia’s recent history. The images and stories of  activists 
occupying voting stations and of  police beating voters have circulated widely in national and 
international media. They have become engraved in the memories of  participants and observers. 
The abbreviation 1-O has become a familiar symbol in public discourse.  
The outstanding symbolic dimension of  the 1-O also became apparent in the analysis of  my 
empirical data. During my ten months of  fieldwork in Catalonia, the date was ever present in 
conversations and during observations, on leaflets and banners, on TV and in social media, at 
protests and meetings. Organizers highlighted the role of  the 1-O in the interviews as well. Many 
of  them described the density of  occurrences on that day. Interviewee Isabel said that  
October 1 is- I don’t know, it’s a day that could be years with all those things that 
happened.  
Isabel’s statement illustrates the eventfulness of  the 1-O by pointing to the condensed sequence 
of  occurrences during that day. In another interview, organizer Gerard independently used a 
similar phrase. 
It was one of those days they say about “days that last years” (Dies que duraran anys). This 
is how long they last, I think, all life long, and they will always be a reference for 
independentism. 
In contrast to Isabel, Gerard used the expression to stress that the impact of  what happened on 
October 1 went well beyond that very day. This was very much the empirical expression of  
McAdam and Sewell’s (2001) idea that transformative events represent short, intense periods of  
time that have long-term consequences. In the activists’ narratives, the 1-O became a turning point 





Everybody knows somebody who they beat or kicked or threw on the ground. Their 
grandmother, their mother. You cannot forget this so easily. It marked us. I think there is 
a before and after October 1. 
The phrase “before and after” is a crucial construction. It indicates that something, or many things, 
if  not everything, changed for the movement on October 1. The statement underlined the 
symbolic importance of  the 1-O as a historic event in Catalan politics. In the data, there was a 
widely shared narrative that constructed the referendum and the related occurrences as a 
transformative moment.  
At the same time, the 1-O has become such a familiar symbol that some interviewees did not 
even bother elaborating on it. Organizer Antoni, for example, elaborated quite extensively on 
September 20. But when he turned to October 1, he just mentioned it briefly. 
Some days later came October 1 (pause) we already know what happened on October 1, 
and you know it better than anyone. 
After this quote Antoni proceeded to talk about the detention of  the Jordis on October 16. He 
was not the only interviewee to treat the 1-O in this way. This suggested that the 1-O was so 
present in public discourse and its stories had been told so many times that interviewees would 
simply take it for granted, as not interesting for the purpose of  my research. Thus, treating the 1-
O as not worth elaborating did not take away from its symbolic relevance. No interviewee stated 
that the 1-O was not important or referred to other events as more relevant. Altogether, there was 
plenty of  evidence in the data that the 1-O was socially constructed as a transformative event for 
the Catalan independence movement.  
At the time of  the interviews, which took place about eight to fourteen months after the 
referendum, the relevance of  the 1-O was evident. However, the retrospective statements in the 
interviews also suggested that this was not the case right after the referendum. The transformative 
meaning of  the 1-O was not clear immediately after the event, but was created in a longer process. 
At first, the violent imagery of  the actions of  Spanish police forces left activists, voters, and 
bystanders in shock. Outrage over the brutality of  the police intervention provoked a massive 
reaction on the October 3 general strike, displaying unity among a wide range of  the Catalan 
population.  
In spite of  this immediate reaction, the data suggested that the movement went through a 
collective crisis of  sensemaking in the days after the referendum. The massive mobilization for the 
occupation of  the voting stations had exceeded the expectations of  activists. Many interviewees 




morning. But it was mostly the violent intervention on part of  the police that many activists had 
not imagined (Della Porta, O’Connor, and Portos 2019). This is best illustrated by the following 
lengthy quote from the interview with ANC and CDR organizer Berta. 
I: How do you recall the weeks before the 1-O, in September? What was the preparation? 
R: Well, there was a lot of uncertainty and worry, because we began to see that the Spanish 
started a repressive, totally antidemocratic campaign [...] we always thought that we would 
make it, that if we did it the State couldn’t do anything, because the image of police taking 
away ballot boxes- we believed that a self-declared democratic state would not want that 
image at any cost. This was something we could not imagine. More than them taking away 
ballot boxes, we imagined we wouldn’t have ballots, that in the end we would have to print 
them at home [...] We saw the logistic problem, the problem that the voting stations would 
be closed, but in no way we imagined the uncertainty if we would achieve it or not. It was 
like an obstacle race [...] Never, never did we imagine what the 1-O would be. 
For many activists who were involved in the organizing of  the defense of  the voting stations, the 
1-O had been a primarily logistic problem. Occupying the schools and guaranteeing the voting 
process was already difficult enough in an uncertain situation, in which parts of  the preparations 
had been delegated to clandestine networks.  
In addition, a significant part of  the movement, including ANC and Òmnium Cultural, had not 
encountered much opposition, let alone physical repression from the state in the years before the 
referendum campaign. As mentioned before, former Òmnium Cultural leader Muriel Casals had 
dubbed the independence movement the “Smiling Revolution” (La Revolució dels Somriures), because 
of  its peaceful and orderly repertoire of  action. Activists prided themselves as gent d’ordre (literally 
“people of  order”). Before the referendum campaign, the movement had engaged in legal quarrels 
with the Spanish state, but not in confrontational action. The occurrences of  the 1-O put an end 
to this self-understanding, as the following piece of  data from the interview with Emma illustrates: 
It was always a happy movement. Always, well- I think the 1-O was happy, too, but they 
took it from us. We were very happy, because in the end we were able to vote and so on, 
but they took it from us. They took our happiness. You could not be happy, because, shit, 
you had voted when you knew that there were almost a thousand people injured and the 
brutality that they had been injured with. The Catalan procés is an emotional process. It 
always has been. 
The violent intervention of  the police shattered many activists’ expectations – cognitively and 
emotionally – of  what the referendum would be. They had imagined the 1-O as a joyful celebration 





However, the data also showed that these expectations were not unanimously shared in the 
movement. Interviewees from groups of  the independentist Left stressed that they had been 
suffering from state repression already before the 1-O and were much more aware of  a potential 
police deployment. Even so, many of  them were shocked by the magnitude of  the intervention 
and the brutality of  police actions, as the following quote from the interview with SEPC and UxR 
organizer Ester shows. 
As a people, we were not prepared, we fell into the fallacy of liberal democracy, only trying 
to vote peacefully [...] we militants from the radical left said that it would not be like that. 
We anticipated it in some way, but I think emotionally- at least I did not anticipate it 
enough. Police charging at you during a student protest or the 15-M is within your 
schemes, it's not the first time for me in a police charge. But uff (pause) seeing old people, 
seeing children [getting beat by the police].  
The quote stressed again that expectations of  the referendum were not just cognitive – there was 
a certain emotional element as well. The police violence on the 1-O did not meet the projections 
that many activists had previously made. 
Letamendia (2018) pointed out that the peculiar character of  the 1-O lied in the combination 
of  three types of  action: mobilization, vote, and repression. Activists were left puzzled by the 
unusual sequence of  occurrences. As the pieces of  data above have shown, the police intervention, 
but also the clandestine preparation and the involvement of  non-governmental actors in the voting 
process did not fit with the expectation of  a peaceful, official, and binding referendum. Activists 
needed to make sense of  the referendum. 
It was unclear what the 1-O meant. Did it represent a legitimate mandate for independence, an 
expression of  self-determination, a massive act of  civil disobedience, or even a failure to carry out 
a proper referendum? This was further aggravated by the fact that the institutional consequences 
of  the referendum were unclear in the days after the referendum. Would Puigdemont declare 
independence? And how would the Spanish state react? Would the international community, and 
the European Union in particular, intervene? In Weick’s terms, the occurrences of  the 1-O did not 
make sense to many activists initially. 
In response, the movement went through a collective process of  sensemaking in the days and 
weeks after the referendum. This was an ongoing process that was influenced by the unfolding of  
further events, most importantly the suspended declaration on October 10, the detention of  the 
Jordis on October 16, the application of  article 155, as well as the parliament’s declaration of  
independence on October 27, and finally the arrests of  party leaders on November 2. There was 
agreement in the movement that the 1-O would occupy an outstanding place in Catalan history. 




ways” (Abbott 1992, 438) and integrated in different narratives. This was true for the 1-O:  in the 
aftermath of  the referendum, there was significant controversy on why the event was so important, 
and what followed from it. The following quote from the interview with CDR organizer Xavi 
illustrates this debate: 
It is after the 1-O when precisely the substantive goals appear […] This is when the debates 
start about what to do with the results of the 1-O, how to interpret them, how to manage 
them. It was like “is it binding or is it not? Is it sufficient or not? Can we move forward or 
not?” And this is where the disagreements between parties, detractors, between the ANC, 
civil society, CDRs, and so on start […] This is where the independentist camp starts to 
break. 
The quote points to abovementioned struggles of  activists to make sense of  the referendum. The 
meaning of  the 1-O was – and remains until the time of  writing – very much disputed within the 
movement.  
This sensemaking process is best illustrated by the debates in the CDRs in the immediate 
aftermath of  the 3-O. In the CDR Sabadell, for example, discussions started to take place in the 
assemblies after the general strike. This debate revolved around the “R” in CDR, as organizer 
Joana explained: “what do we do now? Are we Referendum, are we Republic?” Some participants 
argued that the name Committee for the Defense of  the Referendum did not make sense anymore, 
because the referendum had passed. Now, the R should stand for “Republic” instead. Others 
suggested that this would not represent all those people who participated on October 1 and 3 to 
defend the right to decide but were not pro-independence. Losing them would mean losing 
strength. The issue was picked up by the first national assembly of  the CDRs and from there 
spread to all local CDRs throughout the region. However, Xavi’s quote above shows that this 
debate did not just take place within the CDRs, but in the independence movement as a whole. 
Obviously, this was not just a discussion about labels, but one about sensemaking, strategy, and 
identity. It was basically a debate between those who supported the right to decide “but weren't so 
sure if  they were pro-independence and those who were pro-independence for all their lives,” as 
Joana put it. However, these positions should not be equated with particular actors. Rather, it was 
a debate between two discourses that cut across the various organizations, parties, and milieus. In 
the following, I describe them more in detail.  
On the one hand, some activists declared electoral victory for the independence movement. 
Organizer Carles from the CDR Clot said that “we believed that we had won the referendum. And 
that there must be a Republic.” Also in the CDR Sabadell, one part of  the activist group claimed 
that “we have won. That’s it” (Joana). In this narrative, the 1-O was first and foremost a legitimate 




grounds for independence, notwithstanding the abstention of  a large part of  the population and 
the interference of  police in the voting process.  
On the other hand, the “we have won” reading of  the events attracted a lot of  criticism from 
within the movement. CDR organizer Xavi argued in the interview that it represented an erroneous 
interpretation of  the referendum. 
I think it’s a very bad reading of the results. It’s a very bad reading of what has happened. 
It’s a very bad reading when the mobilization had most success, and I think it is a reading 
because of political interests. I think that the independentist Left is wrong about this 
reading, plain wrong. […] If we have won, then where is the reward? No, maybe, we 
haven’t won [...] You’re managing a defeat with a rhetoric of victory. 
Xavi questioned the victory claims of  a part of  the movement after the vote, considering it a bad 
construction of  the event. In the view of  many activists, the narrative of  “we have won” 
represented a simplification of  what happened on the day of  the referendum. For organizer Joana, 
it was “not as easy as ‘we have protested, we have voted, we won, that’s it.’ ” In this view, it was at 
least doubtable that the turnout and result of  the vote were sufficient to claim victory and justify 
a declaration of  independence. Hence, the referendum could not represent the final decision over 
independence, as Oriol argued: 
In any case, the 1-O, I think, has a lot of value, but not just by itself and because of the 
many things that happened, but because it is part of a process and not the end of a 
trajectory. 
In this perspective, it was not so much the result of  the vote that was important, but the fact that 
the referendum could take place at all in the face of  a massive police intervention. “We have won 
means we have managed that people could vote,” as interviewee Joana put it. In this line of  
thinking, the 1-O had value for the movement, but not as an electoral victory.  
In spite of  this internal critique, the interpretation of  the 1-O as a definitive decision and 
legitimation for independence imposed itself  - at least in the CDRs. Practically all CDRs 
throughout Catalonia changed their names to Committee for the Defense of  the Republic. The 
change was a signifier of  the narrative that the referendum should be seen primarily as a 
legitimation for secession from Spain and the foundation of  the Catalan Republic. Besides the 
name change, there were frequent calls to “defend the results of  the referendum” on leaflets, social 
media, and protest banners in the weeks after the referendum. Defending meant making the results 
of  the vote binding – against threat and repression from the Spanish state on the one hand, but 




In sum, the occurrences surrounding the referendum on October 1, 2017 were retrospectively 
constructed as a transformative event. This was not an immediate outcome though. The large-
scale mobilization for the defense of  the voting stations, as well as the violent police intervention 
left activists in shock. Moreover, the outcome and legitimacy of  the referendum were unclear at 
first. The occurrences of  the 1-O were unexpected and did not make sense to many activists. In 
response, two rival event constructions emerged within the movement, one claiming victory and 
grounds for independence, and one highlighting civil disobedience. These two senses of  the 1-O 
were not just retrospective in nature, but carried important implications for future actions of  the 
independence movement. I describe the conflicting strategies that emerged on the bases of  rivaling 
event constructions in the next section. 
2 FROM THE SENSEMAKING CRISIS TO THE CONFLICT OF STRATEGY 
What happened on October 1 was not what many pro-independence activists had expected. Those 
who had imagined an orderly and regular referendum, a purely institutional act, were appalled by 
the confrontations between voters and police. Only the immediate response was apparent to 
organizers: to mobilize massively for the general strike on October 3 as rejection of  the police 
violence on the day of  the referendum. Everything else was unclear, especially the question 
whether the referendum strategy (see chapter 6) had been successful of  not. Since the meaning 
and outcome of  the referendum were ambiguous initially, there was no clear way forward from the 
event. Hence, the crisis of  senses, which I have described above, was also a crisis of  movement 
strategy. This became manifest in various ways.   
For example, several ANC interviewees pointed out that the organization had a crisis of  
strategy after the 1-O. As interviewee Iris put it, the ANC was in “a state of  shock.” After the 
detention of  Jordi Sànchez, the organization was lacking a stable leadership. Local ANC organizers 
reported that they had difficulties coordinating with the central organization. The lack of  
coordination among organizational levels led to overall disorientation. This was not exclusive to 
the ANC. Also other collective actors briefly lost their sense of  reaction. La Forja organizer Gerard 
described the state of  the independentist Left after the referendum as follows:  
I think until some point, we in the independentist Left, all sectors, doesn't matter if 
Endavant or Poble Lliure, we all lost sight of reality. 
The ambiguity of  the 1-O left the collective actors of  the independence movement disoriented 
and without a clear strategy forward. According to interviewee Pere, already on the day of  the 




dialogue and relax the situation, while the other part wanted to push further and risk more 
confrontation with the Spanish state. He highlighted that this debate ran across party lines: there 
were people on both sides in ERC and JxCat.  The disorientation was aggravated by further events 
such as the detention of  the Jordis and Puigdemont’s suspended declaration of  independence. In 
sum, the independence movement had no clear strategy going forward in early October.  
Nevertheless, two rival constructions or senses of  the 1-O emerged in the weeks of  October, 
which I have described in the previous section. The various individual and collective actors tried 
to make sense of  what had happened on the day of  the referendum. These were no mere isolated 
retrospective assessments, though. In fact, the two meanings of  the 1-O were fundamental for 
movement strategy after the event. The interview data reflect how organizers designed plans how 
to move forward on the basis of  the constructed senses of  the 1-O. Thus, the two processes – 
sensemaking and strategizing – were closely intertwined, as actors’ constructions and 
interpretations of  past events directly influenced their projections into the future. Moreover, these 
elements were not stable, but changed over time as further events after the referendum had to be 
integrated into these strategies.  
3 SECESSIONIST STRATEGIES AFTER THE 1-O REFERENDUM 
3.1 Fer República: Unilateral Strategy 
The two event constructions of  the 1-O led to vastly different conclusions about the movement’s 
future actions. On the one hand, the “we have won” narrative, which was materialized in the name 
change of  the CDRs, resulted in goal replacement: from organizing the referendum to 
“implementing the Republic.” In particular in the days after the referendum, this meant putting 
pressure on the Catalan government, and President Puigdemont in particular, to unilaterally declare 
independence from Spain. This is why I call this strategy unilateral.  
Proponents of  the “we have won” interpretation demanded the application of  the referendum 
results. In the interview, CDR organizer Carles reclaimed the 1-O as legitimate and rejected any 
agreement with the Spanish sate. 
We think that the 1-O was worth it. It was real and for everything that it cost us to defend 
it, we also have to defend the results […] if some “fool on the hill” from Convergència, 
Esquerra, or the CUP comes and says “we have to make an agreement [with the Spanish 
state],” then as a CDR we have to say that we don’t want to bargain, that we have already 
won a plebiscite. 
The quote illustrates nicely the strategy that followed from the “we have won” reading of  the 1-




disobedience” from all pro-independence actors: the movement organizations, the political parties, 
and the government. Unilateral action was the only way forward, and there should be no 
negotiations with the Spanish state. 
After Puigdemont’s suspended declaration and the ineffective declaration on October 27, the 
pressure strategy was complemented by a narrative of  disenchantment with institutional politics. 
Many interviewees criticized the regional government and the political parties for not applying the 
results of  the referendum. Instead of  institutional politics, many interviewees chose protest as the 
primary tactic. Organizers aimed to keep the level of  mobilization high, as Iris recalled in the 
interview. 
I: Do you remember the days after? What was the atmosphere, the debate? 
R: Yes, yes. We want the Republic. We want to defend the results of October 1. How? 
Publicly, showing our will in the streets. 
When the institutional means to achieve independence failed, contention in the street seemed the 
only option forward to many organizers. However, the disappointment with the pro-independence 
parties and the regional government also led to demobilization after October 27. Maintaining 
pressure on the streets became more difficult for those who followed the unilateral strategy. 
On the other hand, the strategic proposition of  unilateral action and disobedience attracted 
quite some critique as well. One line of  criticism attacked the viability of  the unilateral strategy. 
Many organizers within the movement thought that this strategy could not be maintained, in 
particular as it became clear that the Spanish state would respond with severe legal repression. A 
second argument criticized the strategy as ineffective. Oriol argued that “we will not advance by 
saying ‘tomorrow Republic, tomorrow Republic, tomorrow Republic’, hanging ribbons and flags.” 
Thus, many activists within the movement came to regard the unilateral strategy that focused on 
“implementing the Republic” through civil disobedience as illusionary. Or, as Xavi put it, as trying 
to implement the “Republic of  the unicorns, over the rainbow in candy land.” As such, many 
organizers perceived the unilateral strategy as deceptive, or - as Pere called it - a blatant “lie.”  
Interviewees addressed this criticism mostly to the CDRs. La Forja organizer Gerard, for 
instance, argued when it became clear it would not be possible to “defend the mandate of  the 1-
O”, the CDR became “a space void of  goals.” Others also attacked the political parties. Oriol for 
example, said that the problem was that the parties went into the 21-D election campaign with the 
slogan to “implement the Republic.” However, these organizers did not only criticize the unilateral 




3.2 Eixamplar la Base: Gradualist Strategy 
The second strategy emerged out of  the construction of  the 1-O as an event that had value for 
the movement beyond the electoral victory. This narrative rejected the notion of  the referendum 
as a final decision on independence, but situated it as part of  a larger process. The strategy that 
followed from this event construction can be called gradualist. It opened up several avenues for 
future action. More concretely, interviewees pointed to a combination of  two plans. The first one 
was to achieve what the 1-O could not be: a binding referendum, which would have been agreed 
in some form with the Spanish state (un referèndum pactat). This meant acknowledging that the 1-O 
had not been a success, which automatically attracted criticism from those who claimed to defend 
its mandate. This was why Joana responded to my question about strategies: “Which is the way to 
go? They will call me traitor, but: an agreed referendum.” This choice of  language showed the 
severity of  the debate: anyone who demanded another referendum risked being attacked as 
revisionist, as betraying the 1-O. Yet, this strategy did find support within the movement. Many 
interviewees mentioned another referendum as a potential way forward.  
The second plan implied building a solid pro-independence majority among the Catalan 
population in order to win a possible binding referendum. This approach has often been called 
“enhancing the basis” (eixamplar la base). This discourse was mostly pushed by Òmnium Cultural 
after the 1-O episode. In the view of  organizer Isabel, the movement had to speak to the majority 
of  the people, which it had not always done. However, this perspective was widely shared beyond 
Òmnium Cultural. For example, CDR organizer Xavi stressed the need to extend support among 
the population. 
I don’t even know if [the referendum] is legitimate, and I’m independentist, but we have 
48 percent [of support among the population]. We don’t have 58. [...] Well, we have to 
work- we must enhance the basis [seguir ampliando la base]. 
The phrase 48 percent became a shorthand signifier for the broad but not majoritarian support for 
independence in Catalan society. Another CDR organizer, Oriol, argued that the “we have won” 
narrative contributed to a spiral of  polarization, of  splitting Catalan society. Instead of  following 
a unilateral strategy, the movement should broaden its appeal outside of  its constituencies.  
Maybe it is the moment to withdraw and see in which ways we can have an impact in the 
entire society again [...] If independentism wants to be a winning project it must be 
interested in building bridges. 
Of  course the gradualist strategy came under attack from those who pursued the unilateral strategy. 




ANC. In his view, these organizations had chosen to move on. “These political strategies are wrong 
in my view - but I can understand they see it like this.” This suggested implicitly that ANC and 
Òmnium might adopt a more “moderate” stance for “political” reasons - i.e. their close 
relationships with political parties. 
3.3 Llibertat Presos Polítics: Anti-repressive Strategy 
The two strategies described above, unilateral and gradualist, were the results of  competing 
interpretations of  the 1-O as an event. The strategizing process within the movement did not stop 
after the referendum, though. As the 1-O episode continued to unfold after the referendum, 
further events occurred that activists had to make sense of. In particular, the detentions of  several 
pro-independence politicians and activists produced a third movement strategy: anti-repression.  
On October 16, the leaders of  ANC and Òmnium Cultural, Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sànchez 
were cited by a judge for their actions on the protest on September 20. Both were charged with 
rebellion and sedition for calling the protest and kept in custody. On November 2, eight politicians, 
among them Vice President Oriol Junqueras, were also arrested and charged with rebellion and 
sedition. These events were perceived as unjust and repressive and led to an adjustment of  the 
post-referendum movement strategy. This strategy is represented by the label Llibertat Presos Polítics 
(“Freedom for the Political Prisoners”), which was the name of  the campaign by Òmnium Cultural 
(see chapter 9). Anti-repressive strategy was also actively pursued by ANC, the CDRs, and the 
political parties, and was also shared by many smaller collective actors within the movement.  
Interviewees report that the strategy supposed a dramatic shift for the Òmnium Cultural, 
because its leadership did not expect that Cuixart would enter prison directly on October 16. The 
day after, Òmnium Cultural organizers designed “a whole strategy with regards to the prison” 
(Antoni) and launched its Llibertat Presos Polítics campaign. The strategy meant supporting 
Cuixart and his family on the one side, and a public campaign denouncing the detention as 
repression by the Spanish state. Òmnium Cultural launched its Cuixart campaign, which was in 
conjunction but slightly different from the main Llibertat Presos Polítics campaign. Its goal was to 
single out Jordi Cuixart as a social leader who never held or ran for office. This campaign tried to 
reach out to people who were not independentist, but against the imprisonments of  Catalan 
leaders. 
Solidarity with the political prisoners was unanimous in the movement even after the 1-O 
episode. However, the anti-repressive strategy did receive some criticism. CDR activists in 
particular criticized the increased attention to this particular brand of  anti-repressive action. In 




as independence itself. In the interview, organizer Quim argued that the “concept” Llibertat Presos 
Polítics replaced the concept Republic. In his view, the pro-independence elites proposed that 
“first we free the prisoners, then we implement the Republic.” In contrast, CDR activists claimed 
that as long as Catalonia remained an Autonomous Community of  Spain, it would be impossible 
to bargain with the Spanish state as equals.  
Interviewees also criticized their own organizations. ANC organizer Enric, for example, said in 
the interview that focusing so much on the political prisoners was a “mistake that we recognize.” 
This focus took away energy from their main effort, which should have been to fight for the 
Republic, while in reality they could not do anything in their power to free the prisoners. He told 
me that the only power they had was to “really create the Republic” or to provoke a crisis in the 
Spanish state. “If  all we do is to simply defend them, we will lose a lot of  strength, and I think 
we’re becoming aware of  that.” This is why they started to not dedicate “100 percent of  our 
efforts” for the political prisoners, as they were doing before.  
4 POST-REFERENDUM STRATEGIES AND PROTEST ORGANIZING 
As shown above, the strategies of  the Catalan independence movement were not rigid over time, 
but changed as a result of  transformative events. Throughout the 1-O episode, organizers had to 
make sense of  a series of  occurrences, in particular the contested referendum itself. The 
constructions of  these events were not uniform within the movement. A debate emerged about 
what they meant and how to move forward. 
The data analysis showed that secessionist strategy played an important role for protest 
organizing both during and after the 1-O episode of  contention. As frames for future action, 
strategies were fundamental in structuring the focus of  organizers. Before the 1-O, individual and 
collective actors dedicated their time and resources to the preparation of  the referendum. ANC 
organizer Carme, for example, said in the interview that the organization “did everything else on 
the side” since the announcement of  the referendum. The referendum strategy was able to channel 
all organizational efforts into a single goal (see chapter 7). Once the referendum was past, 
organizers lost this focus and the various strategic discourses drove their time and resources into 
different directions. The data showed that both ANC and Òmnium Cultural devoted a lot of  
energy to anti-repressive strategy after the 1-O. For some time, practically all the organizations’ 
efforts went into work for the prisoners. After a while, the leadership re-evaluated this strategy, as 
organizer Enric told: “we thought we could take on everything, but then we realized we couldn't 




Strategies not only influenced what kind of  actions movement actors pursued. Strategies also 
impacted how movement actors organized these actions. Interviewees linked the debates over 
strategy to two shifts in organizational practices and processes. The strategic debates after the 1-
O resulted in, first, more deliberation and less directing in decision making, and second, less 
collaboration among collective actors.  
An important caveat of  these findings is that they do not suggest that these transformations 
were the result of  a specific strategy adopted by the given actors. Although this seems a plausible 
line of  reasoning, there is no conclusive evidence about this relationship. Instead, the data show 
that what mattered was first the lack of  strategy and later the disagreement over strategy. These two 
critical moments then resulted in more deliberation and less collaboration. In the next two sections, 
I describe the two transformations. 
4.1 From Directing to Deliberation 
The data showed that the increased debates over strategies resulted after the 1-O resulted in a shift 
in decision-making practices, from directing to deliberation. First, it became evident that there was 
less directing. While the practice of  directing played an important role in the protest organizing 
processes before the referendum, and in particular during the preparations of  the defense of  the 
voting stations (see chapter 8), it became less prominent after the 1-O.  
For example, organizer Josep lamented that after the detentions of  the Jordis and the 
application of  article 155, the ANC as an organization was disoriented and lacking a stable 
leadership. There were no clear directions given to the lower organizational levels. The sectorial 
and territorial chapters of  the ANC did not know what the strategy of  the organization was and 
were lacking concrete and coordinated action. 
Another illustrative example is the student platform UxR, which did not have the same success 
after the 1-O and the end of  the occupation of  the University of  Barcelona. As described in 
chapter 8, the organizing process of  the occupation relied heavily on leadership decision making. 
A small group of  leaders from different student groups told other youth activists how to prepare 
and manage the occupation. This top-down organizing process was only acceptable to participants, 
because it served a short-term goal, as Pere explained. 
Of course, you cannot do this indefinitely. You cannot do it. You cannot avoid uprising, 
you cannot table debates forever. It can only be for a short amount of time and for a 
tangible, real goal. 
Once this clear goal - the referendum - was past, this way of  organizing protest did not work 




limits. It works if  applied well-measured, but in the long run it has some problems.” After the 1-
O, the course of  the platform became unsteady and the leadership group had less control over the 
organizing process. This became clear already on the 3-O, when the group failed to organize a 
protest camp because of  internal differences (see chapter 7). 
Second, activists and organizers deliberated more after the 1-O referendum. A central 
characteristic of  the organizing processes for the occupation of  the university, as well as of  the 
defense of  the voting stations, was the absence of  deliberation, because the goal of  the organizing 
processes was clear: making the referendum happen. Once the referendum was over, deliberation 
reemerged in the CDRs, UxR, and the ANC. As described above, the contested character of  the 
1-O required activists to make sense of  the event and to readjust their strategies. These collective 
sensemaking and strategizing processes took place in the form of  deliberations within and between 
SMOs. The most striking example of  this shift from directing to deliberation were the CDRs. In 
chapter 8, I have shown that deliberation was practically absent in their assemblies. This changed 
dramatically after the 3-O, as this passage from the interview with CDR Sabadell organizer Joana 
showed. 
The assemblies started to have more debates as well. Because the other ones [before the 
1-O] are more functional, more organizational. Those after October 3 are more for debate, 
“well, what are we doing, are we referendum, or are we Republic?” This is also when the 
coordination at the Catalan level started and the CDR Catalunya emerges. 
Comparing the assemblies before and after the referendum revealed notable differences in 
decision-making practices. In contrast to the “more functional, more organizational” assemblies 
before the referendum, there was much more debate after the 3-O – primarily about strategy and 
identity of  the CDRs. 
Another example was the ANC after the referendum, and in particular after the detention of  
its leader Jordi Sànchez on October 16. As mentioned above, these events left the organization 
without a clear strategy and leadership. In the interviews, organizers report that this led to more 
deliberation about how to move forwards both in the Board of  Directors as well as at the local 
level. Carme told that within the leadership, there was a group of  members arguing the 
organization should act more carefully and coordinate with other organizations and the political 
parties, while others thought the ANC should spear-head the secessionist struggle without the 
other pro-independence actors.  
And this is reflected in the Board of Directors as well. There are people who think we 
should wait a bit, and people who do not think so, that we have to be- that we have to act 




slows down the decision making. It already is [slow] because the structure of the ANC is 
already complex and even more when you add these obstacles. 
The quote from the interview with Carme shows that the disagreement over strategy after the 
referendum slowed down the ANC’s decision making, because finding consensus becomes much 
more difficult.  
Of  course, one might argue that these strategic debates should be regarded as separate from 
the actual processes of  organizing protest. It might well have been the case that activists discussed 
more about the overall strategy of  the independence movement, but agreed on tactics, and, as a 
consequence, the organizing process remained unaltered by the strategic debate. Even if  this was 
true, activists would have had less time and energy they could devote to the preparation of  protest, 
because there were more deliberations over strategy. In addition, there was some evidence in the 
data that strategizing also took place while organizing protest. Many CDR interviewees reported 
that ideas for protest actions often emerged from participants in assemblies. In one of  the CDRs 
in Tarragona, activists had fundamental disagreements over protest tactics after the 1-O episode. 
During one assembly, one group of  participants proposed to walk the city’s beaches dressed in 
yellow to draw the attention of  tourists to the independentist cause and the prisoners in particular. 
Interviewee Quim was not happy with this idea: “Walking on the beach dressed in yellow is the 
silliest thing ever.” Instead, he and some other activists favored street demonstrations at concrete 
events. This approach, in turn, was criticized by the beach walkers as not attracting enough 
participation and that small protests looked poor. In the end, both types of  actions were organized, 
but the debates made the respective preparatory processes much more difficult.  
Deliberation needs time, as another interviewee put it: “the assemblarian movement is 
demanding, it takes to come to an agreement when there are different opinions.” In the CDRs, a 
protest action could not be done until there was consensus. While typical for grassroots groups, 
the bottom-up development became much more difficult when there was not clear overall 
movement strategy to guide these tactics. This became most visible precisely when there was little 
time to prepare protests. For example, after the detentions of  the Jordis, the CDRs wanted to react 
quickly and organize a large-scale protest. Organizer Gabriel reported in the interview that “there 
was a lot of  energy.” CDR activists felt that they had won the referendum and that they were ready 
to occupy the parliament or carry out any action that would lead to independence. But they saw 
that from the side of  institutional politics, there was not really a plan. Organizer Xavi said that “we 
talked about blocking the airport, but in the end we didn’t do it, we talked about blocking the 
harbor, but we didn’t do it. And I think this is where we fucked it up.” In Gabriel’s view, there was 




to organize” because of  the lack of  strategy. Xavi told that already then, there was a certain sense 
of  defeat, as it became clear that the CDRs were not able to put the country on hold and organize 
an effective strike. Only three weeks later, and after further detentions, the CDRs organized the 8-
N. Also, during the protest in reaction to Puigdemont’s detention, the CDRs were not well 
prepared. They acted “without any kind of  plan, without anything, and we failed. We didn’t do 
anything, we just received blows from the police” (Gabriel).  
These pieces of  data illustrate the consequences of  the disagreements over strategy for 
decision-making practices in the independence movement. Before the 1-O, the alignment of  
movement strategy had allowed for quick organizing processes with little deliberation and more 
acceptance for directing. In the aftermath of  the referendum, as goals became unclear and several 
strategies emerged out of  the event constructions of  the 1-O, there was more need for deliberation 
within and between collective actors. As a result, organizing processes were slowed down 
significantly. 
4.2 Declining Organizing between Organizations 
The second consequence of  the strategic debates after the referendum was that SMOs collaborated 
with each other to a lesser extent. Diverging interpretations of  how to make sense of  the 1-O, as 
well as different ideas of  how to move on from there were not only the subject of  debate within 
collective actors but also between them. As mentioned above, there was a debate in the ANC 
leadership about strategy that slowed down the organization’s decision making. This also affected 
the ANC’s collaborations with other entities. The ANC and other entities were struggling to find 
their strategy internally, and they were doing even more so at the interorganizational level. ANC 
organizer Carme reported that it became very difficult after the referendum to agree on a common 
strategy among organizations. She said that “what affects us most is disagreement and repression 
in itself.” When I ask how they noticed disagreement and repression, she told me the following. 
Yes, you notice it, because of course when we normally plan a demonstration we have to 
find a consensus with all the other parties and entities. Then, of course you notice that we 
are a bit more daring, and there are people that are a bit more hesitant right now. 
Before the referendum, a central characteristic of  the independence movement was that most large 
protests were jointly called for by the different SMOs. After the referendum, the diverging ideas 
about strategy made this much more difficult. This was visible in the difference between the two 
general strikes. While the 3-O was a great display of  unity, the 8-N was called by a small trade 
union, and most of  the protests were organized by the CDR. Other organizations, such as the 




as Carme described above. In her view, the ANC was ready to act alone and to “pull the wagon 
and the other parties.”  
The prime example of  the impact of  strategic disagreement on interorganizational 
collaboration is the student platform UxR. As described in chapter 7, UxR was the result of  a 
small group of  former SEPC militants, who managed to bring together organizers from different 
student and youth organizations to join forces in a single interorganizational platform for 
contentious action during the 1-O episode. In this way, the platform organized the occupation of  
the University of  Barcelona. However, already after the referendum and the end of  the occupation, 
the emerging strategic debate made collective action much more difficult, as organizer Pere 
describes in the following quote. 
I: At the level of the platform, did you change how you organize after October 1?  
R: The platform only works when there are no political discrepancies. At the level of 
general politics. When there is a common strategy it’s perfect. When there was strategic 
unity, it was perfect, because it was able to agglutinate all the organizations that represented 
the entire cross section of the youth part of the movement […] But when there is strategic 
disparity it does not work. We tried one thing, but the JERC told us “I can’t move [from 
my position], I cannot meet you”, so we said “well let’s go home then and within a month 
when things a clearer we organize something.” 
Collaboration was the foundation for UxR as an interorganizational platform. As the piece of  data 
shows, strategic disagreements made effective collaboration at the level of  the platform impossible. 
This had a direct effect on protest organization, which in the youth sector of  the movement was 
only successful when launched by a broad coalition. This became apparent on the 3-O, when the 
platform organizers had the idea to set up a protest camp.  
We said “we have to set up a camp, like the 15-M.” And we were discussing whether we 
could do it. Those from the independentist Left were like “ok, seems good,” but those 
from ERC “well, we have to call the party, you know”. […] this was where the division 
starts […] in the end, they say yes, but we came very late […] I think on the 3-O, had we 
anticipated it, it would have been a bit different. I’m not saying we would be independent, 
but it would have been different […] but we came late for political decisions 
This quote from the interview with Pere shows that UxR was incapable of  acting without 
collaboration of  the participating youth organizations, which in turn depended on their parent 
parties. In a situation when quick action was needed, the emerging strategic disagreement slowed 
down the organizing process to the extent that the contentious action practically failed. After 
October 27, the UxR organizers came to realize that “this is lost,” as Pere put it. The data suggested 




interorganizational space that relied on the collaboration of  its part. This became increasingly 
difficult, because most of  the youth organizations (JERC, JNC, Arran) were linked to political 
parties, which is why it became impossible to find a common strategy with the 21-D elections 
coming up.  
Of  course, this does not mean that collective actors did not collaborate at all after the 3-O. 
There is some evidence of  organizations joining forces for contentious action at the local level. 
The ANC in Hospitalet, for example, put some efforts into interorganizational collaboration with 
the CDRs, but also the political parties. At the same time, the growing criminalization of  the CDRs 
by the media and police made collaboration difficult, because the ANC took a certain distance to 
the CDRs. Also in the youth sectors, La Forja was focused on initiating mass protest by bringing 
together different organization, for example in December 2018. Overall, however, the data 
suggested that the strategic disagreement within and among collective actors made collaborative 
protest organizing difficult after the referendum.  
5 CONCLUSION 
October 1, 2017 has gone down in history as an exceptionally important event in the secessionist 
conflict in Catalonia. While it did not lead to independence, the referendum had a transformative 
impact on the independence movement itself. Massive participation at the vote and the violent 
actions of  Spanish police forces turned the 1-O into a complex series of  occurrences that was 
hard to grasp for challengers, authorities, and observers. Most importantly, the contentious and 
contested character of  the referendum led to conflicting constructions of  the 1-O as an event 
within the independence movement. While one part of  the movement claimed victory in the 
referendum and saw it as legitimation for outright independence, another part considered the 
results as insufficient and emphasized the value of  mobilization. In other words, there was 
disagreement about whether the referendum strategy had been successful or not. The 1-O had 
produced a crisis of  sensemaking and strategy. Consequently, two rival strategies emerged in the 
aftermath of  the 1-O referendum. On the one hand, those who claimed victory in the referendum 
proposed a unilateral strategy that aimed to “implement” the independent Catalan Republic 
through wide-scale civil and institutional disobedience. On the other hand, the critics of  the “we 
have won” approach championed a more gradualist strategy that centered on increasing support 
for independence in the Catalan population and the negotiation of  a binding referendum.  
These findings represent an important contribution to the academic debate on secessionist and 
counter-secessionist strategies. Previous research in these fields has portrayed the adoption of  




processes (K. G. Cunningham 2013; Sorens 2012). Secessionist movements were understood as 
having a full repertoire of  tactical and strategic options at hand, and being able to choose among 
them through cost-benefit calculations. Although I have not put the cost-benefit calculations of  
independence movement under scrutiny in this chapter, I argue that the findings cast considerable 
doubt on this assumption for two reasons. First, the case of  the Catalan independence movement 
shows that a unitary strategy does not always exist within secessionist movements. The 
disagreements over strategy could be the result of  different actors arriving at different cost-benefit 
calculations depending on their strategic situation. However, I have shown that these debates 
mainly take place within collective actors, which makes it unlikely that strategy depends on their 
specific costs and benefits. Second, and most importantly, the findings show that strategy is formed 
through on interpretive rather than rational processes. Strategies are not freely available to activists, 
but must be constructed in meaningful and convincing ways. The Catalan independence movement 
was quite successful at strategy building before the 1-O, when the referendum strategy served as a 
unifier for its diverse collective actors. However, as described above, the contested character of  
the 1-O initially caused a crisis of  strategy. Before activists could even think about calculating costs 
and benefits, they had to make sense of  what happened during the day of  the referendum. This 
involved the construction of  the event in the first place and the creation of  its meaning. I have 
shown that these event constructions had crucial consequences for strategizing after the 1-O. What 
follows from this is that students of  secessionist strategies should not limit their analyses to rational 
choice assumptions, but include the role of  transformative events and interpretive sensemaking 
and strategizing processes of  actors in their response. 
The conflicts over strategy after the 1-O referendum are not only interesting in themselves, but 
they are relevant for the purpose of  this dissertation because they had a crucial impact on the 
organizational dimension of  the independence movement. The analysis of  the empirical data 
showed that there were two important transformations as a result of  the competing strategies. 
First, at the practice level, there was a shift from directing to deliberation. The referendum strategy 
as a unifier had made the directions of  movement organizers more acceptable to other activists 
before the 1-O. After the referendum, the lack of  such a common strategy made it much harder 
for leaders to formulate clear directions. The disagreements over the movement’s strategy and 
tactics simultaneously led to a greater need for deliberation in the protest organizing processes 
described here. Second, at the process level, the conflict over strategy led to less protest organizing 
between organizations. While interorganizational collaboration was an important feature 
throughout the 1-O episode of  contention, the various organizations of  the independence 




These findings highlight the role of  movement strategy for organizational practices and processes. 
On a general level this is not surprising: protest organizing is, after all, an organizational process 
that is aimed at realizing contentious methods and tactics. The properties of  this process depend 
very much on the relationship of  these methods and tactics with the overall plan of  the movement. 
What is remarkable, however, is how much a contingent event, such as the 1-O referendum, can 













The announcement to hold a referendum on October 1, 2017 was an audacious attempt to achieve 
Catalan independence. But it backfired almost immediately. After the Catalan parliament approved 
the Law on the Referendum on Self-Determination, the Spanish government under conservative 
Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy reacted with a series of  counter-secessionist actions. The response 
of  the Spanish state was hardly surprising. After all, states have a reputation to lose: they fight 
secessionist demands in one region to prevent other regions from following this example (Walter 
2009). But states do not respond uniformly to repression: some states employ violence, others 
negotiate or accommodate (Griffiths 2015, 2016). Even the same state may vary in its responses 
to different secessionist movements  (Butt 2017). In any case, previous research stressed that 
counter-secession shapes the strategies and tactics of  secessionist movements (Griffiths and Muro 
2020a). This chapter looks at how counter-secessionist repression as a result of  the 1-O 
referendum affected protest organizing in the Catalan independence movement.  
Social movements studies have produced an impressive body of  work on the repression of  
social movements (for overviews, see Earl 2011; Peterson and Wahlström 2014). Scholars have 
analyzed the dynamics of  repression along three dimensions (Peterson and Wahlström 2014): the 
scale dimension (from the supra-national to the local level), the institutional dimension (state and 
private actors), and the functional dimension (from coercion and violence to softer forms of  
repression). In spite of  this broad interest for repression, some important blind spots remain in 
the literature. Earl (2011) noted that social movement studies have paid more attention to overt 
and coercive repression, and protest policing in particular, than other forms of  repressive action 
(e.g. Della Porta 1996; Della Porta and Reiter 1998; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Soule and 
Davenport 2009). The effects of  repression on public protest and mobilization – what is called 
“repression-mobilization nexus” (D. Cunningham 2009; see also Davenport 2005a) – are well 




(Balcells, Dorsey, and Tellez 2020; Barceló 2018), the movement’s repertoire (Della Porta, 
O’Connor, and Portos 2019) and frames (Della Porta, O’Connor, and Portos 2020). However, little 
is known about consequences for other aspects of  activism in the Catalan case and beyond. This 
chapter expands this literature by looking at how repression affects organizational practices and 
processes in social movements.  
This is an important question for three reasons. First, organizing is an important prerequisite 
for protest action, social movement scholars have shown (Klandermans, Kriesi, and Tarrow 1989; 
Lofland 1996; McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Rucht 2013, 2017). The effect of  repression on 
movements’ organizational practices may thus impact their capacities for mobilization. Second, 
liberal democracies grant their citizens the freedom to political association. Repression of  activist 
organizational practices might directly limit or impede the exercise of  these fundamental rights 
(Starr et al. 2008). Third, many social movements can be considered “schools of  democracy” 
(Tocqueville), because they champion inclusive and horizontal forms of  organizing (Della Porta 
2009b; Della Porta and Rucht 2015; Felicetti 2017; Polletta 2002). Repression might have harmful 
consequences for movements’ internal democracy by altering their organizational practices. In 
short, the relationship between repression and activist organizational practices matters not only 
for social movements themselves, but for the state of  liberal democracies.  
The first part of  the chapter looks at the sequence of  counter-secessionist repression that was 
triggered by the announcement of  the referendum and how it impacted protest organizing in the 
independence movement. I describe how the detentions of  Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sànchez 
affected the campaigns of  ANC and Òmnium Cultural, and how the CDRs suffered from policing 
and criminalization. The second part shifts the attention to repressive surveillance. I briefly discuss 
the existing literature on surveillance and how organizers in the independence movement perceive 
surveillance. Then I turn to describe five responses to perceived surveillance threats in the 
movement. 
1 REPRESSION AND PROTEST ORGANIZING 
Repression against the independence movement already began before the referendum. The 
Spanish government had taken secessionist actions to the courts repeatedly, for example the 9-N 
referendum. However, the announcement of  the 1-O increased the intensity and frequency of  
repressive action. The approval of  Law on the Referendum on Self-Determination by the Catalan 
parliament was followed by a range of  counter-secessionist actions by the Spanish state. In chapter 
6, I have described the five most important repressive occurrences during the 1-O episode of  




Second, the search of  the Catalan Department of  Economy and the attempted raid of  the 
headquarters of  the CUP on September 20. Third, the violent police intervention on the day of  
the referendum. Fourth, the detention of  Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sànchez on October 16. Fifth, 
the application of  article 155 on October 27. These counter-secessionist actions represented a 
“repressive turn” (Della Porta, O’Connor, and Portos 2019) in the cycle of  contention. The single 
actions were interconnected: for example, the detention of  the Jordis is a result of  their response 
to the raid on September 20. Neither of  these actions would have happened if  the Constitutional 
Court had not ruled the referendum illegal. Thus, they are part of  a repressive sequence.  
This repressive sequence can be read as a transformative mechanisms that was triggered by the 
announcement of  the referendum and affected the independence movement beyond the 
conclusion of  the 1-O episode. After the application of  article 155, legal prosecution of  
secessionist activists and politicians by the Spanish state continued. On November 2, Oriol 
Junqueras, and seven other members of  the Catalan government were arrested and investigated 
for rebellion, sedition, and misuse of  public funds. Jordi Turull, Carme Forcadell, Raül Romeva, 
Josep Rull and Dolors Bassa were released on bail on December 4, but arrested again on March 
23. The day of  their arrests, judge Llarena also opened the proceedings against Carles Puigdemont 
and issued a European arrest warrant. A few days later, Puigdemont was arrested in Germany. The 
disruptive protests on November 2, and in particular those in March 2018 resulted in clashes of  
CDR activists with the police. On April 10, 2018, the Spanish Civil Guard accused CDR organizers 
Tamara Carrasco and Adrià Carrasco33 of  rebellion, sedition, and terrorism for planning and 
preparing the disruptive March protests. While Adrià Carrasco managed to escape detention and 
fled the country, Tamara Carrasco was arrested. She was later released and put under curfew in her 
hometown but eventually acquitted of  all charges. The peak of  legal persecution represented the 
trial against the leaders of  the independence movement. The trial resulted in long prison sentences 
for former vice president Oriol Junqueras and other former members of  the Catalan government, 
former speaker of  the parliament Carme Forcadell, as well as Jordi Sànchez and Jordi Cuixart. In 
short, counter-secessionist repression as a result of  the 1-O referendum continued well beyond 
the very 1-O episode of  contention. The analysis of  empirical data showed that this chain of  
repressive actions influenced the four cases of  protest organizing outlined in chapter 9.  
First, the detention of  Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sànchez on October 16 represent a 
transformative repressive event for their organizations. As an immediate response, Òmnium 
Cultural launched its Llibertat Presos Politics campaign and also the ANC dedicated much of  its 
                                                 




efforts to anti-repression. But the organizing process of  this campaign was hindered by the 
grievance it addressed, namely the imprisonment of  their presidents. Both organizations had been 
relying very much on their leadership before the 1-O episode. As shown before, the two leaders 
became even more important during the referendum campaign. In that time period, they were the 
only representatives from their organizations to participate in the Estat Major, the series of  
meetings of  party leaders and associations. These meetings were often confidential. Arresting 
Cuixart and Sànchez thus supposed removing their knowledge and experience in the Estat Major. 
ANC organizer Emma stated in the interview that this was problematic, because the organization 
had relied more on directing than on deliberation in the 1-O episode of  contention. Expert Roger 
also stressed that “any organization loses collective intelligence when their leadership is removed. 
Cuixart and Sànchez had information that no one else in the organizations had.”  
The detentions affected the everyday practices in the two organizations. This became apparent 
in particular in the interviews with organizers from Òmnium Cultural, who described the 
preparations of  the Llibertat Presos Polítics campaign and the functioning of  the organization 
around that time. Staff  member Isabel said that Cuixart’s detention conditioned how the entity 
worked – in contrast to the ANC, which worked “normally” according to her, because it chose to 
elect a new president. After the imprisonment, Isabel started writing reports for Cuixart every 
three days. Cuixart wanted to know everything that happened and not miss a detail. He voiced his 
opinions and intervened in the process. But this did not always work smoothly, as Isabel reported: 
Sometimes you forget a conclusion and he misses all the debate. Then it may become a 
loop, because I’ve got an opinion, but the other [board members] don’t see it clearly. I 
explain it well in a meeting and convince them. I show it to Jordi, but he is not convinced. 
Then I have to explain it to him too. It makes everything slower, because he does not want 
to miss a detail. He is the president and he wants to see everything. But the truth is it 
makes internal organization more complicated.  
The quote from Isabel’s interview shows that working with Cuixart in prison disrupted the meeting 
practices and deliberations in Òmnium Cultural’s board. Involving Cuixart in the decision-making 
process required to establish another communication channel with him, because he could not be 
present at meetings at the organization’s offices. But communication with Cuixart was not always 
easy, organizer Antoni reported: 
His lawyers can go see him, for other people it is more difficult. I have gone only a few 
times, but I write letters. Communication exists. He receives the letters, they do not read 
them to him. He told me they open them in front of him, but don’t read them. And also 




Communication by mail obviously contributed to slow down the organizing process. In short, 
repression made communication between the president and the rest of  the organization extremely 
difficult. Professional staff  working on the Llibertat Presos Polítics campaign like Isabel had to do 
a lot more organizational work. This slowed down the process and made it more complicated, as 
Isabel said.  
Board member Antoni called Cuixart’s imprisonment “an exceptional situation and we have to 
be aware that the way the organizing functions also is exceptional. That is the reality and we must 
accept it.” This statement underlines the impact of  repression on Òmnium Cultural. Cuixart’s 
detention represented a transformative event for the organization, because it had consequences 
that lasted beyond the 1-O episode. Nevertheless, there never was a debate about electing a new 
president. As I have mentioned in chapter 9, this was seen as anti-repression. In Isabel’s view, the 
intention behind Cuixart’s imprisonment was “that people forget him.” Instead, Isabel called the 
prison an “opportunity – even if  that’s a bit cynical.”34 The organization thus developed the Cuixart 
campaign as a continuation of  the Llibertat Presos Polítics campaign. The narrative was to single 
Cuixart out, because he was different from the other prisoners in that he was a “social leader,” 
who never held or ran for public office. 
The imprisonment of  the leaders of  the two largest organizations not only had negative 
consequences for themselves. It also affected organizing between organizations. The leadership crisis 
in ANC and Òmnium Cultural made it more difficult for other movement actors to interact with 
them. Organizer Josep from a small profession-based organizations told that: 
Well with article 155 and when they put the Jordis in prison, the ANC of course did not 
have a stable leadership. Sometimes it took a lot to find coordination, a direct order or a 
clear order. It was obvious that the ANC was disoriented. 
The statement suggests that after the 1-O episode of  contention, the lack of  leadership of  ANC 
and Òmnium Cultural hindered their communication and decision making with other 
organizations. Moreover, the detentions also played a role in the disagreements over movement 
strategy described in the previous chapter. They led to the creation of  Llibertat Presos Polítics as 
a campaign but also as an anti-repressive strategy. As I have shown, all organizers were not satisfied 
with the efforts put into this campaign rather than in other strategies.  
Second, repression also affected the organizing processes of  the 8-N general strike and the 
March 2018 protests, which were planned and prepared by the CDRs. Both protest cases were 
                                                 




reactions to repressive events: on the 8-N, CDR activists took the occasion of  the general strike 
called by the CSC-Intersindical to condemn the detentions of  Junqueras and other members of  
the government the week before. The March 2018 protests were an even more immediate reaction 
to the imprisonment of  Bassa, Romeva, Rull, and Turull, and the detention of  Puigdemont in 
Germany.  
There was significant disagreement among CDR interviewees regarding the impact of  these 
repressive events on organizing. Organizer Jordi for example observed demobilization as a result 
of  repression, saying that “people were very afraid.” Other interviewees stated that despite overall 
demobilization in the CDRs after the 1-O episode, repressive events actually motivated activists 
and were beneficial for organizing protests in response. Miquel from a small town CDR said that 
“when there is repression, people come back to assemblies.” The different reactions are likely a 
result of  the heterogeneity of  CDRs and it is difficult to discern a general pattern. To some extent, 
these mixed findings mirror the contradicting results on the “repression-mobilization nexus” (D. 
Cunningham 2009; see also Davenport 2005a). What is clear is that the protests were not 
spontaneous, as I have described in chapter 9. Organizer Carles explained in the interview how 
organizers prepared the protest in his local CDR: 
Normally as a CDR it takes us a month or a month and a half to plan an action. Apart 
from that, we said “if they detain Puigdemont’ […] if they detain Puigdemont, we’ll be at 
7pm of that day in the main squares of each city.” But also for the [other members of 
government] there was a plan, which I don’t remember exactly. If they cite them and 
release them on bail, we demonstrate. If not, then everybody to the Delegation of the 
Spanish government. Anyway, there were different ideas depending on the outcome. 
Carles did not remember the exact plans in the interview, but the key fact is that the CDRs activists 
had expected the repressive actions and prepared plans for protest.  
Despite these repressive events, the independence movement did not radicalize in the year after 
the referendum, Della Porta, O’Connor, and Portos (2019) have shown. The repertoire of  action 
became more disruptive but not violent through the 8-N general strike and the March 2018 
protests. Subsequently, the CDRs suffered from attempts to depict them as radical or even violent 
after the 1-O episode. The organizers I interviewed felt criminalized by the Spanish state. CDR 
organizer Iris for example expressed this as follows. 
There was an attempt to identify the CDRs with terrorism. A malicious and atrocious 
attempt to associate the independence movement with violence and terrorism. While it is 




The data showed that this attempt to criminalize the CDRs had an impact of  their protest 
organizing. Several interviewees stated that other organizations of  the movement grew more 
careful of  collaborating with the CDRs to organize protests together. For example, Iris reported 
that the ANC in Hospitalet did not let the CDRs use their facilities for assemblies in winter when 
it was too cold to meet outside. Repression thus contributed to the isolation of  the CDRs and 
reduced interorganizational collaboration in protest organizing. This was already visible in the 
organizing protests analyzed here, but it would continue even more after Tamara Carrasco and 
Adrià Carrasco were accused of  terrorism in April 2018. 
In sum, counter-secessionist repression in the form of  legal prosecution and protest policing 
affected post-1-O protest organizing. The detentions of  the leaders of  ANC and Òmnium 
Cultural had a negative impact on the two organizations. It removed some their organizational 
knowledge, slowed down internal communication, and made it more difficult for other 
organizations to collaborate with them. The CDRs were targeted by repression, too. Although it 
is unclear from the data whether repression resulted in mobilization or demobilization of  their 
activists, the CDRs had plans in place to organize potent reactions to repressive events. 
Nevertheless, the increasing criminalization of  the CDRs hindered collaborations with other 
organizations. These findings show how the referendum affected protest organizing in the 
independence movement through a repressive sequence. This sequence can be considered a 
transformative mechanism that extended beyond the 1-O episode and had lasting consequences 
for the movement. However, the data also suggested that legal prosecution and protest policing 
were not the only means of  repression. The remainder of  this chapter turns to counter-secessionist 
surveillance as a covert form of  repression. 
2 SURVEILLANCE 
Most scholars interested in the role of  state and private repression of  social movements have 
focused more narrowly on the relationship between overt repression (in particular protest policing) 
and mobilization for protest (D. Cunningham 2009; Davenport 2005a). In contrast, this chapter 
shifts the attention to two different concepts that have been studied to a lesser extent: surveillance 
as a covert form of  repression, and organizational practices as a specific aspect of  activism.  
David Lyon (2001, 2) defined surveillance broadly as “any collection and processing of  personal 
data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of  influencing or managing those whose data 
have been garnered.” Although social movement scholars study surveillance less frequently than 
other forms of  repression, the field has documented how surveillance specifically targets internal 




describes the manifold ways in which state and non-state actors employ surveillance technologies 
for the repression of  social movements. Cunningham (2004) provides extensive evidence for the 
surveillance of  US movements through the FBI in the 1960s. Fernandez (2008, 10) shows how 
global justice movements faced different forms of  “soft-line social control.” Wood (2014) 
describes how intelligence techniques were an integral part of  the militarization of  policing in 
North America after the Seattle protests. These studies draw on material from the US and Canada. 
They are mainly interested in how surveillance itself  functions and less with its consequences for 
activism. 
In contrast, I am not so much concerned with the workings of  surveillance itself  but with how 
surveillance is perceived by activists in a European case. This idea stems from theoretical debates in 
surveillance studies. Foucault’s (1995) writings on Bentham’s panopticon highlight the disciplinary 
power of  surveillance. In the panopticon prison, all prisoners are not being watched at any moment 
in time, but the sheer possibility of  being observed creates the docile and self-disciplined prisoner. 
Following this idea means that it is not decisive whether activists are actually surveilled; what 
matters for activists is that they feel surveilled.  
However, post-Foucauldian surveillance theorists suggested that the panopticon might not be 
an adequate model (Haggerty 2006; Haggerty and Ericson 2000; Lyon 2006; Murakami Wood 
2007). Surveillance has much more complex consequences than simple discipline. Social 
movement scholars emphasized that activists are not passive subjects of  surveillance. Previous 
empirical research showed how activists develop strategies against surveillance (Hermida and 
Hernández-Santaolalla 2018; Leistert 2012; Marx 2009; Neumayer and Stald 2014; Ullrich and 
Knopp 2018; Ullrich and Wollinger 2011; D. J. Wilson and Serisier 2010). Although this literature 
focused mainly on public protests, similar findings can be expected for organizers. Organizers need 
not necessarily have any direct experiences with surveillance. Believing to be surveilled may be 
enough for them to adapt their practices. In this way, surveillance may have productive rather than 
disciplinary effects. Before turning to the empirical illustration of  how organizers perceive 
surveillance, I elaborate on the second key concept: organizational practices. 
2.1 Surveillance and Organizational Practices 
The question how repression affects the organizational dimension of  activism has merely been of  
secondary importance to social movement scholars. But some case studies do highlight the 
negative effects of  repression for the organizational infrastructure of  social movements. Many 
organizations face violence and legal action against their members, must deal with slumps in their 




repressive action and organizational maintenance (Boykoff  2006; D. Cunningham 2004; 
Davenport 2005b). Other organizations see themselves forced to “go underground” (Della Porta 
1995, 110–11; Zwerman and Steinhoff  2005; Zwerman, Steinhoff, and Porta 2000). In some cases, 
repression can lead to the complete destruction of  SMOs, as Jeffries (2002) shows for the 
Baltimore chapter of  the Black Panther Party for example. In short, repression harms 
organizational structure and strategy. 
Starr et al. (2008) go beyond previous research by showing how repression also affects the 
internal life of  SMOs. As a result of  repression, “organizations are communicating much less and 
across fewer media” (Starr et al. 2008, 262). Participation in meetings and other organizational 
activities declines, as members drop out for fear of  repressive action. Interviewees in their study 
reported how the threat of  surveillance limits the room for internal discussion. Instead, activists 
described the emergence of  a “security culture” within organizations,  which makes activist safety 
the number-one priority, “with devastating impacts on inclusivity, solidarity, bonds of  friendship 
and community, and prefigurative practices” (Starr et al. 2008, 262). The authors show that 
repression and surveillance do not only play a crucial role in “going underground,” but that they 
profoundly affect the everyday modus operandi of  SMOs as well.  
The present chapter builds on these findings by analyzing organizational practices rather than 
form or structure. However, Starr et al. (2008) only look at practices in organizations. In line with 
the approach taken in this dissertation (see chapter 2) I follow the idea that “there is much more 
organizing in social movements than social movement organizations” (de Bakker, den Hond, and 
Laamanen 2017, 217). I thus look at the broader set of  organizational practices in the 
independence movement. Using organizational practices as the unit of  analysis highlights 
organizers’ agency in dealing with surveillance rather than considering them passive subjects 
(Ullrich and Knopp 2018).  
The analysis includes only pieces of  data in which interviewees made an explicit connection 
between organizational practices and surveillance. On the one hand, I disregarded descriptions of  
perceived surveillance that do not have an impact on practices, and, on the other hand, reports of  
organizational practices that were not the result of  perceived surveillance. This meant focusing on 
a smaller portion of  data for the sake of  analytical rigor. The next section turns to how organizers 
in the movement perceived surveillance. 
2.2 Perceptions of Surveillance 
Since much of  surveillance is covert, it is difficult to obtain reliable data on its dynamics unless 




organizers’ perceptions of  surveillance as they emerged from the interview data without checking 
whether activists were actually monitored by state authorities. The interview data provided rich 
evidence on the perceived surveillance of  the Catalan independence movement by Spanish state 
authorities. Organizers started to feel surveilled already during the 1-O episode, but continued to 
do so as the level of  repression persisted in the contraction phase of  the cycle. The following 
description thus covers both the 1-O episode and the following time period. Surveillance was less 
time-sensitive than other forms of  repression, which were normally linked to concrete events. 
Interviewees often reported a general climate of  surveillance that began with the 1-O episode and 
features a series of  different perceptions that ranged from an abstract awareness of  being 
monitored to concrete instances of  surveillance.   
First, at the abstract end of  this spectrum were descriptions of  general surveillance and 
repression. During the episode of  contention around the referendum, activist were constantly 
living “in tension,” one interviewee reported. Another one said that “you could smell this climate 
of  tension and repression, which was intensifying,” and that organizers were “afraid of  everything” 
that could be a potential threat to the movement.  
Second, in the middle of  the spectrum, interviewees made references to concrete instances, but 
the character of  surveillance remained rather diffuse. Alba, a CDR organizer from a small town in 
central Catalonia, said that on “September 11 [at the ANC’s Diada protest] strange things were 
happening, phones were not working. “ Although activists often did not explain how and when 
exactly they were surveilled, they had little doubt that they were. ANC organizer Emma, for example 
described her experience as follows: 
I’m sure that they had our phones hacked. My phone was- (.) People tell me “you’re 
exaggerating.” Well, when I talked over the phone I heard noises, you see? Normally that 
doesn’t happen – but I heard noises. So we began to have quite a bit of paranoia.  
The description of  perceived surveillance as “paranoia” was frequent throughout the data. 
Interviewees used the term to highlight that their fears of  being monitored might actually not 
grounded in actual surveillance acts. But other interviewees such as Emma were convinced they 
were targeted, and used the word to convey how serious and impacting the feeling of  surveillance 
was for them.35 
Third, at the concrete end of  the perception spectrum, references to specific times and 
locations could be found. Activists reported concrete exposure to surveillance and often described 
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the form of  surveillance in detail. Some interviewees even pointed to official sources. CDR 
organizer Carles, for example, referred to the report of  the investigation judge Pablo Llarena, 
which contained details from the first two national assemblies of  the CDRs. From the analysis of  
the data, two specific surveillance threats emerged: the monitoring of  (digitally) mediated 
communication and the infiltration of  meetings and assemblies by undercover informants.  
First, the interviewees mentioned that their mediated communication might be monitored by 
state authorities. This included emails, landlines, and written communication, but most of  all 
mobile phones and messenger applications. I have already mentioned above the description by 
organizer Emma who was sure that her phone was hacked by the police. In almost all cases, 
interviewees experienced digital surveillance as covert, i.e. not visible to them, which is why their 
descriptions often remained abstract. In one case, organizers Jordi and Josep from profession-
based organization described how a conversation from their WhatsApp group was leaked to the 
press. Other interviewees reported intruders in group chats sending distracting messages, attempts 
to hack Twitter accounts, as well as the confiscation of  mobile phones at police raids.  
Second, undercover police at activist meetings and assemblies represented another surveillance 
threat. Interviewees reported several instances where they felt that police had infiltrated their 
meetings to observe activists and gather information. This was particularly the case on the day of  
the referendum on October 1, when activists occupied voting stations throughout the region and 
organized themselves for potential confrontations with police forces. Generally, the occupations 
were open to anyone who wanted to participate. In this situation, organizers were afraid that 
undercover police would infiltrate the occupations to anticipate the protesters’ strategies. Activist 
Lluís described this as follows: 
This was a situation, where, of course, you don’t know if you can trust all the people inside. 
And we said “Jeez! What if there’s an undercover police?” The town was full with 
undercover police that day, you could see them on the street. You could see them going 
around in pairs, with sunglasses, earphone, the gun under the jacket. You could see them.  
Many interviewees reported that they were worried about undercover police in the voting stations. 
Some, like Lluís claim to have recognized them as such. October 1 was not the only example 
though. The data showed that counter-secessionist surveillance continued after the 1-O episode, 
for example with the infiltration of  the first two national assemblies of  CDRs, which I have 
mentioned above. Some interviewees reported that they were generally worried about undercover 
police at their meetings. CDR organizer Quim for example stated that: “now if  somebody 




call us rude, rather than having police [at the assembly].” In other cases, activists were policed 
overtly at public assemblies in the streets, having their IDs checked by officers. 
The monitoring of  (digitally) mediated communication and the infiltration of  meetings and 
assemblies by undercover informants represented the two most important perceptions of  
surveillance that emerged from the interview data. Interviewees did not describe these perceptions 
in isolation, but within the larger context of  repressive action against the independence movement. 
The cycle of  contention provided an interpretive frame for what might otherwise be considered 
meaningless singular instances – such as the “phones not working” at the Diada demonstration 
described by Alba. Moreover, the perceptions of  surveillance as described above should not be 
understood as uniform across organizations and individual activists: not all interviewees 
mentioned the two major surveillance threats. The perceptions are subject to debates among 
activists as well, as several interviewees reported. Some activists argued that surveillance threats 
were often exaggerated, leading to accusations of  “paranoia.” Paranoia or not, the perception of  
surveillance, and in particular of  meetings and digital communication, had severe impacts on the 
organizational practices of  the independence movement, as I show in the next section. 
3 COUNTER-SURVEILLANT ORGANIZING 
In the previous section, I described how Catalan secessionist organizers felt surveilled by state 
authorities during the October 1 episode of  contention. This had important consequences. 
Perceived surveillance put into jeopardy the generalized trust that was required for open 
communication in the movement. This took two forms.  
First, organizers lost their trust in technology. Interviewees stated that during the episode of  
contention around the referendum, they were worried about the safety of  their communications, 
particularly when texting over WhatsApp. Òmnium Cultural organizer Beatriu, for example, said: 
There was a time when we were using WhatsApp, but only briefly, because we saw that it 
was not a safe network. It was not a safe channel, there could have been leaks truly easily. 
Telegram is slightly more secure. 
This shows that organizers were worried that digital communication technologies could easily be 
hacked by state authorities. This implied a loss of  trust in some technologies that were perceived 
as weakly protected, such as WhatsApp.  
Second, and most importantly, surveillance created mistrust among activists. From the 
interview data, it became clear that activists did not trust all participants in open communication 




organizers held open assemblies at the occupation but shared only limited information with their 
fellow activists. Interviewee Ester described this situation as follows: 
What had to come out always came out in the assembly. It had to be like that to a certain 
extent because there was a brutal level of repression. So sometimes we could not pass on 
all the information that we had. You did not know who was there in assembly. There were 
problems one night like “you’re an undercover cop” and I don’t know, kicking people out, 
which in the end did not happen. However, well, it was not a moment…I don’t know how 
to say…of classic functioning. 
When the pressure of  surveillance and repression was high, such as in the contentious period 
around the October 1 referendum, the generalized trust among activists rapidly declined. Activists 
were afraid of  being monitored and of  being accused by each other of  being undercover police. 
What emerged instead of  trust was what interviewees called secretismo, and Starr et al. (2008, 262) 
called “security culture”, i.e. a culture in which the safety of  activists had priority over all other 
concerns. Similar to the groups studied by Starr et al., perceived surveillance led “security culture 
to replace organizing culture, with devastating impacts on inclusivity, solidarity, bonds of  
friendship and community, and prefigurative practices” (262). Security culture was expressed in 
five responses to surveillance, which I call counter-surveillance moves, following Ullrich and Knopp 
(2018). Counter-surveillance moves are “techniques intended to subvert or contribute to the 
defense against video surveillance” (188). In the next sections, I describe these five moves: 
encryption, face-to-face communication, analogizing meetings, committee decision-making, and 
closing-off  assemblies. 
3.1 Encryption 
First, organizers responded to perceived surveillance by changing their digitally mediated 
communication, particularly on the use of  instant messenger applications. As I have shown before, 
activists in the Independence Movement were seriously worried that their digital communication 
was monitored by the police and other state authorities. Interviewees described how the perception 
of  surveillance led them to use instant messenger applications more carefully. Organizer Josep for 
example recommended the following: 
From time to time, clean your WhatsApp, delete the pictures, or whatever. There 
obviously were questions of security, right? Of course, WhatsApp, or your phone could 
have contacts, depending on whoever takes it […] we know for sure that we do not do 
anything illegal, but we know that we are in the view of the police. So, the police are waiting 




Josep was convinced that the police were surveilling activists, which was why they regularly deleted 
their phone data. He also stated that, more generally, “Constantly living in tension has had an 
impact on the security measures that we have taken. For example, everything was over WhatsApp 
before, now it’s Signal”. This application shift was the most widespread impact of  surveillance on 
digital communication practices. Throughout the data, interviewees stated that in the contentious 
episode around the October 1 referendum, activist groups and organizations switched from 
WhatsApp to Telegram or Signal. They used these messenger services to create group chats to 
announce meetings and protests, share documents, discuss different issues, and even to make 
decisions. As such, their use represented an important organizational practice in contentious 
interactions. Signal and Telegram were supposedly better encrypted and hence offered more 
protection from surveillance. One interviewee also reported the use of  other encrypted 
technologies, such as the Tor browser and the email provider Tutanota. In short, when activists 
felt that their digital organizing practices were surveilled by state authorities, they switched to 
practices that felt safer, primarily by using encrypted technologies. 
3.2 Face-to-face Communication 
As a second counter-surveillance move, activists emphasized face-to-face over mediated 
communication. The data showed clear evidence that activists, when they felt watched, preferred 
to talk to each other in person in a safe environment rather than over the phone or email. This 
pertained to different levels of  communicative practices. On the individual level, CDR organizer 
Oriol, for example, explained: 
Well, it was slightly complicated. There was a moment, let’s say between mid-September 
and the end of September, if you had to print something for example, you would go to 
the firm to speak to them in person, you did not call, did not send any email […] this 
created a certain climate of- I don’t know, clandestinity, of semi-clandestinity. 
As it became clear from Oriol’s statement, organizers did not just avoid instant messenger 
applications but almost any kind of  mediated communication when they felt that these kinds of  
practices might be surveilled. They also avoided mobile phones, landlines, emails, and ‘traditional’ 
mail when they were perceived as unsafe. Òmnium Cultural organizer Beatriu even stated that for 
some issues, they avoided any kind of  written records because of  repression: 
There are many things that we only tell each other when we see each other [in person] so 
that there is nothing written down, right? I’m sorry to say this, but the police have already 




Activists were afraid that their mediated communication might be intercepted. This was why 
several interviewees emphasized the role of  face-to-face meetings and assemblies for discussion 
and decision-making under surveillance. CDR organizer Alba, for example, stressed that there 
were “certain things that you cannot write in a text message, which must be decided face-to-face”. 
Activists discussed sensitive issues only in person, for example, the preparations of  disruptive and 
potentially illegal protests, such as those on the day of  the referendum. Alba’s fellow activist Miquel 
even suggested that they “have to unlearn to use the phones, especially the young people […] We 
have to rediscover old forms of  organization”. This did not mean that face-to-face communication 
was a solution for these perceived threats. The next section describes how meetings and assemblies 
were also affected by surveillance. 
3.3 Analogizing Meetings 
The third move also pertains to the relationship between face-to-face and digital practices. 
Analogizing describes the practice of  removing digital devices from activist meetings. Many activist 
groups did not allow phones or computers at their meetings for fear that police might be recording 
them through these devices. ANC organizer Emma said that activists “have a high level of  
paranoia. In the last meetings of  the leadership, we left the phones in another room”. Judit, from 
the same organization, confirmed that they “have had many meetings without phones, computers, 
all locked up, and always in a different location. Like, truly a lot [of  meetings]”. This was a common 
pattern across groups and organizations. During several interviews with organizers, I was also 
asked to switch off  my phone or leave it in a fridge or in another room. 
3.4 Committee Decision making 
The fourth move consists of  removing decision-making from open assemblies to closed 
committees. Interviewees reported that activists did not dare to discuss sensitive topics in open 
assemblies because they were afraid of  undercover police. For instance, as mentioned before, CDR 
activists found that police and general attorneys had information on the first two national 
assemblies. After this event, activists left phones outside their meetings, but the discussions were 
still inhibited. Organizer Carles said the following: 
One thing that has changed, for example, is that before, in the assemblies, we talked about 
everything. If tomorrow we were going to burn a container, if we were going to stop the 





This did not mean that activists simply avoided sensitive topics. In fact, the most relevant impact 
of  perceived surveillance was the closure of  open meetings and assemblies in the Catalan 
Independence Movement. As mentioned before, open assemblies in the neighborhoods and 
villages throughout the region were crucial in the preparatory process for the defense of  the voting 
stations on the day of  the referendum. However, the data were also rich with examples of  
processes of  closure as repression continued after the referendum. In continuation to the 
statement above lamenting the lack of  discussions in the open assemblies, Carles explained the 
following: 
Now everything is decided in committees […] the committees have their Signal group, 
which is supposedly the most secret communication, they meet among themselves without 
phones, phones switched off outside the room.  Then they decide. 
Moving decision-making and sensitive topics from the open assembly to committees and other 
closed circles was a frequent reaction of  the CDRs to the perception of  surveillance. Other 
organizations limited these practices to their leadership groups. In the ANC, for example, the most 
important decisions in the episode of  contention around the referendum were made by the 
permanent committee. Organizer Josep also explained that in the activist group he was part of, 
they “had to close off  the leadership to some extent”. 
3.5 Closing off Assemblies 
The fourth move also aims at protecting decision-making from the threat of  infiltration. This 
move kept decisions and sensitive topics in their assemblies but closed the meetings off  for 
strangers. This became evident, for example, in the interview with CDR organizer Quim, which I 
have quoted before: 
When the detentions of CDR comrades in Catalonia started, we put the assemblies on 
alert. Now, if somebody unknown comes, we know that we have to stop the assembly and 
call them out. We prefer that they call us rude rather than having police [at the assembly]. 
So, when somebody comes, the assembly stops and we say, “Hello, who are you?” and the 
entire assembly looks at him and says, “Where do you come from, where do you live and 
what’s your name?” So we ask some questions [...], and that is the filter we use. 
Quim specifically referred to the risk of  having undercover police at the assembly as the reason 
for asking strangers a series of  uncomfortable questions, which would most likely deter anyone 
interested in joining the assembly. New participants first had to earn the trust of  the assembly. As 
a consequence, Quim admitted that this has transformed the open assembly into a stable group 





The 2017 referendum on independence represented an immense opportunity for Catalan 
secessionists. For a brief  and intense period of  time, the creation of  an independent Catalan 
republic seemed possible. But most of  the times, states do not simply let go of  secessionist 
territories (Butt 2017; Griffiths 2016; Walter 2009). The Spanish government under Mariano Rajoy 
took a firm stance denying Catalans not only independence, but the right to self-determination. 
After the Spanish Constitutional Courts ruled the holding of  the referendum illegal, Rajoy and his 
government engaged went a long way to prevent the referendum. Counter-secessionist repression 
did not end with the 1-O episode of  contention, however.  
This chapter has described the relationship between counter-secessionist repression and the 
organizational dimension of  the independence movement. The analysis of  empirical data showed 
that repression had a negative impact on the movement’s organizational practices and processes. I 
have focused on two levels of  analysis.  
The first part of  the chapter has outlined how the sequence of  repressive occurrences extended 
beyond the 1-O episode of  contention. The various collective actors of  the independence suffered 
mainly from harsh protest policing and legal prosecution. These repressive measures impacted the 
four cases of  protest organizing described in chapter 9. The detentions of  leaders Jordi Cuixart 
and Jordi Sànchez had terrible consequences for their respective organizations. Especially 
Òmnium Cultural faced difficulties during the organizing of  its Llibertat Presos Polítics campaign: 
the complicated communication and decision making with the imprisoned Cuixart slowed down 
the organizing of  the campaign. Both organizations lost collective intelligence and points of  
contact with other organizations, which reduced interorganizational collaboration. The CDRs 
responded to repressive occurrences with more disruptive protests on the 8-N general strike and 
in March 2018. While having these protests were well prepared, organizing in the CDRs was 
increasingly affected by their criminalization. Other organizations were less inclined to collaborate 
with them. In short, ongoing repression made protest organizing after the 1-O episode of  
contention much more difficult.  
The second part of  the chapter has focused on counter-secessionist surveillance in the 1-O 
episode and beyond. Drawing on the empirical data, I have described how organizers perceived 
surveillance. Interviewees identified two threats: the monitoring of  digital communication and the 
infiltration of  meetings and assemblies by undercover police. These threats put into jeopardy the 
generalized trust among activists and led to emergence of  a “security culture.” In response to these 




technologies, switched to face-to-face communication, refrained from using digital devices at 
meetings, moved decision making to committees, and closed off  their assemblies. In short, 
surveillance heavily affected some of  the fundamental organizational practices in the movement: 
activists used less messenger applications, deliberation was hindered, and assemblies became less 
open. 
In sum, the 1-O referendum triggered a transformative repressive sequence by the Spanish 
state. Counter-secessionist surveillance and repression affected the organizational dimension of  
the independence movement on three levels: organizations suffered from the removal of  their 
leadership, organizing processes were slowed down and less collaborative, organizational practices 
became less inclusive and deliberative. These findings are based on similarities emerged from a 
comparison of  diverse interview sources. It is striking how repression surveillance had the same 
impact on practices across different organizations and activist groups. While I have focused on 
similarities, there were some important differences in the data that can be understood as caveats 
to these findings.  
First, the causal connection between repression and organizing should be treated with care. 
Repression and organizing are not necessarily related. On the one hand, there were a number of  
interviewees who describe the organizational practices displayed above, but did not link them 
explicitly to surveillance. This leaves room for other interpretations, for example that activists 
generally valued privacy and used encrypted technologies, not because they were specifically 
worried about surveillance. On the other hand, perceived surveillance did not always lead to a 
change in practices. CDR organizer Jordi, for example, reported in the interview that “we even 
know that in some places there are undercover police to see what we are talking about.” But he 
also said he was not worried about that, because they did not discuss anything illegal. He even 
joked that police “are welcome, maybe they can contribute something.”  
Second, one should be careful to consider repression as an external treatment that only set on 
in the contentious episode around the 1-O referendum and led to a closure of  what were 
previously open organizational practices in the independence movement. Although repression 
intensified dramatically during the 1-O episode, it was far from new. Organizer Miquel from a 
small town CDR stressed that “people are used to repression, this is nothing new. Some practices 
have always been used in the independentist Left. We are very careful generally.”  
Third, Miquel’s statement also highlighted that there was some variation how repression and 
surveillance were experienced across different sectors of  the same movement. Not all activist 
groups were targeted in the same way by state authorities. This is particularly true for an 




from the radical left to the moderate right. Many CDR groups felt this distinction in the time after 
the referendum, when some of  their members were detained and accused of  terrorism.  
Despite these three caveats, the findings represent an important contribution to the literature 
on repression in social movements. It expands this literature in two ways: first, by looking not only 
at protest policing and legal prosecution, but also at surveillance as a covert form of  repression, 
and second, by focusing on its impact on organizing – rather than public protest. Most of  all, the 
findings underline previous findings on the harmful effects of  repression and surveillance for 
social movement organizing by Starr et al. (2008). When security culture replaces an open 
organizing culture, the internal democracy of  social movements suffer. The two latter counter-
surveillance moves – committee decision making and closing-off  assemblies – undermine the open 
and inclusive character of  many social movements. By repressing and surveilling activist groups, 










The referendum on independence on October 1, 2017 was a risky gamble for the Catalan 
independence movement. On the one hand, the push for a binding vote opened up opportunities 
and sparked a wave of  unprecedented mobilization demanding self-determination and 
independence. The announcement of  the referendum produced an intense episode of  contention 
of  roughly two months in which an independent Catalan Republic seemed achievable. On the 
other hand, the audacity to call for a referendum without the consent of  the Spanish state came 
with a high cost. The Spanish government responded with police batons and prison bars. Catalan 
autonomy was suspended for the first time since its hard-fought re-establishment in 1980.  
This dissertation has addressed the question of  how this intense phase of  contention shaped 
the ways in which the independence movement organized protests. Before the announcement of  
the referendum, the independence movement had built a reputation for staging massive street 
performances such as the Diada. These performances were the result of  meticulous organizational 
efforts by secessionist SMOs, in particular ANC and Òmnium Cultural. I have developed the 
concept of  protest organizing to capture the work of  organizers when planning and preparing 
collective contentious action. Through the experiences and interpretations of  these organizers, the 
empirical part of  the dissertation has explored how protest organizing changed over time. I have 
sought to understand how organizers made sense of  the referendum and the intense episode of  
contention and how they connected these understandings to the ways in which they organized 
protest. 
To answer these questions, I gathered four types of  qualitative data during ten months of  
fieldwork in Catalonia: direct observations, documents, expert interviews, and interviews with key 
organizers. These data cover twelve protest cases over three time periods: before, during, and after 
the 1-O episode of  contention. I performed process-tracing to reconstruct the organizing 





Comparing the thick descriptions of  the twelve preparatory processes showed that not all 
contentious performances are organized in the same way. On the one hand, the findings showed 
that different kinds of  protest required different preparations. A strike was organized differently 
than an occupation or a street demonstration. Activists prepared large-scale action differently than 
local protests. Thus, the preparatory processes seemed to depend very much on the type of  action. 
On the other hand, performances of  the same type can also be organized in various ways. The 
occupation of  the voting stations differed from the occupation of  the University of  Barcelona, as 
well as the general strikes on October 3 and November 8. The results thus confirmed Rucht’s 
(2017, 1698) point that “there is no single pattern in the ways to prepare mass protests.”  
Simply pointing out variation and complexity is a rather banal finding that does not advance 
the state of  the art in any way though. While it was difficult to draw any generalizable conclusions 
from a set of  twelve protests from a single movement, the analysis yielded some important insights 
on the temporal development of  protest organizing. 
I have approached the problem of  organizational change from an eventful perspective. One 
could rephrase the central research question as: was the 1-O referendum a transformative event? 
As mentioned above, the referendum did not lead to independence. One could thus conclude that 
it did not result in “durable transformations of  structures” (Sewell 1996a). However, I have argued 
throughout this dissertation that the 1-O referendum was eventful for the independence 
movement itself. Its announcement triggered an intense contentious episode that had a profound 
effect on protest organizing in the movement. The analysis of  the empirical data showed that the 
1-O episode of  contention shaped protest organizing two ways: during the episode and afterwards. 
The next two sections summarize these findings. 
1 PROTEST ORGANIZING FROM NORMAL TO INTENSE TIMES 
The first protest case in the 1-O episode was the yearly Diada street performance on September 
11, which had become a fixed date in the calendar of  the independence movement. The 2017 
edition was not any different from previous years: a contained symbolic performance. It was 
prepared by the ANC in a long and detailed process, which had started way before the 1-O episode 
and did not allow for spontaneous action during the performance. The organizing process of  the 
Diada thus resembled very much the modes of  protest organizing in normal times prior to the 1-
O episode. 
This changed afterwards: protest not only became more disruptive, but was also organized 
differently. The four other cases of  protest organizing during the 1-O episode differed very much 




First, the 1-O episode unfolded as a combination of  spontaneous eruptions and deliberate, 
planned action. During all four disruptive protests, spontaneous lines of  action emerged. 
Interviewees described how protesters did not leave when demonstrations ended, marches took 
different routes than foreseen, and crowds engaged in clashes with the police. However, the 
majority of  actions during these protests were the result of  deliberate organizing. This shows that, 
empirically, the relationships between contentious action, spontaneity, and organizing were quite 
complex. Through organizing activists tried to minimize the role of  spontaneous action in 
contention. But the responses of  the police could not always be anticipated. In intense contentious 
interactions, organizers could never fully eliminate uncertainty: unforeseen events happened and 
protest escalated. In short, organizing and spontaneity were “often highly interactive” (Snow and 
Moss 2014, 1126). 
Second, the four disruptive organizing processes were much shorter than the Diada. After the 
Constitutional Court ruled the holding of  the referendum illegal, counter-secessionist actions by 
the Spanish state became increasingly intense and unexpected. Organizers reported that the dense 
sequence of  these repressive actions put them under time pressure. The protests on September 20 
and the occupation of  the University of  Barcelona were quick reactions to the search of  the 
Department of  Economy. The 3-O general strike was a response to police violence on the day of  
the referendum less than 48 hours before. Preparatory activities had to be completed in a much 
shorter process. But interviewees also mentioned that they needed less time, because the 
referendum provided a clear goal for the process. 
Third, there was a lot of  organizing between organizations. In three of  the disruptive protests, 
existing SMOs collaborated extensively in the protest organizing processes. This took two forms: 
platform building and cooperation. SMOs had collaborated also before the 1-O episode of  
contention. However, the data suggested that the referendum strategy was key in formulating a 
mid-range goal that allowed SMOs to put aside their disagreements and focus on protest 
organizing more effectively.  
Fourth, the defense of  the voting stations was an exemplary case of  organizing outside 
organizations. Òmnium Cultural and ANC played an important role in the disruptive 20-S protest, 
but for strategic reasons, they remained paralyzed before the referendum and refrained from calling 
for disruptions again. In response, organizers from different backgrounds used open assemblies 
and instant messengers to form the CDRs at the local level. This scale shift and the organizers’ 





Fifth, there was a shift in organizational practices during the 1-O episode. In normal times, 
organizations in the independentist Left, but also the ANC, championed deliberation and 
assemblarian practices. During the 1-O episode, and in particular during the defense of  the 
referendum, deliberation was practically absent. Instead, organizers used assemblies and instant 
messengers to give instructions in the preparatory process. Interviewees suggested that this was 
possible because the referendum set a clear aim and put disagreements on hold.  
In short, protest organizing in the 1-O episode was very different from protest organizing in 
normal times. With the exception of  the Diada, the protests were organized outside or between 
organizations in shorter processes. Opponent actions, contingency, and time pressure made it 
impossible for organizers to stick to previous routines of  long, detailed, and deliberative planning. 
They were able to draw on their experience and practical skill to direct the organizing processes 
and successfully mobilize masses of  protesters. Another key factor was the referendum as a 
unifying strategy for the movement. However, once the referendum was over and it became clear 
that it would not lead to independence, internal divisions in the movement reappeared and protest 
organizing transformed further. The next section summarizes the changes after the 1-O episode. 
2 EVENTFUL TRANSFORMATIONS 
When the Spanish senate approved article 155 of  the Spanish Constitution on October 27, it 
became clear that effective independence would not become reality soon, despite the declaration 
of  the Catalan parliament on the same day. This did not deter the independence movement from 
organizing further protests. Òmnium Cultural launched its Llibertat Presos Polítics campaign in 
response to the detention of  leaders Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sànchez. The CDRs used the occasion 
of  the general strike on November 8 to block highways and railroads. They continued disruptive 
protests after Puigdemont’s arrest in Germany in March 2018. The ANC launched a series of  
campaigns, including a primary for Barcelona’s municipal elections. However, these actions took 
place in a context of  demobilization. Counter-secessionist repression in the form of  legal 
persecution and the closure of  opportunities through the suspension of  Catalan autonomy led to 
the contraction of  the cycle of  contention. In this phase, there were three trajectories of  protest 
organizing: re-equilibration, sedimentation, and transformation. 
First, some of  the changes that occurred during the 1-O episode of  contention were reversed 
afterwards. For Òmnium Cultural and the ANC, the September 20 protest remained an exception. 
Afterwards, they returned to their previous mode of  organizing and focused on detailed 
preparations of  structured campaigns. The inertia of  these large organizations, which had left 




of  repression. Despite a crisis of  leadership (see below), they continued their campaigning work. 
The CDRs, too, took more time to prepare their responses to repressive action and were well 
organized in the 8-N general strike and the March 2018 protests. Overall, there was less spontaneity 
than during the 1-O episode. 
Second, some of  the organizational innovations that emerged during the 1-O episode were 
there to stay. The messenger and assembly practices that were diffused through the organizing of  
the defense of  the voting stations became routine. The most important result of  these 
sedimentations was the emergence of  the CDRs as a collective actor. The CDRs in their early 
stages can hardly be described as an organizational entity, but assembly and messenger practices 
provided them with a stable routine over time and allowed them to organize the 8-N and the March 
2018 protests.  
Third, the referendum triggered four contractive mechanisms that led to further 
transformations of  protest organizing after the end of  the 1-O episode: facilitation, exhaustion, 
strategizing, and repression. After the application of  article 155, the focus of  the conflict returned 
to the institutional arena and the campaign for the anticipated elections on December 21, 2017. 
The movement’s civil society actors suffered from demobilization for their protest activities. 
Organizers were exhausted and could not maintain the fast pace of  preparatory work of  the 1-O 
episode. Two mechanisms were particularly important in transforming protest organizing after 
October 27: strategizing and repression.  
The referendum strategy had allowed the diverse collective actors of  the independence 
movement to rally around a mid-range goal. However, once the referendum was over, this strategy 
fell to pieces. The crucial factor was that the outcome of  the referendum was absolutely unclear, 
because of  its contested and contentious character. In the aftermath of  the 1-O, debates emerged 
in the movement how to make sense of  this event. Two meanings emerged: on the one hand, some 
actors considered the referendum a legitimate mandate to implement an independent Catalan 
republic. Others held that the referendum could not be the final decision on independence, but 
only one step in a longer process. From these rivaling senses of  the 1-O, different strategies 
emerged: unilateral and gradualist. After the detentions of  Cuixart and Sànchez, they were 
complemented by an anti-repressive strategy. These disagreements over movement strategy 
impacted protest organizing in two ways: first, they led to more need for deliberation when 
preparing contentious actions, and second, they inhibited organizing between organizations. 
Counter-secessionist repression was the other contractive mechanism that had profound 
transformative consequences for protest organizing. The announcement of  the referendum 




of  contention. The movement suffered from criminalization, legal prosecutions, and protest 
policing, which made directing, internal communication, and interorganizational collaboration 
much more difficult. At the same time, the threat of  surveillance by the Spanish police made 
organizational practices less inclusive and deliberative. 
In short, the referendum was transformative in two ways. On the one hand, some of  the 
innovations that emerged during the 1-O episode became persistent parts of  the movement’s 
organizational repertoire. Assemblarian practices and messenger use sedimented into the CDRs as 
the most important new collective actor. On the other hand, the referendum set off  four 
mechanisms that transformed protest organizing beyond the 1-O episode. Exhaustion, facilitation, 
repression, and strategizing had complex and profound consequences for organizational practices 
and processes. In the four analyzed cases, internal communication and interorganizational 
collaboration became more difficult. Organizational leaderships were weakened and could rely less 
on directing. Not everything was overhauled, though: after the 1-O episode there was less 
spontaneity and organizational processes were longer and more meticulous. Organizational 
structures and practices showed some inertia in turbulent times.  
The 1-O referendum was a transformative event in the history of  the independence movement. 
It did not lead to Catalan independence, but it changed how activists organize protest in 
fundamental ways. These findings shed light on the development of  the independence movement 
in one of  its most turbulent phases. Thereby, this dissertation contributes to a deeper 
understanding of  the internal dynamics of  the movement. But the contributions go beyond 
describing the Catalan case. The next section outlines some of  the scholarly contributions along 
with the dissertation’s limitations and open questions. 
3 LIMITATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation underlines the importance of  events in the study of  secessionist movements and 
protest organizing. The argument I have put forth is that outstanding political occurrences, such 
as the 1-O referendum, have transformative consequences for independence movements and 
secessionist conflicts. I have substantiated this argument with qualitative data from the Catalan 
independence movement. Before turning to the contributions of  this argument to the scholarly 
debate, I briefly address its limitations. 
Scope represents the main limitation of  my argument. First and foremost, the time period under 
investigation was relatively limited. The case selection included the Ara és l’hora campaign from 
2014, but the rest of  the protest cases fell within a time span of  less than a year. The interviews 




organizational transformations durable, this should be read with care. It is possible that some of  
the changes that took place during or after the 1-O episode simply take longer to re-equilibrate. 
However, this problem is not unique to my research: one can only judge the duration of  change 
and stability from a particular point in time. The only remedy is to repeat data collection in the 
future to see if  the changes described in this dissertation persist. Second, the protest cases I have 
studied here were drawn from a single movement. This had the advantage to prioritize 
comparisons within the movement and over time, but it crucially limits the scope of  the findings. 
It is hard to say whether the findings can be generalized for other secessionist movements or even 
social movements more generally. The Catalan independence movement represents an utterly 
important case among secessionist movements. But if  anything, I have shown that protest 
organizing can vary drastically within one movement and within a short period of  time. Again, the 
only way to address this shortcoming is more comparative research. Third, even within the 
movement, the scope of  the analysis has its limits. I performed a qualitative analysis of  the most 
important cases of  protest organizing. This of  course, represents only a snapshot of  contentious 
activity. The power of  the argument would benefit immensely from mapping more rigorously the 
Catalan cycle of  contention, for example through protest event analysis. Performing this kind of  
data collection in addition to in-depth qualitative work went beyond the possibilities of  this PhD 
research, but it remains an option for future research. 
Despite these limitations of  scope, this dissertation has made important scholarly contributions. 
It represents an ambitious project in that it has explored several unchartered territories of  
knowledge. On the one hand, it left structural approaches to the organizational dimension of  social 
movements aside and focused more explicitly on what activists actually do when they organize. 
On the other hand, the dissertation is among the first works to systematically address the 
organizational dimension of  secessionist movements. In short, the question of  how protest 
organizing in secessionist movements changes over time has not been posed before. However, the 
answers to this question do speak to the existing literature. 
This dissertation has bridged social movement studies and research on secessionism. The 
findings contribute to both these fields. Despite their longstanding interest in organization, social 
movement scholars have normally reduced organization to structural entities. I have advanced the 
conceptual state of  the art by distinguishing between the organizationality of  protest, protest 
organizing as a process, and organizational structures. This conceptual framework has broadened 
the view on the organizational dimension of  social movements and served as the basis for a 




First, I have shown that the 1-O episode of  contention was a not a chaotic sequence. Rather, it 
unfolded as a combination of  spontaneous and organized action. This finding illustrates that social 
movements often involve both types of  action. Spontaneity and organization are not inherent to 
contention, but they are the result of  relational interactions in time. When activists face adversity, 
time pressure, and uncertainty, they may overthrow previous plans as a protest unfolds and take 
spontaneous decisions on the spot. The distinction between spontaneity and organizing also shows 
that organized action should not be confused with protest organized by organizations.  
Second, classic writings in social movement studies considered organizational structures an 
important precondition for protest (Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Klandermans, Kriesi, and Tarrow 
1989; Kriesi 1996; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Rucht 2013; Zald and McCarthy 1979). In contrast, 
the empirical analysis confirmed what organization theorists have suggested (Ahrne and Brunsson 
2011, 2019a): Organizing in the independence movement took place inside, outside, and between 
organizations. Although SMOs provide routines and resources that often lead to well-planned 
protest, they are far from being a necessary condition. The defense of  the voting station has shown 
that experienced and skilled organizers can also take organizing in their own hands. In this case, 
SMOs refrained from organizing action.    
Third, the analysis of  empirical data showed that protest organizing is very volatile over time. 
Previous research has found that social movements undergo organizational change, but has 
focused on changes of  structural entities over longer periods of  time (Clemens 1993; Diani and 
Donati 1999; Kriesi 1996; Rootes 1999; Rucht 1999). While organizational structures may be 
relatively stable, protest organizing appears to change over shorter periods of  time. The relational 
interactions of  challengers and opponents not only impact the frequency and type of  protest, but 
also how protests are organized.  
The dissertation has also made important contributions to the literature on secessionism. 
Conceptually, I have distinguished between secessionist movements and the collective actors that 
compose them. This distinction has provided the grounds for extensive comparisons within the 
movement. Empirically, the existing literature on secessionism treats secessionist strategy mainly 
in rational choice terms (K. G. Cunningham 2013; Griffiths and Muro 2020a; Sorens 2012). 
However, the findings of  this dissertation suggest that secessionist do not simply pick strategies 
from a readymade portfolio. First, the Catalan case suggests that organizers do not adopt strategies 
on the basis of  cost-benefit calculations. Rather, strategies must be constructed. The conflicting 
strategies that emerged in the movement after the 1-O referendum were the product of  




understood as the means to pursue a strategy, are not readily available to secessionist challengers. 
Contentious action as one set of  tactics requires the organizational effort of  activists.  
This dissertation highlights that both these literatures should take seriously the role of  events. 
With the notable exceptions of  Mark Beissinger (1996, 2002) and Karlo Basta (2018), scholars of  
secessionism have not included events as central units of  analysis. Social movement studies engage 
with eventful approaches to contention, but this has not had repercussions for the study of  the 
organizational dimension of  social movements. The case of  the contentious 1-O referendum 
makes it very clear that outstanding political occurrences and their symbolic meanings may have 
profound consequences for secessionist conflicts and contentious politics more in general. 
Scholars have bemoaned the decline of  organizational sociology, not just in social movement 
studies (Soule 2013), but also more generally within the social sciences (Ahrne and Brunsson 2011; 
Besio, du Gay, and Serrano Velarde 2020; King 2017). It goes beyond the scope of  this dissertation 
to develop a theory of  organizing that deserves that name. But the framework I have presented 
here demonstrates that organizational sociology has much to offer for scholars of  social 
movements and contentious politics if  they are willing to go beyond narrow entity-based 
understandings of  organization. Process, practice, and CCO approaches to organizing have not 
been employed in social movement studies, with some notable exceptions (Haug 2013; Kavada 
2015; Shoshan 2017). These approaches represent valuable resources for social movement scholars 
in that they not only clarify some of  the conceptual confusion I have described in this dissertation. 
4 OUTLOOK 
More than three years after the referendum on October 1, 2017, there is still no independent 
Catalan Republic. Catalan secessionists have not lost their determination to split from Spain. In 
the Catalan regional elections on February 14, 2021, pro-independence parties for the first time 
achieved not only a majority of seats in the Catalan parliament, but also of the votes cast. However, 
at the time of writing these lines in April 2021, ERC, JxC, and CUP have not come to an agreement 
to form government. Moreover, the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic the previous year marked 
a clear rupture with the previous political cycle. Secessionist parties have tried to exploit the 
pandemic by blaming the Spanish government for its management of the crisis. But secessionist 
civil society and protest activity have clearly suffered from the pandemic. It is too early to tell 
whether the pandemic represents an endpoint to the long secessionist cycle of contention that 
started in 2009. What is obvious is that secessionist contention, which had its peak at the 2017 




As I have written at the outset of this concluding chapter, the referendum was a risky gamble in 
retrospective. This does not mean that the 1-O referendum will go down in history simply as a 
failed attempt at secession. As I have shown in this dissertation, the referendum had numerous 
consequences for the independence movement and Catalan politics. Some of them were short-
term changes, some of them had an impact in the long run. Without doubt, the 1-O referendum 
represents a truly historical event for Catalonia. However, this does not mean that all questions are 
answered. Throughout this dissertation, I have bemoaned the lack of academic research on the 1-
O many times. This dissertation itself has addressed this gap and made important contributions in 
some areas but only scratched the surface of other questions of course. First, the findings suggest 
that the relationship between institutional and non-institutional secessionists, the prospective and 
retrospective framing of political events, and the role of strategizing processes are all important 
for the study of secessionist movements. Second, I have demonstrated that contentious action 
played an important role in the Catalan case, but its forms and frequency could be mapped more 
precisely over time. Third, the comparison with other secessionist movements and independence 
referendums looms over many of the findings. With a potential second referendum on 
independence in Scotland on the horizon, it is necessary to go beyond Catalonia to provide some 
generalizable insights. In my view, these three areas represent important avenues for future 
research on the 1-O referendum, on the Catalan secessionist conflict, and independence 
movements more in general. 
In this dissertation, I have sketched some lessons that scholars of  social movements and 
secessionism can learn from this remarkable episode of  contention. The Catalan independence 
movement will surely draw its own conclusions from the referendum and the subsequent 
development. The post-referendum debates on strategy illustrate that making sense of  
transformative events is not always easy nor consensual, but learning processes are inevitable. Only 






















1 EXPLORATORY INTERVIEWS:  
 Eduard (19/05/18; 21/06/18) 
 Zaina (25/05/18) 
 Daniel (13/06/18) 
 Ivan (15/06/18) 
 Thomas (22/06/18) 
 Roger (13/12/18) 
 Jaume (23/11/18) 
 
2 OBSERVATIONS 
 Putting up posters in Poble Sec (24/05/18) 
 Protest solidarity with Valtonyc (23/05/18) 
 Anti-racist protest (27/05/18) 
 Assembly and Vermut in Poble Sec (02/06/18) 
 Open assembly CUP Vilanova (16/06/18) 
 Vermut i Bitlles CDR Tarragona (17/06/18) 
 Assembly CDR Vilanova (21/06/18) 
 Assembly CDR Tarragona (26/06/18) 
 Diada: Arc de Triomf, Diagonal, Uriquinaona (11/09/18) 
 Protest Remembering 20-S (20/09/18) 
 Torn-al-cole in Gràcia (30/09/18) 
 Protest Banco de España (01/10/18) 
 Remembering 1-O (01/10/18) 
 Protest CCD, Hospital Clínic (14/11/18) 
 Protest CCD, Hospital Clínic (22/11/18) 
 Protest against Constitutional Court Sentence (19/11/2019) 
 Protest against Constitutional Court Sentence (26/11/2019) 
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4 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
Table 6: Interview data.  
# Pseudonym Org. affiliation 1 Org. affiliation 2 Org. affiliation 3 Org. Level Territorial Gender 
1 Alba & Miquel CDR ANC  Local Montanya F/M 
2 Alex Òmnium Cultural   Regional Regional M 
3 Antoni Òmnium Cultural Convergència  Regional Regional M 
4 Beatriu Òmnium Cultural   Regional Regional F 
5 Berta ANC CDR RA Local Girona F 
6 Carles CDR   Local BCN-El Clot M 
7 Carme ANC   Local, Regional Barcelona F 
8 Emma ANC   Local, Regional Exterior F 
9 Enric ANC   Local, Regional L’Hospitalet de Llobregat M 
10 Ester UxR SEPC CUP Local, Regional BCN, Regional F 
11 Eulàlia N/A RA  Local Local in Gironès F 
12 Gabriel CDR   Local BCN - Poble Sec, Sant-Antoni M 
13 Gerard La Forja JUP Arran Regional Regional M 
14 Irene SEPC   Local Hospital Clínic F 
15 Iris ANC CDR RA Local L’Hospitalet de Llobregat F 
16 Isabel Òmnium Cultural ANC  Regional Regional F 
17 Joana CDR   Local, Intermed Sabadell F 
18 Jordi BxR CDR  Local Santa María del Coll M 
19 Josep BxR CDR  Regional Regional M 
20 Judit ANC   Local, Regional Regional, BCN F 
21 Lluis AMPA CDR ANC Local Gavà M 
22 Montserrat CSC-Intersindical   Regional Regional F 
23 Oriol CUP CDR  Local Fastiada M 
24 Paloma Òmnium Cultural   Local BCN-Gràcia F 
25 Pasqual N/A Convergència ANC Local Fastiada M 
26 Pere UxR ANC Arran Regional Regional M 
27 Quim CDR   Local Tarragona M 
28 Ruben Arran   Local BCN-Sant Gervasi M 
29 Sergi & Dolors CDR   Local Girona M/F 
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